Brexit adds to gloom over long‐term growth prospects
The prospect of continued weak productivity growth and less support from rising labour supply means we are relatively gloomy about medium‐term growth prospects. Our forecasts show potential output growth of just 1.6% a year from 2017–2030. This would be well below the average of the decade prior to...
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Artikel |
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2017 |
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Nutzungsrecht: © Oxford Economics 2017 © COPYRIGHT 2017 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: United Kingdom economic outlook - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1938, 41(2017), 1, Seite 5-11 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:41 ; year:2017 ; number:1 ; pages:5-11 |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1111/1468-0319.12257 |
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| 520 | |a The prospect of continued weak productivity growth and less support from rising labour supply means we are relatively gloomy about medium‐term growth prospects. Our forecasts show potential output growth of just 1.6% a year from 2017–2030. This would be well below the average of the decade prior to the financial crisis (2.7%) and in line with our estimate for the 2007 and 2016 period which included the global financial crisis. We have become more pessimistic about the extent to which growth in total factor productivity is likely to accelerate. This is partly due to a judgement call that more of the weakness since the financial crisis reflects structural factors. Brexit is also likely to weigh on long‐term prospects, resulting in a degree of trade destruction and lower FDI inflows than would be the case were the UK to remain in the EU. Brexit is also likely to result in less capital deepening. Demographic factors also point to weak potential output growth moving forwards. High levels of inward migration have mitigated the impact of an ageing population recently. However, immigration is likely to fall sharply over the next decade, as first an improving European labour market reduces incentives to migrate and then the UK Government adopts more restrictive immigration policy. We are also coming into a period where there will be fewer increases in state pension age than of late. Since the mid‐1990s there has been a surge in the number of people going to university, resulting in strong contributions from human capital. But this will be less important moving forwards as university admissions reach a ceiling. Stronger growth in potential output would be possible if Brexit results in trading arrangements which are closer to the status quo, or if policy is more ‘liberal’, than our baseline assumptions. | ||
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10.1111/1468-0319.12257 doi PQ20170301 (DE-627)OLC1990850871 (DE-599)GBVOLC1990850871 (PRQ)c1107-6cac30887803071fe7535a3bf8cfd196369e940ed6872ef3bdcaba3a0983e8360 (KEY)0099013220170000041000100005brexitaddstogloomoverlongtermgrowthprospects DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DE-600 Brexit adds to gloom over long‐term growth prospects 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier The prospect of continued weak productivity growth and less support from rising labour supply means we are relatively gloomy about medium‐term growth prospects. Our forecasts show potential output growth of just 1.6% a year from 2017–2030. This would be well below the average of the decade prior to the financial crisis (2.7%) and in line with our estimate for the 2007 and 2016 period which included the global financial crisis. We have become more pessimistic about the extent to which growth in total factor productivity is likely to accelerate. This is partly due to a judgement call that more of the weakness since the financial crisis reflects structural factors. Brexit is also likely to weigh on long‐term prospects, resulting in a degree of trade destruction and lower FDI inflows than would be the case were the UK to remain in the EU. Brexit is also likely to result in less capital deepening. Demographic factors also point to weak potential output growth moving forwards. High levels of inward migration have mitigated the impact of an ageing population recently. However, immigration is likely to fall sharply over the next decade, as first an improving European labour market reduces incentives to migrate and then the UK Government adopts more restrictive immigration policy. We are also coming into a period where there will be fewer increases in state pension age than of late. Since the mid‐1990s there has been a surge in the number of people going to university, resulting in strong contributions from human capital. But this will be less important moving forwards as university admissions reach a ceiling. Stronger growth in potential output would be possible if Brexit results in trading arrangements which are closer to the status quo, or if policy is more ‘liberal’, than our baseline assumptions. Nutzungsrecht: © Oxford Economics 2017 © COPYRIGHT 2017 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Retirement age Emigration and immigration Emigration and immigration law Enthalten in United Kingdom economic outlook Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1938 41(2017), 1, Seite 5-11 Bände (DE-627)863197949 (DE-600)2862182-7 (DE-576)474919919 nnns volume:41 year:2017 number:1 pages:5-11 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0319.12257 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-0319.12257/abstract GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 AR 41 2017 1 5-11 |
