Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons
Abstract This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of age...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Lillehammer, Hallvard [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2009 |
|---|
| Schlagwörter: |
|---|
| Anmerkung: |
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 |
|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: The journal of ethics - Springer Netherlands, 1997, 14(2009), 1 vom: 31. März, Seite 17-26 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:14 ; year:2009 ; number:1 ; day:31 ; month:03 ; pages:17-26 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3 |
|---|
| Katalog-ID: |
OLC2026424500 |
|---|
| LEADER | 01000caa a22002652 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | OLC2026424500 | ||
| 003 | DE-627 | ||
| 005 | 20230503140640.0 | ||
| 007 | tu | ||
| 008 | 200819s2009 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (DE-627)OLC2026424500 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-He213)s10892-009-9045-3-p | ||
| 040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | |a eng | ||
| 082 | 0 | 4 | |a 100 |q VZ |
| 084 | |a 5,1 |a 1 |2 ssgn | ||
| 084 | |a PHILOS |q DE-12 |2 fid | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Lillehammer, Hallvard |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons |
| 264 | 1 | |c 2009 | |
| 336 | |a Text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a Band |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 | ||
| 520 | |a Abstract This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised. | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Normative reasons | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Reasons and facts | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Reasons and ends | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Reasons and principles | |
| 773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t The journal of ethics |d Springer Netherlands, 1997 |g 14(2009), 1 vom: 31. März, Seite 17-26 |w (DE-627)216376203 |w (DE-600)1338489-2 |w (DE-576)078589606 |x 1382-4554 |7 nnns |
| 773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:14 |g year:2009 |g number:1 |g day:31 |g month:03 |g pages:17-26 |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3 |z lizenzpflichtig |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a GBV_USEFLAG_A | ||
| 912 | |a SYSFLAG_A | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_OLC | ||
| 912 | |a FID-PHILOS | ||
| 912 | |a SSG-OLC-PHI | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_11 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_39 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2002 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2007 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2010 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4012 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4112 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4326 | ||
| 951 | |a AR | ||
| 952 | |d 14 |j 2009 |e 1 |b 31 |c 03 |h 17-26 | ||
| author_variant |
h l hl |
|---|---|
| matchkey_str |
article:13824554:2009----::atedadomtv |
| hierarchy_sort_str |
2009 |
| publishDate |
2009 |
| allfields |
10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3 doi (DE-627)OLC2026424500 (DE-He213)s10892-009-9045-3-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 VZ 5,1 1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid Lillehammer, Hallvard verfasserin aut Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons 2009 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 Abstract This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised. Normative reasons Reasons and facts Reasons and ends Reasons and principles Enthalten in The journal of ethics Springer Netherlands, 1997 14(2009), 1 vom: 31. März, Seite 17-26 (DE-627)216376203 (DE-600)1338489-2 (DE-576)078589606 1382-4554 nnns volume:14 year:2009 number:1 day:31 month:03 pages:17-26 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4326 AR 14 2009 1 31 03 17-26 |
| spelling |
10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3 doi (DE-627)OLC2026424500 (DE-He213)s10892-009-9045-3-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 VZ 5,1 1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid Lillehammer, Hallvard verfasserin aut Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons 2009 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 Abstract This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised. Normative reasons Reasons and facts Reasons and ends Reasons and principles Enthalten in The journal of ethics Springer Netherlands, 1997 14(2009), 1 vom: 31. März, Seite 17-26 (DE-627)216376203 (DE-600)1338489-2 (DE-576)078589606 1382-4554 nnns volume:14 year:2009 number:1 day:31 month:03 pages:17-26 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4326 AR 14 2009 1 31 03 17-26 |
| allfields_unstemmed |
10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3 doi (DE-627)OLC2026424500 (DE-He213)s10892-009-9045-3-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 VZ 5,1 1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid Lillehammer, Hallvard verfasserin aut Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons 2009 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 Abstract This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised. Normative reasons Reasons and facts Reasons and ends Reasons and principles Enthalten in The journal of ethics Springer Netherlands, 1997 14(2009), 1 vom: 31. März, Seite 17-26 (DE-627)216376203 (DE-600)1338489-2 (DE-576)078589606 1382-4554 nnns volume:14 year:2009 number:1 day:31 month:03 pages:17-26 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4326 AR 14 2009 1 31 03 17-26 |
