Urban Growth Modeling Based on a Game between Farmers and Governments: Case Study of Urban Fringe in Wuhan, Hubei Province in China
AbstractUrban systems are complicated systems where land-use changes may significantly affect the environment and the ecosystem. Therefore, modeling urban growth is crucial for urban planners and administrators to support sustainable development. This paper provides a spatially disaggregated model f...
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| Autor*in: |
He, Qingsong [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2016 |
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| Rechteinformationen: |
Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers © COPYRIGHT 2016 American Society of Civil Engineers |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Journal of urban planning and development - Reston, Va. : ASCE, 1983, 142(2016), 2 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:142 ; year:2016 ; number:2 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1061/(ASCE)UP.1943-5444.0000304 |
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| 520 | |a AbstractUrban systems are complicated systems where land-use changes may significantly affect the environment and the ecosystem. Therefore, modeling urban growth is crucial for urban planners and administrators to support sustainable development. This paper provides a spatially disaggregated model for urban growth simulation that is characterized by the innovative idea that considers the behavior of residents and couples the explorations of the game between farmers and governments in the land development process. Three kinds of agents, namely, residents, farmers, and governments, make their decisions according to their land use–conversion preferences. Through the use of different strategies that are abstracted from actual land transactions in China, the payoffs to farmers and governments in the game of land expropriation are quantified and then the Nash equilibrium solution of the game is worked out. Those cells with mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solutions that include a probability of greater than 0.5 that either governments will expropriate land legally or that farmers will accept the land acquisition of the governments are referred to as “candidate regions for urban expansion.” Based on how they evaluate the “candidate region” condition according to the surrounding environment and land price, residents determine the final land-use transition of each cell in the candidate region that is formed in the previous step. Jiangxia, a suburban area in Wuhan, is used as a case study area to simulate the spatial and temporal dynamics of urban growth. The proposed model, which couples game theory and human decision making in the land-development process, can effectively represent and simulate the spatiotemporal dynamics and patterns of urban growth as well as explain the driving mechanism of urban expansion. | ||
| 540 | |a Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers | ||
| 540 | |a © COPYRIGHT 2016 American Society of Civil Engineers | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Technical Papers | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Municipal government | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Urban sprawl | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Case studies | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Game theory | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Farmers | |
| 650 | 4 | |a City planning | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Urban land use | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Models | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Usage | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Zhou, Kehao |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Tan, Ronghui |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Tang, Shuohua |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Liu, Yaolin |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Liu, Gege |4 oth | |
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10.1061/(ASCE)UP.1943-5444.0000304 doi PQ20160719 (DE-627)OLC1976486572 (DE-599)GBVOLC1976486572 (PRQ)a1302-53a7c4cef6ddaaac5b340b54d973cfa61468264d17b0617f0dc06d905a34204a0 (KEY)0003395220160000142000200000urbangrowthmodelingbasedonagamebetweenfarmersandgo DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 690 ZDB 74.72 bkl He, Qingsong verfasserin aut Urban Growth Modeling Based on a Game between Farmers and Governments: Case Study of Urban Fringe in Wuhan, Hubei Province in China 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier AbstractUrban systems are complicated systems where land-use changes may significantly affect the environment and the ecosystem. Therefore, modeling urban growth is crucial for urban planners and administrators to support sustainable development. This paper provides a spatially disaggregated model for urban growth simulation that is characterized by the innovative idea that considers the behavior of residents and couples the explorations of the game between farmers and governments in the land development process. Three kinds of agents, namely, residents, farmers, and governments, make their decisions according to their land use–conversion preferences. Through the use of different strategies that are abstracted from actual land transactions in China, the payoffs to farmers and governments in the game of land expropriation are quantified and then the Nash