Institutional competition of optional codes in European contract law
Abstract The Common European Sales Law (CESL) is the European Commission’s most recent policy initiative for European contract law. It aims to address the problem that differences between the national contract laws of the Member States may constitute an obstacle for the European Internal Market. Thi...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Wulf, Alexander J. [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2014 |
|---|
| Schlagwörter: |
|---|
| Anmerkung: |
© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014 |
|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: European journal of law and economics - Springer US, 1994, 38(2014), 1 vom: 28. März, Seite 139-162 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:38 ; year:2014 ; number:1 ; day:28 ; month:03 ; pages:139-162 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s10657-014-9439-y |
|---|
| Katalog-ID: |
OLC2038359393 |
|---|
| LEADER | 01000caa a22002652 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | OLC2038359393 | ||
| 003 | DE-627 | ||
| 005 | 20230503050456.0 | ||
| 007 | tu | ||
| 008 | 200819s2014 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1007/s10657-014-9439-y |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (DE-627)OLC2038359393 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-He213)s10657-014-9439-y-p | ||
| 040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | |a eng | ||
| 082 | 0 | 4 | |a 340 |a 330 |a 360 |q VZ |
| 100 | 1 | |a Wulf, Alexander J. |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Institutional competition of optional codes in European contract law |
| 264 | 1 | |c 2014 | |
| 336 | |a Text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a Band |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014 | ||
| 520 | |a Abstract The Common European Sales Law (CESL) is the European Commission’s most recent policy initiative for European contract law. It aims to address the problem that differences between the national contract laws of the Member States may constitute an obstacle for the European Internal Market. This paper develops a model of the institutional competition in European contract law and uses it to addresses the question as to whether an optional European contract code and the CESL are economically desirable for European contract law. To do so I examine the transaction costs involved in the process of choosing an applicable law that European businesses face when they conduct cross-border transactions in the European Internal Market. I then describe how these transaction costs shape the competitive environment, i.e. what I refer to as the “European market for contract laws” in which the contracting parties choose a law to govern their cross-border contracts. Having identified this environment and the competitive forces operating within it, I propose a model, the “Cycle of European Contract Law”. I use this model to analyze the competitive processes that take place in the European market for contract laws. Based on my results I make recommendations for the optimal implementation of an optional European contract code and the CESL in European contract law. | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Law and Economics | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Institutional competition | |
| 650 | 4 | |a European Union | |
| 650 | 4 | |a European contract law | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Common European Sales Law | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Choice of law | |
| 773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t European journal of law and economics |d Springer US, 1994 |g 38(2014), 1 vom: 28. März, Seite 139-162 |w (DE-627)184980658 |w (DE-600)1231592-8 |w (DE-576)046704884 |x 0929-1261 |7 nnns |
| 773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:38 |g year:2014 |g number:1 |g day:28 |g month:03 |g pages:139-162 |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-014-9439-y |z lizenzpflichtig |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a GBV_USEFLAG_A | ||
| 912 | |a SYSFLAG_A | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_OLC | ||
| 912 | |a SSG-OLC-WIW | ||
| 912 | |a SSG-OLC-IBL | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_22 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_26 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_39 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2062 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4012 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4318 | ||
| 951 | |a AR | ||
| 952 | |d 38 |j 2014 |e 1 |b 28 |c 03 |h 139-162 | ||
| author_variant |
a j w aj ajw |
|---|---|
| matchkey_str |
article:09291261:2014----::ntttoacmeiinfpinloeier |
| hierarchy_sort_str |
2014 |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| allfields |
10.1007/s10657-014-9439-y doi (DE-627)OLC2038359393 (DE-He213)s10657-014-9439-y-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 340 330 360 VZ Wulf, Alexander J. verfasserin aut Institutional competition of optional codes in European contract law 2014 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014 Abstract The Common European Sales Law (CESL) is the European Commission’s most recent policy initiative for European contract law. It aims to address the problem that differences between the national contract laws of the Member States may constitute an obstacle for the European Internal Market. This paper develops a model of the institutional competition in European contract law and uses it to addresses the question as to whether an optional European contract code and the CESL are economically desirable for European contract law. To do so I examine the transaction costs involved in the process of choosing an applicable law that European businesses face when they conduct cross-border transactions in the European Internal Market. I then describe how these transaction costs shape the competitive environment, i.e. what I refer to as the “European market for contract laws” in which the contracting parties choose a law to govern their cross-border contracts. Having identified