On some common objections to a behavioral approach to psychological categories
This paper addresses several objections that have been leveled against a behavioral approach to psychological categories. It reconstructs and critically assesses (a) the so-called causal objection; (b) alleged counterexamples whereby one can exhibit the typical behaviors associated with a psychologi...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Lazzeri, Filipe [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2016 |
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| Rechteinformationen: |
Nutzungsrecht: © 2016 Taylor & Francis 2016 |
|---|
| Schlagwörter: |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Philosophical psychology - Abingdon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 1988, 29(2016), 3, Seite 405 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:29 ; year:2016 ; number:3 ; pages:405 |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1080/09515089.2015.1121540 |
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| 520 | |a This paper addresses several objections that have been leveled against a behavioral approach to psychological categories. It reconstructs and critically assesses (a) the so-called causal objection; (b) alleged counterexamples whereby one can exhibit the typical behaviors associated with a psychological phenomenon without exhibiting the latter, including Lewis' "perfect actor" case and Kirk's "zombie"; (c) alleged counterexamples whereby organisms can exemplify psychological phenomena without exhibiting any behavior associated with them, including Armstrong's imagined brain in a vat, Putnam's "super-super-spartans" scenario, and related cases; and (d) the holistic objection. Mistaken assumptions in each of these objections are pinpointed. The paper starts with a brief characterization of behaviorism about psychological categories and a summary of the particular version thereof supported here, which draws upon Ryle and Skinner, among others. | ||
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150 100 |
| title_sort |
on some common objections to a behavioral approach to psychological categories |
| title_auth |
On some common objections to a behavioral approach to psychological categories |
| abstract |
This paper addresses several objections that have been leveled against a behavioral approach to psychological categories. It reconstructs and critically assesses (a) the so-called causal objection; (b) alleged counterexamples whereby one can exhibit the typical behaviors associated with a psychological phenomenon without exhibiting the latter, including Lewis' "perfect actor" case and Kirk's "zombie"; (c) alleged counterexamples whereby organisms can exemplify psychological phenomena without exhibiting any behavior associated with them, including Armstrong's imagined brain in a vat, Putnam's "super-super-spartans" scenario, and related cases; and (d) the holistic objection. Mistaken assumptions in each of these objections are pinpointed. The paper starts with a brief characterization of behaviorism about psychological categories and a summary of the particular version thereof supported here, which draws upon Ryle and Skinner, among others. |
| abstractGer |
This paper addresses several objections that have been leveled against a behavioral approach to psychological categories. It reconstructs and critically assesses (a) the so-called causal objection; (b) alleged counterexamples whereby one can exhibit the typical behaviors associated with a psychological phenomenon without exhibiting the latter, including Lewis' "perfect actor" case and Kirk's "zombie"; (c) alleged counterexamples whereby organisms can exemplify psychological phenomena without exhibiting any behavior associated with them, including Armstrong's imagined brain in a vat, Putnam's "super-super-spartans" scenario, and related cases; and (d) the holistic objection. Mistaken assumptions in each of these objections are pinpointed. The paper starts with a brief characterization of behaviorism about psychological categories and a summary of the particular version thereof supported here, which draws upon Ryle and Skinner, among others. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
This paper addresses several objections that have been leveled against a behavioral approach to psychological categories. It reconstructs and critically assesses (a) the so-called causal objection; (b) alleged counterexamples whereby one can exhibit the typical behaviors associated with a psychological phenomenon without exhibiting the latter, including Lewis' "perfect actor" case and Kirk's "zombie"; (c) alleged counterexamples whereby organisms can exemplify psychological phenomena without exhibiting any behavior associated with them, including Armstrong's imagined brain in a vat, Putnam's "super-super-spartans" scenario, and related cases; and (d) the holistic objection. Mistaken assumptions in each of these objections are pinpointed. The paper starts with a brief characterization of behaviorism about psychological categories and a summary of the particular version thereof supported here, which draws upon Ryle and Skinner, among others. |
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| title_short |
On some common objections to a behavioral approach to psychological categories |
| url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2015.1121540 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09515089.2015.1121540 http://search.proquest.com/docview/1767660899 |
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| up_date |
2024-07-03T13:21:57.509Z |
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