Agency Costs of Moving to Tax Havens: Evidence from Cross‐border Merger Premia
Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue This paper explores the valuation effects of the tradeoff between tax avoidance and corporate governance through tax haven M&As. Firms can achieve tax savings by selling to an acquirer based in a tax haven, making the newly created multinational...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Col, Burcin [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2017 |
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| Rechteinformationen: |
Nutzungsrecht: © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd |
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| Schlagwörter: |
|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Corporate governance - Oxford : Blackwell, 1993, 25(2017), 4, Seite 271-288 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:25 ; year:2017 ; number:4 ; pages:271-288 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1111/corg.12177 |
|---|
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OLC1995289833 |
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| 520 | |a Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue This paper explores the valuation effects of the tradeoff between tax avoidance and corporate governance through tax haven M&As. Firms can achieve tax savings by selling to an acquirer based in a tax haven, making the newly created multinational a haven resident. Changing a firm's tax home through a 100 percent acquisition is also accompanied by a change in legal system and corporate governance. Therefore, tax savings could come at the expense of corporate governance degradation making the value implications of such tax avoidance attempts an important empirical issue. Research Findings/Insights Using an international sample of cross-border M&As from 1989 to 2012, we find value evidence supporting the agency costs hypothesis. For 100 percent M&As, a lower target premium is associated with those transactions where the tax haven acquirer has weaker investor protection than the target. Theoretical/Academic Implications Our findings provide value evidence regarding the agency costs of tax-motivated M&As as a result of the secrecy laws and limited investor protection of tax havens. Practitioner/Policy Implications This study provides a perspective for executives of multinational firms to take into account the value consequences associated with secrecy laws and weak investor protection while considering a possible relocation to tax havens. It also offers further insight to policymakers concerning the costs of limited investor protection and lack of transparency. | ||
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10.1111/corg.12177 doi PQ20170721 (DE-627)OLC1995289833 (DE-599)GBVOLC1995289833 (PRQ)p1237-db7958a585ebc0d49d00b40a7200def7623abc36fefceec70a3ea725fef0d7190 (KEY)0231645520170000025000400271agencycostsofmovingtotaxhavensevidencefromcrossbor DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 320 DNB Col, Burcin verfasserin aut Agency Costs of Moving to Tax Havens: Evidence from Cross‐border Merger Premia 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue This paper explores the valuation effects of the tradeoff between tax avoidance and corporate governance through tax haven M&As. Firms can achieve tax savings by selling to an acquirer based in a tax haven, making the newly created multinational a haven resident. Changing a firm's tax home through a 100 percent acquisition is also accompanied by a change in legal system and corporate governance. Therefore, tax savings could come at the expense of corporate governance degradation making the value implications of such tax avoidance attempts an important empirical issue. Research Findings/Insights Using an international sample of cross-border M&As from 1989 to 2012, we find value evidence supporting the agency costs hypothesis. For 100 percent M&As, a lower target premium is associated with those transactions where the tax haven acquirer has weaker investor protection than the target. Theoretical/Academic Implications Our findings provide value evidence regarding the agency costs of tax-motivated M&As as a result of the secrecy laws and limited investor protection of tax havens. Practitioner/Policy Implications This study provides a perspective for executives of multinational firms to take into account the value consequences associated with secrecy laws and weak investor protection while considering a possible relocation to tax havens. It also offers further insight to policymakers concerning the costs of limited investor protection and lack of transparency. Nutzungsrecht: © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Cross‐Border Mergers Tax Haven Tax Avoidance Corporate Governance Corporate governance Tax havens Tax avoidance Cost control Enthalten in Corporate governance Oxford : Blackwell, 1993 25(2017), 4, Seite 271-288 (DE-627)188145524 (DE-600)1280434-4 (DE-576)055477801 0964-8410 nnns volume:25 year:2017 number:4 pages:271-288 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/corg.12177 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/corg.12177/abstract https://search.proquest.com/docview/1916111425 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_2062 GBV_ILN_4125 AR 25 2017 4 271-288 |
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10.1111/corg.12177 doi PQ20170721 (DE-627)OLC1995289833 (DE-599)GBVOLC1995289833 (PRQ)p1237-db7958a585ebc0d49d00b40a7200def7623abc36fefceec70a3ea725fef0d7190 (KEY)0231645520170000025000400271agencycostsofmovingtotaxhavensevidencefromcrossbor DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 320 DNB Col, Burcin verfasserin aut Agency Costs of Moving to Tax Havens: Evidence from Cross‐border Merger Premia 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue This paper explores the valuation effects of the tradeoff between tax avoidance and corporate governance through tax haven M&As. Firms can achieve tax savings by selling to an acquirer based in a tax haven, making the newly created multinational a haven resident. Changing a firm's tax home through a 100 percent acquisition is also accompanied by a change in legal system and corporate governance. Therefore, tax savings could come at the expense of corporate governance degradation making the value implications of such tax avoidance attempts an important empirical issue. Research Findings/Insights Using an international sample of cross-border M&As from 1989 to 2012, we find value evidence supporting the agency costs hypothesis. For 100 percent M&As, a lower target premium is associated with those transactions where the