this environment and the competitive forces operating within it, I propose a model, the “Cycle of European Contract Law”. I use this model to analyze the competitive processes that take place in the European market for contract laws. Based on my results I make recommendations for the optimal implementation of an optional European contract code and the CESL in European contract law. Law and Economics Institutional competition European Union European contract law Common European Sales Law Choice of law Enthalten in European journal of law and economics Springer US, 1994 38(2014), 1 vom: 28. März, Seite 139-162 (DE-627)184980658 (DE-600)1231592-8 (DE-576)046704884 0929-1261 nnns volume:38 year:2014 number:1 day:28 month:03 pages:139-162 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-014-9439-y lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_2062 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4318 AR 38 2014 1 28 03 139-162 |
| spelling |
10.1007/s10657-014-9439-y doi (DE-627)OLC2038359393 (DE-He213)s10657-014-9439-y-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 340 330 360 VZ Wulf, Alexander J. verfasserin aut Institutional competition of optional codes in European contract law 2014 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014 Abstract The Common European Sales Law (CESL) is the European Commission’s most recent policy initiative for European contract law. It aims to address the problem that differences between the national contract laws of the Member States may constitute an obstacle for the European Internal Market. This paper develops a model of the institutional competition in European contract law and uses it to addresses the question as to whether an optional European contract code and the CESL are economically desirable for European contract law. To do so I examine the transaction costs involved in the process of choosing an applicable law that European businesses face when they conduct cross-border transactions in the European Internal Market. I then describe how these transaction costs shape the competitive environment, i.e. what I refer to as the “European market for contract laws” in which the contracting parties choose a law to govern their cross-border contracts. Having identified this environment and the competitive forces operating within it, I propose a model, the “Cycle of European Contract Law”. I use this model to analyze the competitive processes that take place in the European market for contract laws. Based on my results I make recommendations for the optimal implementation of an optional European contract code and the CESL in European contract law. Law and Economics Institutional competition European Union European contract law Common European Sales Law Choice of law Enthalten in European journal of law and economics Springer US, 1994 38(2014), 1 vom: 28. März, Seite 139-162 (DE-627)184980658 (DE-600)1231592-8 (DE-576)046704884 0929-1261 nnns volume:38 year:2014 number:1 day:28 month:03 pages:139-162 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-014-9439-y lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_2062 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4318 AR 38 2014 1 28 03 139-162 |
| allfields_unstemmed |
10.1007/s10657-014-9439-y doi (DE-627)OLC2038359393 (DE-He213)s10657-014-9439-y-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 340 330 360 VZ Wulf, Alexander J. verfasserin aut Institutional competition of optional codes in European contract law 2014 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014 Abstract The Common European Sales Law (CESL) is the European Commission’s most recent policy initiative for European contract law. It aims to address the problem that differences between the national contract laws of the Member States may constitute an obstacle for the European Internal Market. This paper develops a model of the institutional competition in European contract law and uses it to addresses the question as to whether an optional European contract code and the CESL are economically desirable for European contract law. To do so I examine the transaction costs involved in the process of choosing an applicable law that European businesses face when they conduct cross-border transactions in the European Internal Market. I then describe how these transaction costs shape the competitive environment, i.e. what I refer to as the “European market for contract laws” in which the contracting parties choose a law to govern their cross-border contracts. Having identified this environment and the competitive forces operating within it, I propose a model, the “Cycle of European Contract Law”. I use this model to analyze the competitive processes that take place in the European market for contract laws. Based on my results I make recommendations for the optimal implementation of an optional European contract code and the CESL in European contract law. Law and Economics Institutional competition European Union European contract law Common European Sales Law Choice of law Enthalten in European journal of law and economics Springer US, 1994 38(2014), 1 vom: 28. März, Seite 139-162 (DE-627)184980658 (DE-600)1231592-8 (DE-576)046704884 0929-1261 nnns volume:38 year:2014 number:1 day:28 month:03 pages:139-162 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-014-9439-y lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_2062 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4318 AR 38 2014 1 28 03 139-162 |
| allfieldsGer |
