Delegating Eminent Domain Powers to Private Firms: Land Use and Efficiency Implications
Abstract Many private common carriers or regulated utilities have eminent domain powers in the U.S. The rationale resembles that for local governments; lower cost of assembling land for long distance electric transmission, gas and oil products pipelines, etc. Recent court cases raise questions about...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Turnbull, Geoffrey K. [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
2010 |
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Schlagwörter: |
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Anmerkung: |
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: The journal of real estate finance and economics - Springer US, 1988, 45(2010), 2 vom: 04. Aug., Seite 305-325 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:45 ; year:2010 ; number:2 ; day:04 ; month:08 ; pages:305-325 |
Links: |
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DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11146-010-9260-5 |
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Katalog-ID: |
OLC2037177739 |
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10.1007/s11146-010-9260-5 doi (DE-627)OLC2037177739 (DE-He213)s11146-010-9260-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Turnbull, Geoffrey K. verfasserin aut Delegating Eminent Domain Powers to Private Firms: Land Use and Efficiency Implications 2010 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010 Abstract Many private common carriers or regulated utilities have eminent domain powers in the U.S. The rationale resembles that for local governments; lower cost of assembling land for long distance electric transmission, gas and oil products pipelines, etc. Recent court cases raise questions about whether eminent domain allows firms to use inefficiently long indirect land corridors, inefficiently wide corridors, or higher value land when lower value land is available as an alternative? Despite the incentive to over-use capital under rate-of-return regulation, it turns out that the firm adopts an excessive land corridor width only to the extent that corridor width is tied to capital usage. For route selection, rate-of-return regulated firms follow the same Pareto rule that would be followed by an efficiency-oriented government when designating which land to take for a transmission route by eminent domain. Private eminent domain Public use Regulated firm Enthalten in The journal of real estate finance and economics Springer US, 1988 45(2010), 2 vom: 04. Aug., Seite 305-325 (DE-627)170550265 (DE-600)1073289-5 (DE-576)025193546 0895-5638 nnns volume:45 year:2010 number:2 day:04 month:08 pages:305-325 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-010-9260-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_648 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4125 AR 45 2010 2 04 08 305-325 |
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10.1007/s11146-010-9260-5 doi (DE-627)OLC2037177739 (DE-He213)s11146-010-9260-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Turnbull, Geoffrey K. verfasserin aut Delegating Eminent Domain Powers to Private Firms: Land Use and Efficiency Implications 2010 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010 Abstract Many private common carriers or regulated utilities have eminent domain powers in the U.S. The rationale resembles that for local governments; lower cost of assembling land for long distance electric transmission, gas and oil products pipelines, etc. Recent court cases raise questions about whether eminent domain allows firms to use inefficiently long indirect land corridors, inefficiently wide corridors, or higher value land when lower value land is available as an alternative? Despite the incentive to over-use capital under rate-of-return regulation, it turns out that the firm adopts an excessive land corridor width only to the extent that corridor width is tied to capital usage. For route selection, rate-of-return regulated firms follow the same Pareto rule that would be followed by an efficiency-oriented government when designating which land to take for a transmission route by eminent domain. Private eminent domain Public use Regulated firm Enthalten in The journal of real estate finance and economics Springer US, 1988 45(2010), 2 vom: 04. Aug., Seite 305-325 (DE-627)170550265 (DE-600)1073289-5 (DE-576)025193546 0895-5638 nnns volume:45 year:2010 number:2 day:04 month:08 pages:305-325 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-010-9260-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_648 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4125 AR 45 2010 2 04 08 305-325 |
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10.1007/s11146-010-9260-5 doi (DE-627)OLC2037177739 (DE-He213)s11146-010-9260-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Turnbull, Geoffrey K. verfasserin aut Delegating Eminent Domain Powers to Private Firms: Land Use and Efficiency Implications 2010 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010 Abstract Many private common carriers or regulated utilities have eminent domain powers in the U.S. The rationale resembles that for local governments; lower cost of assembling land for long distance electric transmission, gas and oil products pipelines, etc. Recent court cases raise questions about whether eminent domain allows firms to use inefficiently long indirect land corridors, inefficiently wide corridors, or higher value land when lower value land is available as an alternative? Despite the incentive to over-use capital under rate-of-return regulation, it turns out that the firm adopts an excessive land corridor width only to the extent that corridor width is tied to capital usage. For route selection, rate-of-return regulated firms follow the same Pareto rule that would be followed by an efficiency-oriented government when designating which land to take for a transmission route by eminent domain. Private eminent domain Public use Regulated firm Enthalten in The journal of real estate finance and economics Springer US, 1988 45(2010), 2 vom: 04. Aug., Seite 305-325 (DE-627)170550265 (DE-600)1073289-5 (DE-576)025193546 0895-5638 nnns volume:45 year:2010 number:2 day:04 month:08 pages:305-325 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-010-9260-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_648 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4125 AR 45 2010 2 04 08 305-325 |
