Equality, its Basis and Moral Status: Challenging the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests
The principle of equal consideration of interests (ECOI) is a very popular principle in animal ethics. Peter Singer employs it to ground equal treatment and solve the problem of the basis of equality, namely the problem of why we should grant equal treatment despite the variability of people's...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Zuolo, Federico [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2017 |
|---|
| Rechteinformationen: |
Nutzungsrecht: © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 2017 |
|---|
| Schlagwörter: |
|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: International journal of philosophical studies - Abingdon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 1993, 25(2017), 2, Seite 170-19 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:25 ; year:2017 ; number:2 ; pages:170-19 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 |
|---|
| Katalog-ID: |
OLC199237421X |
|---|
| LEADER | 01000caa a2200265 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | OLC199237421X | ||
| 003 | DE-627 | ||
| 005 | 20230715041602.0 | ||
| 007 | tu | ||
| 008 | 170512s2017 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 |2 doi | |
| 028 | 5 | 2 | |a PQ20170501 |
| 035 | |a (DE-627)OLC199237421X | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBVOLC199237421X | ||
| 035 | |a (PRQ)c2126-6e6b8459e1a3158e6beda6f78417ce37f85573a0753e7df937db244c477fb7f30 | ||
| 035 | |a (KEY)0055019120170000025000200170equalityitsbasisandmoralstatuschallengingtheprinci | ||
| 040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | |a eng | ||
| 082 | 0 | 4 | |a 100 |q ZDB |
| 084 | |a PHILOS |2 fid | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Zuolo, Federico |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Equality, its Basis and Moral Status: Challenging the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests |
| 264 | 1 | |c 2017 | |
| 336 | |a Text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a Band |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 520 | |a The principle of equal consideration of interests (ECOI) is a very popular principle in animal ethics. Peter Singer employs it to ground equal treatment and solve the problem of the basis of equality, namely the problem of why we should grant equal treatment despite the variability of people's features. In this paper, I challenge Singer's argument because ECOI does not provide plausible grounds to presume that the interests of diverse individuals are actually equal. Analyzing the case of pain and the interest in not suffering in particular, I contend that there are some insurmountable epistemic and axiological problems in accounting for the equality of interests. Besides criticizing ECOI as a basis of equality, I argue that we need to rely on an equality of moral status. I conclude by providing some considerations on the relation between equality and the principle of proportionality. | ||
| 540 | |a Nutzungsrecht: © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 2017 | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a equal consideration of interests | |
| 650 | 4 | |a animal ethics | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Basis of equality | |
| 650 | 4 | |a proportionality principle | |
| 650 | 4 | |a pain | |
| 650 | 4 | |a equality | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Equality | |
| 773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t International journal of philosophical studies |d Abingdon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 1993 |g 25(2017), 2, Seite 170-19 |w (DE-627)171095731 |w (DE-600)1151040-7 |w (DE-576)034202234 |x 0967-2559 |7 nnns |
| 773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:25 |g year:2017 |g number:2 |g pages:170-19 |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 |3 Volltext |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |u http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |u http://search.proquest.com/docview/1887030801 |
| 912 | |a GBV_USEFLAG_A | ||
| 912 | |a SYSFLAG_A | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_OLC | ||
| 912 | |a FID-PHILOS | ||
| 912 | |a SSG-OLC-PHI | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_11 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_110 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2001 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4012 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4027 | ||
| 951 | |a AR | ||
| 952 | |d 25 |j 2017 |e 2 |h 170-19 | ||
| author_variant |
f z fz |
|---|---|
| matchkey_str |
article:09672559:2017----::qaiytbssnmrlttshlegnterniloeulo |
| hierarchy_sort_str |
2017 |
| publishDate |
2017 |
| allfields |
10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 doi PQ20170501 (DE-627)OLC199237421X (DE-599)GBVOLC199237421X (PRQ)c2126-6e6b8459e1a3158e6beda6f78417ce37f85573a0753e7df937db244c477fb7f30 (KEY)0055019120170000025000200170equalityitsbasisandmoralstatuschallengingtheprinci DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 ZDB PHILOS fid Zuolo, Federico verfasserin aut Equality, its Basis and Moral Status: Challenging the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier The principle of equal consideration of interests (ECOI) is a very popular principle in animal ethics. Peter Singer employs it to ground equal treatment and solve the problem of the basis of equality, namely the problem of why we should grant equal treatment despite the variability of people's features. In this paper, I challenge Singer's argument because ECOI does not provide plausible grounds to presume that the interests of diverse individuals are actually equal. Analyzing the case of pain and the interest in not suffering in particular, I contend that there are some insurmountable epistemic and axiological problems in accounting for the equality of interests. Besides criticizing ECOI as a basis of equality, I argue that we need to rely on an equality of moral status. I conclude by providing some considerations on the relation between equality and the principle of proportionality. Nutzungsrecht: © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 2017 equal consideration of interests animal ethics Basis of equality proportionality principle pain equality Equality Enthalten in International journal of philosophical studies Abingdon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 1993 25(2017), 2, Seite 170-19 (DE-627)171095731 (DE-600)1151040-7 (DE-576)034202234 0967-2559 nnns volume:25 year:2017 number:2 pages:170-19 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 Volltext http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 http://search.proquest.com/docview/1887030801 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4027 AR 25 2017 2 170-19 |
