Conflicts of interest distort public evaluations: Evidence from NCAA football coaches
This paper investigates how private incentives distort public evaluations. Exploiting a unique empirical setting, we study the influence of conflicts of interest among NCAA football coaches participating in the USA Today Coaches Poll of the top 25 teams from 2005 to 2010. The research design takes a...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Matthew J Kotchen [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2014 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Journal of economic behavior & organization - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1980, 107(2014), Seite 51-63 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:107 ; year:2014 ; pages:51-63 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.jebo.2014.07.018 |
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| 520 | |a This paper investigates how private incentives distort public evaluations. Exploiting a unique empirical setting, we study the influence of conflicts of interest among NCAA football coaches participating in the USA Today Coaches Poll of the top 25 teams from 2005 to 2010. The research design takes advantage of a situation where many agents are evaluating the same thing, private incentives are clearly defined and measurable, and there exists an alternative source of computer rankings that is bias free. We find evidence that coaches distort their rankings to reflect their own financial and reputational interests. Most importantly, we find that coaches show more favoritism toward their own team when they stand to gain more financially and toward other teams when it generates higher direct financial payoffs for their own university. Additionally, coaches boost the ranking of their own team and teams from their same athletic conference, even after accounting for direct financial incentives. Coaches also rank teams they defeated more favorably, thereby making their own team look better. | ||
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| 650 | 4 | |a Coaches & managers | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Conflicts of interest | |
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10.1016/j.jebo.2014.07.018 doi PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC1968222626 (DE-599)GBVOLC1968222626 (PRQ)c2415-a180268b434de10fe2ff6f6d980282017eb7ad29fcd28f22acf2feec03bc80420 (KEY)0095646520140000107000000051conflictsofinterestdistortpublicevaluationsevidenc DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 300 DNB 83.00 bkl Matthew J Kotchen verfasserin aut Conflicts of interest distort public evaluations: Evidence from NCAA football coaches 2014 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier This paper investigates how private incentives distort public evaluations. Exploiting a unique empirical setting, we study the influence of conflicts of interest among NCAA football coaches participating in the USA Today Coaches Poll of the top 25 teams from 2005 to 2010. The research design takes advantage of a situation where many agents are evaluating the same thing, private incentives are clearly defined and measurable, and there exists an alternative source of computer rankings that is bias free. We find evidence that coaches distort their rankings to reflect their own financial and reputational interests. Most importantly, we find that coaches show more favoritism toward their own team when they stand to gain more financially and toward other teams when it generates higher direct financial payoffs for their own university. Additionally, coaches boost the ranking of their own team and teams from their same athletic conference, even after accounting for direct financial incentives. Coaches also rank teams they defeated more favorably, thereby making their own team look better. Ratings & rankings Coaches & managers Conflicts of interest Sports agents Favoritism College football Studies Matthew Potoski oth Enthalten in Journal of economic behavior & organization Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1980 107(2014), Seite 51-63 (DE-627)130666602 (DE-600)864321-0 (DE-576)016211154 0167-2681 nnns volume:107 year:2014 pages:51-63 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.07.018 Volltext http://search.proquest.com/docview/1622687060 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4393 83.00 AVZ AR 107 2014 51-63 |
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10.1016/j.jebo.2014.07.018 doi PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC1968222626 (DE-599)GBVOLC1968222626 (PRQ)c2415-a180268b434de10fe2ff6f6d980282017eb7ad29fcd28f22acf2feec03bc80420 (KEY)0095646520140000107000000051conflictsofinterestdistortpublicevaluationsevidenc DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 300 DNB 83.00 bkl Matthew J Kotchen verfasserin aut Conflicts of interest distort public evaluations: Evidence from NCAA football coaches 2014 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier This paper investigates how private incentives distort public evaluations. Exploiting a unique empirical setting, we study the influence of conflicts of interest among NCAA football coaches participating in the USA Today Coaches Poll of the top 25 teams from 2005 to 2010. The research design takes advantage of a situation where many agents are evaluating the same thing, private incentives are clearly defined and measurable, and there exists an alternative source of computer rankings that is bias free. We find evidence that coaches distort their rankings to reflect their own financial and reputational interests. Most importantly, we find that coaches show more favoritism toward their own team when they stand to gain more financially and toward other teams when it generates higher direct financial payoffs for their own university. Additionally, coaches boost the ranking of their own team and teams from their same athletic conference, even after accounting for direct financial incentives. Coaches also rank teams they defeated more favorably, thereby making their own team look better. Ratings & rankings Coaches & managers Conflicts of interest Sports agents Favoritism College football Studies Matthew Potoski oth Enthalten in Journal of economic behavior & organization Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1980 107(2014), Seite 51-63 (DE-627)130666602 (DE-600)864321-0 (DE-576)016211154 0167-2681 nnns volume:107 year:2014 pages:51-63 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.07.018 Volltext http://search.proquest.com/docview/1622687060 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4393 83.00 AVZ AR 107 2014 51-63 |