10.1007/s10657-014-9439-y doi (DE-627)OLC2038359393 (DE-He213)s10657-014-9439-y-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 340 330 360 VZ Wulf, Alexander J. verfasserin aut Institutional competition of optional codes in European contract law 2014 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014 Abstract The Common European Sales Law (CESL) is the European Commission’s most recent policy initiative for European contract law. It aims to address the problem that differences between the national contract laws of the Member States may constitute an obstacle for the European Internal Market. This paper develops a model of the institutional competition in European contract law and uses it to addresses the question as to whether an optional European contract code and the CESL are economically desirable for European contract law. To do so I examine the transaction costs involved in the process of choosing an applicable law that European businesses face when they conduct cross-border transactions in the European Internal Market. I then describe how these transaction costs shape the competitive environment, i.e. what I refer to as the “European market for contract laws” in which the contracting parties choose a law to govern their cross-border contracts. Having identified this environment and the competitive forces operating within it, I propose a model, the “Cycle of European Contract Law”. I use this model to analyze the competitive processes that take place in the European market for contract laws. Based on my results I make recommendations for the optimal implementation of an optional European contract code and the CESL in European contract law. Law and Economics Institutional competition European Union European contract law Common European Sales Law Choice of law Enthalten in European journal of law and economics Springer US, 1994 38(2014), 1 vom: 28. März, Seite 139-162 (DE-627)184980658 (DE-600)1231592-8 (DE-576)046704884 0929-1261 nnns volume:38 year:2014 number:1 day:28 month:03 pages:139-162 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-014-9439-y lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_2062 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4318 AR 38 2014 1 28 03 139-162 |
| allfieldsSound |
10.1007/s10657-014-9439-y doi (DE-627)OLC2038359393 (DE-He213)s10657-014-9439-y-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 340 330 360 VZ Wulf, Alexander J. verfasserin aut Institutional competition of optional codes in European contract law 2014 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014 Abstract The Common European Sales Law (CESL) is the European Commission’s most recent policy initiative for European contract law. It aims to address the problem that differences between the national contract laws of the Member States may constitute an obstacle for the European Internal Market. This paper develops a model of the institutional competition in European contract law and uses it to addresses the question as to whether an optional European contract code and the CESL are economically desirable for European contract law. To do so I examine the transaction costs involved in the process of choosing an applicable law that European businesses face when they conduct cross-border transactions in the European Internal Market. I then describe how these transaction costs shape the competitive environment, i.e. what I refer to as the “European market for contract laws” in which the contracting parties choose a law to govern their cross-border contracts. Having identified this environment and the competitive forces operating within it, I propose a model, the “Cycle of European Contract Law”. I use this model to analyze the competitive processes that take place in the European market for contract laws. Based on my results I make recommendations for the optimal implementation of an optional European contract code and the CESL in European contract law. Law and Economics Institutional competition European Union European contract law Common European Sales Law Choice of law Enthalten in European journal of law and economics Springer US, 1994 38(2014), 1 vom: 28. März, Seite 139-162 (DE-627)184980658 (DE-600)1231592-8 (DE-576)046704884 0929-1261 nnns volume:38 year:2014 number:1 day:28 month:03 pages:139-162 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-014-9439-y lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_2062 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4318 AR 38 2014 1 28 03 139-162 |
| language |
English |
| source |
Enthalten in European journal of law and economics 38(2014), 1 vom: 28. März, Seite 139-162 volume:38 year:2014 number:1 day:28 month:03 pages:139-162 |
| sourceStr |
Enthalten in European journal of law and economics 38(2014), 1 vom: 28. März, Seite 139-162 volume:38 year:2014 number:1 day:28 month:03 pages:139-162 |
| format_phy_str_mv |
Article |
| institution |
findex.gbv.de |
| topic_facet |
Law and Economics Institutional competition European Union European contract law Common European Sales Law Choice of law |
| dewey-raw |
340 |
| isfreeaccess_bool |
false |
| container_title |
European journal of law and economics |
| authorswithroles_txt_mv |
Wulf, Alexander J. @@aut@@ |
| publishDateDaySort_date |
2014-03-28T00:00:00Z |
| hierarchy_top_id |
184980658 |
| dewey-sort |
3340 |
| id |
OLC2038359393 |
| language_de |
englisch |
| fullrecord |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC2038359393</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230503050456.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">200819s2014 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s10657-014-9439-y</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC2038359393</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-He213)s10657-014-9439-y-p</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">340</subfield><subfield code="a">330</subfield><subfield code="a">360</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Wulf, Alexander J.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Institutional competition of optional codes in European contract law</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2014</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract The Common European Sales Law (CESL) is the European Commission’s most recent policy initiative for European contract law. It aims to address the problem that differences between the national contract laws of the Member States may constitute an obstacle for the European Internal Market. This paper develops a model of the institutional competition in European contract law and uses it to addresses the question as to whether an optional European contract code and the CESL are economically desirable for European contract law. To do so I examine the transaction costs involved in the process of choosing an applicable law that European businesses face when they conduct cross-border transactions in the European Internal Market. I then describe how these transaction costs shape the competitive environment, i.e. what I refer to as the “European market for contract laws” in which the contracting parties choose a law to govern their cross-border contracts. Having identified this environment and the competitive forces operating within it, I propose a model, the “Cycle of European Contract Law”. I use this model to analyze the competitive processes that take place in the European market for contract laws. Based on my results I make recommendations for the optimal implementation of an optional European contract code and the CESL in European contract law.