| spelling |
10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 doi PQ20170501 (DE-627)OLC199237421X (DE-599)GBVOLC199237421X (PRQ)c2126-6e6b8459e1a3158e6beda6f78417ce37f85573a0753e7df937db244c477fb7f30 (KEY)0055019120170000025000200170equalityitsbasisandmoralstatuschallengingtheprinci DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 ZDB PHILOS fid Zuolo, Federico verfasserin aut Equality, its Basis and Moral Status: Challenging the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier The principle of equal consideration of interests (ECOI) is a very popular principle in animal ethics. Peter Singer employs it to ground equal treatment and solve the problem of the basis of equality, namely the problem of why we should grant equal treatment despite the variability of people's features. In this paper, I challenge Singer's argument because ECOI does not provide plausible grounds to presume that the interests of diverse individuals are actually equal. Analyzing the case of pain and the interest in not suffering in particular, I contend that there are some insurmountable epistemic and axiological problems in accounting for the equality of interests. Besides criticizing ECOI as a basis of equality, I argue that we need to rely on an equality of moral status. I conclude by providing some considerations on the relation between equality and the principle of proportionality. Nutzungsrecht: © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 2017 equal consideration of interests animal ethics Basis of equality proportionality principle pain equality Equality Enthalten in International journal of philosophical studies Abingdon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 1993 25(2017), 2, Seite 170-19 (DE-627)171095731 (DE-600)1151040-7 (DE-576)034202234 0967-2559 nnns volume:25 year:2017 number:2 pages:170-19 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 Volltext http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 http://search.proquest.com/docview/1887030801 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4027 AR 25 2017 2 170-19 |
| allfields_unstemmed |
10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 doi PQ20170501 (DE-627)OLC199237421X (DE-599)GBVOLC199237421X (PRQ)c2126-6e6b8459e1a3158e6beda6f78417ce37f85573a0753e7df937db244c477fb7f30 (KEY)0055019120170000025000200170equalityitsbasisandmoralstatuschallengingtheprinci DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 ZDB PHILOS fid Zuolo, Federico verfasserin aut Equality, its Basis and Moral Status: Challenging the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier The principle of equal consideration of interests (ECOI) is a very popular principle in animal ethics. Peter Singer employs it to ground equal treatment and solve the problem of the basis of equality, namely the problem of why we should grant equal treatment despite the variability of people's features. In this paper, I challenge Singer's argument because ECOI does not provide plausible grounds to presume that the interests of diverse individuals are actually equal. Analyzing the case of pain and the interest in not suffering in particular, I contend that there are some insurmountable epistemic and axiological problems in accounting for the equality of interests. Besides criticizing ECOI as a basis of equality, I argue that we need to rely on an equality of moral status. I conclude by providing some considerations on the relation between equality and the principle of proportionality. Nutzungsrecht: © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 2017 equal consideration of interests animal ethics Basis of equality proportionality principle pain equality Equality Enthalten in International journal of philosophical studies Abingdon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 1993 25(2017), 2, Seite 170-19 (DE-627)171095731 (DE-600)1151040-7 (DE-576)034202234 0967-2559 nnns volume:25 year:2017 number:2 pages:170-19 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 Volltext http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 http://search.proquest.com/docview/1887030801 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4027 AR 25 2017 2 170-19 |
| allfieldsGer |
10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 doi PQ20170501 (DE-627)OLC199237421X (DE-599)GBVOLC199237421X (PRQ)c2126-6e6b8459e1a3158e6beda6f78417ce37f85573a0753e7df937db244c477fb7f30 (KEY)0055019120170000025000200170equalityitsbasisandmoralstatuschallengingtheprinci DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 ZDB PHILOS fid Zuolo, Federico verfasserin aut Equality, its Basis and Moral Status: Challenging the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier The principle of equal consideration of interests (ECOI) is a very popular principle in animal ethics. Peter Singer employs it to ground equal treatment and solve the problem of the basis of equality, namely the problem of why we should grant equal treatment despite the variability of people's features. In this paper, I challenge Singer's argument because ECOI does not provide plausible grounds to presume that the interests of diverse individuals are actually equal. Analyzing the case of pain and the interest in not suffering in particular, I contend that there are some insurmountable epistemic and axiological problems in accounting for the equality of interests. Besides criticizing ECOI as a basis of equality, I argue that we need to rely on an equality of moral status. I conclude by providing some considerations on the relation between equality and the principle of proportionality. Nutzungsrecht: © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 2017 equal consideration of interests animal ethics Basis of equality proportionality principle pain equality Equality Enthalten in International journal of philosophical studies Abingdon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 1993 25(2017), 2, Seite 170-19 (DE-627)171095731 (DE-600)1151040-7 (DE-576)034202234 0967-2559 nnns volume:25 year:2017 number:2 pages:170-19 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 Volltext http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 http://search.proquest.com/docview/1887030801 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4027 AR 25 2017 2 170-19 |
