Implications of a Multi-Purpose Reporting System on CEO and CFO Incentives and Risk Preferences
This paper presents a model in which the CEO generates productive output while the CFO oversees a reporting system that provides information useful for monitoring, decision-making, and contracting, but is also subject to costly manipulation. Because the reporting system serves multiple roles, the CE...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Friedman, Henry L [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2016 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Journal of management accounting research - Sarasota, Fla. : Assoc., 1989, 28(2016), 3, Seite 101-132 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:28 ; year:2016 ; number:3 ; pages:101-132 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.2308/jmar-51497 |
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| 520 | |a This paper presents a model in which the CEO generates productive output while the CFO oversees a reporting system that provides information useful for monitoring, decision-making, and contracting, but is also subject to costly manipulation. Because the reporting system serves multiple roles, the CEO's compensation incentives and the quality of the reporting system can be substitutes or complements. When they are substitutes, the CEO's incentive compensation is positively related to performance metric risk, firm value can be increasing in the CFO's risk aversion, and high biasing costs can reduce the positive association between firm value and CFO risk aversion. Whether they are primarily substitutes or complements can depend on the speed of decreasing returns to scale in the production function. The potential value of CEO-CFO collusion in this setting is explored in an extension. | ||
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10.2308/jmar-51497 doi PQ20170301 (DE-627)OLC1985958163 (DE-599)GBVOLC1985958163 (PRQ)c871-42f275f1870ae3b66bc7aceb18af2fd90c5c12652fc7a1ad7c283c1c7719a8f30 (KEY)0213933220160000028000300101implicationsofamultipurposereportingsystemonceoand DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 ZDB Friedman, Henry L verfasserin aut Implications of a Multi-Purpose Reporting System on CEO and CFO Incentives and Risk Preferences 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier This paper presents a model in which the CEO generates productive output while the CFO oversees a reporting system that provides information useful for monitoring, decision-making, and contracting, but is also subject to costly manipulation. Because the reporting system serves multiple roles, the CEO's compensation incentives and the quality of the reporting system can be substitutes or complements. When they are substitutes, the CEO's incentive compensation is positively related to performance metric risk, firm value can be increasing in the CFO's risk aversion, and high biasing costs can reduce the positive association between firm value and CFO risk aversion. Whether they are primarily substitutes or complements can depend on the speed of decreasing returns to scale in the production function. The potential value of CEO-CFO collusion in this setting is explored in an extension. Risk aversion Studies Chief executive officers Chief financial officers Productivity Enthalten in Journal of management accounting research Sarasota, Fla. : Assoc., 1989 28(2016), 3, Seite 101-132 (DE-627)170755975 (DE-600)1101530-5 (DE-576)08098634X 1049-2127 nnns volume:28 year:2016 number:3 pages:101-132 http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-51497 Volltext http://search.proquest.com/docview/1835924484 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4310 AR 28 2016 3 101-132 |
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10.2308/jmar-51497 doi PQ20170301 (DE-627)OLC1985958163 (DE-599)GBVOLC1985958163 (PRQ)c871-42f275f1870ae3b66bc7aceb18af2fd90c5c12652fc7a1ad7c283c1c7719a8f30 (KEY)0213933220160000028000300101implicationsofamultipurposereportingsystemonceoand DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 ZDB Friedman, Henry L verfasserin aut Implications of a Multi-Purpose Reporting System on CEO and CFO Incentives and Risk Preferences 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier This paper presents a model in which the CEO generates productive output while the CFO oversees a reporting system that provides information useful for monitoring, decision-making, and contracting, but is also subject to costly manipulation. Because the reporting system serves multiple roles, the CEO's compensation incentives and the quality of the reporting system can be substitutes or complements. When they are substitutes, the CEO's incentive compensation is positively related to performance metric risk, firm value can be increasing in the CFO's risk aversion, and high biasing costs can reduce the positive association between firm value and CFO risk aversion. Whether they are primarily substitutes or complements can depend on the speed of decreasing returns to scale in the production function. The potential value of CEO-CFO collusion in this setting is explored in an extension. Risk aversion Studies Chief executive officers Chief financial officers Productivity Enthalten in Journal of management accounting research Sarasota, Fla. : Assoc., 1989 28(2016), 3, Seite 101-132 (DE-627)170755975 (DE-600)1101530-5 (DE-576)08098634X 1049-2127 nnns volume:28 year:2016 number:3 pages:101-132 http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-51497 Volltext http://search.proquest.com/docview/1835924484 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4310 AR 28 2016 3 101-132 |