equilibrium solution of the game is worked out. Those cells with mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solutions that include a probability of greater than 0.5 that either governments will expropriate land legally or that farmers will accept the land acquisition of the governments are referred to as “candidate regions for urban expansion.” Based on how they evaluate the “candidate region” condition according to the surrounding environment and land price, residents determine the final land-use transition of each cell in the candidate region that is formed in the previous step. Jiangxia, a suburban area in Wuhan, is used as a case study area to simulate the spatial and temporal dynamics of urban growth. The proposed model, which couples game theory and human decision making in the land-development process, can effectively represent and simulate the spatiotemporal dynamics and patterns of urban growth as well as explain the driving mechanism of urban expansion. Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers © COPYRIGHT 2016 American Society of Civil Engineers Technical Papers Municipal government Urban sprawl Case studies Game theory Farmers City planning Urban land use Models Usage Zhou, Kehao oth Tan, Ronghui oth Tang, Shuohua oth Liu, Yaolin oth Liu, Gege oth Enthalten in Journal of urban planning and development Reston, Va. : ASCE, 1983 142(2016), 2 (DE-627)12962084X (DE-600)246108-0 (DE-576)015127141 0733-9488 nnns volume:142 year:2016 number:2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)UP.1943-5444.0000304 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-UMW SSG-OLC-ARC SSG-OLC-TEC SSG-OLC-GEO GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_4700 74.72 AVZ AR 142 2016 2 |
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10.1061/(ASCE)UP.1943-5444.0000304 doi PQ20160719 (DE-627)OLC1976486572 (DE-599)GBVOLC1976486572 (PRQ)a1302-53a7c4cef6ddaaac5b340b54d973cfa61468264d17b0617f0dc06d905a34204a0 (KEY)0003395220160000142000200000urbangrowthmodelingbasedonagamebetweenfarmersandgo DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 690 ZDB 74.72 bkl He, Qingsong verfasserin aut Urban Growth Modeling Based on a Game between Farmers and Governments: Case Study of Urban Fringe in Wuhan, Hubei Province in China 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier AbstractUrban systems are complicated systems where land-use changes may significantly affect the environment and the ecosystem. Therefore, modeling urban growth is crucial for urban planners and administrators to support sustainable development. This paper provides a spatially disaggregated model for urban growth simulation that is characterized by the innovative idea that considers the behavior of residents and couples the explorations of the game between farmers and governments in the land development process. Three kinds of agents, namely, residents, farmers, and governments, make their decisions according to their land use–conversion preferences. Through the use of different strategies that are abstracted from actual land transactions in China, the payoffs to farmers and governments in the game of land expropriation are quantified and then the Nash equilibrium solution of the game is worked out. Those cells with mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solutions that include a probability of greater than 0.5 that either governments will expropriate land legally or that farmers will accept the land acquisition of the governments are referred to as “candidate regions for urban expansion.” Based on how they evaluate the “candidate region” condition according to the surrounding environment and land price, residents determine the final land-use transition of each cell in the candidate region that is formed in the previous step. Jiangxia, a suburban area in Wuhan, is used as a case study area to simulate the spatial and temporal dynamics of urban growth. The proposed model, which couples game theory and human decision making in the land-development process, can effectively represent and simulate the spatiotemporal dynamics and patterns of urban growth as well as explain the driving mechanism of urban expansion. Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers © COPYRIGHT 2016 American Society of Civil Engineers Technical Papers Municipal government Urban sprawl Case studies Game theory Farmers City planning Urban land use Models Usage Zhou, Kehao oth Tan, Ronghui oth Tang, Shuohua oth Liu, Yaolin oth Liu, Gege oth Enthalten in Journal of urban planning and development Reston, Va. : ASCE, 1983 142(2016), 2 (DE-627)12962084X (DE-600)246108-0 (DE-576)015127141 0733-9488 nnns volume:142 year:2016 number:2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)UP.1943-5444.0000304 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-UMW SSG-OLC-ARC SSG-OLC-TEC SSG-OLC-GEO GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_4700 74.72 AVZ AR 142 2016 2 |
