Washington's failure to resolve the North Korean nuclear conundrum: examining two decades of US policy
More than two decades of nuclear dialogue between the United States and North Korea have not prevented Pyongyang from conducting four nuclear tests and building up a nuclear weapons arsenal. Putting the blame for the failure of this dialogue solely on Pyongyang ignores the hesitancy and confusion of...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
FARAGO, NIV [verfasserIn] |
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Englisch |
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2016 |
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Rechteinformationen: |
Nutzungsrecht: 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. © COPYRIGHT 2016 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: International affairs - Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1931, 92(2016), 5, Seite 1127-1145 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:92 ; year:2016 ; number:5 ; pages:1127-1145 |
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DOI / URN: |
10.1111/1468-2346.12707 |
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Katalog-ID: |
OLC1981415815 |
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520 | |a More than two decades of nuclear dialogue between the United States and North Korea have not prevented Pyongyang from conducting four nuclear tests and building up a nuclear weapons arsenal. Putting the blame for the failure of this dialogue solely on Pyongyang ignores the hesitancy and confusion of US policy. Historical evidence suggests that the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations consistently failed to prioritize their objectives and adopted an impatient and uncompromising negotiating strategy that contributed to this ongoing non‐proliferation fiasco. Identifying US policy mistakes at important crossroads in the dialogue with Pyongyang could help to prevent similar mistakes in the future. In this regard, the following analysis suggests a new approach towards Pyongyang based on a long‐term trust‐building process during which North Korea would be required to cap and then gradually eliminate its nuclear weapons in return for economic assistance and normalization of relations with the United States. Importantly, the United States might have to resign itself to North Korea's keeping an independent nuclear fuel cycle under supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as to accepting South Korea's request to independently enrich uranium and pyroprocess spent nuclear fuel. This would be a more favourable alternative to allowing North Korea to continue accumulating nuclear weapons. Moreover, if the United States continues on the Obama administration's failed policy path, then there is a better than even chance that the Korean Peninsula may slide into a nuclear arms race. | ||
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10.1111/1468-2346.12707 doi PQ20170206 (DE-627)OLC1981415815 (DE-599)GBVOLC1981415815 (PRQ)c1677-2874bcb26b17434d51b6449345da81e5d2e76697102341b2d4661e3d57e5ae870 (KEY)0026331120160000092000501127washingtonsfailuretoresolvethenorthkoreannuclearco DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 320 DE-600 320 VZ 3,6 0 ssgn PR 1000 PR 1000 VZ rvk (DE-625)rvk/139478: MA 1000 MA 1000 VZ rvk (DE-625)rvk/122259: 89.70 bkl 89.90 bkl FARAGO, NIV verfasserin aut Washington's failure to resolve the North Korean nuclear conundrum: examining two decades of US policy 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier More than two decades of nuclear dialogue between the United States and North Korea have not prevented Pyongyang from conducting four nuclear tests and building up a nuclear weapons arsenal. Putting the blame for the failure of this dialogue solely on Pyongyang ignores the hesitancy and confusion of US policy. Historical evidence suggests that the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations consistently failed to prioritize their objectives and adopted an impatient and uncompromising negotiating strategy that contributed to this ongoing non‐proliferation fiasco. Identifying US policy mistakes at important crossroads in the dialogue with Pyongyang could help to prevent similar mistakes in the future. In this regard, the following analysis suggests a new approach towards Pyongyang based on a long‐term trust‐building process during which North Korea would be required to cap and then gradually eliminate its nuclear weapons in return for economic assistance and normalization of relations with the United States. Importantly, the United States might have to resign itself to North Korea's keeping an independent nuclear fuel cycle under supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as to accepting South Korea's request to independently enrich uranium and pyroprocess spent nuclear fuel. This would be a more favourable alternative to allowing North Korea to continue accumulating nuclear weapons. Moreover, if the United States continues on the Obama administration's failed policy path, then there is a better than even chance that the Korean Peninsula may slide into