Protecting from Cloud-based SIP flooding attacks by leveraging temporal and structural fingerprints
The session initiation protocol (SIP) is among the most popular voice over IP (VoIP) signaling protocols. Like other Internet protocols, deployment in live scenarios showed its vulnerability to flooding attacks. These attacks are very similar to those against TCP protocol but have emerged at the app...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Dassouki, Khaled [verfasserIn] |
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Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
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2017 |
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Rechteinformationen: |
Nutzungsrecht: © COPYRIGHT 2017 Elsevier B.V. |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Computers & security - Kidlington, Oxford : Elsevier, 1982, 70(2017), Seite 618 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:70 ; year:2017 ; pages:618 |
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DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.cose.2017.08.003 |
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520 | |a The session initiation protocol (SIP) is among the most popular voice over IP (VoIP) signaling protocols. Like other Internet protocols, deployment in live scenarios showed its vulnerability to flooding attacks. These attacks are very similar to those against TCP protocol but have emerged at the application level of the Internet architecture. In this paper, we present a new approach to protect SIP devices from flooding attacks. Our proposed approach is mainly composed of two algorithms: 1) a detection algorithm that takes into consideration the temporal characteristics of SIP protocol as well as the fingerprints of its messages and 2) a mitigation algorithm that filters SIP messages based on a fingerprint whitelist database. We evaluate our approach through an extensive set of experimental tests using widely distributed virtual machines in the cloud and compare to similar approaches found in the literature. The experiments emulate a large flooding attack launched from mutually distant geographic data centers. The results report short detection time, low sensibility to false alarms and high effectiveness in reducing the computational resources. | ||
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10.1016/j.cose.2017.08.003 doi PQ20171125 (DE-627)OLC1997711443 (DE-599)GBVOLC1997711443 (PRQ)g954-ef704b83f1dab8c1b375b2acdffedb715ab1609b2d4ffde068d9e490a2031ce00 (KEY)0111913320170000070000000618protectingfromcloudbasedsipfloodingattacksbylevera DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 DE-600 Dassouki, Khaled verfasserin aut Protecting from Cloud-based SIP flooding attacks by leveraging temporal and structural fingerprints 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier The session initiation protocol (SIP) is among the most popular voice over IP (VoIP) signaling protocols. Like other Internet protocols, deployment in live scenarios showed its vulnerability to flooding attacks. These attacks are very similar to those against TCP protocol but have emerged at the application level of the Internet architecture. In this paper, we present a new approach to protect SIP devices from flooding attacks. Our proposed approach is mainly composed of two algorithms: 1) a detection algorithm that takes into consideration the temporal characteristics of SIP protocol as well as the fingerprints of its messages and 2) a mitigation algorithm that filters SIP messages based on a fingerprint whitelist database. We evaluate our approach through an extensive set of experimental tests using widely distributed virtual machines in the cloud and compare to similar approaches found in the literature. The experiments emulate a large flooding attack launched from mutually distant geographic data centers. The results report short detection time, low sensibility to false alarms and high effectiveness in reducing the computational resources. Nutzungsrecht: © COPYRIGHT 2017 Elsevier B.V. Algorithms Computer network protocols Floods Safa, Haidar oth Nassar, Mohamed oth Hijazi, Abbas oth Enthalten in Computers & security Kidlington, Oxford : Elsevier, 1982 70(2017), Seite 618 (DE-627)130549738 (DE-600)782630-8 (DE-576)016107063 0167-4048 nnns volume:70 year:2017 pages:618 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2017.08.003 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_70 AR 70 2017 618 |
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10.1016/j.cose.2017.08.003 doi PQ20171125 (DE-627)OLC1997711443 (DE-599)GBVOLC1997711443 (PRQ)g954-ef704b83f1dab8c1b375b2acdffedb715ab1609b2d4ffde068d9e490a2031ce00 (KEY)0111913320170000070000000618protectingfromcloudbasedsipfloodingattacksbylevera DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 DE-600 Dassouki, Khaled verfasserin aut Protecting from Cloud-based SIP flooding attacks by leveraging temporal and structural fingerprints 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier The session initiation protocol (SIP) is among the most popular voice over IP (VoIP) signaling protocols. Like other Internet protocols, deployment in live scenarios showed its vulnerability to flooding attacks. These attacks are very similar to those against TCP protocol but have emerged at the application level of the Internet architecture. In this paper, we present a new approach to protect SIP devices from flooding attacks. Our proposed approach is mainly composed of two algorithms: 1) a detection algorithm that takes into consideration the temporal characteristics of SIP protocol as well as the fingerprints of its messages and 2) a mitigation algorithm that filters SIP messages based on a fingerprint whitelist database. We evaluate our approach through an extensive set of experimental tests using widely distributed virtual machines in the cloud and compare to similar approaches found in the literature. The experiments emulate a large flooding attack launched from mutually distant geographic data centers. The results report short detection time, low sensibility to false alarms and high effectiveness in reducing the computational resources. Nutzungsrecht: © COPYRIGHT 2017 Elsevier B.V. Algorithms Computer network protocols Floods Safa, Haidar oth Nassar, Mohamed oth Hijazi, Abbas oth Enthalten in Computers & security Kidlington, Oxford : Elsevier, 1982 70(2017), Seite 618 (DE-627)130549738 (DE-600)782630-8 (DE-576)016107063 0167-4048 nnns volume:70 year:2017 pages:618 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2017.08.003 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_70 AR 70 2017 618 |
