THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION
Innovation is typically a trial‐and‐error process. While some research paths lead to the innovation sought, others result in dead ends. Because firms benefit from their competitors working in the wrong direction, they do not reveal their dead‐end findings. Time and resources are wasted on projects t...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Akcigit, Ufuk [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2016 |
|---|
| Rechteinformationen: |
Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 by the European Economic Association |
|---|
| Schlagwörter: |
|---|
| Systematik: |
|
|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Journal of the European Economic Association - Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003, 14(2016), 4, Seite 828-870 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:14 ; year:2016 ; number:4 ; pages:828-870 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1111/jeea.12153 |
|---|
| Katalog-ID: |
OLC1980783136 |
|---|
| LEADER | 01000caa a2200265 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | OLC1980783136 | ||
| 003 | DE-627 | ||
| 005 | 20220215085327.0 | ||
| 007 | tu | ||
| 008 | 160816s2016 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1111/jeea.12153 |2 doi | |
| 028 | 5 | 2 | |a PQ20160815 |
| 035 | |a (DE-627)OLC1980783136 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBVOLC1980783136 | ||
| 035 | |a (PRQ)c1658-b09ff88386ec44dd05c90ab3482b1f71dac9d320648e3732b4fe9d96e1796b350 | ||
| 035 | |a (KEY)0531943920160000014000400828roleofinformationininnovationandcompetition | ||
| 040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | |a eng | ||
| 082 | 0 | 4 | |a 330 |q DNB |
| 084 | |a QA 10000 |q AVZ |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a 83.00 |2 bkl | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Akcigit, Ufuk |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 4 | |a THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION |
| 264 | 1 | |c 2016 | |
| 336 | |a Text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a Band |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 520 | |a Innovation is typically a trial‐and‐error process. While some research paths lead to the innovation sought, others result in dead ends. Because firms benefit from their competitors working in the wrong direction, they do not reveal their dead‐end findings. Time and resources are wasted on projects that other firms have already found to be fruitless. We offer a simple model with two firms and two research lines to study this prevalent problem. We characterize the equilibrium in a decentralized environment that necessarily entails significant efficiency losses due to wasteful dead‐end replication and an information externality that leads to an early abandonment of the risky project. We show that different types of firms follow different innovation strategies and create different kinds of welfare losses. In an extension of the core model, we also study a centralized mechanism whereby firms are incentivized to disclose their actions and share their private information in a timely manner. (JEL: O31, D92) | ||
| 540 | |a Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 by the European Economic Association | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Competition | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Economic models | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Innovations | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Liu, Qingmin |4 oth | |
| 773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t Journal of the European Economic Association |d Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003 |g 14(2016), 4, Seite 828-870 |w (DE-627)366930028 |w (DE-600)2114709-7 |w (DE-576)106846345 |x 1542-4766 |7 nnns |
| 773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:14 |g year:2016 |g number:4 |g pages:828-870 |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12153 |3 Volltext |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |u http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jeea.12153/abstract |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |u http://search.proquest.com/docview/1805792285 |
| 912 | |a GBV_USEFLAG_A | ||
| 912 | |a SYSFLAG_A | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_OLC | ||
| 912 | |a SSG-OLC-WIW | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_26 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_70 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2012 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2062 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4125 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4126 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4305 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4318 | ||
| 936 | r | v | |a QA 10000 |
| 936 | b | k | |a 83.00 |q AVZ |
| 951 | |a AR | ||
| 952 | |d 14 |j 2016 |e 4 |h 828-870 | ||
| author_variant |
u a ua |
|---|---|
| matchkey_str |
article:15424766:2016----::hrloifrainnnoain |
| hierarchy_sort_str |
2016 |
| bklnumber |
83.00 |
| publishDate |
2016 |
| allfields |
10.1111/jeea.12153 doi PQ20160815 (DE-627)OLC1980783136 (DE-599)GBVOLC1980783136 (PRQ)c1658-b09ff88386ec44dd05c90ab3482b1f71dac9d320648e3732b4fe9d96e1796b350 (KEY)0531943920160000014000400828roleofinformationininnovationandcompetition DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DNB QA 10000 AVZ rvk 83.00 bkl Akcigit, Ufuk verfasserin aut THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier Innovation is typically a trial‐and‐error process. While some research paths lead to the innovation sought, others result in dead ends. Because firms benefit from their competitors working in the wrong direction, they do not reveal their dead‐end findings. Time and resources are wasted on projects that other firms have already found to be fruitless. We offer a simple model with two firms and two research lines to study this prevalent problem. We characterize the equilibrium in a decentralized environment that necessarily entails significant efficiency losses due to wasteful dead‐end replication and an information externality that leads to an early abandonment of the risky project. We show that different types of firms follow different innovation strategies and create different kinds of welfare losses. In an extension of the core model, we also study a centralized mechanism whereby firms are incentivized to disclose their actions and share their private information in a timely manner. (JEL: O31, D92) Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 by the European Economic Association Competition Economic models Innovations Liu, Qingmin oth Enthalten in Journal of the European Economic Association Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003 14(2016), 4, Seite 828-870 (DE-627)366930028 (DE-600)2114709-7 (DE-576)106846345 1542-4766 nnns volume:14 year:2016 number:4 pages:828-870 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12153 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jeea.12153/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1805792285 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2062 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4318 QA 10000 83.00 AVZ AR 14 2016 4 828-870 |
