Research on cold chain logistic service pricing—based on tripartite Stackelberg game
Abstract Fresh e-commerce cannot be separated from cold chain logistics as a guarantee when supplying fresh agricultural products in different places. On the one hand, the high cost of cold chain logistics requires the cold chain logistic enterprises to price their services provided by cold chain lo...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Zhang, Yajuan [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2018 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© The Natural Computing Applications Forum 2018 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Neural computing & applications - Springer London, 1993, 32(2018), 1 vom: 09. Okt., Seite 213-222 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:32 ; year:2018 ; number:1 ; day:09 ; month:10 ; pages:213-222 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s00521-018-3803-8 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract Fresh e-commerce cannot be separated from cold chain logistics as a guarantee when supplying fresh agricultural products in different places. On the one hand, the high cost of cold chain logistics requires the cold chain logistic enterprises to price their services provided by cold chain logistic enterprises. On the other hand, it requires fresh e-commerce to reprice their products considering cold chain logistic cost. Whether the pricing strategies of both are proper affects the income of both sides, and also affects the consumers’ willingness to pay. Based on Steinberg game model and benefit equilibrium analysis, a three-stage pricing model with third-party cold chain logistic enterprise as leader, fresh e-commerce company as follower and consumer as secondary follower is established. Through the analysis of cooperative game and non-cooperative game, the optimal pricing and the best income of the cold chain logistic enterprises and the fresh e-commerce enterprises in the process of using cold chain logistics are obtained. Taking two different types of fresh products as an example, this paper simulates two kinds of fresh products based on pricing model, compares the two strategies of cooperative game and non-cooperative game, probes into the change of profit between fresh e-commerce and cold chain enterprises in different price ranges and selects pricing strategy. | ||
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| 700 | 1 | |a Wang, Zhuang |4 aut | |
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10.1007/s00521-018-3803-8 doi (DE-627)OLC202561652X (DE-He213)s00521-018-3803-8-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 VZ Zhang, Yajuan verfasserin aut Research on cold chain logistic service pricing—based on tripartite Stackelberg game 2018 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © The Natural Computing Applications Forum 2018 Abstract Fresh e-commerce cannot be separated from cold chain logistics as a guarantee when supplying fresh agricultural products in different places. On the one hand, the high cost of cold chain logistics requires the cold chain logistic enterprises to price their services provided by cold chain logistic enterprises. On the other hand, it requires fresh e-commerce to reprice their products considering cold chain logistic cost. Whether the pricing strategies of both are proper affects the income of both sides, and also affects the consumers’ willingness to pay. Based on Steinberg game model and benefit equilibrium analysis, a three-stage pricing model with third-party cold chain logistic enterprise as leader, fresh e-commerce company as follower and consumer as secondary follower is established. Through the analysis of cooperative game and non-cooperative game, the optimal pricing and the best income of the cold chain logistic enterprises and the fresh e-commerce enterprises in the process of using cold chain logistics are obtained. Taking two different types of fresh products as an example, this paper simulates two kinds of fresh products based on pricing model, compares the two strategies of cooperative game and non-cooperative game, probes into the change of profit between fresh e-commerce and cold chain enterprises in different price ranges and selects pricing strategy. Cold chain logistics Stackelberg game Three-phase pricing model Non-cooperative game Cooperative game Rong, Fang aut Wang, Zhuang aut Enthalten in Neural computing & applications Springer London, 1993 32(2018), 1 vom: 09. Okt., Seite 213-222 (DE-627)165669608 (DE-600)1136944-9 (DE-576)032873050 0941-0643 nnns volume:32 year:2018 number:1 day:09 month:10 pages:213-222 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00521-018-3803-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4277 AR 32 2018 1 09 10 213-222 |
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10.1007/s00521-018-3803-8 doi (DE-627)OLC202561652X (DE-He213)s00521-018-3803-8-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 VZ Zhang, Yajuan verfasserin aut Research on cold chain logistic service pricing—based on tripartite Stackelberg game 2018 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © The Natural Computing Applications Forum 2018 Abstract Fresh e-commerce cannot be separated from cold chain logistics as a guarantee when supplying fresh agricultural products in different places. On the one hand, the high cost of cold chain logistics requires the cold chain logistic enterprises to price their services provided by cold chain logistic enterprises. On the other hand, it requires fresh e-commerce to reprice their products considering cold chain logistic cost. Whether the pricing strategies of both are proper affects the income of both sides, and also affects the consumers’ willingness to pay. Based on Steinberg game model and benefit equilibrium analysis, a three-stage pricing model with third-party cold chain logistic enterprise as leader, fresh e-commerce company as follower and consumer as secondary follower is established. Through the analysis of cooperative game and non-cooperative game, the optimal pricing and the best income of the cold chain logistic enterprises and the fresh e-commerce enterprises in the process of using cold chain logistics are obtained. Taking two different types of fresh products as an example, this paper simulates two kinds of fresh products based on pricing model, compares the two strategies of cooperative game and non-cooperative game, probes into the change of profit between fresh e-commerce and cold chain enterprises in different price ranges and selects pricing strategy. Cold chain logistics Stackelberg game Three-phase pricing model Non-cooperative game Cooperative game Rong, Fang aut Wang, Zhuang aut Enthalten in Neural computing & applications Springer London, 1993 32(2018), 1 vom: 09. Okt., Seite 213-222 (DE-627)165669608 (DE-600)1136944-9 (DE-576)032873050 0941-0643 nnns volume:32 year:2018 number:1 day:09 month:10 pages:213-222 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00521-018-3803-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4277 AR 32 2018 1 09 10 213-222 |
