The effect of cultural distance on contracting decisions: The case of executive compensation
This paper focuses on how differences in national culture may relate to cross-country differences in the structure of executive compensation contracts. We know that firms design executive compensation contracts to reduce conflicts of interest between owners and managers. We contend that cultural con...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Stephen Bryan [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2015 |
|---|
| Schlagwörter: |
|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: The journal of corporate finance - Amsterdam : Elsevier, 1994, 33(2015), Seite 180-195 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:33 ; year:2015 ; pages:180-195 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.06.001 |
|---|
| Katalog-ID: |
OLC1959769030 |
|---|
| LEADER | 01000caa a2200265 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | OLC1959769030 | ||
| 003 | DE-627 | ||
| 005 | 20220216013243.0 | ||
| 007 | tu | ||
| 008 | 160206s2015 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.06.001 |2 doi | |
| 028 | 5 | 2 | |a PQ20160617 |
| 035 | |a (DE-627)OLC1959769030 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBVOLC1959769030 | ||
| 035 | |a (PRQ)c1872-bf69b1d9ee1fb4e428bdeb3327086f46670fb790cb1dac5ef586989357973f470 | ||
| 035 | |a (KEY)0236201520150000033000000180effectofculturaldistanceoncontractingdecisionsthec | ||
| 040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | |a eng | ||
| 082 | 0 | 4 | |a 330 |q ZDB |
| 084 | |a 85.00 |2 bkl | ||
| 100 | 0 | |a Stephen Bryan |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 4 | |a The effect of cultural distance on contracting decisions: The case of executive compensation |
| 264 | 1 | |c 2015 | |
| 336 | |a Text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a Band |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 520 | |a This paper focuses on how differences in national culture may relate to cross-country differences in the structure of executive compensation contracts. We know that firms design executive compensation contracts to reduce conflicts of interest between owners and managers. We contend that cultural context affects these conflicts of interest and hypothesize that firms from cultures that are similar (different) should design compensation contracts that are similar (different). To specify cultural context, we calculate cultural distance using value dimensions from Hofstede (1980) and test for a relation between culture and contracting using compensation data for 39 countries from 1996-2009. Our findings indicate that culture is a significant determinant of cross-sectional differences in compensation structures. These results are robust to our use of instrumental variables methodologies (to mitigate concerns of potential omitted variables and reverse causation). By exploring the relatively unexplored impact of national culture on compensation structure, we hope to contribute to a better overall understanding of contracting decisions. | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Conflicts of interest | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Studies | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Employment contracts | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Cultural differences | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Corporate culture | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Executive compensation | |
| 700 | 0 | |a Robert Nash |4 oth | |
| 700 | 0 | |a Ajay Patel |4 oth | |
| 773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t The journal of corporate finance |d Amsterdam : Elsevier, 1994 |g 33(2015), Seite 180-195 |w (DE-627)182237680 |w (DE-600)1189269-9 |w (DE-576)040101339 |x 0929-1199 |7 nnns |
| 773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:33 |g year:2015 |g pages:180-195 |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.06.001 |3 Volltext |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |u http://search.proquest.com/docview/1730764973 |
| 912 | |a GBV_USEFLAG_A | ||
| 912 | |a SYSFLAG_A | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_OLC | ||
| 912 | |a SSG-OLC-WIW | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_26 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_130 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2062 | ||
| 936 | b | k | |a 85.00 |q AVZ |
| 951 | |a AR | ||
| 952 | |d 33 |j 2015 |h 180-195 | ||
| author_variant |
s b sb |
|---|---|
| matchkey_str |
article:09291199:2015----::hefcocluadsacocnrcigeiinteae |
| hierarchy_sort_str |
2015 |
| bklnumber |
85.00 |
| publishDate |
2015 |
| allfields |