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10.1061/(ASCE)UP.1943-5444.0000304 doi PQ20160719 (DE-627)OLC1976486572 (DE-599)GBVOLC1976486572 (PRQ)a1302-53a7c4cef6ddaaac5b340b54d973cfa61468264d17b0617f0dc06d905a34204a0 (KEY)0003395220160000142000200000urbangrowthmodelingbasedonagamebetweenfarmersandgo DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 690 ZDB 74.72 bkl He, Qingsong verfasserin aut Urban Growth Modeling Based on a Game between Farmers and Governments: Case Study of Urban Fringe in Wuhan, Hubei Province in China 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier AbstractUrban systems are complicated systems where land-use changes may significantly affect the environment and the ecosystem. Therefore, modeling urban growth is crucial for urban planners and administrators to support sustainable development. This paper provides a spatially disaggregated model for urban growth simulation that is characterized by the innovative idea that considers the behavior of residents and couples the explorations of the game between farmers and governments in the land development process. Three kinds of agents, namely, residents, farmers, and governments, make their decisions according to their land use–conversion preferences. Through the use of different strategies that are abstracted from actual land transactions in China, the payoffs to farmers and governments in the game of land expropriation are quantified and then the Nash equilibrium solution of the game is worked out. Those cells with mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solutions that include a probability of greater than 0.5 that either governments will expropriate land legally or that farmers will accept the land acquisition of the governments are referred to as “candidate regions for urban expansion.” Based on how they evaluate the “candidate region” condition according to the surrounding environment and land price, residents determine the final land-use transition of each cell in the candidate region that is formed in the previous step. Jiangxia, a suburban area in Wuhan, is used as a case study area to simulate the spatial and temporal dynamics of urban growth. The proposed model, which couples game theory and human decision making in the land-development process, can effectively represent and simulate the spatiotemporal dynamics and patterns of urban growth as well as explain the driving mechanism of urban expansion. Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers © COPYRIGHT 2016 American Society of Civil Engineers Technical Papers Municipal government Urban sprawl Case studies Game theory Farmers City planning Urban land use Models Usage Zhou, Kehao oth Tan, Ronghui oth Tang, Shuohua oth Liu, Yaolin oth Liu, Gege oth Enthalten in Journal of urban planning and development Reston, Va. : ASCE, 1983 142(2016), 2 (DE-627)12962084X (DE-600)246108-0 (DE-576)015127141 0733-9488 nnns volume:142 year:2016 number:2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)UP.1943-5444.0000304 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-UMW SSG-OLC-ARC SSG-OLC-TEC SSG-OLC-GEO GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_4700 74.72 AVZ AR 142 2016 2 |
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10.1061/(ASCE)UP.1943-5444.0000304 doi PQ20160719 (DE-627)OLC1976486572 (DE-599)GBVOLC1976486572 (PRQ)a1302-53a7c4cef6ddaaac5b340b54d973cfa61468264d17b0617f0dc06d905a34204a0 (KEY)0003395220160000142000200000urbangrowthmodelingbasedonagamebetweenfarmersandgo DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 690 ZDB 74.72 bkl He, Qingsong verfasserin aut Urban Growth Modeling Based on a Game between Farmers and Governments: Case Study of Urban Fringe in Wuhan, Hubei Province in China 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier AbstractUrban systems are complicated systems where land-use changes may significantly affect the environment and the ecosystem. Therefore, modeling urban growth is crucial for urban planners and administrators to support sustainable development. This paper provides a spatially disaggregated model for urban growth simulation that is characterized by the innovative idea that considers the behavior of residents and couples the explorations of the game between farmers and governments in the land development process. Three kinds of agents, namely, residents, farmers, and governments, make their decisions according to their land use–conversion preferences. Through the use of different strategies that are abstracted from actual land transactions in China, the payoffs to farmers and governments in the game of land expropriation are quantified and then the Nash equilibrium solution of the game is worked out. Those cells with mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solutions that include a probability of greater than 0.5 that either governments will expropriate land legally or that farmers will accept the land acquisition of the governments are referred to as “candidate regions for urban expansion.” Based on how they evaluate the “candidate region” condition according to the surrounding environment and land price, residents determine the final land-use transition of each cell in the candidate region that is formed in the previous step. Jiangxia, a suburban area in Wuhan, is used as a case study area to simulate the spatial and temporal dynamics of urban growth. The proposed model, which couples game theory and human decision making in the land-development process, can effectively represent and simulate the spatiotemporal dynamics and patterns of urban growth as well as explain the driving mechanism of urban expansion. Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers © COPYRIGHT 2016 American Society of Civil Engineers Technical Papers Municipal government Urban sprawl Case studies Game theory Farmers City planning Urban land use Models Usage Zhou, Kehao oth Tan, Ronghui oth Tang, Shuohua oth Liu, Yaolin oth Liu, Gege oth Enthalten in Journal of urban planning and development Reston, Va. : ASCE, 1983 142(2016), 2 (DE-627)12962084X (DE-600)246108-0 (DE-576)015127141 0733-9488 nnns volume:142 year:2016 number:2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)UP.1943-5444.0000304 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-UMW SSG-OLC-ARC SSG-OLC-TEC SSG-OLC-GEO GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_4700 74.72 AVZ AR 142 2016 2 |