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10.1007/s00521-018-3803-8 doi (DE-627)OLC202561652X (DE-He213)s00521-018-3803-8-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 VZ Zhang, Yajuan verfasserin aut Research on cold chain logistic service pricing—based on tripartite Stackelberg game 2018 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © The Natural Computing Applications Forum 2018 Abstract Fresh e-commerce cannot be separated from cold chain logistics as a guarantee when supplying fresh agricultural products in different places. On the one hand, the high cost of cold chain logistics requires the cold chain logistic enterprises to price their services provided by cold chain logistic enterprises. On the other hand, it requires fresh e-commerce to reprice their products considering cold chain logistic cost. Whether the pricing strategies of both are proper affects the income of both sides, and also affects the consumers’ willingness to pay. Based on Steinberg game model and benefit equilibrium analysis, a three-stage pricing model with third-party cold chain logistic enterprise as leader, fresh e-commerce company as follower and consumer as secondary follower is established. Through the analysis of cooperative game and non-cooperative game, the optimal pricing and the best income of the cold chain logistic enterprises and the fresh e-commerce enterprises in the process of using cold chain logistics are obtained. Taking two different types of fresh products as an example, this paper simulates two kinds of fresh products based on pricing model, compares the two strategies of cooperative game and non-cooperative game, probes into the change of profit between fresh e-commerce and cold chain enterprises in different price ranges and selects pricing strategy. Cold chain logistics Stackelberg game Three-phase pricing model Non-cooperative game Cooperative game Rong, Fang aut Wang, Zhuang aut Enthalten in Neural computing & applications Springer London, 1993 32(2018), 1 vom: 09. Okt., Seite 213-222 (DE-627)165669608 (DE-600)1136944-9 (DE-576)032873050 0941-0643 nnns volume:32 year:2018 number:1 day:09 month:10 pages:213-222 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00521-018-3803-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4277 AR 32 2018 1 09 10 213-222 |
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10.1007/s00521-018-3803-8 doi (DE-627)OLC202561652X (DE-He213)s00521-018-3803-8-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 VZ Zhang, Yajuan verfasserin aut Research on cold chain logistic service pricing—based on tripartite Stackelberg game 2018 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © The Natural Computing Applications Forum 2018 Abstract Fresh e-commerce cannot be separated from cold chain logistics as a guarantee when supplying fresh agricultural products in different places. On the one hand, the high cost of cold chain logistics requires the cold chain logistic enterprises to price their services provided by cold chain logistic enterprises. On the other hand, it requires fresh e-commerce to reprice their products considering cold chain logistic cost. Whether the pricing strategies of both are proper affects the income of both sides, and also affects the consumers’ willingness to pay. Based on Steinberg game model and benefit equilibrium analysis, a three-stage pricing model with third-party cold chain logistic enterprise as leader, fresh e-commerce company as follower and consumer as secondary follower is established. Through the analysis of cooperative game and non-cooperative game, the optimal pricing and the best income of the cold chain logistic enterprises and the fresh e-commerce enterprises in the process of using cold chain logistics are obtained. Taking two different types of fresh products as an example, this paper simulates two kinds of fresh products based on pricing model, compares the two strategies of cooperative game and non-cooperative game, probes into the change of profit between fresh e-commerce and cold chain enterprises in different price ranges and selects pricing strategy. Cold chain logistics Stackelberg game Three-phase pricing model Non-cooperative game Cooperative game Rong, Fang aut Wang, Zhuang aut Enthalten in Neural computing & applications Springer London, 1993 32(2018), 1 vom: 09. Okt., Seite 213-222 (DE-627)165669608 (DE-600)1136944-9 (DE-576)032873050 0941-0643 nnns volume:32 year:2018 number:1 day:09 month:10 pages:213-222 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00521-018-3803-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4277 AR 32 2018 1 09 10 213-222 |
