UPDATE: Gulfstream IV at BED
Investigators reviewed the CVR and FDR data (see sidebar) and determined that the airplane's ground roll began about 49 sec. before the end of the CVR recording. The CVR captured callouts of 80 kt., VI and rotate, and comments concerning aircraft control. FDR data indicated the airplane reached...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Richard N Aarons [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2015 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Business and commercial aviation - New York, NY : McGraw Hill, 1958, (2015), Seite 48 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
year:2015 ; pages:48 |
| Links: |
|---|
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OLC1964266351 |
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| 520 | |a Investigators reviewed the CVR and FDR data (see sidebar) and determined that the airplane's ground roll began about 49 sec. before the end of the CVR recording. The CVR captured callouts of 80 kt., VI and rotate, and comments concerning aircraft control. FDR data indicated the airplane reached a maximum speed of 165 kt. during the takeoff roll and did not lift off the runway. FDR data further indicated thrust reversers were deployed and wheel brake pressures increased as the airplane decelerated. The FDR data ended about 7 sec. after thrust reverser deployment, with the airplane at about 100 kt. (There is an approximate 7-sec. lag in the FDR data write function.) Both pilots were highly experienced and well-respected by colleagues. The 44-year-old left-seat pilot held an ATP and had accumulated 11,250 hr. of total flight experience. He was listed as PIC. He held type ratings for the BE-400, G-1159 (Gulfstream II/III), LR-Jet, MU300 and GIV airplanes. The PIC also held a flight instructor certificate with singleengine airplane and instrument airplane ratings. His most-recent flight instructor certificate was issued/renewed on Nov. 13, 2012. The PIC?s most recent training event was completed on Sept. 17,2013, at the FlightSafety International Philadelphia/Wilmington Learning Center. The PIC had been associated with the accident airplane owners for approximately 12 years, about 8.5 of those in the GIV. The SIC pilot at the time of the accident acted as the chief pilot and director of maintenance. He coordinated pilot training and maintenance activity for the accident airplane. The accident pilots normally flew the accident airplane as a crew. Contract pilots were used only occasionally when one of the accident pilots was on vacation or otherwise not available. The accident pilots customarily traded seats, left and right, between flights as both pilots were qualified in the airplane AFM checklists call for the gust locks to be disengaged before engine start that applies hydraulic pressure to the flight control system. The AFM instructs pilots to shut down engines before attempting to release the gust locks in the event that they accidentally start engines before the gust lock is disengaged. Some Gulfstream pilots report that they can disengage the control locks after engine start by momentarily pulling the flight power shutoff handle rather than doing a shutdown and restart. Pulling the flight power handle removes hydraulic power from the flight controls. The flight power handle was found in the ?pulled? position in the accident airplane - an indication that the crew may have attempted to disengage a stuck gust lock by unloading hydraulic pressure. | ||
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PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC1964266351 (DE-599)GBVOLC1964266351 (PRQ)p869-d09003d9b2343bdf7776e6e30a4a27dd7cb0cba5cec0e2ca323636810a6419fd0 (KEY)0028129820150000000000000048updategulfstreamivatbed DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 380 ZDB Richard N Aarons verfasserin aut UPDATE: Gulfstream IV at BED 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier Investigators reviewed the CVR and FDR data (see sidebar) and determined that the airplane's ground roll began about 49 sec. before the end of the CVR recording. The CVR captured callouts of 80 kt., VI and rotate, and comments concerning aircraft control. FDR data indicated the airplane reached a maximum speed of 165 kt. during the takeoff roll and did not lift off the runway. FDR data further indicated thrust reversers were deployed and wheel brake pressures increased as the airplane decelerated. The FDR data ended about 7 sec. after thrust reverser deployment, with the airplane at about 100 kt. (There is an approximate 7-sec. lag in the FDR data write function.) Both pilots were highly experienced and well-respected by colleagues. The 44-year-old left-seat pilot held an ATP and had accumulated 11,250 hr. of total flight experience. He was listed as PIC. He held type ratings for the BE-400, G-1159 (Gulfstream II/III), LR-Jet, MU300 and GIV airplanes. The PIC also held a flight instructor certificate