Strategic uncertainty, indeterminacy, and the formation of international environmental agreements
Since the end of the Kyoto Protocol, global climate negotiations have shifted away from setting binding short-run targets on emissions towards placing long-term limits on global warming. We investigate how this alters the incentives for participation in a technology-centred international environment...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Narita, Daiju [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2017 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Oxford economic papers - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, 1938, 69(2017), 2, Seite 432 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:69 ; year:2017 ; number:2 ; pages:432 |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1093/oep/gpx001 |
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| 520 | |a Since the end of the Kyoto Protocol, global climate negotiations have shifted away from setting binding short-run targets on emissions towards placing long-term limits on global warming. We investigate how this alters the incentives for participation in a technology-centred international environmental agreement (IEA) where countries choose between conventional abatement and a breakthrough abatement technology that exhibits a network externality. When switching technologies is costly, we obtain that equilibrium adoption is indeterminate because the future adoption rate is subject to strategic uncertainty. Participation in an IEA that mandates the adoption of the breakthrough technology will be complete only if countries expect that all other countries will adopt eventually. Long-run temperature targets can be regarded as a device to coordinate countries' expectations on that outcome. [web URL: https://academic.oup.com/oep/article-abstract/69/2/432/3002326/Strategic-uncertainty-indeterminacy-and-the?redirectedFrom=fulltext] | ||
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| 650 | 4 | |a International agreements | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Clean technology | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Wagner, Ulrich J |4 oth | |
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10.1093/oep/gpx001 doi PQ20170501 (DE-627)OLC1991809247 (DE-599)GBVOLC1991809247 (PRQ)c1210-54af3a67a7ef9ad566e737aa7fef5582f15a8ba87c2435f4a74ec607efbdd6ca0 (KEY)0002143120170000069000200432strategicuncertaintyindeterminacyandtheformationof DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DE-600 83.00 bkl Narita, Daiju verfasserin aut Strategic uncertainty, indeterminacy, and the formation of international environmental agreements 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier Since the end of the Kyoto Protocol, global climate negotiations have shifted away from setting binding short-run targets on emissions towards placing long-term limits on global warming. We investigate how this alters the incentives for participation in a technology-centred international environmental agreement (IEA) where countries choose between conventional abatement and a breakthrough abatement technology that exhibits a network externality. When switching technologies is costly, we obtain that equilibrium adoption is indeterminate because the future adoption rate is subject to strategic uncertainty. Participation in an IEA that mandates the adoption of the breakthrough technology will be complete only if countries expect that all other countries will adopt eventually. Long-run temperature targets can be regarded as a device to coordinate countries' expectations on that outcome. [web URL: https://academic.oup.com/oep/article-abstract/69/2/432/3002326/Strategic-uncertainty-indeterminacy-and-the?redirectedFrom=fulltext] Emissions control Equilibrium Global warming Studies Externality International agreements Clean technology Wagner, Ulrich J oth Enthalten in Oxford economic papers Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, 1938 69(2017), 2, Seite 432 (DE-627)129497657 (DE-600)207599-4 (DE-576)014896702 0030-7653 nnns volume:69 year:2017 number:2 pages:432 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpx001 Volltext http://search.proquest.com/docview/1878759930 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_4700 83.00 AVZ AR 69 2017 2 432 |