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.06.001 doi PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC1959769030 (DE-599)GBVOLC1959769030 (PRQ)c1872-bf69b1d9ee1fb4e428bdeb3327086f46670fb790cb1dac5ef586989357973f470 (KEY)0236201520150000033000000180effectofculturaldistanceoncontractingdecisionsthec DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 ZDB 85.00 bkl Stephen Bryan verfasserin aut The effect of cultural distance on contracting decisions: The case of executive compensation 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier This paper focuses on how differences in national culture may relate to cross-country differences in the structure of executive compensation contracts. We know that firms design executive compensation contracts to reduce conflicts of interest between owners and managers. We contend that cultural context affects these conflicts of interest and hypothesize that firms from cultures that are similar (different) should design compensation contracts that are similar (different). To specify cultural context, we calculate cultural distance using value dimensions from Hofstede (1980) and test for a relation between culture and contracting using compensation data for 39 countries from 1996-2009. Our findings indicate that culture is a significant determinant of cross-sectional differences in compensation structures. These results are robust to our use of instrumental variables methodologies (to mitigate concerns of potential omitted variables and reverse causation). By exploring the relatively unexplored impact of national culture on compensation structure, we hope to contribute to a better overall understanding of contracting decisions. Conflicts of interest Studies Employment contracts Cultural differences Corporate culture Executive compensation Robert Nash oth Ajay Patel oth Enthalten in The journal of corporate finance Amsterdam : Elsevier, 1994 33(2015), Seite 180-195 (DE-627)182237680 (DE-600)1189269-9 (DE-576)040101339 0929-1199 nnns volume:33 year:2015 pages:180-195 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.06.001 Volltext http://search.proquest.com/docview/1730764973 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2062 85.00 AVZ AR 33 2015 180-195 |
| spelling |
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.06.001 doi PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC1959769030 (DE-599)GBVOLC1959769030 (PRQ)c1872-bf69b1d9ee1fb4e428bdeb3327086f46670fb790cb1dac5ef586989357973f470 (KEY)0236201520150000033000000180effectofculturaldistanceoncontractingdecisionsthec DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 ZDB 85.00 bkl Stephen Bryan verfasserin aut The effect of cultural distance on contracting decisions: The case of executive compensation 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier This paper focuses on how differences in national culture may relate to cross-country differences in the structure of executive compensation contracts. We know that firms design executive compensation contracts to reduce conflicts of interest between owners and managers. We contend that cultural context affects these conflicts of interest and hypothesize that firms from cultures that are similar (different) should design compensation contracts that are similar (different). To specify cultural context, we calculate cultural distance using value dimensions from Hofstede (1980) and test for a relation between culture and contracting using compensation data for 39 countries from 1996-2009. Our findings indicate that culture is a significant determinant of cross-sectional differences in compensation structures. These results are robust to our use of instrumental variables methodologies (to mitigate concerns of potential omitted variables and reverse causation). By exploring the relatively unexplored impact of national culture on compensation structure, we hope to contribute to a better overall understanding of contracting decisions. Conflicts of interest Studies Employment contracts Cultural differences Corporate culture Executive compensation Robert Nash oth Ajay Patel oth Enthalten in The journal of corporate finance Amsterdam : Elsevier, 1994 33(2015), Seite 180-195 (DE-627)182237680 (DE-600)1189269-9 (DE-576)040101339 0929-1199 nnns volume:33 year:2015 pages:180-195 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.06.001 Volltext http://search.proquest.com/docview/1730764973 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2062 85.00 AVZ AR 33 2015 180-195 |
| allfields_unstemmed |
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.06.001 doi PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC1959769030 (DE-599)GBVOLC1959769030 (PRQ)c1872-bf69b1d9ee1fb4e428bdeb3327086f46670fb790cb1dac5ef586989357973f470 (KEY)0236201520150000033000000180effectofculturaldistanceoncontractingdecisionsthec DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 ZDB 85.00 bkl Stephen Bryan verfasserin aut The effect of cultural distance on contracting decisions: The case of executive compensation 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier This paper focuses on how differences in national culture may relate to cross-country differences in the structure of executive compensation contracts. We know that firms design executive compensation contracts to reduce conflicts of interest between owners and managers. We contend that cultural context affects these conflicts of interest and hypothesize that firms from cultures that are similar (different) should design compensation contracts that are similar (different). To specify cultural context, we calculate cultural distance using value dimensions from Hofstede (1980) and test for a relation between culture and contracting using compensation data for 39 countries from 1996-2009. Our findings indicate that culture is a significant determinant of cross-sectional differences in compensation structures. These results are robust to our use of instrumental variables methodologies (to mitigate concerns of potential omitted variables and reverse causation). By exploring the relatively unexplored impact of national culture on compensation structure, we hope to contribute to a better overall understanding of contracting decisions. Conflicts of interest Studies Employment contracts Cultural differences Corporate culture Executive compensation Robert Nash oth Ajay Patel oth Enthalten in The journal of corporate finance Amsterdam : Elsevier, 1994 33(2015), Seite 180-195 (DE-627)182237680 (DE-600)1189269-9 (DE-576)040101339 0929-1199 nnns volume:33 year:2015 pages:180-195 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.06.001 Volltext http://search.proquest.com/docview/1730764973 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2062 85.00 AVZ AR 33 2015 180-195 |