with singleengine airplane and instrument airplane ratings. His most-recent flight instructor certificate was issued/renewed on Nov. 13, 2012. The PIC?s most recent training event was completed on Sept. 17,2013, at the FlightSafety International Philadelphia/Wilmington Learning Center. The PIC had been associated with the accident airplane owners for approximately 12 years, about 8.5 of those in the GIV. The SIC pilot at the time of the accident acted as the chief pilot and director of maintenance. He coordinated pilot training and maintenance activity for the accident airplane. The accident pilots normally flew the accident airplane as a crew. Contract pilots were used only occasionally when one of the accident pilots was on vacation or otherwise not available. The accident pilots customarily traded seats, left and right, between flights as both pilots were qualified in the airplane AFM checklists call for the gust locks to be disengaged before engine start that applies hydraulic pressure to the flight control system. The AFM instructs pilots to shut down engines before attempting to release the gust locks in the event that they accidentally start engines before the gust lock is disengaged. Some Gulfstream pilots report that they can disengage the control locks after engine start by momentarily pulling the flight power shutoff handle rather than doing a shutdown and restart. Pulling the flight power handle removes hydraulic power from the flight controls. The flight power handle was found in the ?pulled? position in the accident airplane - an indication that the crew may have attempted to disengage a stuck gust lock by unloading hydraulic pressure. Deaths Investigations United States--US Aircraft accidents & safety Aircraft industry Enthalten in Business and commercial aviation New York, NY : McGraw Hill, 1958 (2015), Seite 48 (DE-627)130585084 (DE-600)789871-X (DE-576)067289622 0007-6570 nnns year:2015 pages:48 http://search.proquest.com/docview/1750422279 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-TEC AR 2015 48 |
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PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC1964266351 (DE-599)GBVOLC1964266351 (PRQ)p869-d09003d9b2343bdf7776e6e30a4a27dd7cb0cba5cec0e2ca323636810a6419fd0 (KEY)0028129820150000000000000048updategulfstreamivatbed DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 380 ZDB Richard N Aarons verfasserin aut UPDATE: Gulfstream IV at BED 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier Investigators reviewed the CVR and FDR data (see sidebar) and determined that the airplane's ground roll began about 49 sec. before the end of the CVR recording. The CVR captured callouts of 80 kt., VI and rotate, and comments concerning aircraft control. FDR data indicated the airplane reached a maximum speed of 165 kt. during the takeoff roll and did not lift off the runway. FDR data further indicated thrust reversers were deployed and wheel brake pressures increased as the airplane decelerated. The FDR data ended about 7 sec. after thrust reverser deployment, with the airplane at about 100 kt. (There is an approximate 7-sec. lag in the FDR data write function.) Both pilots were highly experienced and well-respected by colleagues. The 44-year-old left-seat pilot held an ATP and had accumulated 11,250 hr. of total flight experience. He was listed as PIC. He held type ratings for the BE-400, G-1159 (Gulfstream II/III), LR-Jet, MU300 and GIV airplanes. The PIC also held a flight instructor certificate with singleengine airplane and instrument airplane ratings. His most-recent flight instructor certificate was issued/renewed on Nov. 13, 2012. The PIC?s most recent training event was completed on Sept. 17,2013, at the FlightSafety International Philadelphia/Wilmington Learning Center. The PIC had been associated with the accident airplane owners for approximately 12 years, about 8.5 of those in the GIV. The SIC pilot at the time of the accident acted as the chief pilot and director of maintenance. He coordinated pilot training and maintenance activity for the accident airplane. The accident pilots normally flew the accident airplane as a crew. Contract pilots were used only occasionally when one of the accident pilots was on vacation or otherwise not available. The accident pilots customarily traded seats, left and right, between flights as both pilots were qualified in the airplane AFM checklists call for the gust locks to be disengaged before engine start that applies hydraulic pressure to the flight control system. The AFM instructs pilots to shut down engines before attempting to release the gust locks in the event that they accidentally start engines before the gust lock is disengaged. Some Gulfstream pilots report that they can disengage the control locks after engine start by momentarily pulling the flight power shutoff handle rather than doing a shutdown and restart. Pulling the flight power handle removes hydraulic power from the flight controls. The flight power handle was found in the ?pulled? position in the accident airplane - an indication that the crew may have attempted to disengage a stuck gust lock by unloading hydraulic pressure. Deaths Investigations United States--US Aircraft accidents & safety Aircraft industry Enthalten in Business and commercial aviation New York, NY : McGraw Hill, 1958 (2015), Seite 48 (DE-627)130585084 (DE-600)789871-X (DE-576)067289622 0007-6570 nnns year:2015 pages:48 http://search.proquest.com/docview/1750422279 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-TEC AR 2015 48 |
