Reverse Pricing and Revenue Sharing in a Vertical Market
Advancing in information technology has empowered firms with unprecedented flexibility when interacting with each other. We compare welfare results in a vertical market (e.g., manufacturers and retailers) for several types of pricing strategies depending upon the following: (1) which side (retailers...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Liu, Qihong [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2015 |
|---|
| Rechteinformationen: |
Nutzungsrecht: Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
|---|
| Schlagwörter: |
|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Managerial and decision economics - Chichester [u.a.] : Wiley, 1980, 36(2015), 5, Seite 299-313 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:36 ; year:2015 ; number:5 ; pages:299-313 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1002/mde.2669 |
|---|
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OLC1968469427 |
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| 520 | |a Advancing in information technology has empowered firms with unprecedented flexibility when interacting with each other. We compare welfare results in a vertical market (e.g., manufacturers and retailers) for several types of pricing strategies depending upon the following: (1) which side (retailers or manufacturers) chooses retail prices; and (2) whether there is revenue sharing or linear pricing between the two sides. Our results are as follows. Under revenue sharing, retail prices (and thus industry profits) are higher if and only if they are chosen by the side featuring less competition. Under linear pricing, however, retail prices are higher if they are chosen by the side featuring more competition (for linear demand functions). Relative to linear pricing, revenue sharing always leads to lower retail prices, higher consumer surplus and social surplus. However, the comparison on industry profits depends on the demand elasticity ratios. Revenue sharing raises industry profits when the elasticity ratios are small, but the results are reversed when the elasticity ratios are large. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. | ||
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| 650 | 4 | |a Comparative analysis | |
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Liu, Qihong |
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10.1002/mde.2669 |
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reverse pricing and revenue sharing in a vertical market |
| title_auth |
Reverse Pricing and Revenue Sharing in a Vertical Market |
| abstract |
Advancing in information technology has empowered firms with unprecedented flexibility when interacting with each other. We compare welfare results in a vertical market (e.g., manufacturers and retailers) for several types of pricing strategies depending upon the following: (1) which side (retailers or manufacturers) chooses retail prices; and (2) whether there is revenue sharing or linear pricing between the two sides. Our results are as follows. Under revenue sharing, retail prices (and thus industry profits) are higher if and only if they are chosen by the side featuring less competition. Under linear pricing, however, retail prices are higher if they are chosen by the side featuring more competition (for linear demand functions). Relative to linear pricing, revenue sharing always leads to lower retail prices, higher consumer surplus and social surplus. However, the comparison on industry profits depends on the demand elasticity ratios. Revenue sharing raises industry profits when the elasticity ratios are small, but the results are reversed when the elasticity ratios are large. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
| abstractGer |
Advancing in information technology has empowered firms with unprecedented flexibility when interacting with each other. We compare welfare results in a vertical market (e.g., manufacturers and retailers) for several types of pricing strategies depending upon the following: (1) which side (retailers or manufacturers) chooses retail prices; and (2) whether there is revenue sharing or linear pricing between the two sides. Our results are as follows. Under revenue sharing, retail prices (and thus industry profits) are higher if and only if they are chosen by the side featuring less competition. Under linear pricing, however, retail prices are higher if they are chosen by the side featuring more competition (for linear demand functions). Relative to linear pricing, revenue sharing always leads to lower retail prices, higher consumer surplus and social surplus. However, the comparison on industry profits depends on the demand elasticity ratios. Revenue sharing raises industry profits when the elasticity ratios are small, but the results are reversed when the elasticity ratios are large. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Advancing in information technology has empowered firms with unprecedented flexibility when interacting with each other. We compare welfare results in a vertical market (e.g., manufacturers and retailers) for several types of pricing strategies depending upon the following: (1) which side (retailers or manufacturers) chooses retail prices; and (2) whether there is revenue sharing or linear pricing between the two sides. Our results are as follows. Under revenue sharing, retail prices (and thus industry profits) are higher if and only if they are chosen by the side featuring less competition. Under linear pricing, however, retail prices are higher if they are chosen by the side featuring more competition (for linear demand functions). Relative to linear pricing, revenue sharing always leads to lower retail prices, higher consumer surplus and social surplus. However, the comparison on industry profits depends on the demand elasticity ratios. Revenue sharing raises industry profits when the elasticity ratios are small, but the results are reversed when the elasticity ratios are large. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
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Reverse Pricing and Revenue Sharing in a Vertical Market |
| url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mde.2669 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/mde.2669/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1688038734 |
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Shuai, Jie |
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Shuai, Jie |
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| doi_str |
10.1002/mde.2669 |
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2024-07-04T03:27:33.099Z |
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