| allfieldsGer |
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.06.001 doi PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC1959769030 (DE-599)GBVOLC1959769030 (PRQ)c1872-bf69b1d9ee1fb4e428bdeb3327086f46670fb790cb1dac5ef586989357973f470 (KEY)0236201520150000033000000180effectofculturaldistanceoncontractingdecisionsthec DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 ZDB 85.00 bkl Stephen Bryan verfasserin aut The effect of cultural distance on contracting decisions: The case of executive compensation 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier This paper focuses on how differences in national culture may relate to cross-country differences in the structure of executive compensation contracts. We know that firms design executive compensation contracts to reduce conflicts of interest between owners and managers. We contend that cultural context affects these conflicts of interest and hypothesize that firms from cultures that are similar (different) should design compensation contracts that are similar (different). To specify cultural context, we calculate cultural distance using value dimensions from Hofstede (1980) and test for a relation between culture and contracting using compensation data for 39 countries from 1996-2009. Our findings indicate that culture is a significant determinant of cross-sectional differences in compensation structures. These results are robust to our use of instrumental variables methodologies (to mitigate concerns of potential omitted variables and reverse causation). By exploring the relatively unexplored impact of national culture on compensation structure, we hope to contribute to a better overall understanding of contracting decisions. Conflicts of interest Studies Employment contracts Cultural differences Corporate culture Executive compensation Robert Nash oth Ajay Patel oth Enthalten in The journal of corporate finance Amsterdam : Elsevier, 1994 33(2015), Seite 180-195 (DE-627)182237680 (DE-600)1189269-9 (DE-576)040101339 0929-1199 nnns volume:33 year:2015 pages:180-195 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.06.001 Volltext http://search.proquest.com/docview/1730764973 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2062 85.00 AVZ AR 33 2015 180-195 |
| allfieldsSound |
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.06.001 doi PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC1959769030 (DE-599)GBVOLC1959769030 (PRQ)c1872-bf69b1d9ee1fb4e428bdeb3327086f46670fb790cb1dac5ef586989357973f470 (KEY)0236201520150000033000000180effectofculturaldistanceoncontractingdecisionsthec DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 ZDB 85.00 bkl Stephen Bryan verfasserin aut The effect of cultural distance on contracting decisions: The case of executive compensation 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier This paper focuses on how differences in national culture may relate to cross-country differences in the structure of executive compensation contracts. We know that firms design executive compensation contracts to reduce conflicts of interest between owners and managers. We contend that cultural context affects these conflicts of interest and hypothesize that firms from cultures that are similar (different) should design compensation contracts that are similar (different). To specify cultural context, we calculate cultural distance using value dimensions from Hofstede (1980) and test for a relation between culture and contracting using compensation data for 39 countries from 1996-2009. Our findings indicate that culture is a significant determinant of cross-sectional differences in compensation structures. These results are robust to our use of instrumental variables methodologies (to mitigate concerns of potential omitted variables and reverse causation). By exploring the relatively unexplored impact of national culture on compensation structure, we hope to contribute to a better overall understanding of contracting decisions. Conflicts of interest Studies Employment contracts Cultural differences Corporate culture Executive compensation Robert Nash oth Ajay Patel oth Enthalten in The journal of corporate finance Amsterdam : Elsevier, 1994 33(2015), Seite 180-195 (DE-627)182237680 (DE-600)1189269-9 (DE-576)040101339 0929-1199 nnns volume:33 year:2015 pages:180-195 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.06.001 Volltext http://search.proquest.com/docview/1730764973 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2062 85.00 AVZ AR 33 2015 180-195 |
| language |
English |
| source |
Enthalten in The journal of corporate finance 33(2015), Seite 180-195 volume:33 year:2015 pages:180-195 |
| sourceStr |
Enthalten in The journal of corporate finance 33(2015), Seite 180-195 volume:33 year:2015 pages:180-195 |
| format_phy_str_mv |
Article |
| institution |
findex.gbv.de |
| topic_facet |
Conflicts of interest Studies Employment contracts Cultural differences Corporate culture Executive compensation |
| dewey-raw |
330 |
| isfreeaccess_bool |
false |