| allfieldsSound |
10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 doi PQ20170501 (DE-627)OLC199237421X (DE-599)GBVOLC199237421X (PRQ)c2126-6e6b8459e1a3158e6beda6f78417ce37f85573a0753e7df937db244c477fb7f30 (KEY)0055019120170000025000200170equalityitsbasisandmoralstatuschallengingtheprinci DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 ZDB PHILOS fid Zuolo, Federico verfasserin aut Equality, its Basis and Moral Status: Challenging the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier The principle of equal consideration of interests (ECOI) is a very popular principle in animal ethics. Peter Singer employs it to ground equal treatment and solve the problem of the basis of equality, namely the problem of why we should grant equal treatment despite the variability of people's features. In this paper, I challenge Singer's argument because ECOI does not provide plausible grounds to presume that the interests of diverse individuals are actually equal. Analyzing the case of pain and the interest in not suffering in particular, I contend that there are some insurmountable epistemic and axiological problems in accounting for the equality of interests. Besides criticizing ECOI as a basis of equality, I argue that we need to rely on an equality of moral status. I conclude by providing some considerations on the relation between equality and the principle of proportionality. Nutzungsrecht: © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 2017 equal consideration of interests animal ethics Basis of equality proportionality principle pain equality Equality Enthalten in International journal of philosophical studies Abingdon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 1993 25(2017), 2, Seite 170-19 (DE-627)171095731 (DE-600)1151040-7 (DE-576)034202234 0967-2559 nnns volume:25 year:2017 number:2 pages:170-19 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 Volltext http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 http://search.proquest.com/docview/1887030801 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4027 AR 25 2017 2 170-19 |
| language |
English |
| source |
Enthalten in International journal of philosophical studies 25(2017), 2, Seite 170-19 volume:25 year:2017 number:2 pages:170-19 |
| sourceStr |
Enthalten in International journal of philosophical studies 25(2017), 2, Seite 170-19 volume:25 year:2017 number:2 pages:170-19 |
| format_phy_str_mv |
Article |
| institution |
findex.gbv.de |
| topic_facet |
equal consideration of interests animal ethics Basis of equality proportionality principle pain equality Equality |
| dewey-raw |
100 |
| isfreeaccess_bool |
false |
| container_title |
International journal of philosophical studies |
| authorswithroles_txt_mv |
Zuolo, Federico @@aut@@ |
| publishDateDaySort_date |
2017-01-01T00:00:00Z |
| hierarchy_top_id |
171095731 |
| dewey-sort |
3100 |
| id |
OLC199237421X |
| language_de |
englisch |
| fullrecord |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a2200265 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC199237421X</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230715041602.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">170512s2017 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="028" ind1="5" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">PQ20170501</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC199237421X</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVOLC199237421X</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(PRQ)c2126-6e6b8459e1a3158e6beda6f78417ce37f85573a0753e7df937db244c477fb7f30</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(KEY)0055019120170000025000200170equalityitsbasisandmoralstatuschallengingtheprinci</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">100</subfield><subfield code="q">ZDB</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">PHILOS</subfield><subfield code="2">fid</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zuolo, Federico</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Equality, its Basis and Moral Status: Challenging the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2017</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">The principle of equal consideration of interests (ECOI) is a very popular principle in animal ethics. Peter Singer employs it to ground equal treatment and solve the problem of the basis of equality, namely the problem of why we should grant equal treatment despite the variability of people's features. In this paper, I challenge Singer's argument because ECOI does not provide plausible grounds to presume that the interests of diverse individuals are actually equal. Analyzing the case of pain and the interest in not suffering in particular, I contend that there are some insurmountable epistemic and axiological problems in accounting for the equality of interests. Besides criticizing ECOI as a basis of equality, I argue that we need to rely on an equality of moral status. I conclude by providing some considerations on the relation between equality and the principle of proportionality.