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PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC1964266351 (DE-599)GBVOLC1964266351 (PRQ)p869-d09003d9b2343bdf7776e6e30a4a27dd7cb0cba5cec0e2ca323636810a6419fd0 (KEY)0028129820150000000000000048updategulfstreamivatbed DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 380 ZDB Richard N Aarons verfasserin aut UPDATE: Gulfstream IV at BED 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier Investigators reviewed the CVR and FDR data (see sidebar) and determined that the airplane's ground roll began about 49 sec. before the end of the CVR recording. The CVR captured callouts of 80 kt., VI and rotate, and comments concerning aircraft control. FDR data indicated the airplane reached a maximum speed of 165 kt. during the takeoff roll and did not lift off the runway. FDR data further indicated thrust reversers were deployed and wheel brake pressures increased as the airplane decelerated. The FDR data ended about 7 sec. after thrust reverser deployment, with the airplane at about 100 kt. (There is an approximate 7-sec. lag in the FDR data write function.) Both pilots were highly experienced and well-respected by colleagues. The 44-year-old left-seat pilot held an ATP and had accumulated 11,250 hr. of total flight experience. He was listed as PIC. He held type ratings for the BE-400, G-1159 (Gulfstream II/III), LR-Jet, MU300 and GIV airplanes. The PIC also held a flight instructor certificate with singleengine airplane and instrument airplane ratings. His most-recent flight instructor certificate was issued/renewed on Nov. 13, 2012. The PIC?s most recent training event was completed on Sept. 17,2013, at the FlightSafety International Philadelphia/Wilmington Learning Center. The PIC had been associated with the accident airplane owners for approximately 12 years, about 8.5 of those in the GIV. The SIC pilot at the time of the accident acted as the chief pilot and director of maintenance. He coordinated pilot training and maintenance activity for the accident airplane. The accident pilots normally flew the accident airplane as a crew. Contract pilots were used only occasionally when one of the accident pilots was on vacation or otherwise not available. The accident pilots customarily traded seats, left and right, between flights as both pilots were qualified in the airplane AFM checklists call for the gust locks to be disengaged before engine start that applies hydraulic pressure to the flight control system. The AFM instructs pilots to shut down engines before attempting to release the gust locks in the event that they accidentally start engines before the gust lock is disengaged. Some Gulfstream pilots report that they can disengage the control locks after engine start by momentarily pulling the flight power shutoff handle rather than doing a shutdown and restart. Pulling the flight power handle removes hydraulic power from the flight controls. The flight power handle was found in the ?pulled? position in the accident airplane - an indication that the crew may have attempted to disengage a stuck gust lock by unloading hydraulic pressure. Deaths Investigations United States--US Aircraft accidents & safety Aircraft industry Enthalten in Business and commercial aviation New York, NY : McGraw Hill, 1958 (2015), Seite 48 (DE-627)130585084 (DE-600)789871-X (DE-576)067289622 0007-6570 nnns year:2015 pages:48 http://search.proquest.com/docview/1750422279 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-TEC AR 2015 48 |
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PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC1964266351 (DE-599)GBVOLC1964266351 (PRQ)p869-d09003d9b2343bdf7776e6e30a4a27dd7cb0cba5cec0e2ca323636810a6419fd0 (KEY)0028129820150000000000000048updategulfstreamivatbed DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 380 ZDB Richard N Aarons verfasserin aut UPDATE: Gulfstream IV at BED 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier Investigators reviewed the CVR and FDR data (see sidebar) and determined that the airplane's ground roll began about 49 sec. before the end of the CVR recording. The CVR captured callouts of 80 kt., VI and rotate, and comments concerning aircraft control. FDR data indicated the airplane reached a maximum speed of 165 kt. during the takeoff roll and did not lift off the