Contract designs for energy-saving product development in a monopoly
We study two types of contracts (fixed amount and price discount) for a budget-constrained government. * We capture the firm's responce to the contracts in terms of pricing and product design. * We consider two types of environmental performance and show that they have the same effect on contra...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Zhou, Wenhui [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
2016 |
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Rechteinformationen: |
Nutzungsrecht: © COPYRIGHT 2016 Elsevier B.V. |
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Schlagwörter: |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: European journal of operational research - Amsterdam : Elsevier, 1977, 250(2016), 3, Seite 902 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:250 ; year:2016 ; number:3 ; pages:902 |
Links: |
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DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.ejor.2015.10.024 |
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10.1016/j.ejor.2015.10.024 doi PQ20160719 (DE-627)OLC1975146581 (DE-599)GBVOLC1975146581 (PRQ)g1110-f3849bbdc020e959edc15d2f66e9305cf999bac797abc72ecdf506b6a4631a6c0 (KEY)0068880020160000250000300902contractdesignsforenergysavingproductdevelopmentin DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 050 DNB 650 AVZ Zhou, Wenhui verfasserin aut Contract designs for energy-saving product development in a monopoly 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier We study two types of contracts (fixed amount and price discount) for a budget-constrained government. * We capture the firm's responce to the contracts in terms of pricing and product design. * We consider two types of environmental performance and show that they have the same effect on contract designs. * The impacts of the budget and consumers' environmental awareness are explored. * No contract type is always dominating or dominated. Nutzungsrecht: © COPYRIGHT 2016 Elsevier B.V. Evaluation Product development Studies Energy consumption Game theory Government subsidies Government contracts Monopolies Huang, Weixiang oth Enthalten in European journal of operational research Amsterdam : Elsevier, 1977 250(2016), 3, Seite 902 (DE-627)129611131 (DE-600)243003-4 (DE-576)015106594 0377-2217 nnns volume:250 year:2016 number:3 pages:902 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.10.024 Volltext http://search.proquest.com/docview/1762373327 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_30 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_4126 AR 250 2016 3 902 |
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10.1016/j.ejor.2015.10.024 doi PQ20160719 (DE-627)OLC1975146581 (DE-599)GBVOLC1975146581 (PRQ)g1110-f3849bbdc020e959edc15d2f66e9305cf999bac797abc72ecdf506b6a4631a6c0 (KEY)0068880020160000250000300902contractdesignsforenergysavingproductdevelopmentin DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 050 DNB 650 AVZ Zhou, Wenhui verfasserin aut Contract designs for energy-saving product development in a monopoly 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier We study two types of contracts (fixed amount and price discount) for a budget-constrained government. * We capture the firm's responce to the contracts in terms of pricing and product design. * We consider two types of environmental performance and show that they have the same effect on contract designs. * The impacts of the budget and consumers' environmental awareness are explored. * No contract type is always dominating or dominated. Nutzungsrecht: © COPYRIGHT 2016 Elsevier B.V. Evaluation Product development Studies Energy consumption Game theory Government subsidies Government contracts Monopolies Huang, Weixiang oth Enthalten in European journal of operational research Amsterdam : Elsevier, 1977 250(2016), 3, Seite 902 (DE-627)129611131 (DE-600)243003-4 (DE-576)015106594 0377-2217 nnns volume:250 year:2016 number:3 pages:902 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.10.024 Volltext http://search.proquest.com/docview/1762373327 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_30 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_4126 AR 250 2016 3 902 |
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10.1016/j.ejor.2015.10.024 doi PQ20160719 (DE-627)OLC1975146581 (DE-599)GBVOLC1975146581 (PRQ)g1110-f3849bbdc020e959edc15d2f66e9305cf999bac797abc72ecdf506b6a4631a6c0 (KEY)0068880020160000250000300902contractdesignsforenergysavingproductdevelopmentin DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 050 DNB 650 AVZ Zhou, Wenhui verfasserin aut Contract designs for energy-saving product development in a monopoly 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier We study two types of contracts (fixed amount and price discount) for a budget-constrained government. * We capture the firm's responce to the contracts in terms of pricing and product design. * We consider two types of environmental performance and show that they have the same effect on contract designs. * The impacts of the budget and consumers' environmental awareness are explored. * No contract type is always dominating or dominated. Nutzungsrecht: © COPYRIGHT 2016 Elsevier B.V. Evaluation Product development Studies Energy consumption Game theory Government subsidies Government contracts Monopolies Huang, Weixiang oth Enthalten in European journal of operational research Amsterdam : Elsevier, 1977 250(2016), 3, Seite 902 (DE-627)129611131 (DE-600)243003-4 (DE-576)015106594 0377-2217 nnns volume:250 year:2016 number:3 pages:902 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.10.024 Volltext http://search.proquest.com/docview/1762373327 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_30 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_4126 AR 250 2016 3 902 |
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10.1016/j.ejor.2015.10.024 doi PQ20160719 (DE-627)OLC1975146581 (DE-599)GBVOLC1975146581 (PRQ)g1110-f3849bbdc020e959edc15d2f66e9305cf999bac797abc72ecdf506b6a4631a6c0 (KEY)0068880020160000250000300902contractdesignsforenergysavingproductdevelopmentin DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 050 DNB 650 AVZ Zhou, Wenhui verfasserin aut Contract designs for energy-saving product development in a monopoly 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier We study two types of contracts (fixed amount and price discount) for a budget-constrained government. * We capture the firm's responce to the contracts in terms of pricing and product design. * We consider two types of environmental performance and show that they have the same effect on contract designs. * The impacts of the budget and consumers' environmental awareness are explored. * No contract type is always dominating or dominated. Nutzungsrecht: © COPYRIGHT 2016 Elsevier B.V. Evaluation Product development Studies Energy consumption Game theory Government subsidies Government contracts Monopolies Huang, Weixiang oth Enthalten in European journal of operational research Amsterdam : Elsevier, 1977 250(2016), 3, Seite 902 (DE-627)129611131 (DE-600)243003-4 (DE-576)015106594 0377-2217 nnns volume:250 year:2016 number:3 pages:902 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.10.024 Volltext http://search.proquest.com/docview/1762373327 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_30 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_4126 AR 250 2016 3 902 |
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We study two types of contracts (fixed amount and price discount) for a budget-constrained government. * We capture the firm's responce to the contracts in terms of pricing and product design. * We consider two types of environmental performance and show that they have the same effect on contract designs. * The impacts of the budget and consumers' environmental awareness are explored. * No contract type is always dominating or dominated. |
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