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10.1111/1468-0319.12257 doi PQ20170301 (DE-627)OLC1990850871 (DE-599)GBVOLC1990850871 (PRQ)c1107-6cac30887803071fe7535a3bf8cfd196369e940ed6872ef3bdcaba3a0983e8360 (KEY)0099013220170000041000100005brexitaddstogloomoverlongtermgrowthprospects DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DE-600 Brexit adds to gloom over long‐term growth prospects 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier The prospect of continued weak productivity growth and less support from rising labour supply means we are relatively gloomy about medium‐term growth prospects. Our forecasts show potential output growth of just 1.6% a year from 2017–2030. This would be well below the average of the decade prior to the financial crisis (2.7%) and in line with our estimate for the 2007 and 2016 period which included the global financial crisis. We have become more pessimistic about the extent to which growth in total factor productivity is likely to accelerate. This is partly due to a judgement call that more of the weakness since the financial crisis reflects structural factors. Brexit is also likely to weigh on long‐term prospects, resulting in a degree of trade destruction and lower FDI inflows than would be the case were the UK to remain in the EU. Brexit is also likely to result in less capital deepening. Demographic factors also point to weak potential output growth moving forwards. High levels of inward migration have mitigated the impact of an ageing population recently. However, immigration is likely to fall sharply over the next decade, as first an improving European labour market reduces incentives to migrate and then the UK Government adopts more restrictive immigration policy. We are also coming into a period where there will be fewer increases in state pension age than of late. Since the mid‐1990s there has been a surge in the number of people going to university, resulting in strong contributions from human capital. But this will be less important moving forwards as university admissions reach a ceiling. Stronger growth in potential output would be possible if Brexit results in trading arrangements which are closer to the status quo, or if policy is more ‘liberal’, than our baseline assumptions. Nutzungsrecht: © Oxford Economics 2017 © COPYRIGHT 2017 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Retirement age Emigration and immigration Emigration and immigration law Enthalten in United Kingdom economic outlook Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1938 41(2017), 1, Seite 5-11 Bände (DE-627)863197949 (DE-600)2862182-7 (DE-576)474919919 nnns volume:41 year:2017 number:1 pages:5-11 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0319.12257 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-0319.12257/abstract GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 AR 41 2017 1 5-11 |
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10.1111/1468-0319.12257 doi PQ20170301 (DE-627)OLC1990850871 (DE-599)GBVOLC1990850871 (PRQ)c1107-6cac30887803071fe7535a3bf8cfd196369e940ed6872ef3bdcaba3a0983e8360 (KEY)0099013220170000041000100005brexitaddstogloomoverlongtermgrowthprospects DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DE-600 Brexit adds to gloom over long‐term growth prospects 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier The prospect of continued weak productivity growth and less support from rising labour supply means we are relatively gloomy about medium‐term growth prospects. Our forecasts show potential output growth of just 1.6% a year from 2017–2030. This would be well below the average of the decade prior to the financial crisis (2.7%) and in line with our estimate for the 2007 and 2016 period which included the global financial crisis. We have become more pessimistic about the extent to which growth in total factor productivity is likely to accelerate. This is partly due to a judgement call that more of the weakness since the financial crisis reflects structural factors. Brexit is also likely to weigh on long‐term prospects, resulting in a degree of trade destruction and lower FDI inflows than would be the case were the UK to remain in the EU. Brexit is also likely to result in less capital deepening. Demographic factors also point to weak potential output growth moving forwards. High levels of inward migration have mitigated the impact of an ageing population recently. However, immigration is likely to fall sharply over the next decade, as first an improving European labour market reduces incentives to migrate and then the UK Government adopts more restrictive immigration policy. We are also coming into a period where there will be fewer increases in state pension age than of late. Since the mid‐1990s there has been a surge in the number of people going to university, resulting in strong contributions from human capital. But this will be less important moving forwards as university admissions reach a ceiling. Stronger growth in potential output would be possible if Brexit results in trading arrangements which are closer to the status quo, or if policy is more ‘liberal’, than our baseline assumptions. Nutzungsrecht: © Oxford Economics 2017 © COPYRIGHT 2017 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Retirement age Emigration and immigration Emigration and immigration law Enthalten in United Kingdom economic outlook Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1938 41(2017), 1, Seite 5-11 Bände (DE-627)863197949 (DE-600)2862182-7 (DE-576)474919919 nnns volume:41 year:2017 number:1 pages:5-11 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0319.12257 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-0319.12257/abstract GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 AR 41 2017 1 5-11 |
