Investment in Shared Suppliers: Effect of Learning, Spillover, and Competition
We investigate the optimal strategies for firms to invest in their suppliers when the benefits of such investments can spillover to other firms who also source from the same suppliers. We consider two Bayesian firms that can invest in improving the quality of their shared supplier; the firms do not...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Agrawal, Anupam [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2016 |
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| Rechteinformationen: |
Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 Production and Operations Management Society |
|---|
| Schlagwörter: |
|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Production and operations management - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley-Blackwell, 1992, 25(2016), 4, Seite 736-750 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:25 ; year:2016 ; number:4 ; pages:736-750 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1111/poms.12503 |
|---|
| Katalog-ID: |
OLC1975886879 |
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| 520 | |a We investigate the optimal strategies for firms to invest in their suppliers when the benefits of such investments can spillover to other firms who also source from the same suppliers. We consider two Bayesian firms that can invest in improving the quality of their shared supplier; the firms do not have complete information on the true quality of the supplier, but they update their beliefs based on the supplier's performance. We formulate the problem as an investment game and obtain Markov perfect equilibria characterized by the investment thresholds of both firms. The equilibrium investment strategies of the two firms are characterized by a region of preemption and a region of war of attrition. We also examine how the interplay between spillover, competition, and returns from the investment at shared suppliers affect the investment threshold and the time to the leader's investment, and identify the conditions under which competition delays or hastens the first investment in a shared supplier. | ||
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| 650 | 4 | |a quality management | |
| 650 | 4 | |a spillover | |
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| 650 | 4 | |a Equilibrium | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Bayesian analysis | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Competitive advantage | |
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| 650 | 4 | |a Markov analysis | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Vendor supplier relations | |
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| 700 | 1 | |a Kwon, H. Dharma |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Muthulingam, Suresh |4 oth | |
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10.1111/poms.12503 doi PQ20160610 (DE-627)OLC1975886879 (DE-599)GBVOLC1975886879 (PRQ)c1651-ac7d404d889f1cb0ab4f71612039793efe9e946ed761977f553a2de6bf07c29f3 (KEY)0207872420160000025000400736investmentinsharedsupplierseffectoflearningspillov DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 ZDB Agrawal, Anupam verfasserin aut Investment in Shared Suppliers: Effect of Learning, Spillover, and Competition 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier We investigate the optimal strategies for firms to invest in their suppliers when the benefits of such investments can spillover to other firms who also source from the same suppliers. We consider two Bayesian firms that can invest in improving the quality of their shared supplier; the firms do not have complete information on the true quality of the supplier, but they update their beliefs based on the supplier's performance. We formulate the problem as an investment game and obtain Markov perfect equilibria characterized by the investment thresholds of both firms. The equilibrium investment strategies of the two firms are characterized by a region of preemption and a region of war of attrition. We also examine how the interplay between spillover, competition, and returns from the investment at shared suppliers affect the investment threshold and the time to the leader's investment, and identify the conditions under which competition delays or hastens the first investment in a shared supplier. Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 Production and Operations Management Society supplier investment quality management spillover shared suppliers Rates of return Equilibrium Bayesian analysis Competitive advantage Studies Markov analysis Vendor supplier relations Kim, Youngsoo oth Kwon, H. Dharma oth Muthulingam, Suresh oth Enthalten in Production and operations management Hoboken, NJ : Wiley-Blackwell, 1992 25(2016), 4, Seite 736-750 (DE-627)13106522X (DE-600)1108460-1 (DE-576)032731965 1059-1478 nnns volume:25 year:2016 number:4 pages:736-750 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/poms.12503 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/poms.12503/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1783691778 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_673 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4126 AR 25 2016 4 736-750 |
