“Good Types” in Authoritarian Elections

A new electoral design for subnational congress elections in China allows me to investigate the informational utility of authoritarian elections. Authoritarian regimes are notoriously bad at solving the moral hazard problem in the voter’s agency relationship with politicians. Borrowing from the lite...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Manion, Melanie [verfasserIn]

Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2017

Rechteinformationen:	Nutzungsrecht: © The Author(s) 2014

Schlagwörter:	Evaluation Public relations Analysis Methods Legislators Congressional elections Surveys Ethical aspects Authoritarianism Voting Nominations Political parties Moral hazard

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Comparative political studies - Thousand Oaks, Calif. [u.a.] : Sage, 1968, 50(2017), 3, Seite 362-394
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:50 ; year:2017 ; number:3 ; pages:362-394

Links:	Volltext Link aufrufen Link aufrufen

DOI / URN:	10.1177/0010414014537027

Katalog-ID:	OLC1992625301

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title	“Good Types” in Authoritarian Elections
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title_full	“Good Types” in Authoritarian Elections
author_sort	Manion, Melanie
journal	Comparative political studies
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doi_str_mv	10.1177/0010414014537027
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title_sort	“good types” in authoritarian elections
title_auth	“Good Types” in Authoritarian Elections
abstract	A new electoral design for subnational congress elections in China allows me to investigate the informational utility of authoritarian elections. Authoritarian regimes are notoriously bad at solving the moral hazard problem in the voter’s agency relationship with politicians. Borrowing from the literature on political selection, I theorize that authoritarian elections can nonetheless solve the adverse selection problem: Chinese voters can use their electoral power to select “good types,” with personal qualities that signal they will reliably represent local interests. I analyze original data from a survey of 4,071 Chinese local congressmen and women, including voter nominees and communist party nominees. I find that voters do in fact overcome coordination difficulties to nominate and elect “good types.” In contacting politicians about local problems after the elections, however, voters hedge their bets by contacting regime insiders too. At these very local levels, congressional representation by means of political selection co-exists with communist party nominating and veto power in the electoral process.
abstractGer	A new electoral design for subnational congress elections in China allows me to investigate the informational utility of authoritarian elections. Authoritarian regimes are notoriously bad at solving the moral hazard problem in the voter’s agency relationship with politicians. Borrowing from the literature on political selection, I theorize that authoritarian elections can nonetheless solve the adverse selection problem: Chinese voters can use their electoral power to select “good types,” with personal qualities that signal they will reliably represent local interests. I analyze original data from a survey of 4,071 Chinese local congressmen and women, including voter nominees and communist party nominees. I find that voters do in fact overcome coordination difficulties to nominate and elect “good types.” In contacting politicians about local problems after the elections, however, voters hedge their bets by contacting regime insiders too. At these very local levels, congressional representation by means of political selection co-exists with communist party nominating and veto power in the electoral process.
abstract_unstemmed	A new electoral design for subnational congress elections in China allows me to investigate the informational utility of authoritarian elections. Authoritarian regimes are notoriously bad at solving the moral hazard problem in the voter’s agency relationship with politicians. Borrowing from the literature on political selection, I theorize that authoritarian elections can nonetheless solve the adverse selection problem: Chinese voters can use their electoral power to select “good types,” with personal qualities that signal they will reliably represent local interests. I analyze original data from a survey of 4,071 Chinese local congressmen and women, including voter nominees and communist party nominees. I find that voters do in fact overcome coordination difficulties to nominate and elect “good types.” In contacting politicians about local problems after the elections, however, voters hedge their bets by contacting regime insiders too. At these very local levels, congressional representation by means of political selection co-exists with communist party nominating and veto power in the electoral process.
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container_issue	3
title_short	“Good Types” in Authoritarian Elections
url	http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414014537027 http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0010414014537027 https://search.proquest.com/docview/1864987985
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up_date	2024-07-04T05:20:12.802Z
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