a nuclear arms race. Nutzungsrecht: 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. © COPYRIGHT 2016 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Nuclear nonproliferation Nuclear industry Nuclear proliferation Nuclear energy Nuclear fuel cycle Analysis Nuclear weapons Foreign policy International relations-US Arms control & disarmament Nuclear fuels Enthalten in International affairs Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1931 92(2016), 5, Seite 1127-1145 (DE-627)129059684 (DE-600)215-X (DE-576)014390272 0020-5850 nnns volume:92 year:2016 number:5 pages:1127-1145 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12707 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12707/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1815334367 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-HIS SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL SSG-OPC-ANG GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_49 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_2024 GBV_ILN_2035 GBV_ILN_2040 GBV_ILN_2060 GBV_ILN_2121 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4238 GBV_ILN_4266 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4325 PR 1000 Zeitschriften Rechtswissenschaft Völkerrecht Rechtswissenschaft Völkerrecht Zeitschriften (DE-625)rvk/139478: (DE-576)205347541 MA 1000 Zeitschriften Politologie Politologie Zeitschriften (DE-625)rvk/122259: (DE-576)201576767 89.70 Internationale Beziehungen: Allgemeines Internationale Beziehungen: Allgemeines VZ 89.90 Außenpolitik Internationale Politik Außenpolitik Internationale Politik VZ AR 92 2016 5 1127-1145 |
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10.1111/1468-2346.12707 doi PQ20170206 (DE-627)OLC1981415815 (DE-599)GBVOLC1981415815 (PRQ)c1677-2874bcb26b17434d51b6449345da81e5d2e76697102341b2d4661e3d57e5ae870 (KEY)0026331120160000092000501127washingtonsfailuretoresolvethenorthkoreannuclearco DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 320 DE-600 320 VZ 3,6 0 ssgn PR 1000 PR 1000 VZ rvk (DE-625)rvk/139478: MA 1000 MA 1000 VZ rvk (DE-625)rvk/122259: 89.70 bkl 89.90 bkl FARAGO, NIV verfasserin aut Washington's failure to resolve the North Korean nuclear conundrum: examining two decades of US policy 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier More than two decades of nuclear dialogue between the United States and North Korea have not prevented Pyongyang from conducting four nuclear tests and building up a nuclear weapons arsenal. Putting the blame for the failure of this dialogue solely on Pyongyang ignores the hesitancy and confusion of US policy. Historical evidence suggests that the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations consistently failed to prioritize their objectives and adopted an impatient and uncompromising negotiating strategy that contributed to this ongoing non‐proliferation fiasco. Identifying US policy mistakes at important crossroads in the dialogue with Pyongyang could help to prevent similar mistakes in the future. In this regard, the following analysis suggests a new approach towards Pyongyang based on a long‐term trust‐building process during which North Korea would be required to cap and then gradually eliminate its nuclear weapons in return for economic assistance and normalization of relations with the United States. Importantly, the United States might have to resign itself to North Korea's keeping an independent nuclear fuel cycle under supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as to accepting South Korea's request to independently enrich uranium and pyroprocess spent nuclear fuel. This would be a more favourable alternative to allowing North Korea to continue accumulating nuclear weapons. Moreover, if the United States continues on the Obama administration's failed policy path, then there is a better than even chance that the Korean Peninsula may slide into a nuclear arms race. Nutzungsrecht: 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. © COPYRIGHT 2016 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Nuclear nonproliferation Nuclear industry Nuclear proliferation Nuclear energy Nuclear fuel cycle Analysis Nuclear weapons Foreign policy International relations-US Arms control & disarmament Nuclear fuels Enthalten in International affairs Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1931 92(2016), 5, Seite 1127-1145 (DE-627)129059684 (DE-600)215-X (DE-576)014390272 0020-5850 nnns volume:92 year:2016 number:5 pages:1127-1145 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12707 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12707/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1815334367 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-HIS SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL SSG-OPC-ANG GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_49 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_2024 GBV_ILN_2035 GBV_ILN_2040 GBV_ILN_2060 GBV_ILN_2121 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4238 GBV_ILN_4266 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4325 PR 1000 Zeitschriften Rechtswissenschaft Völkerrecht Rechtswissenschaft Völkerrecht Zeitschriften (DE-625)rvk/139478: (DE-576)205347541 MA 1000 Zeitschriften Politologie Politologie Zeitschriften (DE-625)rvk/122259: (DE-576)201576767 89.70 Internationale Beziehungen: Allgemeines Internationale Beziehungen: Allgemeines VZ 89.90 Außenpolitik Internationale Politik Außenpolitik Internationale Politik VZ AR 92 2016 5 1127-1145 |
