Understanding in‐house transactions in the real estate brokerage industry
About 20% of residential real estate transactions in North America are in‐house transactions, for which buyers and sellers are represented by the same brokerage. We examine to what extent in‐house transactions are explained by agents' strategic incentives as opposed to matching efficiency. Usin...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Han, Lu [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2016 |
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| Rechteinformationen: |
Nutzungsrecht: © 2016, The RAND Corporation. © COPYRIGHT 2016 Published on behalf of the RAND Corporation. |
|---|
| Schlagwörter: |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: The Rand journal of economics - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, 1984, 47(2016), 4, Seite 1057-1086 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:47 ; year:2016 ; number:4 ; pages:1057-1086 |
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|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1111/1756-2171.12163 |
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| 520 | |a About 20% of residential real estate transactions in North America are in‐house transactions, for which buyers and sellers are represented by the same brokerage. We examine to what extent in‐house transactions are explained by agents' strategic incentives as opposed to matching efficiency. Using home transaction data, we find that agents are more likely to promote internal listings when they are financially rewarded and such effect becomes weaker when consumers are more aware of agents' incentives. We further develop a structural model and find that about one third of in‐house transactions are explained by agents' strategic promotion, causing significant utility loss for home buyers. | ||
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10.1111/1756-2171.12163 doi PQ20170501 (DE-627)OLC198820349X (DE-599)GBVOLC198820349X (PRQ)g2163-64aeeb7f11a66476422457e286833550f98d54909c22f8ccbe98f108977c2bff0 (KEY)0078130420160000047000401057understandinginhousetransactionsintherealestatebro DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 300 DE-600 83.00 bkl Han, Lu verfasserin aut Understanding in‐house transactions in the real estate brokerage industry 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier About 20% of residential real estate transactions in North America are in‐house transactions, for which buyers and sellers are represented by the same brokerage. We examine to what extent in‐house transactions are explained by agents' strategic incentives as opposed to matching efficiency. Using home transaction data, we find that agents are more likely to promote internal listings when they are financially rewarded and such effect becomes weaker when consumers are more aware of agents' incentives. We further develop a structural model and find that about one third of in‐house transactions are explained by agents' strategic promotion, causing significant utility loss for home buyers. Nutzungsrecht: © 2016, The RAND Corporation. © COPYRIGHT 2016 Published on behalf of the RAND Corporation. Management Real estate industry In house Studies Incentives Real estate agents & brokers Hong, Seung‐Hyun oth Enthalten in The Rand journal of economics Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, 1984 47(2016), 4, Seite 1057-1086 (DE-627)130630128 (DE-600)798131-4 (DE-576)016135814 0741-6261 nnns volume:47 year:2016 number:4 pages:1057-1086 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12163 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1756-2171.12163/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1843761526 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_2174 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4306 83.00 AVZ AR 47 2016 4 1057-1086 |
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10.1111/1756-2171.12163 doi PQ20170501 (DE-627)OLC198820349X (DE-599)GBVOLC198820349X (PRQ)g2163-64aeeb7f11a66476422457e286833550f98d54909c22f8ccbe98f108977c2bff0 (KEY)0078130420160000047000401057understandinginhousetransactionsintherealestatebro DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 300 DE-600 83.00 bkl Han, Lu verfasserin aut Understanding in‐house transactions in the real estate brokerage industry 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier About 20% of residential real estate transactions in North America are in‐house transactions, for which buyers and sellers are represented by the same brokerage. We examine to what extent in‐house transactions are explained by agents' strategic incentives as opposed to matching efficiency. Using home transaction data, we find that agents are more likely to promote internal listings when they are financially rewarded and such effect becomes weaker when consumers are more aware of agents' incentives. We further develop a structural model and find that about one third of in‐house transactions are explained by agents' strategic promotion, causing significant utility loss for home buyers. Nutzungsrecht: © 2016, The RAND Corporation. © COPYRIGHT 2016 Published on behalf of the RAND Corporation. Management Real estate industry In house Studies Incentives Real estate agents & brokers Hong, Seung‐Hyun oth Enthalten in The Rand journal of economics Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, 1984 47(2016), 4, Seite 1057-1086 (DE-627)130630128 (DE-600)798131-4 (DE-576)016135814 0741-6261 nnns volume:47 year:2016 number:4 pages:1057-1086 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12163 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1756-2171.12163/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1843761526 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_2174 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4306 83.00 AVZ AR 47 2016 4 1057-1086 |
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10.1111/1756-2171.12163 |
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understanding in‐house transactions in the real estate brokerage industry |
| title_auth |
Understanding in‐house transactions in the real estate brokerage industry |
| abstract |
About 20% of residential real estate transactions in North America are in‐house transactions, for which buyers and sellers are represented by the same brokerage. We examine to what extent in‐house transactions are explained by agents' strategic incentives as opposed to matching efficiency. Using home transaction data, we find that agents are more likely to promote internal listings when they are financially rewarded and such effect becomes weaker when consumers are more aware of agents' incentives. We further develop a structural model and find that about one third of in‐house transactions are explained by agents' strategic promotion, causing significant utility loss for home buyers. |
| abstractGer |
About 20% of residential real estate transactions in North America are in‐house transactions, for which buyers and sellers are represented by the same brokerage. We examine to what extent in‐house transactions are explained by agents' strategic incentives as opposed to matching efficiency. Using home transaction data, we find that agents are more likely to promote internal listings when they are financially rewarded and such effect becomes weaker when consumers are more aware of agents' incentives. We further develop a structural model and find that about one third of in‐house transactions are explained by agents' strategic promotion, causing significant utility loss for home buyers. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
About 20% of residential real estate transactions in North America are in‐house transactions, for which buyers and sellers are represented by the same brokerage. We examine to what extent in‐house transactions are explained by agents' strategic incentives as opposed to matching efficiency. Using home transaction data, we find that agents are more likely to promote internal listings when they are financially rewarded and such effect becomes weaker when consumers are more aware of agents' incentives. We further develop a structural model and find that about one third of in‐house transactions are explained by agents' strategic promotion, causing significant utility loss for home buyers. |
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Understanding in‐house transactions in the real estate brokerage industry |
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12163 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1756-2171.12163/abstract http://search.proquest.com/docview/1843761526 |
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