Behavior-Based Pricing, Production Efficiency, and Quality Differentiation
In a two-period vertical duopoly, we examine how behavior-based price discrimination (BPD) affects the firms’ endogenous quality differentiation and profits. The firms’ relative production efficiency , defined as the ratio between their unit cost difference and quality difference, plays a crucial ro...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Jing, Bing [verfasserIn] |
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Englisch |
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2017 |
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Enthalten in: Management science - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, 1954, 63(2017), 7, Seite 2365-2376 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:63 ; year:2017 ; number:7 ; pages:2365-2376 |
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DOI / URN: |
10.1287/mnsc.2016.2463 |
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520 | |a In a two-period vertical duopoly, we examine how behavior-based price discrimination (BPD) affects the firms’ endogenous quality differentiation and profits. The firms’ relative production efficiency , defined as the ratio between their unit cost difference and quality difference, plays a crucial role. With exogenous product qualities, BPD always decreases the profits of the more efficient firm, but increases those of the sufficiently less efficient firm. Anticipating its period 2 disadvantage in price discrimination, the less efficient firm competes more vigorously and also gains more in period 1 than its competitor. For the sufficiently less efficient firm, its period 1 gain dominates its period 2 loss, and its total profits increase. With endogenous quality choices, BPD does not alter the low-end quality (at the lower bound of the quality space), but increases the high-end quality, enlarging quality differentiation. This is because under BPD, each firm’s profit gain decreases (or its profit loss increases) in its relative production efficiency. Interestingly, BPD may increase both firms’ profits under endogenous quality differentiation. Aside from causing mismatch between consumers and products, we further show that BPD lowers social welfare through inducing excessive quality differentiation. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing . | ||
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10.1287/mnsc.2016.2463 doi PQ20170901 (DE-627)OLC1994131489 (DE-599)GBVOLC1994131489 (PRQ)c773-b8c0c7e394afa23e0935119213e24f27096c36f8ef9ae74246f80c045bc349a90 (KEY)0017576520170000063000702365behaviorbasedpricingproductionefficiencyandquality DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 DE-600 QP 300: AVZ rvk 85.03 bkl 85.06 bkl Jing, Bing verfasserin aut Behavior-Based Pricing, Production Efficiency, and Quality Differentiation 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier In a two-period vertical duopoly, we examine how behavior-based price discrimination (BPD) affects the firms’ endogenous quality differentiation and profits. The firms’ relative production efficiency , defined as the ratio between their unit cost difference and quality difference, plays a crucial role. With exogenous product qualities, BPD always decreases the profits of the more efficient firm, but increases those of the sufficiently less efficient firm. Anticipating its period 2 disadvantage in price discrimination, the less efficient firm competes more vigorously and also gains more in period 1 than its competitor. For the sufficiently less efficient firm, its period 1 gain dominates its period 2 loss, and its total profits increase. With endogenous quality choices, BPD does not alter the low-end quality (at the lower bound of the quality space), but increases the high-end quality, enlarging quality differentiation. This is because under BPD, each firm’s profit gain decreases (or its profit loss increases) in its relative production efficiency. Interestingly, BPD may increase both firms’ profits under endogenous quality differentiation. Aside from causing mismatch between consumers and products, we further show that BPD lowers social welfare through inducing excessive quality differentiation. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing . quality production efficiency price discrimination behavior-based pricing vertical differentiation Enthalten in Management science Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, 1954 63(2017), 7, Seite 2365-2376 (DE-627)129491470 (DE-600)206345-1 (DE-576)014886529 0025-1909 nnns volume:63 year:2017 number:7 pages:2365-2376 http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2463 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_648 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2016 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4315 GBV_ILN_4316 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4700 QP 300: 85.03 AVZ 85.06 AVZ AR 63 2017 7 2365-2376 |
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10.1287/mnsc.2016.2463 doi PQ20170901 (DE-627)OLC1994131489 (DE-599)GBVOLC1994131489 (PRQ)c773-b8c0c7e394afa23e0935119213e24f27096c36f8ef9ae74246f80c045bc349a90 (KEY)0017576520170000063000702365behaviorbasedpricingproductionefficiencyandquality DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 DE-600 QP 300: AVZ rvk 85.03 bkl 85.06 bkl Jing, Bing verfasserin aut Behavior-Based Pricing, Production Efficiency, and Quality Differentiation 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier In a two-period vertical duopoly, we examine how behavior-based price discrimination (BPD) affects the firms’ endogenous quality differentiation and profits. The firms’ relative production efficiency , defined as the ratio between their unit cost difference and quality difference, plays a crucial role. With exogenous product qualities, BPD always decreases the profits of the more efficient firm, but increases those of the sufficiently less efficient firm. Anticipating its period 2 disadvantage in price discrimination, the less efficient firm competes more vigorously and also gains more in period 1 than its competitor. For the sufficiently less efficient firm, its period 1 gain dominates its period 2 loss, and its total profits increase. With endogenous quality choices, BPD does not alter the low-end quality (at the lower bound of the quality space), but increases the high-end quality, enlarging quality differentiation. This is because under BPD, each firm’s profit gain decreases (or its profit loss increases) in its relative production efficiency. Interestingly, BPD may increase both firms’ profits under endogenous quality differentiation. Aside from causing mismatch between consumers and products, we further show that BPD lowers social welfare through inducing excessive quality differentiation. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing . quality production efficiency price discrimination behavior-based pricing vertical differentiation Enthalten in Management science Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, 1954 63(2017), 7, Seite 2365-2376 (DE-627)129491470 (DE-600)206345-1 (DE-576)014886529 0025-1909 nnns volume:63 year:2017 number:7 pages:2365-2376 http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2463 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_648 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2016 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4315 GBV_ILN_4316 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4700 QP 300: 85.03 AVZ 85.06 AVZ AR 63 2017 7 2365-2376 |
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10.1287/mnsc.2016.2463 doi PQ20170901 (DE-627)OLC1994131489 (DE-599)GBVOLC1994131489 (PRQ)c773-b8c0c7e394afa23e0935119213e24f27096c36f8ef9ae74246f80c045bc349a90 (KEY)0017576520170000063000702365behaviorbasedpricingproductionefficiencyandquality DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 DE-600 QP 300: AVZ rvk 85.03 bkl 85.06 bkl Jing, Bing verfasserin aut Behavior-Based Pricing, Production Efficiency, and Quality Differentiation 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier In a two-period vertical duopoly, we examine how behavior-based price discrimination (BPD) affects the firms’ endogenous quality differentiation and profits. The firms’ relative production efficiency , defined as the ratio between their unit cost difference and quality difference, plays a crucial role. With exogenous product qualities, BPD always decreases the profits of the more efficient firm, but increases those of the sufficiently less efficient firm. Anticipating its period 2 disadvantage in price discrimination, the less efficient firm competes more vigorously and also gains more in period 1 than its competitor. For the sufficiently less efficient firm, its period 1 gain dominates its period 2 loss, and its total profits increase. With endogenous quality choices, BPD does not alter the low-end quality (at the lower bound of the quality space), but increases the high-end quality, enlarging quality differentiation. This is because under BPD, each firm’s profit gain decreases (or its profit loss increases) in its relative production efficiency. Interestingly, BPD may increase both firms’ profits under endogenous quality differentiation. Aside from causing mismatch between consumers and products, we further show that BPD lowers social welfare through inducing excessive quality differentiation. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing . quality production efficiency price discrimination behavior-based pricing vertical differentiation Enthalten in Management science Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, 1954 63(2017), 7, Seite 2365-2376 (DE-627)129491470 (DE-600)206345-1 (DE-576)014886529 0025-1909 nnns volume:63 year:2017 number:7 pages:2365-2376 http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2463 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_648 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2016 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4315 GBV_ILN_4316 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4700 QP 300: 85.03 AVZ 85.06 AVZ AR 63 2017 7 2365-2376 |
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10.1287/mnsc.2016.2463 doi PQ20170901 (DE-627)OLC1994131489 (DE-599)GBVOLC1994131489 (PRQ)c773-b8c0c7e394afa23e0935119213e24f27096c36f8ef9ae74246f80c045bc349a90 (KEY)0017576520170000063000702365behaviorbasedpricingproductionefficiencyandquality DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 DE-600 QP 300: AVZ rvk 85.03 bkl 85.06 bkl Jing, Bing verfasserin aut Behavior-Based Pricing, Production Efficiency, and Quality Differentiation 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier In a two-period vertical duopoly, we examine how behavior-based price discrimination (BPD) affects the firms’ endogenous quality differentiation and profits. The firms’ relative production efficiency , defined as the ratio between their unit cost difference and quality difference, plays a crucial role. With exogenous product qualities, BPD always decreases the profits of the more efficient firm, but increases those of the sufficiently less efficient firm. Anticipating its period 2 disadvantage in price discrimination, the less efficient firm competes more vigorously and also gains more in period 1 than its competitor. For the sufficiently less efficient firm, its period 1 gain dominates its period 2 loss, and its total profits increase. With endogenous quality choices, BPD does not alter the low-end quality (at the lower bound of the quality space), but increases the high-end quality, enlarging quality differentiation. This is because under BPD, each firm’s profit gain decreases (or its profit loss increases) in its relative production efficiency. Interestingly, BPD may increase both firms’ profits under endogenous quality differentiation. Aside from causing mismatch between consumers and products, we further show that BPD lowers social welfare through inducing excessive quality differentiation. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing . quality production efficiency price discrimination behavior-based pricing vertical differentiation Enthalten in Management science Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, 1954 63(2017), 7, Seite 2365-2376 (DE-627)129491470 (DE-600)206345-1 (DE-576)014886529 0025-1909 nnns volume:63 year:2017 number:7 pages:2365-2376 http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2463 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_648 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2016 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4315 GBV_ILN_4316 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4700 QP 300: 85.03 AVZ 85.06 AVZ AR 63 2017 7 2365-2376 |