| spelling |
10.1111/jeea.12153 doi PQ20160815 (DE-627)OLC1980783136 (DE-599)GBVOLC1980783136 (PRQ)c1658-b09ff88386ec44dd05c90ab3482b1f71dac9d320648e3732b4fe9d96e1796b350 (KEY)0531943920160000014000400828roleofinformationininnovationandcompetition DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DNB QA 10000 AVZ rvk 83.00 bkl Akcigit, Ufuk verfasserin aut THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier Innovation is typically a trial‐and‐error process. While some research paths lead to the innovation sought, others result in dead ends. Because firms benefit from their competitors working in the wrong direction, they do not reveal their dead‐end findings. Time and resources are wasted on projects that other firms have already found to be fruitless. We offer a simple model with two firms and two research lines to study this prevalent problem. We characterize the equilibrium in a decentralized environment that necessarily entails significant efficiency losses due to wasteful dead‐end replication and an information externality that leads to an early abandonment of the risky project. We show that different types of firms follow different innovation strategies and create different kinds of welfare losses. In an extension of the core model, we also study a centralized mechanism whereby firms are incentivized to disclose their actions and share their private information in a timely manner. (JEL: O31, D92) Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 by the European Economic Association Competition Economic models Innovations Liu, Qingmin oth Enthalten in Journal of the European Economic Association Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003 14(2016), 4, Seite 828-870 (DE-627)366930028 (DE-600)2114709-7 (DE-576)106846345 1542-4766 nnns volume:14 year:2016 number:4 pages:828-870 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12153 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jeea.12153/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1805792285 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2062 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4318 QA 10000 83.00 AVZ AR 14 2016 4 828-870 |
| allfields_unstemmed |
10.1111/jeea.12153 doi PQ20160815 (DE-627)OLC1980783136 (DE-599)GBVOLC1980783136 (PRQ)c1658-b09ff88386ec44dd05c90ab3482b1f71dac9d320648e3732b4fe9d96e1796b350 (KEY)0531943920160000014000400828roleofinformationininnovationandcompetition DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DNB QA 10000 AVZ rvk 83.00 bkl Akcigit, Ufuk verfasserin aut THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier Innovation is typically a trial‐and‐error process. While some research paths lead to the innovation sought, others result in dead ends. Because firms benefit from their competitors working in the wrong direction, they do not reveal their dead‐end findings. Time and resources are wasted on projects that other firms have already found to be fruitless. We offer a simple model with two firms and two research lines to study this prevalent problem. We characterize the equilibrium in a decentralized environment that necessarily entails significant efficiency losses due to wasteful dead‐end replication and an information externality that leads to an early abandonment of the risky project. We show that different types of firms follow different innovation strategies and create different kinds of welfare losses. In an extension of the core model, we also study a centralized mechanism whereby firms are incentivized to disclose their actions and share their private information in a timely manner. (JEL: O31, D92) Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 by the European Economic Association Competition Economic models Innovations Liu, Qingmin oth Enthalten in Journal of the European Economic Association Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003 14(2016), 4, Seite 828-870 (DE-627)366930028 (DE-600)2114709-7 (DE-576)106846345 1542-4766 nnns volume:14 year:2016 number:4 pages:828-870 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12153 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jeea.12153/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1805792285 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2062 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4318 QA 10000 83.00 AVZ AR 14 2016 4 828-870 |
| allfieldsGer |
10.1111/jeea.12153 doi PQ20160815 (DE-627)OLC1980783136 (DE-599)GBVOLC1980783136 (PRQ)c1658-b09ff88386ec44dd05c90ab3482b1f71dac9d320648e3732b4fe9d96e1796b350 (KEY)0531943920160000014000400828roleofinformationininnovationandcompetition DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DNB QA 10000 AVZ rvk 83.00 bkl Akcigit, Ufuk verfasserin aut THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier Innovation is typically a trial‐and‐error process. While some research paths lead to the innovation sought, others result in dead ends. Because firms benefit from their competitors working in the wrong direction, they do not reveal their dead‐end findings. Time and resources are wasted on projects that other firms have already found to be fruitless. We offer a simple model with two firms and two research lines to study this prevalent problem. We characterize the equilibrium in a decentralized environment that necessarily entails significant efficiency losses due to wasteful dead‐end replication and an information externality that leads to an early abandonment of the risky project. We show that different types of firms follow different innovation strategies and create different kinds of welfare losses. In an extension of the core model, we also study a centralized mechanism whereby firms are incentivized to disclose their actions and share their private information in a timely manner. (JEL: O31, D92) Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 by the European Economic Association Competition Economic models Innovations Liu, Qingmin oth Enthalten in Journal of the European Economic Association Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003 14(2016), 4, Seite 828-870 (DE-627)366930028 (DE-600)2114709-7 (DE-576)106846345 1542-4766 nnns volume:14 year:2016 number:4 pages:828-870 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12153 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jeea.12153/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1805792285 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2062 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4318 QA 10000 83.00 AVZ AR 14 2016 4 828-870 |
