A Theory of Soft Capture

In this paper, we propose an alternative model for capture that is based not on reciprocity but on congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator. A regulator is charged by a political principal to provide an imperfect signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe it...
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Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Agrell, Per J [verfasserIn] Gautier, Axel

Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2017

Rechteinformationen:	Nutzungsrecht: © The editors of 2015. © COPYRIGHT 2017 Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

Schlagwörter:	Information regulatory capture Economic models Regulation

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: The Scandinavian journal of economics - Oxford : Wiley, 1976, 119(2017), 3, Seite 571-596
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:119 ; year:2017 ; number:3 ; pages:571-596

Links:	Volltext Link aufrufen Link aufrufen

DOI / URN:	10.1111/sjoe.12171

Katalog-ID:	OLC1994062940

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allfields	10.1111/sjoe.12171 doi PQ20171228 (DE-627)OLC1994062940 (DE-599)GBVOLC1994062940 (PRQ)c1931-a856f7f94273a4b6584653633daa0951cc3b33eb176724205cf55ea736340c250 (KEY)0012305620170000119000300571theoryofsoftcapture DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DE-600 Agrell, Per J verfasserin aut A Theory of Soft Capture 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier In this paper, we propose an alternative model for capture that is based not on reciprocity but on congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator. A regulator is charged by a political principal to provide an imperfect signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe its type, and the production of a signal is costly. The firm can provide a costless alternative signal of lower accuracy to the regulator. In a self‐enforcing equilibrium, the regulator transmits the firm‐produced signal and saves information‐gathering costs, and the firm enjoys higher information rents. Nutzungsrecht: © The editors of 2015. © COPYRIGHT 2017 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Information regulatory capture Economic models Regulation Gautier, Axel oth Enthalten in The Scandinavian journal of economics Oxford : Wiley, 1976 119(2017), 3, Seite 571-596 (DE-627)129097675 (DE-600)8170-X (DE-576)014434253 0347-0520 nnns volume:119 year:2017 number:3 pages:571-596 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12171 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12171/abstract https://search.proquest.com/docview/1914414301 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4326 AR 119 2017 3 571-596
spelling	10.1111/sjoe.12171 doi PQ20171228 (DE-627)OLC1994062940 (DE-599)GBVOLC1994062940 (PRQ)c1931-a856f7f94273a4b6584653633daa0951cc3b33eb176724205cf55ea736340c250 (KEY)0012305620170000119000300571theoryofsoftcapture DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DE-600 Agrell, Per J verfasserin aut A Theory of Soft Capture 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier In this paper, we propose an alternative model for capture that is based not on reciprocity but on congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator. A regulator is charged by a political principal to provide an imperfect signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe its type, and the production of a signal is costly. The firm can provide a costless alternative signal of lower accuracy to the regulator. In a self‐enforcing equilibrium, the regulator transmits the firm‐produced signal and saves information‐gathering costs, and the firm enjoys higher information rents. Nutzungsrecht: © The editors of 2015. © COPYRIGHT 2017 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Information regulatory capture Economic models Regulation Gautier, Axel oth Enthalten in The Scandinavian journal of economics Oxford : Wiley, 1976 119(2017), 3, Seite 571-596 (DE-627)129097675 (DE-600)8170-X (DE-576)014434253 0347-0520 nnns volume:119 year:2017 number:3 pages:571-596 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12171 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12171/abstract https://search.proquest.com/docview/1914414301 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4326 AR 119 2017 3 571-596
allfields_unstemmed	10.1111/sjoe.12171 doi PQ20171228 (DE-627)OLC1994062940 (DE-599)GBVOLC1994062940 (PRQ)c1931-a856f7f94273a4b6584653633daa0951cc3b33eb176724205cf55ea736340c250 (KEY)0012305620170000119000300571theoryofsoftcapture DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DE-600 Agrell, Per J verfasserin aut A Theory of Soft Capture 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier In this paper, we propose an alternative model for capture that is based not on reciprocity but on congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator. A regulator is charged by a political principal to provide an imperfect signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe its type, and the production of a signal is costly. The firm can provide a costless alternative signal of lower accuracy to the regulator. In a self‐enforcing equilibrium, the regulator transmits the firm‐produced signal and saves information‐gathering costs, and the firm enjoys higher information rents. Nutzungsrecht: © The editors of 2015. © COPYRIGHT 2017 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Information regulatory capture Economic models Regulation Gautier, Axel oth Enthalten in The Scandinavian journal of economics Oxford : Wiley, 1976 119(2017), 3, Seite 571-596 (DE-627)129097675 (DE-600)8170-X (DE-576)014434253 0347-0520 nnns volume:119 year:2017 number:3 pages:571-596 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12171 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12171/abstract https://search.proquest.com/docview/1914414301 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4326 AR 119 2017 3 571-596