| allfieldsGer |
10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3 doi (DE-627)OLC2026424500 (DE-He213)s10892-009-9045-3-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 VZ 5,1 1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid Lillehammer, Hallvard verfasserin aut Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons 2009 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 Abstract This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised. Normative reasons Reasons and facts Reasons and ends Reasons and principles Enthalten in The journal of ethics Springer Netherlands, 1997 14(2009), 1 vom: 31. März, Seite 17-26 (DE-627)216376203 (DE-600)1338489-2 (DE-576)078589606 1382-4554 nnns volume:14 year:2009 number:1 day:31 month:03 pages:17-26 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4326 AR 14 2009 1 31 03 17-26 |
| allfieldsSound |
10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3 doi (DE-627)OLC2026424500 (DE-He213)s10892-009-9045-3-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 VZ 5,1 1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid Lillehammer, Hallvard verfasserin aut Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons 2009 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 Abstract This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised. Normative reasons Reasons and facts Reasons and ends Reasons and principles Enthalten in The journal of ethics Springer Netherlands, 1997 14(2009), 1 vom: 31. März, Seite 17-26 (DE-627)216376203 (DE-600)1338489-2 (DE-576)078589606 1382-4554 nnns volume:14 year:2009 number:1 day:31 month:03 pages:17-26 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4326 AR 14 2009 1 31 03 17-26 |
| language |
English |
| source |
Enthalten in The journal of ethics 14(2009), 1 vom: 31. März, Seite 17-26 volume:14 year:2009 number:1 day:31 month:03 pages:17-26 |
| sourceStr |
Enthalten in The journal of ethics 14(2009), 1 vom: 31. März, Seite 17-26 volume:14 year:2009 number:1 day:31 month:03 pages:17-26 |
| format_phy_str_mv |
Article |
| institution |
findex.gbv.de |
| topic_facet |
Normative reasons Reasons and facts Reasons and ends Reasons and principles |
| dewey-raw |
100 |
| isfreeaccess_bool |
false |
| container_title |
The journal of ethics |
| authorswithroles_txt_mv |
Lillehammer, Hallvard @@aut@@ |
| publishDateDaySort_date |
2009-03-31T00:00:00Z |
| hierarchy_top_id |
216376203 |
| dewey-sort |
3100 |
| id |
OLC2026424500 |
| language_de |
englisch |
| fullrecord |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC2026424500</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230503140640.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">200819s2009 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC2026424500</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-He213)s10892-009-9045-3-p</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">100</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">5,1</subfield><subfield code="a">1</subfield><subfield code="2">ssgn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">PHILOS</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="2">fid</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Lillehammer, Hallvard</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Normative reasons</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Reasons and facts</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Reasons and ends</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Reasons and principles</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">The journal of ethics</subfield><subfield code="d">Springer Netherlands, 1997</subfield><subfield code="g">14(2009), 1 vom: 31. März, Seite 17-26</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)216376203</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)1338489-2</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)078589606</subfield><subfield code="x">1382-4554</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:14</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2009</subfield><subfield code="g">number:1</subfield><subfield code="g">day:31</subfield><subfield code="g">month:03</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:17-26</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3</subfield><subfield code="z">lizenzpflichtig</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_OLC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">FID-PHILOS</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-PHI</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_11</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2002</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2010</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4112</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4326</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">14</subfield><subfield code="j">2009</subfield><subfield code="e">1</subfield><subfield code="b">31</subfield><subfield code="c">03</subfield><subfield code="h">17-26</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| author |
Lillehammer, Hallvard |
| spellingShingle |
Lillehammer, Hallvard ddc 100 ssgn 5,1 fid PHILOS misc Normative reasons misc Reasons and facts misc Reasons and ends misc Reasons and principles Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons |
| authorStr |
Lillehammer, Hallvard |