| allfieldsSound |
10.1111/jeea.12153 doi PQ20160815 (DE-627)OLC1980783136 (DE-599)GBVOLC1980783136 (PRQ)c1658-b09ff88386ec44dd05c90ab3482b1f71dac9d320648e3732b4fe9d96e1796b350 (KEY)0531943920160000014000400828roleofinformationininnovationandcompetition DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DNB QA 10000 AVZ rvk 83.00 bkl Akcigit, Ufuk verfasserin aut THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier Innovation is typically a trial‐and‐error process. While some research paths lead to the innovation sought, others result in dead ends. Because firms benefit from their competitors working in the wrong direction, they do not reveal their dead‐end findings. Time and resources are wasted on projects that other firms have already found to be fruitless. We offer a simple model with two firms and two research lines to study this prevalent problem. We characterize the equilibrium in a decentralized environment that necessarily entails significant efficiency losses due to wasteful dead‐end replication and an information externality that leads to an early abandonment of the risky project. We show that different types of firms follow different innovation strategies and create different kinds of welfare losses. In an extension of the core model, we also study a centralized mechanism whereby firms are incentivized to disclose their actions and share their private information in a timely manner. (JEL: O31, D92) Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 by the European Economic Association Competition Economic models Innovations Liu, Qingmin oth Enthalten in Journal of the European Economic Association Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003 14(2016), 4, Seite 828-870 (DE-627)366930028 (DE-600)2114709-7 (DE-576)106846345 1542-4766 nnns volume:14 year:2016 number:4 pages:828-870 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12153 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jeea.12153/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1805792285 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2062 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4318 QA 10000 83.00 AVZ AR 14 2016 4 828-870 |
| language |
English |
| source |
Enthalten in Journal of the European Economic Association 14(2016), 4, Seite 828-870 volume:14 year:2016 number:4 pages:828-870 |
| sourceStr |
Enthalten in Journal of the European Economic Association 14(2016), 4, Seite 828-870 volume:14 year:2016 number:4 pages:828-870 |
| format_phy_str_mv |
Article |
| institution |
findex.gbv.de |
| topic_facet |
Competition Economic models Innovations |
| dewey-raw |
330 |
| isfreeaccess_bool |
false |
| container_title |
Journal of the European Economic Association |
| authorswithroles_txt_mv |
Akcigit, Ufuk @@aut@@ Liu, Qingmin @@oth@@ |
| publishDateDaySort_date |
2016-01-01T00:00:00Z |
| hierarchy_top_id |
366930028 |
| dewey-sort |
3330 |
| id |
OLC1980783136 |
| language_de |
englisch |
| fullrecord |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a2200265 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC1980783136</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20220215085327.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">160816s2016 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1111/jeea.12153</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="028" ind1="5" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">PQ20160815</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC1980783136</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVOLC1980783136</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(PRQ)c1658-b09ff88386ec44dd05c90ab3482b1f71dac9d320648e3732b4fe9d96e1796b350</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(KEY)0531943920160000014000400828roleofinformationininnovationandcompetition</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">330</subfield><subfield code="q">DNB</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QA 10000</subfield><subfield code="q">AVZ</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">83.00</subfield><subfield code="2">bkl</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Akcigit, Ufuk</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2016</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Innovation is typically a trial‐and‐error process. While some research paths lead to the innovation sought, others result in dead ends. Because firms benefit from their competitors working in the wrong direction, they do not reveal their dead‐end findings. Time and resources are wasted on projects that other firms have already found to be fruitless. We offer a simple model with two firms and two research lines to study this prevalent problem. We characterize the equilibrium in a decentralized environment that necessarily entails significant efficiency losses due to wasteful dead‐end replication and an information externality that leads to an early abandonment of the risky project. We show that different types of firms follow different innovation strategies and create different kinds of welfare losses. In an extension of the core model, we also study a centralized mechanism whereby firms are incentivized to disclose their actions and share their private information in a timely manner. (JEL: O31, D92)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 by the European Economic Association</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Competition</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Economic