| container_title |
The journal of corporate finance |
| authorswithroles_txt_mv |
Stephen Bryan @@aut@@ Robert Nash @@oth@@ Ajay Patel @@oth@@ |
| publishDateDaySort_date |
2015-01-01T00:00:00Z |
| hierarchy_top_id |
182237680 |
| dewey-sort |
3330 |
| id |
OLC1959769030 |
| language_de |
englisch |
| fullrecord |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a2200265 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC1959769030</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20220216013243.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">160206s2015 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.06.001</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="028" ind1="5" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">PQ20160617</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC1959769030</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVOLC1959769030</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(PRQ)c1872-bf69b1d9ee1fb4e428bdeb3327086f46670fb790cb1dac5ef586989357973f470</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(KEY)0236201520150000033000000180effectofculturaldistanceoncontractingdecisionsthec</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">330</subfield><subfield code="q">ZDB</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">85.00</subfield><subfield code="2">bkl</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Stephen Bryan</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">The effect of cultural distance on contracting decisions: The case of executive compensation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2015</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This paper focuses on how differences in national culture may relate to cross-country differences in the structure of executive compensation contracts. We know that firms design executive compensation contracts to reduce conflicts of interest between owners and managers. We contend that cultural context affects these conflicts of interest and hypothesize that firms from cultures that are similar (different) should design compensation contracts that are similar (different). To specify cultural context, we calculate cultural distance using value dimensions from Hofstede (1980) and test for a relation between culture and contracting using compensation data for 39 countries from 1996-2009. Our findings indicate that culture is a significant determinant of cross-sectional differences in compensation structures. These results are robust to our use of instrumental variables methodologies (to mitigate concerns of potential omitted variables and reverse causation). By exploring the relatively unexplored impact of national culture on compensation structure, we hope to contribute to a better overall understanding of contracting decisions.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Conflicts of interest</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Studies</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Employment contracts</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Cultural differences</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Corporate culture</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Executive compensation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Robert Nash</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Ajay Patel</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">The journal of corporate finance</subfield><subfield code="d">Amsterdam : Elsevier, 1994</subfield><subfield code="g">33(2015), Seite 180-195</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)182237680</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)1189269-9</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)040101339</subfield><subfield code="x">0929-1199</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:33</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2015</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:180-195</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.06.001</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">http://search.proquest.com/docview/1730764973</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_OLC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-WIW</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_26</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_130</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2062</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="936" ind1="b" ind2="k"><subfield code="a">85.00</subfield><subfield code="q">AVZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">33</subfield><subfield code="j">2015</subfield><subfield code="h">180-195</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| author |
Stephen Bryan |
| spellingShingle |
Stephen Bryan ddc 330 bkl 85.00 misc Conflicts of interest misc Studies misc Employment contracts misc Cultural differences misc Corporate culture misc Executive compensation The effect of cultural distance on contracting decisions: The case of executive compensation |
| authorStr |
Stephen Bryan |
| ppnlink_with_tag_str_mv |
@@773@@(DE-627)182237680 |
| format |
Article |
| dewey-ones |
330 - Economics |
| delete_txt_mv |
keep |
| author_role |
aut |
| collection |
OLC |
| remote_str |
false |
| illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
| issn |
0929-1199 |
| topic_title |