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10.1007/s11146-010-9260-5 doi (DE-627)OLC2037177739 (DE-He213)s11146-010-9260-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Turnbull, Geoffrey K. verfasserin aut Delegating Eminent Domain Powers to Private Firms: Land Use and Efficiency Implications 2010 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010 Abstract Many private common carriers or regulated utilities have eminent domain powers in the U.S. The rationale resembles that for local governments; lower cost of assembling land for long distance electric transmission, gas and oil products pipelines, etc. Recent court cases raise questions about whether eminent domain allows firms to use inefficiently long indirect land corridors, inefficiently wide corridors, or higher value land when lower value land is available as an alternative? Despite the incentive to over-use capital under rate-of-return regulation, it turns out that the firm adopts an excessive land corridor width only to the extent that corridor width is tied to capital usage. For route selection, rate-of-return regulated firms follow the same Pareto rule that would be followed by an efficiency-oriented government when designating which land to take for a transmission route by eminent domain. Private eminent domain Public use Regulated firm Enthalten in The journal of real estate finance and economics Springer US, 1988 45(2010), 2 vom: 04. Aug., Seite 305-325 (DE-627)170550265 (DE-600)1073289-5 (DE-576)025193546 0895-5638 nnns volume:45 year:2010 number:2 day:04 month:08 pages:305-325 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-010-9260-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_648 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4125 AR 45 2010 2 04 08 305-325 |
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Abstract Many private common carriers or regulated utilities have eminent domain powers in the U.S. The rationale resembles that for local governments; lower cost of assembling land for long distance electric transmission, gas and oil products pipelines, etc. Recent court cases raise questions about whether eminent domain allows firms to use inefficiently long indirect land corridors, inefficiently wide corridors, or higher value land when lower value land is available as an alternative? Despite the incentive to over-use capital under rate-of-return regulation, it turns out that the firm adopts an excessive land corridor width only to the extent that corridor width is tied to capital usage. For route selection, rate-of-return regulated firms follow the same Pareto rule that would be followed by an efficiency-oriented government when designating which land to take for a transmission route by eminent domain. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010 |
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Abstract Many private common carriers or regulated utilities have eminent domain powers in the U.S. The rationale resembles that for local governments; lower cost of assembling land for long distance electric transmission, gas and oil products pipelines, etc. Recent court cases raise questions about whether eminent domain allows firms to use inefficiently long indirect land corridors, inefficiently wide corridors, or higher value land when lower value land is available as an alternative? Despite the incentive to over-use capital under rate-of-return regulation, it turns out that the firm adopts an excessive land corridor width only to the extent that corridor width is tied to capital usage. For route selection, rate-of-return regulated firms follow the same Pareto rule that would be followed by an efficiency-oriented government when designating which land to take for a transmission route by eminent domain. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010 |
abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract Many private common carriers or regulated utilities have eminent domain powers in the U.S. The rationale resembles that for local governments; lower cost of assembling land for long distance electric transmission, gas and oil products pipelines, etc. Recent court cases raise questions about whether eminent domain allows firms to use inefficiently long indirect land corridors, inefficiently wide corridors, or higher value land when lower value land is available as an alternative? Despite the incentive to over-use capital under rate-of-return regulation, it turns out that the firm adopts an excessive land corridor width only to the extent that corridor width is tied to capital usage. For route selection, rate-of-return regulated firms follow the same Pareto rule that would be followed by an efficiency-oriented government when designating which land to take for a transmission route by eminent domain. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010 |
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