Copyright piracy as prey–predator behavior
Abstract The economic analysis of the piracy of copyright products has used a variety of modeling assumptions, the majority of which use typical industrial organization settings. The results of such models are manyfold, but in general they are ambiguous as to the optimal protection strategy, and the...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Vázquez, Francisco J. [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2010 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2010 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Journal of bioeconomics - Springer US, 1999, 13(2010), 1 vom: 20. Nov., Seite 31-43 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:13 ; year:2010 ; number:1 ; day:20 ; month:11 ; pages:31-43 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s10818-010-9098-1 |
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OLC2034715225 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract The economic analysis of the piracy of copyright products has used a variety of modeling assumptions, the majority of which use typical industrial organization settings. The results of such models are manyfold, but in general they are ambiguous as to the optimal protection strategy, and the effects of protection on the welfare of copyright holders, and on the existence of piracy. Concretely, little has been said about which types of protection mechanisms are most adequate for controlling piracy. In the present paper, we propose a new theoretical framework by drawing an analogy between copyright piracy and prey–predator behavior. This analogy gives us a new perspective to approach copyright issues and it provides the economic theory of copyright piracy with a new set of mathematical models. We consider a very simple model that can be used to show that publicly instigated and financed policies designed to deter piracy can have the effect of increasing the amount of piracy, while privately financed strategies (e.g. DRM) will always decrease piracy. | ||
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Abstract The economic analysis of the piracy of copyright products has used a variety of modeling assumptions, the majority of which use typical industrial organization settings. The results of such models are manyfold, but in general they are ambiguous as to the optimal protection strategy, and the effects of protection on the welfare of copyright holders, and on the existence of piracy. Concretely, little has been said about which types of protection mechanisms are most adequate for controlling piracy. In the present paper, we propose a new theoretical framework by drawing an analogy between copyright piracy and prey–predator behavior. This analogy gives us a new perspective to approach copyright issues and it provides the economic theory of copyright piracy with a new set of mathematical models. We consider a very simple model that can be used to show that publicly instigated and financed policies designed to deter piracy can have the effect of increasing the amount of piracy, while privately financed strategies (e.g. DRM) will always decrease piracy. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2010 |
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Abstract The economic analysis of the piracy of copyright products has used a variety of modeling assumptions, the majority of which use typical industrial organization settings. The results of such models are manyfold, but in general they are ambiguous as to the optimal protection strategy, and the effects of protection on the welfare of copyright holders, and on the existence of piracy. Concretely, little has been said about which types of protection mechanisms are most adequate for controlling piracy. In the present paper, we propose a new theoretical framework by drawing an analogy between copyright piracy and prey–predator behavior. This analogy gives us a new perspective to approach copyright issues and it provides the economic theory of copyright piracy with a new set of mathematical models. We consider a very simple model that can be used to show that publicly instigated and financed policies designed to deter piracy can have the effect of increasing the amount of piracy, while privately financed strategies (e.g. DRM) will always decrease piracy. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2010 |
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Abstract The economic analysis of the piracy of copyright products has used a variety of modeling assumptions, the majority of which use typical industrial organization settings. The results of such models are manyfold, but in general they are ambiguous as to the optimal protection strategy, and the effects of protection on the welfare of copyright holders, and on the existence of piracy. Concretely, little has been said about which types of protection mechanisms are most adequate for controlling piracy. In the present paper, we propose a new theoretical framework by drawing an analogy between copyright piracy and prey–predator behavior. This analogy gives us a new perspective to approach copyright issues and it provides the economic theory of copyright piracy with a new set of mathematical models. We consider a very simple model that can be used to show that publicly instigated and financed policies designed to deter piracy can have the effect of increasing the amount of piracy, while privately financed strategies (e.g. DRM) will always decrease piracy. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2010 |
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC2034715225</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230503112918.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">200819s2010 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s10818-010-9098-1</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC2034715225</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-He213)s10818-010-9098-1-p</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">570</subfield><subfield code="a">330</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">12</subfield><subfield code="2">ssgn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Vázquez, Francisco J.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Copyright piracy as prey–predator behavior</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2010</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2010</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract The economic analysis of the piracy of copyright products has used a variety of modeling assumptions, the majority of which use typical industrial organization settings. The results of such models are manyfold, but in general they are ambiguous as to the optimal protection strategy, and the effects of protection on the welfare of copyright holders, and on the existence of piracy. Concretely, little has been said about which types of protection mechanisms are most adequate for controlling piracy. In the present paper, we propose a new theoretical framework by drawing an analogy between copyright piracy and prey–predator behavior. This analogy gives us a new perspective to approach copyright issues and it provides the economic theory of copyright piracy with a new set of mathematical models. We consider a very simple model that can be used to show that publicly instigated and financed policies designed to deter piracy can have the effect of increasing the amount of piracy, while privately financed strategies (e.g. DRM) will always decrease piracy.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Copyright piracy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Prey–predator dynamics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Anti-piracy policies</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Watt, Richard</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Journal of bioeconomics</subfield><subfield code="d">Springer US, 1999</subfield><subfield code="g">13(2010), 1 vom: 20. 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