runway. FDR data further indicated thrust reversers were deployed and wheel brake pressures increased as the airplane decelerated. The FDR data ended about 7 sec. after thrust reverser deployment, with the airplane at about 100 kt. (There is an approximate 7-sec. lag in the FDR data write function.) Both pilots were highly experienced and well-respected by colleagues. The 44-year-old left-seat pilot held an ATP and had accumulated 11,250 hr. of total flight experience. He was listed as PIC. He held type ratings for the BE-400, G-1159 (Gulfstream II/III), LR-Jet, MU300 and GIV airplanes. The PIC also held a flight instructor certificate with singleengine airplane and instrument airplane ratings. His most-recent flight instructor certificate was issued/renewed on Nov. 13, 2012. The PIC?s most recent training event was completed on Sept. 17,2013, at the FlightSafety International Philadelphia/Wilmington Learning Center. The PIC had been associated with the accident airplane owners for approximately 12 years, about 8.5 of those in the GIV. The SIC pilot at the time of the accident acted as the chief pilot and director of maintenance. He coordinated pilot training and maintenance activity for the accident airplane. The accident pilots normally flew the accident airplane as a crew. Contract pilots were used only occasionally when one of the accident pilots was on vacation or otherwise not available. The accident pilots customarily traded seats, left and right, between flights as both pilots were qualified in the airplane AFM checklists call for the gust locks to be disengaged before engine start that applies hydraulic pressure to the flight control system. The AFM instructs pilots to shut down engines before attempting to release the gust locks in the event that they accidentally start engines before the gust lock is disengaged. Some Gulfstream pilots report that they can disengage the control locks after engine start by momentarily pulling the flight power shutoff handle rather than doing a shutdown and restart. Pulling the flight power handle removes hydraulic power from the flight controls. The flight power handle was found in the ?pulled? position in the accident airplane - an indication that the crew may have attempted to disengage a stuck gust lock by unloading hydraulic pressure. Deaths Investigations United States--US Aircraft accidents & safety Aircraft industry Enthalten in Business and commercial aviation New York, NY : McGraw Hill, 1958 (2015), Seite 48 (DE-627)130585084 (DE-600)789871-X (DE-576)067289622 0007-6570 nnns year:2015 pages:48 http://search.proquest.com/docview/1750422279 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-TEC AR 2015 48 |
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PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC1964266351 (DE-599)GBVOLC1964266351 (PRQ)p869-d09003d9b2343bdf7776e6e30a4a27dd7cb0cba5cec0e2ca323636810a6419fd0 (KEY)0028129820150000000000000048updategulfstreamivatbed DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 380 ZDB Richard N Aarons verfasserin aut UPDATE: Gulfstream IV at BED 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier Investigators reviewed the CVR and FDR data (see sidebar) and determined that the airplane's ground roll began about 49 sec. before the end of the CVR recording. The CVR captured callouts of 80 kt., VI and rotate, and comments concerning aircraft control. FDR data indicated the airplane reached a maximum speed of 165 kt. during the takeoff roll and did not lift off the runway. FDR data further indicated thrust reversers were deployed and wheel brake pressures increased as the airplane decelerated. The FDR data ended about 7 sec. after thrust reverser deployment, with the airplane at about 100 kt. (There is an approximate 7-sec. lag in the FDR data write function.) Both pilots were highly experienced and well-respected by colleagues. The 44-year-old left-seat pilot held an ATP and had accumulated 11,250 hr. of total flight experience. He was listed as PIC. He held type ratings for the BE-400, G-1159 (Gulfstream II/III), LR-Jet, MU300 and GIV airplanes. The PIC also held a flight instructor certificate with singleengine airplane and instrument airplane ratings. His most-recent flight instructor certificate was issued/renewed on Nov. 13, 2012. The PIC?s most recent training event was completed on Sept. 17,2013, at the FlightSafety International Philadelphia/Wilmington Learning Center. The PIC had been associated with the accident airplane owners for approximately 12 years, about 8.5 of those in the GIV. The SIC pilot at the time of the accident acted as the chief pilot and director of maintenance. He coordinated pilot training and maintenance activity for the accident airplane. The accident pilots normally flew the accident airplane as a crew. Contract pilots were used only occasionally when one of the accident pilots was on vacation or otherwise not available. The accident pilots customarily traded