tax haven acquirer has weaker investor protection than the target. Theoretical/Academic Implications Our findings provide value evidence regarding the agency costs of tax-motivated M&As as a result of the secrecy laws and limited investor protection of tax havens. Practitioner/Policy Implications This study provides a perspective for executives of multinational firms to take into account the value consequences associated with secrecy laws and weak investor protection while considering a possible relocation to tax havens. It also offers further insight to policymakers concerning the costs of limited investor protection and lack of transparency. Nutzungsrecht: © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Cross‐Border Mergers Tax Haven Tax Avoidance Corporate Governance Corporate governance Tax havens Tax avoidance Cost control Enthalten in Corporate governance Oxford : Blackwell, 1993 25(2017), 4, Seite 271-288 (DE-627)188145524 (DE-600)1280434-4 (DE-576)055477801 0964-8410 nnns volume:25 year:2017 number:4 pages:271-288 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/corg.12177 Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/corg.12177/abstract https://search.proquest.com/docview/1916111425 GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_2062 GBV_ILN_4125 AR 25 2017 4 271-288 |
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Agency Costs of Moving to Tax Havens: Evidence from Cross‐border Merger Premia |
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Agency Costs of Moving to Tax Havens: Evidence from Cross‐border Merger Premia |
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agency costs of moving to tax havens: evidence from cross‐border merger premia |
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Agency Costs of Moving to Tax Havens: Evidence from Cross‐border Merger Premia |
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Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue This paper explores the valuation effects of the tradeoff between tax avoidance and corporate governance through tax haven M&As. Firms can achieve tax savings by selling to an acquirer based in a tax haven, making the newly created multinational a haven resident. Changing a firm's tax home through a 100 percent acquisition is also accompanied by a change in legal system and corporate governance. Therefore, tax savings could come at the expense of corporate governance degradation making the value implications of such tax avoidance attempts an important empirical issue. Research Findings/Insights Using an international sample of cross-border M&As from 1989 to 2012, we find value evidence supporting the agency costs hypothesis. For 100 percent M&As, a lower target premium is associated with those transactions where the tax haven acquirer has weaker investor protection than the target. Theoretical/Academic Implications Our findings provide value evidence regarding the agency costs of tax-motivated M&As as a result of the secrecy laws and limited investor protection of tax havens. Practitioner/Policy Implications This study provides a perspective for executives of multinational firms to take into account the value consequences associated with secrecy laws and weak investor protection while considering a possible relocation to tax havens. It also offers further insight to policymakers concerning the costs of limited investor protection and lack of transparency. |
| abstractGer |
Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue This paper explores the valuation effects of the tradeoff between tax avoidance and corporate governance through tax haven M&As. Firms can achieve tax savings by selling to an acquirer based in a tax haven, making the newly created multinational a haven resident. Changing a firm's tax home through a 100 percent acquisition is also accompanied by a change in legal system and corporate governance. Therefore, tax savings could come at the expense of corporate governance degradation making the value implications of such tax avoidance attempts an important empirical issue. Research Findings/Insights Using an international sample of cross-border M&As from 1989 to 2012, we find value evidence supporting the agency costs hypothesis. For 100 percent M&As, a lower target premium is associated with those transactions where the tax haven acquirer has weaker investor protection than the target. Theoretical/Academic Implications Our findings provide value evidence regarding the agency costs of tax-motivated M&As as a result of the secrecy laws and limited investor protection of tax havens. Practitioner/Policy Implications This study provides a perspective for executives of multinational firms to take into account the value consequences associated with secrecy laws and weak investor protection while considering a possible relocation to tax havens. It also offers further insight to policymakers concerning the costs of limited investor protection and lack of transparency. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue This paper explores the valuation effects of the tradeoff between tax avoidance and corporate governance through tax haven M&As. Firms can achieve tax savings by selling to an acquirer based in a tax haven, making the newly created multinational a haven resident. Changing a firm's tax home through a 100 percent acquisition is also accompanied by a change in legal system and corporate governance. Therefore, tax savings could come at the expense of corporate governance degradation making the value implications of such tax avoidance attempts an important empirical issue. Research Findings/Insights Using an international sample of cross-border M&As from 1989 to 2012, we find value evidence supporting the agency costs hypothesis. For 100 percent M&As, a lower target premium is associated with those transactions where the tax haven acquirer has weaker investor protection than the target. Theoretical/Academic Implications Our findings provide value evidence regarding the agency costs of tax-motivated M&As as a result of the secrecy laws and limited investor protection of tax havens. Practitioner/Policy Implications This study provides a perspective for executives of multinational firms to take into account the value consequences associated with secrecy laws and weak investor protection while considering a possible relocation to tax havens. It also offers further insight to policymakers concerning the costs of limited investor protection and lack of transparency. |
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Agency Costs of Moving to Tax Havens: Evidence from Cross‐border Merger Premia |
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