Models and reality
Kripke models, interpreted realistically, have difficulty making sense of the thesis that there might have existed things that do not in fact exist, since a Kripke model in which this thesis is true requires a model structure in which there are possible worlds with domains that contain things that d...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Stalnaker, Robert [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
2016 |
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Rechteinformationen: |
Nutzungsrecht: © 2016 Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2016 |
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Schlagwörter: |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Canadian journal of philosophy - New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 1971, 46(2016), 4-5, Seite 709-726 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:46 ; year:2016 ; number:4-5 ; pages:709-726 |
Links: |
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DOI / URN: |
10.1080/00455091.2016.1156979 |
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Kripke models, interpreted realistically, have difficulty making sense of the thesis that there might have existed things that do not in fact exist, since a Kripke model in which this thesis is true requires a model structure in which there are possible worlds with domains that contain things that do not exist. This paper argues that we can use Kripke models as representational devices that allow us to give a realistic interpretation of a modal language. The method of doing this is sketched, with the help of an analogy with a Galilean relativist theory of spatial properties and relations. |
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Kripke models, interpreted realistically, have difficulty making sense of the thesis that there might have existed things that do not in fact exist, since a Kripke model in which this thesis is true requires a model structure in which there are possible worlds with domains that contain things that do not exist. This paper argues that we can use Kripke models as representational devices that allow us to give a realistic interpretation of a modal language. The method of doing this is sketched, with the help of an analogy with a Galilean relativist theory of spatial properties and relations. |
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This paper argues that we can use Kripke models as representational devices that allow us to give a realistic interpretation of a modal language. 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