330 ZDB 85.00 bkl The effect of cultural distance on contracting decisions: The case of executive compensation Conflicts of interest Studies Employment contracts Cultural differences Corporate culture Executive compensation |
| topic |
ddc 330 bkl 85.00 misc Conflicts of interest misc Studies misc Employment contracts misc Cultural differences misc Corporate culture misc Executive compensation |
| topic_unstemmed |
ddc 330 bkl 85.00 misc Conflicts of interest misc Studies misc Employment contracts misc Cultural differences misc Corporate culture misc Executive compensation |
| topic_browse |
ddc 330 bkl 85.00 misc Conflicts of interest misc Studies misc Employment contracts misc Cultural differences misc Corporate culture misc Executive compensation |
| format_facet |
Aufsätze Gedruckte Aufsätze |
| format_main_str_mv |
Text Zeitschrift/Artikel |
| carriertype_str_mv |
nc |
| author2_variant |
r n rn a p ap |
| hierarchy_parent_title |
The journal of corporate finance |
| hierarchy_parent_id |
182237680 |
| dewey-tens |
330 - Economics |
| hierarchy_top_title |
The journal of corporate finance |
| isfreeaccess_txt |
false |
| familylinks_str_mv |
(DE-627)182237680 (DE-600)1189269-9 (DE-576)040101339 |
| title |
The effect of cultural distance on contracting decisions: The case of executive compensation |
| ctrlnum |
(DE-627)OLC1959769030 (DE-599)GBVOLC1959769030 (PRQ)c1872-bf69b1d9ee1fb4e428bdeb3327086f46670fb790cb1dac5ef586989357973f470 (KEY)0236201520150000033000000180effectofculturaldistanceoncontractingdecisionsthec |
| title_full |
The effect of cultural distance on contracting decisions: The case of executive compensation |
| author_sort |
Stephen Bryan |
| journal |
The journal of corporate finance |
| journalStr |
The journal of corporate finance |
| lang_code |
eng |
| isOA_bool |
false |
| dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
| recordtype |
marc |
| publishDateSort |
2015 |
| contenttype_str_mv |
txt |
| container_start_page |
180 |
| author_browse |
Stephen Bryan |
| container_volume |
33 |
| class |
330 ZDB 85.00 bkl |
| format_se |
Aufsätze |
| author-letter |
Stephen Bryan |
| doi_str_mv |
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.06.001 |
| dewey-full |
330 |
| title_sort |
effect of cultural distance on contracting decisions: the case of executive compensation |
| title_auth |
The effect of cultural distance on contracting decisions: The case of executive compensation |
| abstract |
This paper focuses on how differences in national culture may relate to cross-country differences in the structure of executive compensation contracts. We know that firms design executive compensation contracts to reduce conflicts of interest between owners and managers. We contend that cultural context affects these conflicts of interest and hypothesize that firms from cultures that are similar (different) should design compensation contracts that are similar (different). To specify cultural context, we calculate cultural distance using value dimensions from Hofstede (1980) and test for a relation between culture and contracting using compensation data for 39 countries from 1996-2009. Our findings indicate that culture is a significant determinant of cross-sectional differences in compensation structures. These results are robust to our use of instrumental variables methodologies (to mitigate concerns of potential omitted variables and reverse causation). By exploring the relatively unexplored impact of national culture on compensation structure, we hope to contribute to a better overall understanding of contracting decisions. |
| abstractGer |
This paper focuses on how differences in national culture may relate to cross-country differences in the structure of executive compensation contracts. We know that firms design executive compensation contracts to reduce conflicts of interest between owners and managers. We contend that cultural context affects these conflicts of interest and hypothesize that firms from cultures that are similar (different) should design compensation contracts that are similar (different). To specify cultural context, we calculate cultural distance using value dimensions from Hofstede (1980) and test for a relation between culture and contracting using compensation data for 39 countries from 1996-2009. Our findings indicate that culture is a significant determinant of cross-sectional differences in compensation structures. These results are robust to our use of instrumental variables methodologies (to mitigate concerns of potential omitted variables and reverse causation). By exploring the relatively unexplored impact of national culture on compensation structure, we hope to contribute to a better overall understanding of contracting decisions. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
This paper focuses on how differences in national culture may relate to cross-country differences in the structure of executive compensation contracts. We know that firms design executive compensation contracts to reduce conflicts of interest between owners and managers. We contend that cultural context affects these conflicts of interest and hypothesize that firms from cultures that are similar (different) should design compensation contracts that are similar (different). To specify cultural context, we calculate cultural distance using value dimensions from Hofstede (1980) and test for a relation between culture and contracting using compensation data for 39 countries from 1996-2009. Our findings indicate that culture is a significant determinant of cross-sectional differences in compensation structures. These results are robust to our use of instrumental variables methodologies (to mitigate concerns of potential omitted variables and reverse causation). By exploring the relatively unexplored impact of national culture on compensation structure, we hope to contribute to a better overall understanding of contracting decisions. |
