Can Shareholder Litigation Discipline CEO Bonuses in the Financial Sector? The Role of Securities Class Actions
There is evidence that, especially in the financial sector, CEOs are rewarded with very high bonuses. This phenomenon vividly contrasts with the alleged executive misbehaviour which fueled securities litigation during the recent financial turmoil. This paper empirically investigates the relationship...
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Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Dalla Pellegrina, Lucia [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2016 |
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| Rechteinformationen: |
Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Economic notes - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1972, 45(2016), 1, Seite 3-36 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:45 ; year:2016 ; number:1 ; pages:3-36 |
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10.1111/ecno.12050 |
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| 520 | |a There is evidence that, especially in the financial sector, CEOs are rewarded with very high bonuses. This phenomenon vividly contrasts with the alleged executive misbehaviour which fueled securities litigation during the recent financial turmoil. This paper empirically investigates the relationship between securities class actions (SCAs) and the growth of CEO bonuses in the period 1999-2010 for financial intermediaries included in the S&P500 index. An instrumental variable related to US Federal Courts' Guidelines is exploited to address endogeneity issues. The analysis shows that SCAs are likely to moderate the dynamics of bonuses. This result supports the idea that private enforcement provided by securities litigation works as a complementarity tool of corporate governance aimed at 'shielding' small shareholders and other investors against inefficient risk undertaking which is in turn reflected in sizeable executive bonuses. | ||
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10.1111/ecno.12050 doi PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC196069054X (DE-599)GBVOLC196069054X (PRQ)c1590-1046765b232104077eb35283823bb105ab92f6e03f4c11cc41b35766a1e0854b0 (KEY)0361816120160000045000100003canshareholderlitigationdisciplineceobonusesinthef DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 300 330 DNB Dalla Pellegrina, Lucia verfasserin aut Can Shareholder Litigation Discipline CEO Bonuses in the Financial Sector? The Role of Securities Class Actions 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier There is evidence that, especially in the financial sector, CEOs are rewarded with very high bonuses. This phenomenon vividly contrasts with the alleged executive misbehaviour which fueled securities litigation during the recent financial turmoil. This paper empirically investigates the relationship between securities class actions (SCAs) and the growth of CEO bonuses in the period 1999-2010 for financial intermediaries included in the S&P500 index. An instrumental variable related to US Federal Courts' Guidelines is exploited to address endogeneity issues. The analysis shows that SCAs are likely to moderate the dynamics of bonuses. This result supports the idea that private enforcement provided by securities litigation works as a complementarity tool of corporate governance aimed at 'shielding' small shareholders and other investors against inefficient risk undertaking which is in turn reflected in sizeable executive bonuses. Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA Bonuses Economic theory Chief executive officers Executive compensation Class action lawsuits Operations research Studies Saraceno, Margherita oth Enthalten in Economic notes Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1972 45(2016), 1, Seite 3-36 (DE-627)166451606 (DE-600)194032-6 (DE-576)014807661 0391-5026 nnns volume:45 year:2016 number:1 pages:3-36 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecno.12050 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecno.12050/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1755264199 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_60 AR 45 2016 1 3-36 |
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10.1111/ecno.12050 doi PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC196069054X (DE-599)GBVOLC196069054X (PRQ)c1590-1046765b232104077eb35283823bb105ab92f6e03f4c11cc41b35766a1e0854b0 (KEY)0361816120160000045000100003canshareholderlitigationdisciplineceobonusesinthef DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 300 330 DNB Dalla Pellegrina, Lucia verfasserin aut Can Shareholder Litigation Discipline CEO Bonuses in the Financial Sector? The Role of Securities Class Actions 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier There is evidence that, especially in the financial sector, CEOs are rewarded with very high bonuses. This phenomenon vividly contrasts with the alleged executive misbehaviour which fueled securities litigation during the recent financial turmoil. This paper empirically investigates the relationship between securities class actions (SCAs) and the growth of CEO bonuses in the period 1999-2010 for financial intermediaries included in the S&P500 index. An instrumental variable related to US Federal Courts' Guidelines is exploited to address endogeneity issues. The analysis shows that SCAs are likely to moderate the dynamics of bonuses. This result supports the idea that private enforcement provided by securities litigation works as a complementarity tool of corporate governance aimed at 'shielding' small shareholders and other investors against inefficient risk undertaking which is in turn reflected in sizeable executive bonuses. Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA Bonuses Economic theory Chief executive officers Executive compensation Class action lawsuits Operations research Studies Saraceno, Margherita oth Enthalten in Economic notes Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1972 45(2016), 1, Seite 3-36 (DE-627)166451606 (DE-600)194032-6 (DE-576)014807661 0391-5026 nnns volume:45 year:2016 number:1 pages:3-36 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecno.12050 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecno.12050/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1755264199 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_60 AR 45 2016 1 3-36 |