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10.1016/j.cose.2017.08.003 doi PQ20171125 (DE-627)OLC1997711443 (DE-599)GBVOLC1997711443 (PRQ)g954-ef704b83f1dab8c1b375b2acdffedb715ab1609b2d4ffde068d9e490a2031ce00 (KEY)0111913320170000070000000618protectingfromcloudbasedsipfloodingattacksbylevera DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 DE-600 Dassouki, Khaled verfasserin aut Protecting from Cloud-based SIP flooding attacks by leveraging temporal and structural fingerprints 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier The session initiation protocol (SIP) is among the most popular voice over IP (VoIP) signaling protocols. Like other Internet protocols, deployment in live scenarios showed its vulnerability to flooding attacks. These attacks are very similar to those against TCP protocol but have emerged at the application level of the Internet architecture. In this paper, we present a new approach to protect SIP devices from flooding attacks. Our proposed approach is mainly composed of two algorithms: 1) a detection algorithm that takes into consideration the temporal characteristics of SIP protocol as well as the fingerprints of its messages and 2) a mitigation algorithm that filters SIP messages based on a fingerprint whitelist database. We evaluate our approach through an extensive set of experimental tests using widely distributed virtual machines in the cloud and compare to similar approaches found in the literature. The experiments emulate a large flooding attack launched from mutually distant geographic data centers. The results report short detection time, low sensibility to false alarms and high effectiveness in reducing the computational resources. Nutzungsrecht: © COPYRIGHT 2017 Elsevier B.V. Algorithms Computer network protocols Floods Safa, Haidar oth Nassar, Mohamed oth Hijazi, Abbas oth Enthalten in Computers & security Kidlington, Oxford : Elsevier, 1982 70(2017), Seite 618 (DE-627)130549738 (DE-600)782630-8 (DE-576)016107063 0167-4048 nnns volume:70 year:2017 pages:618 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2017.08.003 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_70 AR 70 2017 618 |
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10.1016/j.cose.2017.08.003 doi PQ20171125 (DE-627)OLC1997711443 (DE-599)GBVOLC1997711443 (PRQ)g954-ef704b83f1dab8c1b375b2acdffedb715ab1609b2d4ffde068d9e490a2031ce00 (KEY)0111913320170000070000000618protectingfromcloudbasedsipfloodingattacksbylevera DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 DE-600 Dassouki, Khaled verfasserin aut Protecting from Cloud-based SIP flooding attacks by leveraging temporal and structural fingerprints 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier The session initiation protocol (SIP) is among the most popular voice over IP (VoIP) signaling protocols. Like other Internet protocols, deployment in live scenarios showed its vulnerability to flooding attacks. These attacks are very similar to those against TCP protocol but have emerged at the application level of the Internet architecture. In this paper, we present a new approach to protect SIP devices from flooding attacks. Our proposed approach is mainly composed of two algorithms: 1) a detection algorithm that takes into consideration the temporal characteristics of SIP protocol as well as the fingerprints of its messages and 2) a mitigation algorithm that filters SIP messages based on a fingerprint whitelist database. We evaluate our approach through an extensive set of experimental tests using widely distributed virtual machines in the cloud and compare to similar approaches found in the literature. The experiments emulate a large flooding attack launched from mutually distant geographic data centers. The results report short detection time, low sensibility to false alarms and high effectiveness in reducing the computational resources. Nutzungsrecht: © COPYRIGHT 2017 Elsevier B.V. Algorithms Computer network protocols Floods Safa, Haidar oth Nassar, Mohamed oth Hijazi, Abbas oth Enthalten in Computers & security Kidlington, Oxford : Elsevier, 1982 70(2017), Seite 618 (DE-627)130549738 (DE-600)782630-8 (DE-576)016107063 0167-4048 nnns volume:70 year:2017 pages:618 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2017.08.003 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_70 AR 70 2017 618 |