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10.1111/1468-2346.12707 doi PQ20170206 (DE-627)OLC1981415815 (DE-599)GBVOLC1981415815 (PRQ)c1677-2874bcb26b17434d51b6449345da81e5d2e76697102341b2d4661e3d57e5ae870 (KEY)0026331120160000092000501127washingtonsfailuretoresolvethenorthkoreannuclearco DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 320 DE-600 320 VZ 3,6 0 ssgn PR 1000 PR 1000 VZ rvk (DE-625)rvk/139478: MA 1000 MA 1000 VZ rvk (DE-625)rvk/122259: 89.70 bkl 89.90 bkl FARAGO, NIV verfasserin aut Washington's failure to resolve the North Korean nuclear conundrum: examining two decades of US policy 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier More than two decades of nuclear dialogue between the United States and North Korea have not prevented Pyongyang from conducting four nuclear tests and building up a nuclear weapons arsenal. Putting the blame for the failure of this dialogue solely on Pyongyang ignores the hesitancy and confusion of US policy. Historical evidence suggests that the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations consistently failed to prioritize their objectives and adopted an impatient and uncompromising negotiating strategy that contributed to this ongoing non‐proliferation fiasco. Identifying US policy mistakes at important crossroads in the dialogue with Pyongyang could help to prevent similar mistakes in the future. In this regard, the following analysis suggests a new approach towards Pyongyang based on a long‐term trust‐building process during which North Korea would be required to cap and then gradually eliminate its nuclear weapons in return for economic assistance and normalization of relations with the United States. Importantly, the United States might have to resign itself to North Korea's keeping an independent nuclear fuel cycle under supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as to accepting South Korea's request to independently enrich uranium and pyroprocess spent nuclear fuel. This would be a more favourable alternative to allowing North Korea to continue accumulating nuclear weapons. Moreover, if the United States continues on the Obama administration's failed policy path, then there is a better than even chance that the Korean Peninsula may slide into a nuclear arms race. Nutzungsrecht: 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. © COPYRIGHT 2016 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Nuclear nonproliferation Nuclear industry Nuclear proliferation Nuclear energy Nuclear fuel cycle Analysis Nuclear weapons Foreign policy International relations-US Arms control & disarmament Nuclear fuels Enthalten in International affairs Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1931 92(2016), 5, Seite 1127-1145 (DE-627)129059684 (DE-600)215-X (DE-576)014390272 0020-5850 nnns volume:92 year:2016 number:5 pages:1127-1145 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12707 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12707/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1815334367 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-HIS SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL SSG-OPC-ANG GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_49 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_2024 GBV_ILN_2035 GBV_ILN_2040 GBV_ILN_2060 GBV_ILN_2121 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4238 GBV_ILN_4266 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4325 PR 1000 Zeitschriften Rechtswissenschaft Völkerrecht Rechtswissenschaft Völkerrecht Zeitschriften (DE-625)rvk/139478: (DE-576)205347541 MA 1000 Zeitschriften Politologie Politologie Zeitschriften (DE-625)rvk/122259: (DE-576)201576767 89.70 Internationale Beziehungen: Allgemeines Internationale Beziehungen: Allgemeines VZ 89.90 Außenpolitik Internationale Politik Außenpolitik Internationale Politik VZ AR 92 2016 5 1127-1145 |
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10.1111/1468-2346.12707 doi PQ20170206 (DE-627)OLC1981415815 (DE-599)GBVOLC1981415815 (PRQ)c1677-2874bcb26b17434d51b6449345da81e5d2e76697102341b2d4661e3d57e5ae870 (KEY)0026331120160000092000501127washingtonsfailuretoresolvethenorthkoreannuclearco DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 320 DE-600 320 VZ 3,6 0 ssgn PR 1000 PR 1000 VZ rvk (DE-625)rvk/139478: MA 1000 MA 1000 VZ rvk (DE-625)rvk/122259: 89.70 bkl 89.90 bkl FARAGO, NIV verfasserin aut Washington's failure to resolve the North Korean nuclear conundrum: examining two decades of US policy 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier More than two decades of nuclear dialogue between the United States and North Korea have not prevented Pyongyang from conducting four nuclear tests and building up a nuclear weapons arsenal. Putting the blame for the failure of this dialogue