Inequalities, responsibility and rational capacities: A defence of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism

This article aims to defend responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism by arguing for the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility as a plausible conception of an agent's responsibility for inequalities caused by his or her choice in responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. I show tha...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Inoue, Akira [verfasserIn]

Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2016

Rechteinformationen:	Nutzungsrecht: © 2016 Australian Political Studies Association 2016

Schlagwörter:	rational capacities proportionality luck egalitarianism responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism Ideal theory Egalitarianism Inequality Political theory

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Australian journal of political science - Abingdon : Taylor & Francis, 1990, 51(2016), 1, Seite 86
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:51 ; year:2016 ; number:1 ; pages:86

Links:	Volltext Link aufrufen Link aufrufen

DOI / URN:	10.1080/10361146.2015.1114585

Katalog-ID:	OLC1972854836

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title_auth	Inequalities, responsibility and rational capacities: A defence of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism
abstract	This article aims to defend responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism by arguing for the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility as a plausible conception of an agent's responsibility for inequalities caused by his or her choice in responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. I show that the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility is not only philosophically defensible as a conception of genuine choice, but also promising enough to ward off two common worries which cast doubt on responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism (qua luck egalitarianism): first, the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility allows the assignment of differential degrees of responsibility to rational agents in proportional terms, which may make it echo the adverse effects of their childhood environments. Second, its proportional construal essentially allows that nobody possesses a full degree of rational capacities. This enables responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism to refute the harshness objection.
abstractGer	This article aims to defend responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism by arguing for the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility as a plausible conception of an agent's responsibility for inequalities caused by his or her choice in responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. I show that the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility is not only philosophically defensible as a conception of genuine choice, but also promising enough to ward off two common worries which cast doubt on responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism (qua luck egalitarianism): first, the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility allows the assignment of differential degrees of responsibility to rational agents in proportional terms, which may make it echo the adverse effects of their childhood environments. Second, its proportional construal essentially allows that nobody possesses a full degree of rational capacities. This enables responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism to refute the harshness objection.
abstract_unstemmed	This article aims to defend responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism by arguing for the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility as a plausible conception of an agent's responsibility for inequalities caused by his or her choice in responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism. I show that the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility is not only philosophically defensible as a conception of genuine choice, but also promising enough to ward off two common worries which cast doubt on responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism (qua luck egalitarianism): first, the rational capacities-based principle of responsibility allows the assignment of differential degrees of responsibility to rational agents in proportional terms, which may make it echo the adverse effects of their childhood environments. Second, its proportional construal essentially allows that nobody possesses a full degree of rational capacities. This enables responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism to refute the harshness objection.
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title_short	Inequalities, responsibility and rational capacities: A defence of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism
url	http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2015.1114585 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10361146.2015.1114585 http://search.proquest.com/docview/1779892397
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doi_str	10.1080/10361146.2015.1114585
up_date	2024-07-04T00:48:45.745Z
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