models</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Innovations</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Liu, Qingmin</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Journal of the European Economic Association</subfield><subfield code="d">Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003</subfield><subfield code="g">14(2016), 4, Seite 828-870</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)366930028</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2114709-7</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)106846345</subfield><subfield code="x">1542-4766</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:14</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2016</subfield><subfield code="g">number:4</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:828-870</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12153</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jeea.12153/abstract</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">http://search.proquest.com/docview/1805792285</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_OLC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-WIW</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_26</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_70</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2062</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4125</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4126</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4305</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4318</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="936" ind1="r" ind2="v"><subfield code="a">QA 10000</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="936" ind1="b" ind2="k"><subfield code="a">83.00</subfield><subfield code="q">AVZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">14</subfield><subfield code="j">2016</subfield><subfield code="e">4</subfield><subfield code="h">828-870</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| author |
Akcigit, Ufuk |
| spellingShingle |
Akcigit, Ufuk ddc 330 rvk QA 10000 bkl 83.00 misc Competition misc Economic models misc Innovations THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION |
| authorStr |
Akcigit, Ufuk |
| ppnlink_with_tag_str_mv |
@@773@@(DE-627)366930028 |
| format |
Article |
| dewey-ones |
330 - Economics |
| delete_txt_mv |
keep |
| author_role |
aut |
| collection |
OLC |
| remote_str |
false |
| illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
| issn |
1542-4766 |
| topic_title |
330 DNB QA 10000 AVZ rvk 83.00 bkl THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION Competition Economic models Innovations |
| topic |
ddc 330 rvk QA 10000 bkl 83.00 misc Competition misc Economic models misc Innovations |
| topic_unstemmed |
ddc 330 rvk QA 10000 bkl 83.00 misc Competition misc Economic models misc Innovations |
| topic_browse |
ddc 330 rvk QA 10000 bkl 83.00 misc Competition misc Economic models misc Innovations |
| format_facet |
Aufsätze Gedruckte Aufsätze |
| format_main_str_mv |
Text Zeitschrift/Artikel |
| carriertype_str_mv |
nc |
| author2_variant |
q l ql |
| hierarchy_parent_title |
Journal of the European Economic Association |
| hierarchy_parent_id |
366930028 |
| dewey-tens |
330 - Economics |
| hierarchy_top_title |
Journal of the European Economic Association |
| isfreeaccess_txt |
false |
| familylinks_str_mv |
(DE-627)366930028 (DE-600)2114709-7 (DE-576)106846345 |
| title |
THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION |
| ctrlnum |
(DE-627)OLC1980783136 (DE-599)GBVOLC1980783136 (PRQ)c1658-b09ff88386ec44dd05c90ab3482b1f71dac9d320648e3732b4fe9d96e1796b350 (KEY)0531943920160000014000400828roleofinformationininnovationandcompetition |
| title_full |
THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION |
| author_sort |
Akcigit, Ufuk |
| journal |
Journal of the European Economic Association |
| journalStr |
Journal of the European Economic Association |
| lang_code |
eng |
| isOA_bool |
false |
| dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
| recordtype |
marc |
| publishDateSort |
2016 |
| contenttype_str_mv |
txt |
| container_start_page |
828 |
| author_browse |
Akcigit, Ufuk |
| container_volume |
14 |
| class |
330 DNB QA 10000 AVZ rvk 83.00 bkl |
| format_se |
Aufsätze |
| author-letter |
Akcigit, Ufuk |
| doi_str_mv |
10.1111/jeea.12153 |
| dewey-full |
330 |
| title_sort |
role of information in innovation and competition |
| title_auth |
THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION |
| abstract |
Innovation is typically a trial‐and‐error process. While some research paths lead to the innovation sought, others result in dead ends. Because firms benefit from their competitors working in the wrong direction, they do not reveal their dead‐end findings. Time and resources are wasted on projects that other firms have already found to be fruitless. We offer a simple model with two firms and two research lines to study this prevalent problem. We characterize the equilibrium in a decentralized environment that necessarily entails significant efficiency losses due to wasteful dead‐end replication and an information externality that leads to an early abandonment of the risky project. We show that different types of firms follow different innovation strategies and create different kinds of welfare losses. In an extension of the core model, we also study a centralized mechanism whereby firms are incentivized to disclose their actions and share their private information in a timely manner. (JEL: O31, D92) |
| abstractGer |