seats, left and right, between flights as both pilots were qualified in the airplane AFM checklists call for the gust locks to be disengaged before engine start that applies hydraulic pressure to the flight control system. The AFM instructs pilots to shut down engines before attempting to release the gust locks in the event that they accidentally start engines before the gust lock is disengaged. Some Gulfstream pilots report that they can disengage the control locks after engine start by momentarily pulling the flight power shutoff handle rather than doing a shutdown and restart. Pulling the flight power handle removes hydraulic power from the flight controls. The flight power handle was found in the ?pulled? position in the accident airplane - an indication that the crew may have attempted to disengage a stuck gust lock by unloading hydraulic pressure. Deaths Investigations United States--US Aircraft accidents & safety Aircraft industry Enthalten in Business and commercial aviation New York, NY : McGraw Hill, 1958 (2015), Seite 48 (DE-627)130585084 (DE-600)789871-X (DE-576)067289622 0007-6570 nnns year:2015 pages:48 http://search.proquest.com/docview/1750422279 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-TEC AR 2015 48 |
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380 ZDB UPDATE: Gulfstream IV at BED Deaths Investigations United States--US Aircraft accidents & safety Aircraft industry |
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UPDATE: Gulfstream IV at BED |
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UPDATE: Gulfstream IV at BED |
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UPDATE: Gulfstream IV at BED |
| abstract |
Investigators reviewed the CVR and FDR data (see sidebar) and determined that the airplane's ground roll began about 49 sec. before the end of the CVR recording. The CVR captured callouts of 80 kt., VI and rotate, and comments concerning aircraft control. FDR data indicated the airplane reached a maximum speed of 165 kt. during the takeoff roll and did not lift off the runway. FDR data further indicated thrust reversers were deployed and wheel brake pressures increased as the airplane decelerated. The FDR data ended about 7 sec. after thrust reverser deployment, with the airplane at about 100 kt. (There is an approximate 7-sec. lag in the FDR data write function.) Both pilots were highly experienced and well-respected by colleagues. The 44-year-old left-seat pilot held an ATP and had accumulated 11,250 hr. of total flight experience. He was listed as PIC. He held type ratings for the BE-400, G-1159 (Gulfstream II/III), LR-Jet, MU300 and GIV airplanes. The PIC also held a flight instructor certificate with singleengine airplane and instrument airplane ratings. His most-recent flight instructor certificate was issued/renewed on Nov. 13, 2012. The PIC?s most recent training event was completed on Sept. 17,2013, at the FlightSafety International Philadelphia/Wilmington Learning Center. The PIC had been associated with the accident airplane owners for approximately 12 years, about 8.5 of those in the GIV. The SIC pilot at the time of the accident acted as the chief pilot and director of maintenance. He coordinated pilot training and maintenance activity for the accident airplane. The accident pilots normally flew the accident airplane as a crew. Contract pilots were used only occasionally when one of the accident pilots was on vacation or otherwise not available. The accident pilots customarily traded seats, left and right, between flights as both pilots were qualified in the airplane AFM checklists call for the gust locks to be disengaged before engine start that applies hydraulic pressure to the flight control system. The AFM instructs pilots to shut down engines before attempting to release the gust locks in the event that they accidentally start engines before the gust lock is disengaged. Some Gulfstream pilots report that they can disengage the control locks after engine start by momentarily pulling the flight power shutoff handle rather than doing a shutdown and restart. Pulling the flight power handle removes hydraulic power from the flight controls. The flight power handle was found in the ?pulled? position in the accident airplane - an indication that the crew may have attempted to disengage a stuck gust lock by unloading hydraulic pressure. |
| abstractGer |