allfieldsGer	10.1111/sjoe.12171 doi PQ20171228 (DE-627)OLC1994062940 (DE-599)GBVOLC1994062940 (PRQ)c1931-a856f7f94273a4b6584653633daa0951cc3b33eb176724205cf55ea736340c250 (KEY)0012305620170000119000300571theoryofsoftcapture DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DE-600 Agrell, Per J verfasserin aut A Theory of Soft Capture 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier In this paper, we propose an alternative model for capture that is based not on reciprocity but on congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator. A regulator is charged by a political principal to provide an imperfect signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe its type, and the production of a signal is costly. The firm can provide a costless alternative signal of lower accuracy to the regulator. In a self‐enforcing equilibrium, the regulator transmits the firm‐produced signal and saves information‐gathering costs, and the firm enjoys higher information rents. Nutzungsrecht: © The editors of 2015. © COPYRIGHT 2017 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Information regulatory capture Economic models Regulation Gautier, Axel oth Enthalten in The Scandinavian journal of economics Oxford : Wiley, 1976 119(2017), 3, Seite 571-596 (DE-627)129097675 (DE-600)8170-X (DE-576)014434253 0347-0520 nnns volume:119 year:2017 number:3 pages:571-596 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12171 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12171/abstract https://search.proquest.com/docview/1914414301 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4326 AR 119 2017 3 571-596
allfieldsSound	10.1111/sjoe.12171 doi PQ20171228 (DE-627)OLC1994062940 (DE-599)GBVOLC1994062940 (PRQ)c1931-a856f7f94273a4b6584653633daa0951cc3b33eb176724205cf55ea736340c250 (KEY)0012305620170000119000300571theoryofsoftcapture DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DE-600 Agrell, Per J verfasserin aut A Theory of Soft Capture 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier In this paper, we propose an alternative model for capture that is based not on reciprocity but on congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator. A regulator is charged by a political principal to provide an imperfect signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe its type, and the production of a signal is costly. The firm can provide a costless alternative signal of lower accuracy to the regulator. In a self‐enforcing equilibrium, the regulator transmits the firm‐produced signal and saves information‐gathering costs, and the firm enjoys higher information rents. Nutzungsrecht: © The editors of 2015. © COPYRIGHT 2017 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Information regulatory capture Economic models Regulation Gautier, Axel oth Enthalten in The Scandinavian journal of economics Oxford : Wiley, 1976 119(2017), 3, Seite 571-596 (DE-627)129097675 (DE-600)8170-X (DE-576)014434253 0347-0520 nnns volume:119 year:2017 number:3 pages:571-596 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12171 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12171/abstract https://search.proquest.com/docview/1914414301 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4326 AR 119 2017 3 571-596
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abstract	In this paper, we propose an alternative model for capture that is based not on reciprocity but on congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator. A regulator is charged by a political principal to provide an imperfect signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe its type, and the production of a signal is costly. The firm can provide a costless alternative signal of lower accuracy to the regulator. In a self‐enforcing equilibrium, the regulator transmits the firm‐produced signal and saves information‐gathering costs, and the firm enjoys higher information rents.
abstractGer	In this paper, we propose an alternative model for capture that is based not on reciprocity but on congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator. A regulator is charged by a political principal to provide an imperfect signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe its type, and the production of a signal is costly. The firm can provide a costless alternative signal of lower accuracy to the regulator. In a self‐enforcing equilibrium, the regulator transmits the firm‐produced signal and saves information‐gathering costs, and the firm enjoys higher information rents.
abstract_unstemmed	In this paper, we propose an alternative model for capture that is based not on reciprocity but on congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator. A regulator is charged by a political principal to provide an imperfect signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe its type, and the production of a signal is costly. The firm can provide a costless alternative signal of lower accuracy to the regulator. In a self‐enforcing equilibrium, the regulator transmits the firm‐produced signal and saves information‐gathering costs, and the firm enjoys higher information rents.
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up_date	2024-07-03T16:21:13.597Z
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A Theory of Soft Capture

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