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10.2308/jmar-51497 doi PQ20170301 (DE-627)OLC1985958163 (DE-599)GBVOLC1985958163 (PRQ)c871-42f275f1870ae3b66bc7aceb18af2fd90c5c12652fc7a1ad7c283c1c7719a8f30 (KEY)0213933220160000028000300101implicationsofamultipurposereportingsystemonceoand DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 ZDB Friedman, Henry L verfasserin aut Implications of a Multi-Purpose Reporting System on CEO and CFO Incentives and Risk Preferences 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier This paper presents a model in which the CEO generates productive output while the CFO oversees a reporting system that provides information useful for monitoring, decision-making, and contracting, but is also subject to costly manipulation. Because the reporting system serves multiple roles, the CEO's compensation incentives and the quality of the reporting system can be substitutes or complements. When they are substitutes, the CEO's incentive compensation is positively related to performance metric risk, firm value can be increasing in the CFO's risk aversion, and high biasing costs can reduce the positive association between firm value and CFO risk aversion. Whether they are primarily substitutes or complements can depend on the speed of decreasing returns to scale in the production function. The potential value of CEO-CFO collusion in this setting is explored in an extension. Risk aversion Studies Chief executive officers Chief financial officers Productivity Enthalten in Journal of management accounting research Sarasota, Fla. : Assoc., 1989 28(2016), 3, Seite 101-132 (DE-627)170755975 (DE-600)1101530-5 (DE-576)08098634X 1049-2127 nnns volume:28 year:2016 number:3 pages:101-132 http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-51497 Volltext http://search.proquest.com/docview/1835924484 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4310 AR 28 2016 3 101-132 |
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10.2308/jmar-51497 doi PQ20170301 (DE-627)OLC1985958163 (DE-599)GBVOLC1985958163 (PRQ)c871-42f275f1870ae3b66bc7aceb18af2fd90c5c12652fc7a1ad7c283c1c7719a8f30 (KEY)0213933220160000028000300101implicationsofamultipurposereportingsystemonceoand DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 ZDB Friedman, Henry L verfasserin aut Implications of a Multi-Purpose Reporting System on CEO and CFO Incentives and Risk Preferences 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier This paper presents a model in which the CEO generates productive output while the CFO oversees a reporting system that provides information useful for monitoring, decision-making, and contracting, but is also subject to costly manipulation. Because the reporting system serves multiple roles, the CEO's compensation incentives and the quality of the reporting system can be substitutes or complements. When they are substitutes, the CEO's incentive compensation is positively related to performance metric risk, firm value can be increasing in the CFO's risk aversion, and high biasing costs can reduce the positive association between firm value and CFO risk aversion. Whether they are primarily substitutes or complements can depend on the speed of decreasing returns to scale in the production function. The potential value of CEO-CFO collusion in this setting is explored in an extension. Risk aversion Studies Chief executive officers Chief financial officers Productivity Enthalten in Journal of management accounting research Sarasota, Fla. : Assoc., 1989 28(2016), 3, Seite 101-132 (DE-627)170755975 (DE-600)1101530-5 (DE-576)08098634X 1049-2127 nnns volume:28 year:2016 number:3 pages:101-132 http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-51497 Volltext http://search.proquest.com/docview/1835924484 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4310 AR 28 2016 3 101-132 |
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Implications of a Multi-Purpose Reporting System on CEO and CFO Incentives and Risk Preferences |
| abstract |
This paper presents a model in which the CEO generates productive output while the CFO oversees a reporting system that provides information useful for monitoring, decision-making, and contracting, but is also subject to costly manipulation. Because the reporting system serves multiple roles, the CEO's compensation incentives and the quality of the reporting system can be substitutes or complements. When they are substitutes, the CEO's incentive compensation is positively related to performance metric risk, firm value can be increasing in the CFO's risk aversion, and high biasing costs can reduce the positive association between firm value and CFO risk aversion. Whether they are primarily substitutes or complements can depend on the speed of decreasing returns to scale in the production function. The potential value of CEO-CFO collusion in this setting is explored in an extension. |
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This paper presents a model in which the CEO generates productive output while the CFO oversees a reporting system that provides information useful for monitoring, decision-making, and contracting, but is also subject to costly manipulation. Because the reporting system serves multiple roles, the CEO's compensation incentives and the quality of the reporting system can be substitutes or complements. When they are substitutes, the CEO's incentive compensation is positively related to performance metric risk, firm value can be increasing in the CFO's risk aversion, and high biasing costs can reduce the positive association between firm value and CFO risk aversion. Whether they are primarily substitutes or complements can depend on the speed of decreasing returns to scale in the production function. The potential value of CEO-CFO collusion in this setting is explored in an extension. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
This paper presents a model in which the CEO generates productive output while the CFO oversees a reporting system that provides information useful for monitoring, decision-making, and contracting, but is also subject to costly manipulation. Because the reporting system serves multiple roles, the CEO's compensation incentives and the quality of the reporting system can be substitutes or complements. When they are substitutes, the CEO's incentive compensation is positively related to performance metric risk, firm value can be increasing in the CFO's risk aversion, and high biasing costs can reduce the positive association between firm value and CFO risk aversion. Whether they are primarily substitutes or complements can depend on the speed of decreasing returns to scale in the production function. The potential value of CEO-CFO collusion in this setting is explored in an extension. |
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Implications of a Multi-Purpose Reporting System on CEO and CFO Incentives and Risk Preferences |
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