solely on Pyongyang ignores the hesitancy and confusion of US policy. Historical evidence suggests that the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations consistently failed to prioritize their objectives and adopted an impatient and uncompromising negotiating strategy that contributed to this ongoing non‐proliferation fiasco. Identifying US policy mistakes at important crossroads in the dialogue with Pyongyang could help to prevent similar mistakes in the future. In this regard, the following analysis suggests a new approach towards Pyongyang based on a long‐term trust‐building process during which North Korea would be required to cap and then gradually eliminate its nuclear weapons in return for economic assistance and normalization of relations with the United States. Importantly, the United States might have to resign itself to North Korea's keeping an independent nuclear fuel cycle under supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as to accepting South Korea's request to independently enrich uranium and pyroprocess spent nuclear fuel. This would be a more favourable alternative to allowing North Korea to continue accumulating nuclear weapons. Moreover, if the United States continues on the Obama administration's failed policy path, then there is a better than even chance that the Korean Peninsula may slide into a nuclear arms race. Nutzungsrecht: 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. © COPYRIGHT 2016 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Nuclear nonproliferation Nuclear industry Nuclear proliferation Nuclear energy Nuclear fuel cycle Analysis Nuclear weapons Foreign policy International relations-US Arms control & disarmament Nuclear fuels Enthalten in International affairs Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1931 92(2016), 5, Seite 1127-1145 (DE-627)129059684 (DE-600)215-X (DE-576)014390272 0020-5850 nnns volume:92 year:2016 number:5 pages:1127-1145 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12707 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12707/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1815334367 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-HIS SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL SSG-OPC-ANG GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_49 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_2024 GBV_ILN_2035 GBV_ILN_2040 GBV_ILN_2060 GBV_ILN_2121 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4238 GBV_ILN_4266 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4325 PR 1000 Zeitschriften Rechtswissenschaft Völkerrecht Rechtswissenschaft Völkerrecht Zeitschriften (DE-625)rvk/139478: (DE-576)205347541 MA 1000 Zeitschriften Politologie Politologie Zeitschriften (DE-625)rvk/122259: (DE-576)201576767 89.70 Internationale Beziehungen: Allgemeines Internationale Beziehungen: Allgemeines VZ 89.90 Außenpolitik Internationale Politik Außenpolitik Internationale Politik VZ AR 92 2016 5 1127-1145 |
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Washington's failure to resolve the North Korean nuclear conundrum: examining two decades of US policy |
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More than two decades of nuclear dialogue between the United States and North Korea have not prevented Pyongyang from conducting four nuclear tests and building up a nuclear weapons arsenal. Putting the blame for the failure of this dialogue solely on Pyongyang ignores the hesitancy and confusion of US policy. Historical evidence suggests that the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations consistently failed to prioritize their objectives and adopted an impatient and uncompromising negotiating strategy that contributed to this ongoing non‐proliferation fiasco. Identifying US policy mistakes at important crossroads in the dialogue with Pyongyang could help to prevent similar mistakes in the future. In this regard, the following analysis suggests a new approach towards Pyongyang based on a long‐term trust‐building process during which North Korea would be required to cap and then gradually eliminate its nuclear weapons in return for economic assistance and normalization of relations with the United States. Importantly, the United States might have to resign itself to North Korea's keeping an independent nuclear fuel cycle under supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as to accepting South Korea's request to independently enrich uranium and pyroprocess spent nuclear fuel. This would be a more favourable alternative to allowing North Korea to continue accumulating nuclear weapons. Moreover, if the United States continues on the Obama administration's failed policy path, then there is a better than even chance that the Korean Peninsula may slide into a nuclear arms race. |
abstractGer |