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10.1016/j.jebo.2014.07.018 doi PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC1968222626 (DE-599)GBVOLC1968222626 (PRQ)c2415-a180268b434de10fe2ff6f6d980282017eb7ad29fcd28f22acf2feec03bc80420 (KEY)0095646520140000107000000051conflictsofinterestdistortpublicevaluationsevidenc DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 300 DNB 83.00 bkl Matthew J Kotchen verfasserin aut Conflicts of interest distort public evaluations: Evidence from NCAA football coaches 2014 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier This paper investigates how private incentives distort public evaluations. Exploiting a unique empirical setting, we study the influence of conflicts of interest among NCAA football coaches participating in the USA Today Coaches Poll of the top 25 teams from 2005 to 2010. The research design takes advantage of a situation where many agents are evaluating the same thing, private incentives are clearly defined and measurable, and there exists an alternative source of computer rankings that is bias free. We find evidence that coaches distort their rankings to reflect their own financial and reputational interests. Most importantly, we find that coaches show more favoritism toward their own team when they stand to gain more financially and toward other teams when it generates higher direct financial payoffs for their own university. Additionally, coaches boost the ranking of their own team and teams from their same athletic conference, even after accounting for direct financial incentives. Coaches also rank teams they defeated more favorably, thereby making their own team look better. Ratings & rankings Coaches & managers Conflicts of interest Sports agents Favoritism College football Studies Matthew Potoski oth Enthalten in Journal of economic behavior & organization Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1980 107(2014), Seite 51-63 (DE-627)130666602 (DE-600)864321-0 (DE-576)016211154 0167-2681 nnns volume:107 year:2014 pages:51-63 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.07.018 Volltext http://search.proquest.com/docview/1622687060 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4393 83.00 AVZ AR 107 2014 51-63 |
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10.1016/j.jebo.2014.07.018 doi PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC1968222626 (DE-599)GBVOLC1968222626 (PRQ)c2415-a180268b434de10fe2ff6f6d980282017eb7ad29fcd28f22acf2feec03bc80420 (KEY)0095646520140000107000000051conflictsofinterestdistortpublicevaluationsevidenc DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 300 DNB 83.00 bkl Matthew J Kotchen verfasserin aut Conflicts of interest distort public evaluations: Evidence from NCAA football coaches 2014 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier This paper investigates how private incentives distort public evaluations. Exploiting a unique empirical setting, we study the influence of conflicts of interest among NCAA football coaches participating in the USA Today Coaches Poll of the top 25 teams from 2005 to 2010. The research design takes advantage of a situation where many agents are evaluating the same thing, private incentives are clearly defined and measurable, and there exists an alternative source of computer rankings that is bias free. We find evidence that coaches distort their rankings to reflect their own financial and reputational interests. Most importantly, we find that coaches show more favoritism toward their own team when they stand to gain more financially and toward other teams when it generates higher direct financial payoffs for their own university. Additionally, coaches boost the ranking of their own team and teams from their same athletic conference, even after accounting for direct financial incentives. Coaches also rank teams they defeated more favorably, thereby making their own team look better. Ratings & rankings Coaches & managers Conflicts of interest Sports agents Favoritism College football Studies Matthew Potoski oth Enthalten in Journal of economic behavior & organization Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1980 107(2014), Seite 51-63 (DE-627)130666602 (DE-600)864321-0 (DE-576)016211154 0167-2681 nnns volume:107 year:2014 pages:51-63 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.07.018 Volltext http://search.proquest.com/docview/1622687060 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4393 83.00 AVZ AR 107 2014 51-63 |
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Conflicts of interest distort public evaluations: Evidence from NCAA football coaches |
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Conflicts of interest distort public evaluations: Evidence from NCAA football coaches |
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conflicts of interest distort public evaluations: evidence from ncaa football coaches |
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Conflicts of interest distort public evaluations: Evidence from NCAA football coaches |
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This paper investigates how private incentives distort public evaluations. Exploiting a unique empirical setting, we study the influence of conflicts of interest among NCAA football coaches participating in the USA Today Coaches Poll of the top 25 teams from 2005 to 2010. The research design takes advantage of a situation where many agents are evaluating the same thing, private incentives are clearly defined and measurable, and there exists an alternative source of computer rankings that is bias free. We find evidence that coaches distort their rankings to reflect their own financial and reputational interests. Most importantly, we find that coaches show more favoritism toward their own team when they stand to gain more financially and toward other teams when it generates higher direct financial payoffs for their own university. Additionally, coaches boost the ranking of their own team and teams from their same athletic conference, even after accounting for direct financial incentives. Coaches also rank teams they defeated more favorably, thereby making their own team look better. |
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This paper investigates how private incentives distort public evaluations. Exploiting a unique empirical setting, we study the influence of conflicts of interest among NCAA football coaches participating in the USA Today Coaches Poll of the top 25 teams from 2005 to 2010. The research design takes advantage of a situation where many agents are evaluating the same thing, private incentives are clearly defined and measurable, and there exists an alternative source of computer rankings that is bias free. We find evidence that coaches distort their rankings to reflect their own financial and reputational interests. Most importantly, we find that coaches show more favoritism toward their own team when they stand to gain more financially and toward other teams when it generates higher direct financial payoffs for their own university. Additionally, coaches boost the ranking of their own team and teams from their same athletic conference, even after accounting for direct financial incentives. Coaches also rank teams they defeated more favorably, thereby making their own team look better. |
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This paper investigates how private incentives distort public evaluations. Exploiting a unique empirical setting, we study the influence of conflicts of interest among NCAA football coaches participating in the USA Today Coaches Poll of the top 25 teams from 2005 to 2010. The research design takes advantage of a situation where many agents are evaluating the same thing, private incentives are clearly defined and measurable, and there exists an alternative source of computer rankings that is bias free. We find evidence that coaches distort their rankings to reflect their own financial and reputational interests. Most importantly, we find that coaches show more favoritism toward their own team when they stand to gain more financially and toward other teams when it generates higher direct financial payoffs for their own university. Additionally, coaches boost the ranking of their own team and teams from their same athletic conference, even after accounting for direct financial incentives. Coaches also rank teams they defeated more favorably, thereby making their own team look better. |
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