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10.1093/oep/gpx001 doi PQ20170501 (DE-627)OLC1991809247 (DE-599)GBVOLC1991809247 (PRQ)c1210-54af3a67a7ef9ad566e737aa7fef5582f15a8ba87c2435f4a74ec607efbdd6ca0 (KEY)0002143120170000069000200432strategicuncertaintyindeterminacyandtheformationof DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DE-600 83.00 bkl Narita, Daiju verfasserin aut Strategic uncertainty, indeterminacy, and the formation of international environmental agreements 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier Since the end of the Kyoto Protocol, global climate negotiations have shifted away from setting binding short-run targets on emissions towards placing long-term limits on global warming. We investigate how this alters the incentives for participation in a technology-centred international environmental agreement (IEA) where countries choose between conventional abatement and a breakthrough abatement technology that exhibits a network externality. When switching technologies is costly, we obtain that equilibrium adoption is indeterminate because the future adoption rate is subject to strategic uncertainty. Participation in an IEA that mandates the adoption of the breakthrough technology will be complete only if countries expect that all other countries will adopt eventually. Long-run temperature targets can be regarded as a device to coordinate countries' expectations on that outcome. [web URL: https://academic.oup.com/oep/article-abstract/69/2/432/3002326/Strategic-uncertainty-indeterminacy-and-the?redirectedFrom=fulltext] Emissions control Equilibrium Global warming Studies Externality International agreements Clean technology Wagner, Ulrich J oth Enthalten in Oxford economic papers Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, 1938 69(2017), 2, Seite 432 (DE-627)129497657 (DE-600)207599-4 (DE-576)014896702 0030-7653 nnns volume:69 year:2017 number:2 pages:432 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpx001 Volltext http://search.proquest.com/docview/1878759930 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_4700 83.00 AVZ AR 69 2017 2 432 |
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10.1093/oep/gpx001 doi PQ20170501 (DE-627)OLC1991809247 (DE-599)GBVOLC1991809247 (PRQ)c1210-54af3a67a7ef9ad566e737aa7fef5582f15a8ba87c2435f4a74ec607efbdd6ca0 (KEY)0002143120170000069000200432strategicuncertaintyindeterminacyandtheformationof DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DE-600 83.00 bkl Narita, Daiju verfasserin aut Strategic uncertainty, indeterminacy, and the formation of international environmental agreements 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier Since the end of the Kyoto Protocol, global climate negotiations have shifted away from setting binding short-run targets on emissions towards placing long-term limits on global warming. We investigate how this alters the incentives for participation in a technology-centred international environmental agreement (IEA) where countries choose between conventional abatement and a breakthrough abatement technology that exhibits a network externality. When switching technologies is costly, we obtain that equilibrium adoption is indeterminate because the future adoption rate is subject to strategic uncertainty. Participation in an IEA that mandates the adoption of the breakthrough technology will be complete only if countries expect that all other countries will adopt eventually. Long-run temperature targets can be regarded as a device to coordinate countries' expectations on that outcome. [web URL: https://academic.oup.com/oep/article-abstract/69/2/432/3002326/Strategic-uncertainty-indeterminacy-and-the?redirectedFrom=fulltext] Emissions control Equilibrium Global warming Studies Externality International agreements Clean technology Wagner, Ulrich J oth Enthalten in Oxford economic papers Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, 1938 69(2017), 2, Seite 432 (DE-627)129497657 (DE-600)207599-4 (DE-576)014896702 0030-7653 nnns volume:69 year:2017 number:2 pages:432 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpx001 Volltext http://search.proquest.com/docview/1878759930 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_4700 83.00 AVZ AR 69 2017 2 432 |
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10.1093/oep/gpx001 doi PQ20170501 (DE-627)OLC1991809247 (DE-599)GBVOLC1991809247 (PRQ)c1210-54af3a67a7ef9ad566e737aa7fef5582f15a8ba87c2435f4a74ec607efbdd6ca0 (KEY)0002143120170000069000200432strategicuncertaintyindeterminacyandtheformationof DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DE-600 83.00 bkl Narita, Daiju verfasserin aut Strategic uncertainty, indeterminacy, and the formation of international environmental agreements 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier Since the end of the Kyoto Protocol, global climate negotiations have shifted away from setting binding short-run targets on emissions towards placing long-term limits on global warming. We investigate how this alters the incentives for participation in a technology-centred international environmental agreement (IEA) where countries choose between conventional abatement and a breakthrough abatement technology that exhibits a network externality. When switching technologies is costly, we obtain that equilibrium adoption is indeterminate because the future adoption rate is subject to strategic uncertainty. Participation