More than two decades of nuclear dialogue between the United States and North Korea have not prevented Pyongyang from conducting four nuclear tests and building up a nuclear weapons arsenal. Putting the blame for the failure of this dialogue solely on Pyongyang ignores the hesitancy and confusion of US policy. Historical evidence suggests that the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations consistently failed to prioritize their objectives and adopted an impatient and uncompromising negotiating strategy that contributed to this ongoing non‐proliferation fiasco. Identifying US policy mistakes at important crossroads in the dialogue with Pyongyang could help to prevent similar mistakes in the future. In this regard, the following analysis suggests a new approach towards Pyongyang based on a long‐term trust‐building process during which North Korea would be required to cap and then gradually eliminate its nuclear weapons in return for economic assistance and normalization of relations with the United States. Importantly, the United States might have to resign itself to North Korea's keeping an independent nuclear fuel cycle under supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as to accepting South Korea's request to independently enrich uranium and pyroprocess spent nuclear fuel. This would be a more favourable alternative to allowing North Korea to continue accumulating nuclear weapons. Moreover, if the United States continues on the Obama administration's failed policy path, then there is a better than even chance that the Korean Peninsula may slide into a nuclear arms race. |
abstract_unstemmed |
More than two decades of nuclear dialogue between the United States and North Korea have not prevented Pyongyang from conducting four nuclear tests and building up a nuclear weapons arsenal. Putting the blame for the failure of this dialogue solely on Pyongyang ignores the hesitancy and confusion of US policy. Historical evidence suggests that the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations consistently failed to prioritize their objectives and adopted an impatient and uncompromising negotiating strategy that contributed to this ongoing non‐proliferation fiasco. Identifying US policy mistakes at important crossroads in the dialogue with Pyongyang could help to prevent similar mistakes in the future. In this regard, the following analysis suggests a new approach towards Pyongyang based on a long‐term trust‐building process during which North Korea would be required to cap and then gradually eliminate its nuclear weapons in return for economic assistance and normalization of relations with the United States. Importantly, the United States might have to resign itself to North Korea's keeping an independent nuclear fuel cycle under supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as to accepting South Korea's request to independently enrich uranium and pyroprocess spent nuclear fuel. This would be a more favourable alternative to allowing North Korea to continue accumulating nuclear weapons. Moreover, if the United States continues on the Obama administration's failed policy path, then there is a better than even chance that the Korean Peninsula may slide into a nuclear arms race. |
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Putting the blame for the failure of this dialogue solely on Pyongyang ignores the hesitancy and confusion of US policy. Historical evidence suggests that the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations consistently failed to prioritize their objectives and adopted an impatient and uncompromising negotiating strategy that contributed to this ongoing non‐proliferation fiasco. Identifying US policy mistakes at important crossroads in the dialogue with Pyongyang could help to prevent similar mistakes in the future. In this regard, the following analysis suggests a new approach towards Pyongyang based on a long‐term trust‐building process during which North Korea would be required to cap and then gradually eliminate its nuclear weapons in return for economic assistance and normalization of relations with the United States. Importantly, the United States might have to resign itself to North Korea's keeping an independent nuclear fuel cycle under supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as to accepting South Korea's request to independently enrich uranium and pyroprocess spent nuclear fuel. This would be a more favourable alternative to allowing North Korea to continue accumulating nuclear weapons. Moreover, if the United States continues on the Obama administration's failed policy path, then there is a better than even chance that the Korean Peninsula may slide into a nuclear arms race.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Nutzungsrecht: 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">© COPYRIGHT 2016 Blackwell Publishers Ltd.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Nuclear nonproliferation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Nuclear industry</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Nuclear proliferation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Nuclear energy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Nuclear fuel cycle</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Analysis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Nuclear weapons</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Foreign 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