Innovation is typically a trial‐and‐error process. While some research paths lead to the innovation sought, others result in dead ends. Because firms benefit from their competitors working in the wrong direction, they do not reveal their dead‐end findings. Time and resources are wasted on projects that other firms have already found to be fruitless. We offer a simple model with two firms and two research lines to study this prevalent problem. We characterize the equilibrium in a decentralized environment that necessarily entails significant efficiency losses due to wasteful dead‐end replication and an information externality that leads to an early abandonment of the risky project. We show that different types of firms follow different innovation strategies and create different kinds of welfare losses. In an extension of the core model, we also study a centralized mechanism whereby firms are incentivized to disclose their actions and share their private information in a timely manner. (JEL: O31, D92) |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Innovation is typically a trial‐and‐error process. While some research paths lead to the innovation sought, others result in dead ends. Because firms benefit from their competitors working in the wrong direction, they do not reveal their dead‐end findings. Time and resources are wasted on projects that other firms have already found to be fruitless. We offer a simple model with two firms and two research lines to study this prevalent problem. We characterize the equilibrium in a decentralized environment that necessarily entails significant efficiency losses due to wasteful dead‐end replication and an information externality that leads to an early abandonment of the risky project. We show that different types of firms follow different innovation strategies and create different kinds of welfare losses. In an extension of the core model, we also study a centralized mechanism whereby firms are incentivized to disclose their actions and share their private information in a timely manner. (JEL: O31, D92) |
| collection_details |
GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2062 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4318 |
| container_issue |
4 |
| title_short |
THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION |
| url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12153 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jeea.12153/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1805792285 |
| remote_bool |
false |
| author2 |
Liu, Qingmin |
| author2Str |
Liu, Qingmin |
| ppnlink |
366930028 |
| mediatype_str_mv |
n |
| isOA_txt |
false |
| hochschulschrift_bool |
false |
| author2_role |
oth |
| doi_str |
10.1111/jeea.12153 |
| up_date |
2024-07-04T03:45:50.426Z |
| _version_ |
1803618615759470592 |
| fullrecord_marcxml |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a2200265 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC1980783136</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20220215085327.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">160816s2016 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1111/jeea.12153</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="028" ind1="5" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">PQ20160815</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC1980783136</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVOLC1980783136</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(PRQ)c1658-b09ff88386ec44dd05c90ab3482b1f71dac9d320648e3732b4fe9d96e1796b350</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(KEY)0531943920160000014000400828roleofinformationininnovationandcompetition</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">330</subfield><subfield code="q">DNB</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QA 10000</subfield><subfield code="q">AVZ</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">83.00</subfield><subfield code="2">bkl</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Akcigit, Ufuk</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2016</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Innovation is typically a trial‐and‐error process. While some research paths lead to the innovation sought, others result in dead ends. Because firms benefit from their competitors working in the wrong direction, they do not reveal their dead‐end findings. Time and resources are wasted on projects that other firms have already found to be fruitless. We offer a simple model with two firms and two research lines to study this prevalent problem. We characterize the equilibrium in a decentralized environment that necessarily entails significant efficiency losses due to wasteful dead‐end replication and an information externality that leads to an early abandonment of the risky project. We show that different types of firms follow different innovation strategies and create different kinds of welfare losses. In an extension of the core model, we also study a centralized mechanism whereby firms are incentivized to disclose their actions and share their private information in a timely manner. (JEL: O31, D92)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 by the European Economic Association</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Competition</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Economic models</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Innovations</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Liu, Qingmin</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Journal of the European Economic Association</subfield><subfield code="d">Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003</subfield><subfield code="g">14(2016), 4, Seite 828-870</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)366930028</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2114709-7</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)106846345</subfield><subfield code="x">1542-4766</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:14</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2016</subfield><subfield code="g">number:4</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:828-870</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12153</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jeea.12153/abstract</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">http://search.proquest.com/docview/1805792285</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_OLC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-WIW</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_26</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_70</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2062</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4125</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4126</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4305</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4318</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="936" ind1="r" ind2="v"><subfield code="a">QA 10000</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="936" ind1="b" ind2="k"><subfield code="a">83.00</subfield><subfield code="q">AVZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">14</subfield><subfield code="j">2016</subfield><subfield code="e">4</subfield><subfield code="h">828-870</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| score |
7.3987722 |