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10.1287/mnsc.2016.2463 doi PQ20170901 (DE-627)OLC1994131489 (DE-599)GBVOLC1994131489 (PRQ)c773-b8c0c7e394afa23e0935119213e24f27096c36f8ef9ae74246f80c045bc349a90 (KEY)0017576520170000063000702365behaviorbasedpricingproductionefficiencyandquality DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 DE-600 QP 300: AVZ rvk 85.03 bkl 85.06 bkl Jing, Bing verfasserin aut Behavior-Based Pricing, Production Efficiency, and Quality Differentiation 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier In a two-period vertical duopoly, we examine how behavior-based price discrimination (BPD) affects the firms’ endogenous quality differentiation and profits. The firms’ relative production efficiency , defined as the ratio between their unit cost difference and quality difference, plays a crucial role. With exogenous product qualities, BPD always decreases the profits of the more efficient firm, but increases those of the sufficiently less efficient firm. Anticipating its period 2 disadvantage in price discrimination, the less efficient firm competes more vigorously and also gains more in period 1 than its competitor. For the sufficiently less efficient firm, its period 1 gain dominates its period 2 loss, and its total profits increase. With endogenous quality choices, BPD does not alter the low-end quality (at the lower bound of the quality space), but increases the high-end quality, enlarging quality differentiation. This is because under BPD, each firm’s profit gain decreases (or its profit loss increases) in its relative production efficiency. Interestingly, BPD may increase both firms’ profits under endogenous quality differentiation. Aside from causing mismatch between consumers and products, we further show that BPD lowers social welfare through inducing excessive quality differentiation. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing . quality production efficiency price discrimination behavior-based pricing vertical differentiation Enthalten in Management science Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, 1954 63(2017), 7, Seite 2365-2376 (DE-627)129491470 (DE-600)206345-1 (DE-576)014886529 0025-1909 nnns volume:63 year:2017 number:7 pages:2365-2376 http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2463 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_648 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2016 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4315 GBV_ILN_4316 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4700 QP 300: 85.03 AVZ 85.06 AVZ AR 63 2017 7 2365-2376 |
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Behavior-Based Pricing, Production Efficiency, and Quality Differentiation |
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In a two-period vertical duopoly, we examine how behavior-based price discrimination (BPD) affects the firms’ endogenous quality differentiation and profits. The firms’ relative production efficiency , defined as the ratio between their unit cost difference and quality difference, plays a crucial role. With exogenous product qualities, BPD always decreases the profits of the more efficient firm, but increases those of the sufficiently less efficient firm. Anticipating its period 2 disadvantage in price discrimination, the less efficient firm competes more vigorously and also gains more in period 1 than its competitor. For the sufficiently less efficient firm, its period 1 gain dominates its period 2 loss, and its total profits increase. With endogenous quality choices, BPD does not alter the low-end quality (at the lower bound of the quality space), but increases the high-end quality, enlarging quality differentiation. This is because under BPD, each firm’s profit gain decreases (or its profit loss increases) in its relative production efficiency. Interestingly, BPD may increase both firms’ profits under endogenous quality differentiation. Aside from causing mismatch between consumers and products, we further show that BPD lowers social welfare through inducing excessive quality differentiation. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing . |
abstractGer |
In a two-period vertical duopoly, we examine how behavior-based price discrimination (BPD) affects the firms’ endogenous quality differentiation and profits. The firms’ relative production efficiency , defined as the ratio between their unit cost difference and quality difference, plays a crucial role. With exogenous product qualities, BPD always decreases the profits of the more efficient firm, but increases those of the sufficiently less efficient firm. Anticipating its period 2 disadvantage in price discrimination, the less efficient firm competes more vigorously and also gains more in period 1 than its competitor. For the sufficiently less efficient firm, its period 1 gain dominates its period 2 loss, and its total profits increase. With endogenous quality choices, BPD does not alter the low-end quality (at the lower bound of the quality space), but increases the high-end quality, enlarging quality differentiation. This is because under BPD, each firm’s profit gain decreases (or its profit loss increases) in its relative production efficiency. Interestingly, BPD may increase both firms’ profits under endogenous quality differentiation. Aside from causing mismatch between consumers and products, we further show that BPD lowers social welfare through inducing excessive quality differentiation. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing . |
abstract_unstemmed |
In a two-period vertical duopoly, we examine how behavior-based price discrimination (BPD) affects the firms’ endogenous quality differentiation and profits. The firms’ relative production efficiency , defined as the ratio between their unit cost difference and quality difference, plays a crucial role. With exogenous product qualities, BPD always decreases the profits of the more efficient firm, but increases those of the sufficiently less efficient firm. Anticipating its period 2 disadvantage in price discrimination, the less efficient firm competes more vigorously and also gains more in period 1 than its competitor. For the sufficiently less efficient firm, its period 1 gain dominates its period 2 loss, and its total profits increase. With endogenous quality choices, BPD does not alter the low-end quality (at the lower bound of the quality space), but increases the high-end quality, enlarging quality differentiation. This is because under BPD, each firm’s profit gain decreases (or its profit loss increases) in its relative production efficiency. Interestingly, BPD may increase both firms’ profits under endogenous quality differentiation. Aside from causing mismatch between consumers and products, we further show that BPD lowers social welfare through inducing excessive quality differentiation. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing . |
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