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10.1111/1468-0319.12257 doi PQ20170301 (DE-627)OLC1990850871 (DE-599)GBVOLC1990850871 (PRQ)c1107-6cac30887803071fe7535a3bf8cfd196369e940ed6872ef3bdcaba3a0983e8360 (KEY)0099013220170000041000100005brexitaddstogloomoverlongtermgrowthprospects DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DE-600 Brexit adds to gloom over long‐term growth prospects 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier The prospect of continued weak productivity growth and less support from rising labour supply means we are relatively gloomy about medium‐term growth prospects. Our forecasts show potential output growth of just 1.6% a year from 2017–2030. This would be well below the average of the decade prior to the financial crisis (2.7%) and in line with our estimate for the 2007 and 2016 period which included the global financial crisis. We have become more pessimistic about the extent to which growth in total factor productivity is likely to accelerate. This is partly due to a judgement call that more of the weakness since the financial crisis reflects structural factors. Brexit is also likely to weigh on long‐term prospects, resulting in a degree of trade destruction and lower FDI inflows than would be the case were the UK to remain in the EU. Brexit is also likely to result in less capital deepening. Demographic factors also point to weak potential output growth moving forwards. High levels of inward migration have mitigated the impact of an ageing population recently. However, immigration is likely to fall sharply over the next decade, as first an improving European labour market reduces incentives to migrate and then the UK Government adopts more restrictive immigration policy. We are also coming into a period where there will be fewer increases in state pension age than of late. Since the mid‐1990s there has been a surge in the number of people going to university, resulting in strong contributions from human capital. But this will be less important moving forwards as university admissions reach a ceiling. Stronger growth in potential output would be possible if Brexit results in trading arrangements which are closer to the status quo, or if policy is more ‘liberal’, than our baseline assumptions. Nutzungsrecht: © Oxford Economics 2017 © COPYRIGHT 2017 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Retirement age Emigration and immigration Emigration and immigration law Enthalten in United Kingdom economic outlook Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1938 41(2017), 1, Seite 5-11 Bände (DE-627)863197949 (DE-600)2862182-7 (DE-576)474919919 nnns volume:41 year:2017 number:1 pages:5-11 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0319.12257 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-0319.12257/abstract GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 AR 41 2017 1 5-11 |
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10.1111/1468-0319.12257 doi PQ20170301 (DE-627)OLC1990850871 (DE-599)GBVOLC1990850871 (PRQ)c1107-6cac30887803071fe7535a3bf8cfd196369e940ed6872ef3bdcaba3a0983e8360 (KEY)0099013220170000041000100005brexitaddstogloomoverlongtermgrowthprospects DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DE-600 Brexit adds to gloom over long‐term growth prospects 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier The prospect of continued weak productivity growth and less support from rising labour supply means we are relatively gloomy about medium‐term growth prospects. Our forecasts show potential output growth of just 1.6% a year from 2017–2030. This would be well below the average of the decade prior to the financial crisis (2.7%) and in line with our estimate for the 2007 and 2016 period which included the global financial crisis. We have become more pessimistic about the extent to which growth in total factor productivity is likely to accelerate. This is partly due to a judgement call that more of the weakness since the financial crisis reflects structural factors. Brexit is also likely to weigh on long‐term prospects, resulting in a degree of trade destruction and lower FDI inflows than would be the case were the UK to remain in the EU. Brexit is also likely to result in less capital deepening. Demographic factors also point to weak potential output growth moving forwards. High levels of inward migration have mitigated the impact of an ageing population recently. However, immigration is likely to fall sharply over the next decade, as first an improving European labour market reduces incentives to migrate and then the UK Government adopts more restrictive immigration policy. We are also coming into a period where there will be fewer increases in state pension age than of late. Since the mid‐1990s there has been a surge in the number of people going to university, resulting in strong contributions from human capital. But this will be less important moving forwards as university admissions reach a ceiling. Stronger growth in potential output would be possible if Brexit results in trading arrangements which are closer to the status quo, or if policy is more ‘liberal’, than our baseline assumptions. Nutzungsrecht: © Oxford Economics 2017 © COPYRIGHT 2017 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Retirement age Emigration and immigration Emigration and immigration law Enthalten in United Kingdom economic outlook Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1938 41(2017), 1, Seite 5-11 Bände (DE-627)863197949 (DE-600)2862182-7 (DE-576)474919919 nnns volume:41 year:2017 number:1 pages:5-11 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0319.12257 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-0319.12257/abstract GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 AR 41 2017 1 5-11 |
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| title_sort |
brexit adds to gloom over long‐term growth prospects |
| title_auth |
Brexit adds to gloom over long‐term growth prospects |