in an IEA that mandates the adoption of the breakthrough technology will be complete only if countries expect that all other countries will adopt eventually. Long-run temperature targets can be regarded as a device to coordinate countries' expectations on that outcome. [web URL: https://academic.oup.com/oep/article-abstract/69/2/432/3002326/Strategic-uncertainty-indeterminacy-and-the?redirectedFrom=fulltext] Emissions control Equilibrium Global warming Studies Externality International agreements Clean technology Wagner, Ulrich J oth Enthalten in Oxford economic papers Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, 1938 69(2017), 2, Seite 432 (DE-627)129497657 (DE-600)207599-4 (DE-576)014896702 0030-7653 nnns volume:69 year:2017 number:2 pages:432 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpx001 Volltext http://search.proquest.com/docview/1878759930 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_4700 83.00 AVZ AR 69 2017 2 432 |
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Strategic uncertainty, indeterminacy, and the formation of international environmental agreements |
| abstract |
Since the end of the Kyoto Protocol, global climate negotiations have shifted away from setting binding short-run targets on emissions towards placing long-term limits on global warming. We investigate how this alters the incentives for participation in a technology-centred international environmental agreement (IEA) where countries choose between conventional abatement and a breakthrough abatement technology that exhibits a network externality. When switching technologies is costly, we obtain that equilibrium adoption is indeterminate because the future adoption rate is subject to strategic uncertainty. Participation in an IEA that mandates the adoption of the breakthrough technology will be complete only if countries expect that all other countries will adopt eventually. Long-run temperature targets can be regarded as a device to coordinate countries' expectations on that outcome. [web URL: https://academic.oup.com/oep/article-abstract/69/2/432/3002326/Strategic-uncertainty-indeterminacy-and-the?redirectedFrom=fulltext] |
| abstractGer |
Since the end of the Kyoto Protocol, global climate negotiations have shifted away from setting binding short-run targets on emissions towards placing long-term limits on global warming. We investigate how this alters the incentives for participation in a technology-centred international environmental agreement (IEA) where countries choose between conventional abatement and a breakthrough abatement technology that exhibits a network externality. When switching technologies is costly, we obtain that equilibrium adoption is indeterminate because the future adoption rate is subject to strategic uncertainty. Participation in an IEA that mandates the adoption of the breakthrough technology will be complete only if countries expect that all other countries will adopt eventually. Long-run temperature targets can be regarded as a device to coordinate countries' expectations on that outcome. [web URL: https://academic.oup.com/oep/article-abstract/69/2/432/3002326/Strategic-uncertainty-indeterminacy-and-the?redirectedFrom=fulltext] |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Since the end of the Kyoto Protocol, global climate negotiations have shifted away from setting binding short-run targets on emissions towards placing long-term limits on global warming. We investigate how this alters the incentives for participation in a technology-centred international environmental agreement (IEA) where countries choose between conventional abatement and a breakthrough abatement technology that exhibits a network externality. When switching technologies is costly, we obtain that equilibrium adoption is indeterminate because the future adoption rate is subject to strategic uncertainty. Participation in an IEA that mandates the adoption of the breakthrough technology will be complete only if countries expect that all other countries will adopt eventually. Long-run temperature targets can be regarded as a device to coordinate countries' expectations on that outcome. [web URL: https://academic.oup.com/oep/article-abstract/69/2/432/3002326/Strategic-uncertainty-indeterminacy-and-the?redirectedFrom=fulltext] |
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| container_issue |
2 |
| title_short |
Strategic uncertainty, indeterminacy, and the formation of international environmental agreements |
| url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpx001 http://search.proquest.com/docview/1878759930 |
| remote_bool |
false |
| author2 |
Wagner, Ulrich J |
| author2Str |
Wagner, Ulrich J |
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| doi_str |
10.1093/oep/gpx001 |
| up_date |
2024-07-04T03:40:03.674Z |
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