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Nutzungsrecht: © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 2017</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">equal consideration of interests</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">animal ethics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Basis of equality</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">proportionality principle</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">pain</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">equality</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Equality</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">International journal of philosophical studies</subfield><subfield code="d">Abingdon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 1993</subfield><subfield code="g">25(2017), 2, Seite 170-19</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)171095731</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)1151040-7</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)034202234</subfield><subfield code="x">0967-2559</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:25</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2017</subfield><subfield code="g">number:2</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:170-19</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">http://search.proquest.com/docview/1887030801</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_OLC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">FID-PHILOS</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-PHI</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_11</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_110</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2001</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4027</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">25</subfield><subfield code="j">2017</subfield><subfield code="e">2</subfield><subfield code="h">170-19</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| author |
Zuolo, Federico |
| spellingShingle |
Zuolo, Federico ddc 100 fid PHILOS misc equal consideration of interests misc animal ethics misc Basis of equality misc proportionality principle misc pain misc equality misc Equality Equality, its Basis and Moral Status: Challenging the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests |
| authorStr |
Zuolo, Federico |
| ppnlink_with_tag_str_mv |
@@773@@(DE-627)171095731 |
| format |
Article |
| dewey-ones |
100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| delete_txt_mv |
keep |
| author_role |
aut |
| collection |
OLC |
| remote_str |
false |
| illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
| issn |
0967-2559 |
| topic_title |
100 ZDB PHILOS fid Equality, its Basis and Moral Status: Challenging the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests equal consideration of interests animal ethics Basis of equality proportionality principle pain equality Equality |
| topic |
ddc 100 fid PHILOS misc equal consideration of interests misc animal ethics misc Basis of equality misc proportionality principle misc pain misc equality misc Equality |
| topic_unstemmed |
ddc 100 fid PHILOS misc equal consideration of interests misc animal ethics misc Basis of equality misc proportionality principle misc pain misc equality misc Equality |
| topic_browse |
ddc 100 fid PHILOS misc equal consideration of interests misc animal ethics misc Basis of equality misc proportionality principle misc pain misc equality misc Equality |
| format_facet |
Aufsätze Gedruckte Aufsätze |
| format_main_str_mv |
Text Zeitschrift/Artikel |
| carriertype_str_mv |
nc |
| hierarchy_parent_title |
International journal of philosophical studies |
| hierarchy_parent_id |
171095731 |
| dewey-tens |
100 - Philosophy |
| hierarchy_top_title |
International journal of philosophical studies |
| isfreeaccess_txt |
false |
| familylinks_str_mv |
(DE-627)171095731 (DE-600)1151040-7 (DE-576)034202234 |
| title |
Equality, its Basis and Moral Status: Challenging the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests |
| ctrlnum |
(DE-627)OLC199237421X (DE-599)GBVOLC199237421X (PRQ)c2126-6e6b8459e1a3158e6beda6f78417ce37f85573a0753e7df937db244c477fb7f30 (KEY)0055019120170000025000200170equalityitsbasisandmoralstatuschallengingtheprinci |
| title_full |
Equality, its Basis and Moral Status: Challenging the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests |
| author_sort |
Zuolo, Federico |
| journal |
International journal of philosophical studies |
| journalStr |
International journal of philosophical studies |
| lang_code |
eng |
| isOA_bool |
false |
| dewey-hundreds |
100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| recordtype |
marc |
| publishDateSort |
2017 |
| contenttype_str_mv |
txt |
| container_start_page |
170 |
| author_browse |
Zuolo, Federico |
| container_volume |
25 |
| class |
100 ZDB PHILOS fid |
| format_se |
Aufsätze |
| author-letter |
Zuolo, Federico |
| doi_str_mv |
10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 |
| dewey-full |
100 |
| title_sort |
equality, its basis and moral status: challenging the principle of equal consideration of interests |
| title_auth |
Equality, its Basis and Moral Status: Challenging the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests |
| abstract |
The principle of equal consideration of interests (ECOI) is a very popular principle in animal ethics. Peter Singer employs it to ground equal treatment and solve the problem of the basis of equality, namely the problem of why we should grant equal treatment despite the variability of people's features. In this paper, I challenge Singer's argument because ECOI does not provide plausible grounds to presume that the interests of diverse individuals are actually equal. Analyzing the case of pain and the interest in not suffering in particular, I contend that there are some insurmountable epistemic and axiological problems in accounting for the equality of interests. Besides criticizing ECOI as a basis of equality, I argue that we need to rely on an equality of moral status. I conclude by providing some considerations on the relation between equality and the principle of proportionality. |
| abstractGer |
The principle of equal consideration of interests (ECOI) is a very popular principle in animal ethics. Peter Singer employs it to ground equal treatment and solve the problem of the basis of equality, namely the problem of why we should grant equal treatment despite the variability of people's features. In this paper, I challenge Singer's argument because ECOI does not provide plausible grounds to presume that the interests of diverse individuals are actually equal. Analyzing the case of pain and the interest in not suffering in particular, I contend that there are some insurmountable epistemic and axiological problems in accounting for the equality of interests. Besides criticizing ECOI as a basis of equality, I argue that we need to rely on an equality of moral status. I conclude by providing some considerations on the relation between equality and the principle of proportionality. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
