Taxman's Dilemma: Coercion or Persuasion? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Ethiopia

We analyze data from a randomized controlled trial of two innovative anti-tax evasion schemes in Ethiopia that signal threats of audit and complimentary messages that encourage tax morale. Our results indicate that the threat of audit reduces tax evasion significantly, and its effect is higher in bu...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Abebe Shimeles [verfasserIn] Daniel Zerfu Gurara Firew Woldeyes

Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2017

Schlagwörter:	Morality Tax evasion Compliance Tax audits Corporate taxes

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: The American economic review - Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Assoc., 1911, 107(2017), 5, Seite 420
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:107 ; year:2017 ; number:5 ; pages:420

Links:	Volltext Link aufrufen

DOI / URN:	10.1257/aer.p20171141

Katalog-ID:	OLC199480212X

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spelling	10.1257/aer.p20171141 doi PQ20170901 (DE-627)OLC199480212X (DE-599)GBVOLC199480212X (PRQ)p932-79871d42156da87d183d7371132df72ae52793c167b5f65f80952e2c7fb3d6760 (KEY)0108845920170000107000500420taxmansdilemmacoercionorpersuasionevidencefromaran DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DE-101 300 AVZ Abebe Shimeles verfasserin aut Taxman's Dilemma: Coercion or Persuasion? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Ethiopia 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier We analyze data from a randomized controlled trial of two innovative anti-tax evasion schemes in Ethiopia that signal threats of audit and complimentary messages that encourage tax morale. Our results indicate that the threat of audit reduces tax evasion significantly, and its effect is higher in businesses commonly suspected of high tax evasion rates. We also find that appealing to the tax morale promotes compliance but slightly less than that of audit threat. Our results are robust to different estimation strategies and less sensitive to potential confounding factors. Morality Tax evasion Compliance Tax audits Corporate taxes Daniel Zerfu Gurara oth Firew Woldeyes oth Enthalten in The American economic review Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Assoc., 1911 107(2017), 5, Seite 420 (DE-627)129476803 (DE-600)203590-X (DE-576)014856832 0002-8282 nnns volume:107 year:2017 number:5 pages:420 http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171141 Volltext https://search.proquest.com/docview/1898638477 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_30 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_118 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_193 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_640 GBV_ILN_707 GBV_ILN_754 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2035 GBV_ILN_2062 GBV_ILN_2174 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4027 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4238 GBV_ILN_4247 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4316 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4320 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 107 2017 5 420
allfields_unstemmed	10.1257/aer.p20171141 doi PQ20170901 (DE-627)OLC199480212X (DE-599)GBVOLC199480212X (PRQ)p932-79871d42156da87d183d7371132df72ae52793c167b5f65f80952e2c7fb3d6760 (KEY)0108845920170000107000500420taxmansdilemmacoercionorpersuasionevidencefromaran DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DE-101 300 AVZ Abebe Shimeles verfasserin aut Taxman's Dilemma: Coercion or Persuasion? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Ethiopia 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier We analyze data from a randomized controlled trial of two innovative anti-tax evasion schemes in Ethiopia that signal threats of audit and complimentary messages that encourage tax morale. Our results indicate that the threat of audit reduces tax evasion significantly, and its effect is higher in businesses commonly suspected of high tax evasion rates. We also find that appealing to the tax morale promotes compliance but slightly less than that of audit threat. Our results are robust to different estimation strategies and less sensitive to potential confounding factors. Morality Tax evasion Compliance Tax audits Corporate taxes Daniel Zerfu Gurara oth Firew Woldeyes oth Enthalten in The American economic review Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Assoc., 1911 107(2017), 5, Seite 420 (DE-627)129476803 (DE-600)203590-X (DE-576)014856832 0002-8282 nnns volume:107 year:2017 number:5 pages:420 http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171141 Volltext https://search.proquest.com/docview/1898638477 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_30 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_118 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_193 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_640 GBV_ILN_707 GBV_ILN_754 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2035 GBV_ILN_2062 GBV_ILN_2174 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4027 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4238 GBV_ILN_4247 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4316 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4320 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 107 2017 5 420
allfieldsGer	10.1257/aer.p20171141 doi PQ20170901 (DE-627)OLC199480212X (DE-599)GBVOLC199480212X (PRQ)p932-79871d42156da87d183d7371132df72ae52793c167b5f65f80952e2c7fb3d6760 (KEY)0108845920170000107000500420taxmansdilemmacoercionorpersuasionevidencefromaran DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DE-101 300 AVZ Abebe Shimeles verfasserin aut Taxman's Dilemma: Coercion or Persuasion? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Ethiopia 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier We analyze data from a randomized controlled trial of two innovative anti-tax evasion schemes in Ethiopia that signal threats of audit and complimentary messages that encourage tax morale. Our results indicate that the threat of audit reduces tax evasion significantly, and its effect is higher in businesses commonly suspected of high tax evasion rates. We also find that appealing to the tax morale promotes compliance but slightly less than that of audit threat. Our results are robust to different estimation strategies and less sensitive to potential confounding factors. Morality Tax evasion Compliance Tax audits Corporate taxes Daniel Zerfu Gurara oth Firew Woldeyes oth Enthalten in The American economic review Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Assoc., 1911 107(2017), 5, Seite 420 (DE-627)129476803 (DE-600)203590-X (DE-576)014856832 0002-8282 nnns volume:107 year:2017 number:5 pages:420 http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171141 Volltext https://search.proquest.com/docview/1898638477 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_30 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_118 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_193 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_640 GBV_ILN_707 GBV_ILN_754 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2035 GBV_ILN_2062 GBV_ILN_2174 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4027 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4238 GBV_ILN_4247 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4316 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4320 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 107 2017 5 420
allfieldsSound	10.1257/aer.p20171141 doi PQ20170901 (DE-627)OLC199480212X (DE-599)GBVOLC199480212X (PRQ)p932-79871d42156da87d183d7371132df72ae52793c167b5f65f80952e2c7fb3d6760 (KEY)0108845920170000107000500420taxmansdilemmacoercionorpersuasionevidencefromaran DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 DE-101 300 AVZ Abebe Shimeles verfasserin aut Taxman's Dilemma: Coercion or Persuasion? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Ethiopia 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier We analyze data from a randomized controlled trial of two innovative anti-tax evasion schemes in Ethiopia that signal threats of audit and complimentary messages that encourage tax morale. Our results indicate that the threat of audit reduces tax evasion significantly, and its effect is higher in businesses commonly suspected of high tax evasion rates. We also find that appealing to the tax morale promotes compliance but slightly less than that of audit threat. Our results are robust to different estimation strategies and less sensitive to potential confounding factors. Morality Tax evasion Compliance Tax audits Corporate taxes Daniel Zerfu Gurara oth Firew Woldeyes oth Enthalten in The American economic review Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Assoc., 1911 107(2017), 5, Seite 420 (DE-627)129476803 (DE-600)203590-X (DE-576)014856832 0002-8282 nnns volume:107 year:2017 number:5 pages:420 http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171141 Volltext https://search.proquest.com/docview/1898638477 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_30 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_118 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_193 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_640 GBV_ILN_707 GBV_ILN_754 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2035 GBV_ILN_2062 GBV_ILN_2174 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4027 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4238 GBV_ILN_4247 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4316 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4320 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 107 2017 5 420
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source	Enthalten in The American economic review 107(2017), 5, Seite 420 volume:107 year:2017 number:5 pages:420
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author	Abebe Shimeles
spellingShingle	Abebe Shimeles ddc 330 ddc 300 misc Morality misc Tax evasion misc Compliance misc Tax audits misc Corporate taxes Taxman's Dilemma: Coercion or Persuasion? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Ethiopia
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topic_title	330 DE-101 300 AVZ Taxman's Dilemma: Coercion or Persuasion? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Ethiopia Morality Tax evasion Compliance Tax audits Corporate taxes
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title	Taxman's Dilemma: Coercion or Persuasion? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Ethiopia
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title_full	Taxman's Dilemma: Coercion or Persuasion? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Ethiopia
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title_sort	taxman's dilemma: coercion or persuasion? evidence from a randomized field experiment in ethiopia
title_auth	Taxman's Dilemma: Coercion or Persuasion? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Ethiopia
abstract	We analyze data from a randomized controlled trial of two innovative anti-tax evasion schemes in Ethiopia that signal threats of audit and complimentary messages that encourage tax morale. Our results indicate that the threat of audit reduces tax evasion significantly, and its effect is higher in businesses commonly suspected of high tax evasion rates. We also find that appealing to the tax morale promotes compliance but slightly less than that of audit threat. Our results are robust to different estimation strategies and less sensitive to potential confounding factors.
abstractGer	We analyze data from a randomized controlled trial of two innovative anti-tax evasion schemes in Ethiopia that signal threats of audit and complimentary messages that encourage tax morale. Our results indicate that the threat of audit reduces tax evasion significantly, and its effect is higher in businesses commonly suspected of high tax evasion rates. We also find that appealing to the tax morale promotes compliance but slightly less than that of audit threat. Our results are robust to different estimation strategies and less sensitive to potential confounding factors.
abstract_unstemmed	We analyze data from a randomized controlled trial of two innovative anti-tax evasion schemes in Ethiopia that signal threats of audit and complimentary messages that encourage tax morale. Our results indicate that the threat of audit reduces tax evasion significantly, and its effect is higher in businesses commonly suspected of high tax evasion rates. We also find that appealing to the tax morale promotes compliance but slightly less than that of audit threat. Our results are robust to different estimation strategies and less sensitive to potential confounding factors.
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title_short	Taxman's Dilemma: Coercion or Persuasion? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Ethiopia
url	http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171141 https://search.proquest.com/docview/1898638477
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