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10.1007/s00521-018-3803-8 doi (DE-627)OLC202561652X (DE-He213)s00521-018-3803-8-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 VZ Zhang, Yajuan verfasserin aut Research on cold chain logistic service pricing—based on tripartite Stackelberg game 2018 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © The Natural Computing Applications Forum 2018 Abstract Fresh e-commerce cannot be separated from cold chain logistics as a guarantee when supplying fresh agricultural products in different places. On the one hand, the high cost of cold chain logistics requires the cold chain logistic enterprises to price their services provided by cold chain logistic enterprises. On the other hand, it requires fresh e-commerce to reprice their products considering cold chain logistic cost. Whether the pricing strategies of both are proper affects the income of both sides, and also affects the consumers’ willingness to pay. Based on Steinberg game model and benefit equilibrium analysis, a three-stage pricing model with third-party cold chain logistic enterprise as leader, fresh e-commerce company as follower and consumer as secondary follower is established. Through the analysis of cooperative game and non-cooperative game, the optimal pricing and the best income of the cold chain logistic enterprises and the fresh e-commerce enterprises in the process of using cold chain logistics are obtained. Taking two different types of fresh products as an example, this paper simulates two kinds of fresh products based on pricing model, compares the two strategies of cooperative game and non-cooperative game, probes into the change of profit between fresh e-commerce and cold chain enterprises in different price ranges and selects pricing strategy. Cold chain logistics Stackelberg game Three-phase pricing model Non-cooperative game Cooperative game Rong, Fang aut Wang, Zhuang aut Enthalten in Neural computing & applications Springer London, 1993 32(2018), 1 vom: 09. Okt., Seite 213-222 (DE-627)165669608 (DE-600)1136944-9 (DE-576)032873050 0941-0643 nnns volume:32 year:2018 number:1 day:09 month:10 pages:213-222 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00521-018-3803-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4277 AR 32 2018 1 09 10 213-222 |
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Abstract Fresh e-commerce cannot be separated from cold chain logistics as a guarantee when supplying fresh agricultural products in different places. On the one hand, the high cost of cold chain logistics requires the cold chain logistic enterprises to price their services provided by cold chain logistic enterprises. On the other hand, it requires fresh e-commerce to reprice their products considering cold chain logistic cost. Whether the pricing strategies of both are proper affects the income of both sides, and also affects the consumers’ willingness to pay. Based on Steinberg game model and benefit equilibrium analysis, a three-stage pricing model with third-party cold chain logistic enterprise as leader, fresh e-commerce company as follower and consumer as secondary follower is established. Through the analysis of cooperative game and non-cooperative game, the optimal pricing and the best income of the cold chain logistic enterprises and the fresh e-commerce enterprises in the process of using cold chain logistics are obtained. Taking two different types of fresh products as an example, this paper simulates two kinds of fresh products based on pricing model, compares the two strategies of cooperative game and non-cooperative game, probes into the change of profit between fresh e-commerce and cold chain enterprises in different price ranges and selects pricing strategy. © The Natural Computing Applications Forum 2018 |
| abstractGer |
Abstract Fresh e-commerce cannot be separated from cold chain logistics as a guarantee when supplying fresh agricultural products in different places. On the one hand, the high cost of cold chain logistics requires the cold chain logistic enterprises to price their services provided by cold chain logistic enterprises. On the other hand, it requires fresh e-commerce to reprice their products considering cold chain logistic cost. Whether the pricing strategies of both are proper affects the income of both sides, and also affects the consumers’ willingness to pay. Based on Steinberg game model and benefit equilibrium analysis, a three-stage pricing model with third-party cold chain logistic enterprise as leader, fresh e-commerce company as follower and consumer as secondary follower is established. Through the analysis of cooperative game and non-cooperative game, the optimal pricing and the best income of the cold chain logistic enterprises and the fresh e-commerce enterprises in the process of using cold chain logistics are obtained. Taking two different types of fresh products as an example, this paper simulates two kinds of fresh products based on pricing model, compares the two strategies of cooperative game and non-cooperative game, probes into the change of profit between fresh e-commerce and cold chain enterprises in different price ranges and selects pricing strategy. © The Natural Computing Applications Forum 2018 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract Fresh e-commerce cannot be separated from cold chain logistics as a guarantee when supplying fresh agricultural products in different places. On the one hand, the high cost of cold chain logistics requires the cold chain logistic enterprises to price their services provided by cold chain logistic enterprises. On the other hand, it requires fresh e-commerce to reprice their products considering cold chain logistic cost. Whether the pricing strategies of both are proper affects the income of both sides, and also affects the consumers’ willingness to pay. Based on Steinberg game model and benefit equilibrium analysis, a three-stage pricing model with third-party cold chain logistic enterprise as leader, fresh e-commerce company as follower and consumer as secondary follower is established. Through the analysis of cooperative game and non-cooperative game, the optimal pricing and the best income of the cold chain logistic enterprises and the fresh e-commerce enterprises in the process of using cold chain logistics are obtained. Taking two different types of fresh products as an example, this paper simulates two kinds of fresh products based on pricing model, compares the two strategies of cooperative game and non-cooperative game, probes into the change of profit between fresh e-commerce and cold chain enterprises in different price ranges and selects pricing strategy. © The Natural Computing Applications Forum 2018 |
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Research on cold chain logistic service pricing—based on tripartite Stackelberg game |
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Rong, Fang Wang, Zhuang |
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