Investigators reviewed the CVR and FDR data (see sidebar) and determined that the airplane's ground roll began about 49 sec. before the end of the CVR recording. The CVR captured callouts of 80 kt., VI and rotate, and comments concerning aircraft control. FDR data indicated the airplane reached a maximum speed of 165 kt. during the takeoff roll and did not lift off the runway. FDR data further indicated thrust reversers were deployed and wheel brake pressures increased as the airplane decelerated. The FDR data ended about 7 sec. after thrust reverser deployment, with the airplane at about 100 kt. (There is an approximate 7-sec. lag in the FDR data write function.) Both pilots were highly experienced and well-respected by colleagues. The 44-year-old left-seat pilot held an ATP and had accumulated 11,250 hr. of total flight experience. He was listed as PIC. He held type ratings for the BE-400, G-1159 (Gulfstream II/III), LR-Jet, MU300 and GIV airplanes. The PIC also held a flight instructor certificate with singleengine airplane and instrument airplane ratings. His most-recent flight instructor certificate was issued/renewed on Nov. 13, 2012. The PIC?s most recent training event was completed on Sept. 17,2013, at the FlightSafety International Philadelphia/Wilmington Learning Center. The PIC had been associated with the accident airplane owners for approximately 12 years, about 8.5 of those in the GIV. The SIC pilot at the time of the accident acted as the chief pilot and director of maintenance. He coordinated pilot training and maintenance activity for the accident airplane. The accident pilots normally flew the accident airplane as a crew. Contract pilots were used only occasionally when one of the accident pilots was on vacation or otherwise not available. The accident pilots customarily traded seats, left and right, between flights as both pilots were qualified in the airplane AFM checklists call for the gust locks to be disengaged before engine start that applies hydraulic pressure to the flight control system. The AFM instructs pilots to shut down engines before attempting to release the gust locks in the event that they accidentally start engines before the gust lock is disengaged. Some Gulfstream pilots report that they can disengage the control locks after engine start by momentarily pulling the flight power shutoff handle rather than doing a shutdown and restart. Pulling the flight power handle removes hydraulic power from the flight controls. The flight power handle was found in the ?pulled? position in the accident airplane - an indication that the crew may have attempted to disengage a stuck gust lock by unloading hydraulic pressure. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Investigators reviewed the CVR and FDR data (see sidebar) and determined that the airplane's ground roll began about 49 sec. before the end of the CVR recording. The CVR captured callouts of 80 kt., VI and rotate, and comments concerning aircraft control. FDR data indicated the airplane reached a maximum speed of 165 kt. during the takeoff roll and did not lift off the runway. FDR data further indicated thrust reversers were deployed and wheel brake pressures increased as the airplane decelerated. The FDR data ended about 7 sec. after thrust reverser deployment, with the airplane at about 100 kt. (There is an approximate 7-sec. lag in the FDR data write function.) Both pilots were highly experienced and well-respected by colleagues. The 44-year-old left-seat pilot held an ATP and had accumulated 11,250 hr. of total flight experience. He was listed as PIC. He held type ratings for the BE-400, G-1159 (Gulfstream II/III), LR-Jet, MU300 and GIV airplanes. The PIC also held a flight instructor certificate with singleengine airplane and instrument airplane ratings. His most-recent flight instructor certificate was issued/renewed on Nov. 13, 2012. The PIC?s most recent training event was completed on Sept. 17,2013, at the FlightSafety International Philadelphia/Wilmington Learning Center. The PIC had been associated with the accident airplane owners for approximately 12 years, about 8.5 of those in the GIV. The SIC pilot at the time of the accident acted as the chief pilot and director of maintenance. He coordinated pilot training and maintenance activity for the accident airplane. The accident pilots normally flew the accident airplane as a crew. Contract pilots were used only occasionally when one of the accident pilots was on vacation or otherwise not available. The accident pilots customarily traded seats, left and right, between flights as both pilots were qualified in the airplane AFM checklists call for the gust locks to be disengaged before engine start that applies hydraulic pressure to the flight control system. The AFM instructs pilots to shut down engines before attempting to release the gust locks in the event that they accidentally start engines before the gust lock is disengaged. Some Gulfstream pilots report that they can disengage the control locks after engine start by momentarily pulling the flight power shutoff handle rather than doing a shutdown and restart. Pulling the flight power handle removes hydraulic power from the flight controls. The flight power handle was found in the ?pulled? position in the accident airplane - an indication that the crew may have attempted to disengage a stuck gust lock by unloading hydraulic pressure. |
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UPDATE: Gulfstream IV at BED |
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