| abstract |
The prospect of continued weak productivity growth and less support from rising labour supply means we are relatively gloomy about medium‐term growth prospects. Our forecasts show potential output growth of just 1.6% a year from 2017–2030. This would be well below the average of the decade prior to the financial crisis (2.7%) and in line with our estimate for the 2007 and 2016 period which included the global financial crisis. We have become more pessimistic about the extent to which growth in total factor productivity is likely to accelerate. This is partly due to a judgement call that more of the weakness since the financial crisis reflects structural factors. Brexit is also likely to weigh on long‐term prospects, resulting in a degree of trade destruction and lower FDI inflows than would be the case were the UK to remain in the EU. Brexit is also likely to result in less capital deepening. Demographic factors also point to weak potential output growth moving forwards. High levels of inward migration have mitigated the impact of an ageing population recently. However, immigration is likely to fall sharply over the next decade, as first an improving European labour market reduces incentives to migrate and then the UK Government adopts more restrictive immigration policy. We are also coming into a period where there will be fewer increases in state pension age than of late. Since the mid‐1990s there has been a surge in the number of people going to university, resulting in strong contributions from human capital. But this will be less important moving forwards as university admissions reach a ceiling. Stronger growth in potential output would be possible if Brexit results in trading arrangements which are closer to the status quo, or if policy is more ‘liberal’, than our baseline assumptions. |
| abstractGer |
The prospect of continued weak productivity growth and less support from rising labour supply means we are relatively gloomy about medium‐term growth prospects. Our forecasts show potential output growth of just 1.6% a year from 2017–2030. This would be well below the average of the decade prior to the financial crisis (2.7%) and in line with our estimate for the 2007 and 2016 period which included the global financial crisis. We have become more pessimistic about the extent to which growth in total factor productivity is likely to accelerate. This is partly due to a judgement call that more of the weakness since the financial crisis reflects structural factors. Brexit is also likely to weigh on long‐term prospects, resulting in a degree of trade destruction and lower FDI inflows than would be the case were the UK to remain in the EU. Brexit is also likely to result in less capital deepening. Demographic factors also point to weak potential output growth moving forwards. High levels of inward migration have mitigated the impact of an ageing population recently. However, immigration is likely to fall sharply over the next decade, as first an improving European labour market reduces incentives to migrate and then the UK Government adopts more restrictive immigration policy. We are also coming into a period where there will be fewer increases in state pension age than of late. Since the mid‐1990s there has been a surge in the number of people going to university, resulting in strong contributions from human capital. But this will be less important moving forwards as university admissions reach a ceiling. Stronger growth in potential output would be possible if Brexit results in trading arrangements which are closer to the status quo, or if policy is more ‘liberal’, than our baseline assumptions. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
The prospect of continued weak productivity growth and less support from rising labour supply means we are relatively gloomy about medium‐term growth prospects. Our forecasts show potential output growth of just 1.6% a year from 2017–2030. This would be well below the average of the decade prior to the financial crisis (2.7%) and in line with our estimate for the 2007 and 2016 period which included the global financial crisis. We have become more pessimistic about the extent to which growth in total factor productivity is likely to accelerate. This is partly due to a judgement call that more of the weakness since the financial crisis reflects structural factors. Brexit is also likely to weigh on long‐term prospects, resulting in a degree of trade destruction and lower FDI inflows than would be the case were the UK to remain in the EU. Brexit is also likely to result in less capital deepening. Demographic factors also point to weak potential output growth moving forwards. High levels of inward migration have mitigated the impact of an ageing population recently. However, immigration is likely to fall sharply over the next decade, as first an improving European labour market reduces incentives to migrate and then the UK Government adopts more restrictive immigration policy. We are also coming into a period where there will be fewer increases in state pension age than of late. Since the mid‐1990s there has been a surge in the number of people going to university, resulting in strong contributions from human capital. But this will be less important moving forwards as university admissions reach a ceiling. Stronger growth in potential output would be possible if Brexit results in trading arrangements which are closer to the status quo, or if policy is more ‘liberal’, than our baseline assumptions. |
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Brexit adds to gloom over long‐term growth prospects |
| url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0319.12257 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-0319.12257/abstract |
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