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10.1016/j.cose.2017.08.003 doi PQ20171125 (DE-627)OLC1997711443 (DE-599)GBVOLC1997711443 (PRQ)g954-ef704b83f1dab8c1b375b2acdffedb715ab1609b2d4ffde068d9e490a2031ce00 (KEY)0111913320170000070000000618protectingfromcloudbasedsipfloodingattacksbylevera DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 DE-600 Dassouki, Khaled verfasserin aut Protecting from Cloud-based SIP flooding attacks by leveraging temporal and structural fingerprints 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier The session initiation protocol (SIP) is among the most popular voice over IP (VoIP) signaling protocols. Like other Internet protocols, deployment in live scenarios showed its vulnerability to flooding attacks. These attacks are very similar to those against TCP protocol but have emerged at the application level of the Internet architecture. In this paper, we present a new approach to protect SIP devices from flooding attacks. Our proposed approach is mainly composed of two algorithms: 1) a detection algorithm that takes into consideration the temporal characteristics of SIP protocol as well as the fingerprints of its messages and 2) a mitigation algorithm that filters SIP messages based on a fingerprint whitelist database. We evaluate our approach through an extensive set of experimental tests using widely distributed virtual machines in the cloud and compare to similar approaches found in the literature. The experiments emulate a large flooding attack launched from mutually distant geographic data centers. The results report short detection time, low sensibility to false alarms and high effectiveness in reducing the computational resources. Nutzungsrecht: © COPYRIGHT 2017 Elsevier B.V. Algorithms Computer network protocols Floods Safa, Haidar oth Nassar, Mohamed oth Hijazi, Abbas oth Enthalten in Computers & security Kidlington, Oxford : Elsevier, 1982 70(2017), Seite 618 (DE-627)130549738 (DE-600)782630-8 (DE-576)016107063 0167-4048 nnns volume:70 year:2017 pages:618 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2017.08.003 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_70 AR 70 2017 618 |
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Protecting from Cloud-based SIP flooding attacks by leveraging temporal and structural fingerprints |
abstract |
The session initiation protocol (SIP) is among the most popular voice over IP (VoIP) signaling protocols. Like other Internet protocols, deployment in live scenarios showed its vulnerability to flooding attacks. These attacks are very similar to those against TCP protocol but have emerged at the application level of the Internet architecture. In this paper, we present a new approach to protect SIP devices from flooding attacks. Our proposed approach is mainly composed of two algorithms: 1) a detection algorithm that takes into consideration the temporal characteristics of SIP protocol as well as the fingerprints of its messages and 2) a mitigation algorithm that filters SIP messages based on a fingerprint whitelist database. We evaluate our approach through an extensive set of experimental tests using widely distributed virtual machines in the cloud and compare to similar approaches found in the literature. The experiments emulate a large flooding attack launched from mutually distant geographic data centers. The results report short detection time, low sensibility to false alarms and high effectiveness in reducing the computational resources. |
abstractGer |
The session initiation protocol (SIP) is among the most popular voice over IP (VoIP) signaling protocols. Like other Internet protocols, deployment in live scenarios showed its vulnerability to flooding attacks. These attacks are very similar to those against TCP protocol but have emerged at the application level of the Internet architecture. In this paper, we present a new approach to protect SIP devices from flooding attacks. Our proposed approach is mainly composed of two algorithms: 1) a detection algorithm that takes into consideration the temporal characteristics of SIP protocol as well as the fingerprints of its messages and 2) a mitigation algorithm that filters SIP messages based on a fingerprint whitelist database. We evaluate our approach through an extensive set of experimental tests using widely distributed virtual machines in the cloud and compare to similar approaches found in the literature. The experiments emulate a large flooding attack launched from mutually distant geographic data centers. The results report short detection time, low sensibility to false alarms and high effectiveness in reducing the computational resources. |
abstract_unstemmed |
The session initiation protocol (SIP) is among the most popular voice over IP (VoIP) signaling protocols. Like other Internet protocols, deployment in live scenarios showed its vulnerability to flooding attacks. These attacks are very similar to those against TCP protocol but have emerged at the application level of the Internet architecture. In this paper, we present a new approach to protect SIP devices from flooding attacks. Our proposed approach is mainly composed of two algorithms: 1) a detection algorithm that takes into consideration the temporal characteristics of SIP protocol as well as the fingerprints of its messages and 2) a mitigation algorithm that filters SIP messages based on a fingerprint whitelist database. We evaluate our approach through an extensive set of experimental tests using widely distributed virtual machines in the cloud and compare to similar approaches found in the literature. The experiments emulate a large flooding attack launched from mutually distant geographic data centers. The results report short detection time, low sensibility to false alarms and high effectiveness in reducing the computational resources. |
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Protecting from Cloud-based SIP flooding attacks by leveraging temporal and structural fingerprints |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2017.08.003 |
remote_bool |
false |
author2 |
Safa, Haidar Nassar, Mohamed Hijazi, Abbas |
author2Str |
Safa, Haidar Nassar, Mohamed Hijazi, Abbas |
ppnlink |
130549738 |
mediatype_str_mv |
n |
isOA_txt |
false |
hochschulschrift_bool |
false |
author2_role |
oth oth oth |
doi_str |
10.1016/j.cose.2017.08.003 |
up_date |
2024-07-04T03:30:18.874Z |
_version_ |
1803617638941720576 |
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