Evidence of Information Asymmetries in the Market for Residential Condominiums
Abstract Previous research (Rutherford et al. 2005; Levitt and Syverson 2005) identify and quantify agency problems in the brokerage of single-family houses. Real estate agents are found to receive a premium when selling their own houses in comparison to similar client-owned houses. Given the homoge...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Rutherford, Ronald C. [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2007 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: The journal of real estate finance and economics - Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers, 1988, 35(2007), 1 vom: 19. Apr., Seite 23-38 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:35 ; year:2007 ; number:1 ; day:19 ; month:04 ; pages:23-38 |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11146-007-9027-9 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract Previous research (Rutherford et al. 2005; Levitt and Syverson 2005) identify and quantify agency problems in the brokerage of single-family houses. Real estate agents are found to receive a premium when selling their own houses in comparison to similar client-owned houses. Given the homogeneity of the condominium market in comparison to the single-family house market, we use a large sample of condominium transactions to examine if agency problems exist in the condominium market. Controlling for sample selection and endogeneity bias of the data, we find evidence for a similar price premium for agent-owned condominiums. In contrast to the results for single-family houses in the same geographic market, we find that agent-owned condominiums must stay on the market longer to receive a higher price. | ||
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10.1007/s11146-007-9027-9 doi (DE-627)OLC203717523X (DE-He213)s11146-007-9027-9-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Rutherford, Ronald C. verfasserin aut Evidence of Information Asymmetries in the Market for Residential Condominiums 2007 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007 Abstract Previous research (Rutherford et al. 2005; Levitt and Syverson 2005) identify and quantify agency problems in the brokerage of single-family houses. Real estate agents are found to receive a premium when selling their own houses in comparison to similar client-owned houses. Given the homogeneity of the condominium market in comparison to the single-family house market, we use a large sample of condominium transactions to examine if agency problems exist in the condominium market. Controlling for sample selection and endogeneity bias of the data, we find evidence for a similar price premium for agent-owned condominiums. In contrast to the results for single-family houses in the same geographic market, we find that agent-owned condominiums must stay on the market longer to receive a higher price. Real estate agents Condominium market Single-family house market Springer, Thomas M. aut Yavas, Abdullah aut Enthalten in The journal of real estate finance and economics Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers, 1988 35(2007), 1 vom: 19. Apr., Seite 23-38 (DE-627)170550265 (DE-600)1073289-5 (DE-576)025193546 0895-5638 nnns volume:35 year:2007 number:1 day:19 month:04 pages:23-38 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-007-9027-9 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_648 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4125 AR 35 2007 1 19 04 23-38 |
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10.1007/s11146-007-9027-9 doi (DE-627)OLC203717523X (DE-He213)s11146-007-9027-9-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Rutherford, Ronald C. verfasserin aut Evidence of Information Asymmetries in the Market for Residential Condominiums 2007 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007 Abstract Previous research (Rutherford et al. 2005; Levitt and Syverson 2005) identify and quantify agency problems in the brokerage of single-family houses. Real estate agents are found to receive a premium when selling their own houses in comparison to similar client-owned houses. Given the homogeneity of the condominium market in comparison to the single-family house market, we use a large sample of condominium transactions to examine if agency problems exist in the condominium market. Controlling for sample selection and endogeneity bias of the data, we find evidence for a similar price premium for agent-owned condominiums. In contrast to the results for single-family houses in the same geographic market, we find that agent-owned condominiums must stay on the market longer to receive a higher price. Real estate agents Condominium market Single-family house market Springer, Thomas M. aut Yavas, Abdullah aut Enthalten in The journal of real estate finance and economics Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers, 1988 35(2007), 1 vom: 19. Apr., Seite 23-38 (DE-627)170550265 (DE-600)1073289-5 (DE-576)025193546 0895-5638 nnns volume:35 year:2007 number:1 day:19 month:04 pages:23-38 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-007-9027-9 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_648 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4125 AR 35 2007 1 19 04 23-38 |