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10.1111/poms.12503 doi PQ20160610 (DE-627)OLC1975886879 (DE-599)GBVOLC1975886879 (PRQ)c1651-ac7d404d889f1cb0ab4f71612039793efe9e946ed761977f553a2de6bf07c29f3 (KEY)0207872420160000025000400736investmentinsharedsupplierseffectoflearningspillov DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 ZDB Agrawal, Anupam verfasserin aut Investment in Shared Suppliers: Effect of Learning, Spillover, and Competition 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier We investigate the optimal strategies for firms to invest in their suppliers when the benefits of such investments can spillover to other firms who also source from the same suppliers. We consider two Bayesian firms that can invest in improving the quality of their shared supplier; the firms do not have complete information on the true quality of the supplier, but they update their beliefs based on the supplier's performance. We formulate the problem as an investment game and obtain Markov perfect equilibria characterized by the investment thresholds of both firms. The equilibrium investment strategies of the two firms are characterized by a region of preemption and a region of war of attrition. We also examine how the interplay between spillover, competition, and returns from the investment at shared suppliers affect the investment threshold and the time to the leader's investment, and identify the conditions under which competition delays or hastens the first investment in a shared supplier. Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 Production and Operations Management Society supplier investment quality management spillover shared suppliers Rates of return Equilibrium Bayesian analysis Competitive advantage Studies Markov analysis Vendor supplier relations Kim, Youngsoo oth Kwon, H. Dharma oth Muthulingam, Suresh oth Enthalten in Production and operations management Hoboken, NJ : Wiley-Blackwell, 1992 25(2016), 4, Seite 736-750 (DE-627)13106522X (DE-600)1108460-1 (DE-576)032731965 1059-1478 nnns volume:25 year:2016 number:4 pages:736-750 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/poms.12503 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/poms.12503/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1783691778 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_673 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4126 AR 25 2016 4 736-750 |
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10.1111/poms.12503 doi PQ20160610 (DE-627)OLC1975886879 (DE-599)GBVOLC1975886879 (PRQ)c1651-ac7d404d889f1cb0ab4f71612039793efe9e946ed761977f553a2de6bf07c29f3 (KEY)0207872420160000025000400736investmentinsharedsupplierseffectoflearningspillov DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 ZDB Agrawal, Anupam verfasserin aut Investment in Shared Suppliers: Effect of Learning, Spillover, and Competition 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier We investigate the optimal strategies for firms to invest in their suppliers when the benefits of such investments can spillover to other firms who also source from the same suppliers. We consider two Bayesian firms that can invest in improving the quality of their shared supplier; the firms do not have complete information on the true quality of the supplier, but they update their beliefs based on the supplier's performance. We formulate the problem as an investment game and obtain Markov perfect equilibria characterized by the investment thresholds of both firms. The equilibrium investment strategies of the two firms are characterized by a region of preemption and a region of war of attrition. We also examine how the interplay between spillover, competition, and returns from the investment at shared suppliers affect the investment threshold and the time to the leader's investment, and identify the conditions under which competition delays or hastens the first investment in a shared supplier. Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 Production and Operations Management Society supplier investment quality management spillover shared suppliers Rates of return Equilibrium Bayesian analysis Competitive advantage Studies Markov analysis Vendor supplier relations Kim, Youngsoo oth Kwon, H. Dharma oth Muthulingam, Suresh oth Enthalten in Production and operations management Hoboken, NJ : Wiley-Blackwell, 1992 25(2016), 4, Seite 736-750 (DE-627)13106522X (DE-600)1108460-1 (DE-576)032731965 1059-1478 nnns volume:25 year:2016 number:4 pages:736-750 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/poms.12503 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/poms.12503/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1783691778 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_673 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4126 AR 25 2016 4 736-750 |
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10.1111/poms.12503 doi PQ20160610 (DE-627)OLC1975886879 (DE-599)GBVOLC1975886879 (PRQ)c1651-ac7d404d889f1cb0ab4f71612039793efe9e946ed761977f553a2de6bf07c29f3 (KEY)0207872420160000025000400736investmentinsharedsupplierseffectoflearningspillov DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 ZDB Agrawal, Anupam verfasserin aut Investment in Shared Suppliers: Effect of Learning, Spillover, and Competition 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier We investigate the optimal strategies for firms to invest in their suppliers when the benefits of such investments can spillover to other firms who also source from the same suppliers. We consider two Bayesian firms that can invest in improving the quality of their shared supplier; the firms do not have complete information on the true quality of the supplier, but they update their beliefs based on the supplier's performance. We formulate the problem as an investment game and obtain Markov perfect equilibria characterized by the investment thresholds of both firms. The equilibrium investment strategies of the two firms are characterized by a region of preemption and a region of war of attrition. We also examine how the interplay between spillover, competition, and returns from the investment at shared suppliers affect the investment threshold and the time to the leader's investment, and identify the conditions under which competition delays or hastens the first investment in a shared supplier. Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 Production and Operations Management Society supplier investment quality management spillover shared suppliers Rates of return Equilibrium Bayesian analysis Competitive advantage Studies Markov analysis Vendor supplier relations Kim, Youngsoo oth Kwon, H. Dharma oth Muthulingam, Suresh oth Enthalten in Production and operations management Hoboken, NJ : Wiley-Blackwell, 1992 25(2016), 4, Seite 736-750 (DE-627)13106522X (DE-600)1108460-1 (DE-576)032731965 1059-1478 nnns volume:25 year:2016 number:4 pages:736-750 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/poms.12503 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/poms.12503/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1783691778 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_673 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4126 AR 25 2016 4 736-750 |
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Investment in Shared Suppliers: Effect of Learning, Spillover, and Competition |
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Investment in Shared Suppliers: Effect of Learning, Spillover, and Competition |
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Agrawal, Anupam |
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investment in shared suppliers: effect of learning, spillover, and competition |
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Investment in Shared Suppliers: Effect of Learning, Spillover, and Competition |
| abstract |
We investigate the optimal strategies for firms to invest in their suppliers when the benefits of such investments can spillover to other firms who also source from the same suppliers. We consider two Bayesian firms that can invest in improving the quality of their shared supplier; the firms do not have complete information on the true quality of the supplier, but they update their beliefs based on the supplier's performance. We formulate the problem as an investment game and obtain Markov perfect equilibria characterized by the investment thresholds of both firms. The equilibrium investment strategies of the two firms are characterized by a region of preemption and a region of war of attrition. We also examine how the interplay between spillover, competition, and returns from the investment at shared suppliers affect the investment threshold and the time to the leader's investment, and identify the conditions under which competition delays or hastens the first investment in a shared supplier. |
| abstractGer |
We investigate the optimal strategies for firms to invest in their suppliers when the benefits of such investments can spillover to other firms who also source from the same suppliers. We consider two Bayesian firms that can invest in improving the quality of their shared supplier; the firms do not have complete information on the true quality of the supplier, but they update their beliefs based on the supplier's performance. We formulate the problem as an investment game and obtain Markov perfect equilibria characterized by the investment thresholds of both firms. The equilibrium investment strategies of the two firms are characterized by a region of preemption and a region of war of attrition. We also examine how the interplay between spillover, competition, and returns from the investment at shared suppliers affect the investment threshold and the time to the leader's investment, and identify the conditions under which competition delays or hastens the first investment in a shared supplier. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
We investigate the optimal strategies for firms to invest in their suppliers when the benefits of such investments can spillover to other firms who also source from the same suppliers. We consider two Bayesian firms that can invest in improving the quality of their shared supplier; the firms do not have complete information on the true quality of the supplier, but they update their beliefs based on the supplier's performance. We formulate the problem as an investment game and obtain Markov perfect equilibria characterized by the investment thresholds of both firms. The equilibrium investment strategies of the two firms are characterized by a region of preemption and a region of war of attrition. We also examine how the interplay between spillover, competition, and returns from the investment at shared suppliers affect the investment threshold and the time to the leader's investment, and identify the conditions under which competition delays or hastens the first investment in a shared supplier. |
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| title_short |
Investment in Shared Suppliers: Effect of Learning, Spillover, and Competition |
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/poms.12503 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/poms.12503/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1783691778 |
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