| collection_details |
GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2062 |
| title_short |
The effect of cultural distance on contracting decisions: The case of executive compensation |
| url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.06.001 http://search.proquest.com/docview/1730764973 |
| remote_bool |
false |
| author2 |
Robert Nash Ajay Patel |
| author2Str |
Robert Nash Ajay Patel |
| ppnlink |
182237680 |
| mediatype_str_mv |
n |
| isOA_txt |
false |
| hochschulschrift_bool |
false |
| author2_role |
oth oth |
| doi_str |
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.06.001 |
| up_date |
2024-07-03T18:43:53.325Z |
| _version_ |
1803584519093092352 |
| fullrecord_marcxml |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a2200265 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC1959769030</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20220216013243.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">160206s2015 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.06.001</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="028" ind1="5" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">PQ20160617</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC1959769030</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVOLC1959769030</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(PRQ)c1872-bf69b1d9ee1fb4e428bdeb3327086f46670fb790cb1dac5ef586989357973f470</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(KEY)0236201520150000033000000180effectofculturaldistanceoncontractingdecisionsthec</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">330</subfield><subfield code="q">ZDB</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">85.00</subfield><subfield code="2">bkl</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Stephen Bryan</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">The effect of cultural distance on contracting decisions: The case of executive compensation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2015</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This paper focuses on how differences in national culture may relate to cross-country differences in the structure of executive compensation contracts. We know that firms design executive compensation contracts to reduce conflicts of interest between owners and managers. We contend that cultural context affects these conflicts of interest and hypothesize that firms from cultures that are similar (different) should design compensation contracts that are similar (different). To specify cultural context, we calculate cultural distance using value dimensions from Hofstede (1980) and test for a relation between culture and contracting using compensation data for 39 countries from 1996-2009. Our findings indicate that culture is a significant determinant of cross-sectional differences in compensation structures. These results are robust to our use of instrumental variables methodologies (to mitigate concerns of potential omitted variables and reverse causation). By exploring the relatively unexplored impact of national culture on compensation structure, we hope to contribute to a better overall understanding of contracting decisions.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Conflicts of interest</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Studies</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Employment contracts</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Cultural differences</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Corporate culture</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Executive compensation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Robert Nash</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Ajay Patel</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">The journal of corporate finance</subfield><subfield code="d">Amsterdam : Elsevier, 1994</subfield><subfield code="g">33(2015), Seite 180-195</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)182237680</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)1189269-9</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)040101339</subfield><subfield code="x">0929-1199</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:33</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2015</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:180-195</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.06.001</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">http://search.proquest.com/docview/1730764973</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_OLC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-WIW</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_26</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_130</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2062</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="936" ind1="b" ind2="k"><subfield code="a">85.00</subfield><subfield code="q">AVZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">33</subfield><subfield code="j">2015</subfield><subfield code="h">180-195</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| score |
7.4004354 |