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10.1007/s11146-007-9027-9 doi (DE-627)OLC203717523X (DE-He213)s11146-007-9027-9-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Rutherford, Ronald C. verfasserin aut Evidence of Information Asymmetries in the Market for Residential Condominiums 2007 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007 Abstract Previous research (Rutherford et al. 2005; Levitt and Syverson 2005) identify and quantify agency problems in the brokerage of single-family houses. Real estate agents are found to receive a premium when selling their own houses in comparison to similar client-owned houses. Given the homogeneity of the condominium market in comparison to the single-family house market, we use a large sample of condominium transactions to examine if agency problems exist in the condominium market. Controlling for sample selection and endogeneity bias of the data, we find evidence for a similar price premium for agent-owned condominiums. In contrast to the results for single-family houses in the same geographic market, we find that agent-owned condominiums must stay on the market longer to receive a higher price. Real estate agents Condominium market Single-family house market Springer, Thomas M. aut Yavas, Abdullah aut Enthalten in The journal of real estate finance and economics Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers, 1988 35(2007), 1 vom: 19. Apr., Seite 23-38 (DE-627)170550265 (DE-600)1073289-5 (DE-576)025193546 0895-5638 nnns volume:35 year:2007 number:1 day:19 month:04 pages:23-38 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-007-9027-9 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_648 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4125 AR 35 2007 1 19 04 23-38 |
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10.1007/s11146-007-9027-9 doi (DE-627)OLC203717523X (DE-He213)s11146-007-9027-9-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Rutherford, Ronald C. verfasserin aut Evidence of Information Asymmetries in the Market for Residential Condominiums 2007 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007 Abstract Previous research (Rutherford et al. 2005; Levitt and Syverson 2005) identify and quantify agency problems in the brokerage of single-family houses. Real estate agents are found to receive a premium when selling their own houses in comparison to similar client-owned houses. Given the homogeneity of the condominium market in comparison to the single-family house market, we use a large sample of condominium transactions to examine if agency problems exist in the condominium market. Controlling for sample selection and endogeneity bias of the data, we find evidence for a similar price premium for agent-owned condominiums. In contrast to the results for single-family houses in the same geographic market, we find that agent-owned condominiums must stay on the market longer to receive a higher price. Real estate agents Condominium market Single-family house market Springer, Thomas M. aut Yavas, Abdullah aut Enthalten in The journal of real estate finance and economics Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers, 1988 35(2007), 1 vom: 19. Apr., Seite 23-38 (DE-627)170550265 (DE-600)1073289-5 (DE-576)025193546 0895-5638 nnns volume:35 year:2007 number:1 day:19 month:04 pages:23-38 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-007-9027-9 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_648 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4125 AR 35 2007 1 19 04 23-38 |
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Abstract Previous research (Rutherford et al. 2005; Levitt and Syverson 2005) identify and quantify agency problems in the brokerage of single-family houses. Real estate agents are found to receive a premium when selling their own houses in comparison to similar client-owned houses. Given the homogeneity of the condominium market in comparison to the single-family house market, we use a large sample of condominium transactions to examine if agency problems exist in the condominium market. Controlling for sample selection and endogeneity bias of the data, we find evidence for a similar price premium for agent-owned condominiums. In contrast to the results for single-family houses in the same geographic market, we find that agent-owned condominiums must stay on the market longer to receive a higher price. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007 |
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Abstract Previous research (Rutherford et al. 2005; Levitt and Syverson 2005) identify and quantify agency problems in the brokerage of single-family houses. Real estate agents are found to receive a premium when selling their own houses in comparison to similar client-owned houses. Given the homogeneity of the condominium market in comparison to the single-family house market, we use a large sample of condominium transactions to examine if agency problems exist in the condominium market. Controlling for sample selection and endogeneity bias of the data, we find evidence for a similar price premium for agent-owned condominiums. In contrast to the results for single-family houses in the same geographic market, we find that agent-owned condominiums must stay on the market longer to receive a higher price. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007 |
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC203717523X</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230506023922.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">200820s2007 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s11146-007-9027-9</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC203717523X</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-He213)s11146-007-9027-9-p</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">330</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Rutherford, Ronald C.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Evidence of Information Asymmetries in the Market for Residential Condominiums</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract Previous research (Rutherford et al. 2005; Levitt and Syverson 2005) identify and quantify agency problems in the brokerage of single-family houses. 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