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10.1111/ecno.12050 doi PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC196069054X (DE-599)GBVOLC196069054X (PRQ)c1590-1046765b232104077eb35283823bb105ab92f6e03f4c11cc41b35766a1e0854b0 (KEY)0361816120160000045000100003canshareholderlitigationdisciplineceobonusesinthef DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 300 330 DNB Dalla Pellegrina, Lucia verfasserin aut Can Shareholder Litigation Discipline CEO Bonuses in the Financial Sector? The Role of Securities Class Actions 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier There is evidence that, especially in the financial sector, CEOs are rewarded with very high bonuses. This phenomenon vividly contrasts with the alleged executive misbehaviour which fueled securities litigation during the recent financial turmoil. This paper empirically investigates the relationship between securities class actions (SCAs) and the growth of CEO bonuses in the period 1999-2010 for financial intermediaries included in the S&P500 index. An instrumental variable related to US Federal Courts' Guidelines is exploited to address endogeneity issues. The analysis shows that SCAs are likely to moderate the dynamics of bonuses. This result supports the idea that private enforcement provided by securities litigation works as a complementarity tool of corporate governance aimed at 'shielding' small shareholders and other investors against inefficient risk undertaking which is in turn reflected in sizeable executive bonuses. Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA Bonuses Economic theory Chief executive officers Executive compensation Class action lawsuits Operations research Studies Saraceno, Margherita oth Enthalten in Economic notes Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1972 45(2016), 1, Seite 3-36 (DE-627)166451606 (DE-600)194032-6 (DE-576)014807661 0391-5026 nnns volume:45 year:2016 number:1 pages:3-36 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecno.12050 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecno.12050/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1755264199 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_60 AR 45 2016 1 3-36 |
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There is evidence that, especially in the financial sector, CEOs are rewarded with very high bonuses. This phenomenon vividly contrasts with the alleged executive misbehaviour which fueled securities litigation during the recent financial turmoil. This paper empirically investigates the relationship between securities class actions (SCAs) and the growth of CEO bonuses in the period 1999-2010 for financial intermediaries included in the S&P500 index. An instrumental variable related to US Federal Courts' Guidelines is exploited to address endogeneity issues. The analysis shows that SCAs are likely to moderate the dynamics of bonuses. This result supports the idea that private enforcement provided by securities litigation works as a complementarity tool of corporate governance aimed at 'shielding' small shareholders and other investors against inefficient risk undertaking which is in turn reflected in sizeable executive bonuses. |
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There is evidence that, especially in the financial sector, CEOs are rewarded with very high bonuses. This phenomenon vividly contrasts with the alleged executive misbehaviour which fueled securities litigation during the recent financial turmoil. This paper empirically investigates the relationship between securities class actions (SCAs) and the growth of CEO bonuses in the period 1999-2010 for financial intermediaries included in the S&P500 index. An instrumental variable related to US Federal Courts' Guidelines is exploited to address endogeneity issues. The analysis shows that SCAs are likely to moderate the dynamics of bonuses. This result supports the idea that private enforcement provided by securities litigation works as a complementarity tool of corporate governance aimed at 'shielding' small shareholders and other investors against inefficient risk undertaking which is in turn reflected in sizeable executive bonuses. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
There is evidence that, especially in the financial sector, CEOs are rewarded with very high bonuses. This phenomenon vividly contrasts with the alleged executive misbehaviour which fueled securities litigation during the recent financial turmoil. This paper empirically investigates the relationship between securities class actions (SCAs) and the growth of CEO bonuses in the period 1999-2010 for financial intermediaries included in the S&P500 index. An instrumental variable related to US Federal Courts' Guidelines is exploited to address endogeneity issues. The analysis shows that SCAs are likely to moderate the dynamics of bonuses. This result supports the idea that private enforcement provided by securities litigation works as a complementarity tool of corporate governance aimed at 'shielding' small shareholders and other investors against inefficient risk undertaking which is in turn reflected in sizeable executive bonuses. |
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| title_short |
Can Shareholder Litigation Discipline CEO Bonuses in the Financial Sector? The Role of Securities Class Actions |
| url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecno.12050 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecno.12050/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1755264199 |
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| author2 |
Saraceno, Margherita |
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Saraceno, Margherita |
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| doi_str |
10.1111/ecno.12050 |
| up_date |
2024-07-03T22:12:06.821Z |
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