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10.1061/(ASCE)UP.1943-5444.0000304 doi PQ20160719 (DE-627)OLC1976486572 (DE-599)GBVOLC1976486572 (PRQ)a1302-53a7c4cef6ddaaac5b340b54d973cfa61468264d17b0617f0dc06d905a34204a0 (KEY)0003395220160000142000200000urbangrowthmodelingbasedonagamebetweenfarmersandgo DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 690 ZDB 74.72 bkl He, Qingsong verfasserin aut Urban Growth Modeling Based on a Game between Farmers and Governments: Case Study of Urban Fringe in Wuhan, Hubei Province in China 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier AbstractUrban systems are complicated systems where land-use changes may significantly affect the environment and the ecosystem. Therefore, modeling urban growth is crucial for urban planners and administrators to support sustainable development. This paper provides a spatially disaggregated model for urban growth simulation that is characterized by the innovative idea that considers the behavior of residents and couples the explorations of the game between farmers and governments in the land development process. Three kinds of agents, namely, residents, farmers, and governments, make their decisions according to their land use–conversion preferences. Through the use of different strategies that are abstracted from actual land transactions in China, the payoffs to farmers and governments in the game of land expropriation are quantified and then the Nash equilibrium solution of the game is worked out. Those cells with mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solutions that include a probability of greater than 0.5 that either governments will expropriate land legally or that farmers will accept the land acquisition of the governments are referred to as “candidate regions for urban expansion.” Based on how they evaluate the “candidate region” condition according to the surrounding environment and land price, residents determine the final land-use transition of each cell in the candidate region that is formed in the previous step. Jiangxia, a suburban area in Wuhan, is used as a case study area to simulate the spatial and temporal dynamics of urban growth. The proposed model, which couples game theory and human decision making in the land-development process, can effectively represent and simulate the spatiotemporal dynamics and patterns of urban growth as well as explain the driving mechanism of urban expansion. Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers © COPYRIGHT 2016 American Society of Civil Engineers Technical Papers Municipal government Urban sprawl Case studies Game theory Farmers City planning Urban land use Models Usage Zhou, Kehao oth Tan, Ronghui oth Tang, Shuohua oth Liu, Yaolin oth Liu, Gege oth Enthalten in Journal of urban planning and development Reston, Va. : ASCE, 1983 142(2016), 2 (DE-627)12962084X (DE-600)246108-0 (DE-576)015127141 0733-9488 nnns volume:142 year:2016 number:2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)UP.1943-5444.0000304 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-UMW SSG-OLC-ARC SSG-OLC-TEC SSG-OLC-GEO GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_4700 74.72 AVZ AR 142 2016 2 |
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Therefore, modeling urban growth is crucial for urban planners and administrators to support sustainable development. This paper provides a spatially disaggregated model for urban growth simulation that is characterized by the innovative idea that considers the behavior of residents and couples the explorations of the game between farmers and governments in the land development process. Three kinds of agents, namely, residents, farmers, and governments, make their decisions according to their land use–conversion preferences. Through the use of different strategies that are abstracted from actual land transactions in China, the payoffs to farmers and governments in the game of land expropriation are quantified and then the Nash equilibrium solution of the game is worked out. Those cells with mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solutions that include a probability of greater than 0.5 that either governments will expropriate land legally or that farmers will accept the land acquisition of the governments are referred to as “candidate regions for urban expansion.” Based on how they evaluate the “candidate region” condition according to the surrounding environment and land price, residents determine the final land-use transition of each cell in the candidate region that is formed in the previous step. Jiangxia, a suburban area in Wuhan, is used as a case study area to simulate the spatial and temporal dynamics of urban growth. 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urban growth modeling based on a game between farmers and governments: case study of urban fringe in wuhan, hubei province in china |
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Urban Growth Modeling Based on a Game between Farmers and Governments: Case Study of Urban Fringe in Wuhan, Hubei Province in China |