The principle of equal consideration of interests (ECOI) is a very popular principle in animal ethics. Peter Singer employs it to ground equal treatment and solve the problem of the basis of equality, namely the problem of why we should grant equal treatment despite the variability of people's features. In this paper, I challenge Singer's argument because ECOI does not provide plausible grounds to presume that the interests of diverse individuals are actually equal. Analyzing the case of pain and the interest in not suffering in particular, I contend that there are some insurmountable epistemic and axiological problems in accounting for the equality of interests. Besides criticizing ECOI as a basis of equality, I argue that we need to rely on an equality of moral status. I conclude by providing some considerations on the relation between equality and the principle of proportionality. |
| collection_details |
GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4027 |
| container_issue |
2 |
| title_short |
Equality, its Basis and Moral Status: Challenging the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests |
| url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 http://search.proquest.com/docview/1887030801 |
| remote_bool |
false |
| ppnlink |
171095731 |
| mediatype_str_mv |
n |
| isOA_txt |
false |
| hochschulschrift_bool |
false |
| doi_str |
10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679 |
| up_date |
2024-07-04T04:49:42.878Z |
| _version_ |
1803622634351493120 |
| fullrecord_marcxml |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a2200265 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC199237421X</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230715041602.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">170512s2017 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="028" ind1="5" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">PQ20170501</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC199237421X</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVOLC199237421X</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(PRQ)c2126-6e6b8459e1a3158e6beda6f78417ce37f85573a0753e7df937db244c477fb7f30</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(KEY)0055019120170000025000200170equalityitsbasisandmoralstatuschallengingtheprinci</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">100</subfield><subfield code="q">ZDB</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">PHILOS</subfield><subfield code="2">fid</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zuolo, Federico</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Equality, its Basis and Moral Status: Challenging the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2017</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">The principle of equal consideration of interests (ECOI) is a very popular principle in animal ethics. Peter Singer employs it to ground equal treatment and solve the problem of the basis of equality, namely the problem of why we should grant equal treatment despite the variability of people's features. In this paper, I challenge Singer's argument because ECOI does not provide plausible grounds to presume that the interests of diverse individuals are actually equal. Analyzing the case of pain and the interest in not suffering in particular, I contend that there are some insurmountable epistemic and axiological problems in accounting for the equality of interests. Besides criticizing ECOI as a basis of equality, I argue that we need to rely on an equality of moral status. I conclude by providing some considerations on the relation between equality and the principle of proportionality.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Nutzungsrecht: © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 2017</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">equal consideration of interests</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">animal ethics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Basis of equality</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">proportionality principle</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">pain</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">equality</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Equality</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">International journal of philosophical studies</subfield><subfield code="d">Abingdon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 1993</subfield><subfield code="g">25(2017), 2, Seite 170-19</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)171095731</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)1151040-7</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)034202234</subfield><subfield code="x">0967-2559</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:25</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2017</subfield><subfield code="g">number:2</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:170-19</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09672559.2017.1286679</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">http://search.proquest.com/docview/1887030801</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_OLC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">FID-PHILOS</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-PHI</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_11</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_110</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2001</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4027</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">25</subfield><subfield code="j">2017</subfield><subfield code="e">2</subfield><subfield code="h">170-19</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| score |
7.399542 |