| ppnlink_with_tag_str_mv |
@@773@@(DE-627)216376203 |
| format |
Article |
| dewey-ones |
100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| delete_txt_mv |
keep |
| author_role |
aut |
| collection |
OLC |
| remote_str |
false |
| illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
| issn |
1382-4554 |
| topic_title |
100 VZ 5,1 1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons Normative reasons Reasons and facts Reasons and ends Reasons and principles |
| topic |
ddc 100 ssgn 5,1 fid PHILOS misc Normative reasons misc Reasons and facts misc Reasons and ends misc Reasons and principles |
| topic_unstemmed |
ddc 100 ssgn 5,1 fid PHILOS misc Normative reasons misc Reasons and facts misc Reasons and ends misc Reasons and principles |
| topic_browse |
ddc 100 ssgn 5,1 fid PHILOS misc Normative reasons misc Reasons and facts misc Reasons and ends misc Reasons and principles |
| format_facet |
Aufsätze Gedruckte Aufsätze |
| format_main_str_mv |
Text Zeitschrift/Artikel |
| carriertype_str_mv |
nc |
| hierarchy_parent_title |
The journal of ethics |
| hierarchy_parent_id |
216376203 |
| dewey-tens |
100 - Philosophy |
| hierarchy_top_title |
The journal of ethics |
| isfreeaccess_txt |
false |
| familylinks_str_mv |
(DE-627)216376203 (DE-600)1338489-2 (DE-576)078589606 |
| title |
Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons |
| ctrlnum |
(DE-627)OLC2026424500 (DE-He213)s10892-009-9045-3-p |
| title_full |
Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons |
| author_sort |
Lillehammer, Hallvard |
| journal |
The journal of ethics |
| journalStr |
The journal of ethics |
| lang_code |
eng |
| isOA_bool |
false |
| dewey-hundreds |
100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| recordtype |
marc |
| publishDateSort |
2009 |
| contenttype_str_mv |
txt |
| container_start_page |
17 |
| author_browse |
Lillehammer, Hallvard |
| container_volume |
14 |
| class |
100 VZ 5,1 1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid |
| format_se |
Aufsätze |
| author-letter |
Lillehammer, Hallvard |
| doi_str_mv |
10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3 |
| dewey-full |
100 |
| title_sort |
facts, ends, and normative reasons |
| title_auth |
Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons |
| abstract |
Abstract This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 |
| abstractGer |
Abstract This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 |
| collection_details |
GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4326 |
| container_issue |
1 |
| title_short |
Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons |
| url |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3 |
| remote_bool |
false |
| ppnlink |
216376203 |
| mediatype_str_mv |
n |
| isOA_txt |
false |
| hochschulschrift_bool |
false |
| doi_str |
10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3 |
| up_date |
2024-07-04T03:57:19.838Z |
| _version_ |
1803619338659299328 |
| fullrecord_marcxml |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC2026424500</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230503140640.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">200819s2009 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC2026424500</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-He213)s10892-009-9045-3-p</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">100</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">5,1</subfield><subfield code="a">1</subfield><subfield code="2">ssgn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">PHILOS</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="2">fid</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Lillehammer, Hallvard</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Normative reasons</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Reasons and facts</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Reasons and ends</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Reasons and principles</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">The journal of ethics</subfield><subfield code="d">Springer Netherlands, 1997</subfield><subfield code="g">14(2009), 1 vom: 31. März, Seite 17-26</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)216376203</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)1338489-2</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)078589606</subfield><subfield code="x">1382-4554</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:14</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2009</subfield><subfield code="g">number:1</subfield><subfield code="g">day:31</subfield><subfield code="g">month:03</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:17-26</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9045-3</subfield><subfield code="z">lizenzpflichtig</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_OLC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">FID-PHILOS</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-PHI</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_11</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2002</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2010</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4112</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4326</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">14</subfield><subfield code="j">2009</subfield><subfield code="e">1</subfield><subfield code="b">31</subfield><subfield code="c">03</subfield><subfield code="h">17-26</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| score |
7.4001036 |