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AbstractUrban systems are complicated systems where land-use changes may significantly affect the environment and the ecosystem. Therefore, modeling urban growth is crucial for urban planners and administrators to support sustainable development. This paper provides a spatially disaggregated model for urban growth simulation that is characterized by the innovative idea that considers the behavior of residents and couples the explorations of the game between farmers and governments in the land development process. Three kinds of agents, namely, residents, farmers, and governments, make their decisions according to their land use–conversion preferences. Through the use of different strategies that are abstracted from actual land transactions in China, the payoffs to farmers and governments in the game of land expropriation are quantified and then the Nash equilibrium solution of the game is worked out. Those cells with mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solutions that include a probability of greater than 0.5 that either governments will expropriate land legally or that farmers will accept the land acquisition of the governments are referred to as “candidate regions for urban expansion.” Based on how they evaluate the “candidate region” condition according to the surrounding environment and land price, residents determine the final land-use transition of each cell in the candidate region that is formed in the previous step. Jiangxia, a suburban area in Wuhan, is used as a case study area to simulate the spatial and temporal dynamics of urban growth. The proposed model, which couples game theory and human decision making in the land-development process, can effectively represent and simulate the spatiotemporal dynamics and patterns of urban growth as well as explain the driving mechanism of urban expansion. |
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AbstractUrban systems are complicated systems where land-use changes may significantly affect the environment and the ecosystem. Therefore, modeling urban growth is crucial for urban planners and administrators to support sustainable development. This paper provides a spatially disaggregated model for urban growth simulation that is characterized by the innovative idea that considers the behavior of residents and couples the explorations of the game between farmers and governments in the land development process. Three kinds of agents, namely, residents, farmers, and governments, make their decisions according to their land use–conversion preferences. Through the use of different strategies that are abstracted from actual land transactions in China, the payoffs to farmers and governments in the game of land expropriation are quantified and then the Nash equilibrium solution of the game is worked out. Those cells with mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solutions that include a probability of greater than 0.5 that either governments will expropriate land legally or that farmers will accept the land acquisition of the governments are referred to as “candidate regions for urban expansion.” Based on how they evaluate the “candidate region” condition according to the surrounding environment and land price, residents determine the final land-use transition of each cell in the candidate region that is formed in the previous step. Jiangxia, a suburban area in Wuhan, is used as a case study area to simulate the spatial and temporal dynamics of urban growth. The proposed model, which couples game theory and human decision making in the land-development process, can effectively represent and simulate the spatiotemporal dynamics and patterns of urban growth as well as explain the driving mechanism of urban expansion. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
AbstractUrban systems are complicated systems where land-use changes may significantly affect the environment and the ecosystem. Therefore, modeling urban growth is crucial for urban planners and administrators to support sustainable development. This paper provides a spatially disaggregated model for urban growth simulation that is characterized by the innovative idea that considers the behavior of residents and couples the explorations of the game between farmers and governments in the land development process. Three kinds of agents, namely, residents, farmers, and governments, make their decisions according to their land use–conversion preferences. Through the use of different strategies that are abstracted from actual land transactions in China, the payoffs to farmers and governments in the game of land expropriation are quantified and then the Nash equilibrium solution of the game is worked out. Those cells with mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solutions that include a probability of greater than 0.5 that either governments will expropriate land legally or that farmers will accept the land acquisition of the governments are referred to as “candidate regions for urban expansion.” Based on how they evaluate the “candidate region” condition according to the surrounding environment and land price, residents determine the final land-use transition of each cell in the candidate region that is formed in the previous step. Jiangxia, a suburban area in Wuhan, is used as a case study area to simulate the spatial and temporal dynamics of urban growth. The proposed model, which couples game theory and human decision making in the land-development process, can effectively represent and simulate the spatiotemporal dynamics and patterns of urban growth as well as explain the driving mechanism of urban expansion. |
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