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Law and Economics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Institutional competition</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">European Union</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">European contract law</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Common European Sales Law</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Choice of law</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">European journal of law and economics</subfield><subfield code="d">Springer US, 1994</subfield><subfield code="g">38(2014), 1 vom: 28. März, Seite 139-162</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)184980658</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)1231592-8</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)046704884</subfield><subfield code="x">0929-1261</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:38</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2014</subfield><subfield code="g">number:1</subfield><subfield code="g">day:28</subfield><subfield code="g">month:03</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:139-162</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-014-9439-y</subfield><subfield code="z">lizenzpflichtig</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_OLC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-WIW</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-IBL</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_26</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2062</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4318</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">38</subfield><subfield code="j">2014</subfield><subfield code="e">1</subfield><subfield code="b">28</subfield><subfield code="c">03</subfield><subfield code="h">139-162</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| author |
Wulf, Alexander J. |
| spellingShingle |
Wulf, Alexander J. ddc 340 misc Law and Economics misc Institutional competition misc European Union misc European contract law misc Common European Sales Law misc Choice of law Institutional competition of optional codes in European contract law |
| authorStr |
Wulf, Alexander J. |
| ppnlink_with_tag_str_mv |
@@773@@(DE-627)184980658 |
| format |
Article |
| dewey-ones |
340 - Law 330 - Economics 360 - Social problems & services; associations |
| delete_txt_mv |
keep |
| author_role |
aut |
| collection |
OLC |
| remote_str |
false |
| illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
| issn |
0929-1261 |
| topic_title |
340 330 360 VZ Institutional competition of optional codes in European contract law Law and Economics Institutional competition European Union European contract law Common European Sales Law Choice of law |
| topic |
ddc 340 misc Law and Economics misc Institutional competition misc European Union misc European contract law misc Common European Sales Law misc Choice of law |
| topic_unstemmed |
ddc 340 misc Law and Economics misc Institutional competition misc European Union misc European contract law misc Common European Sales Law misc Choice of law |
| topic_browse |
ddc 340 misc Law and Economics misc Institutional competition misc European Union misc European contract law misc Common European Sales Law misc Choice of law |
| format_facet |
Aufsätze Gedruckte Aufsätze |
| format_main_str_mv |
Text Zeitschrift/Artikel |
| carriertype_str_mv |
nc |
| hierarchy_parent_title |
European journal of law and economics |
| hierarchy_parent_id |
184980658 |
| dewey-tens |
340 - Law 330 - Economics 360 - Social problems & social services |
| hierarchy_top_title |
European journal of law and economics |
| isfreeaccess_txt |
false |
| familylinks_str_mv |
(DE-627)184980658 (DE-600)1231592-8 (DE-576)046704884 |
| title |
Institutional competition of optional codes in European contract law |
| ctrlnum |
(DE-627)OLC2038359393 (DE-He213)s10657-014-9439-y-p |
| title_full |
Institutional competition of optional codes in European contract law |
| author_sort |
Wulf, Alexander J. |
| journal |
European journal of law and economics |
| journalStr |
European journal of law and economics |
| lang_code |
eng |
| isOA_bool |
false |
| dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
| recordtype |
marc |
| publishDateSort |
2014 |
| contenttype_str_mv |
txt |
| container_start_page |
139 |
| author_browse |
Wulf, Alexander J. |
| container_volume |
38 |
| class |
340 330 360 VZ |
| format_se |
Aufsätze |
| author-letter |
Wulf, Alexander J. |
| doi_str_mv |
10.1007/s10657-014-9439-y |
| dewey-full |
340 330 360 |
| title_sort |
institutional competition of optional codes in european contract law |
| title_auth |
Institutional competition of optional codes in European contract law |
| abstract |
Abstract The Common European Sales Law (CESL) is the European Commission’s most recent policy initiative for European contract law. It aims to address the problem that differences between the national contract laws of the Member States may constitute an obstacle for the European Internal Market. This paper develops a model of the institutional competition in European contract law and uses it to addresses the question as to whether an optional European contract code and the CESL are economically desirable for European contract law. To do so I examine the transaction costs involved in the process of choosing an applicable law that European businesses face when they conduct cross-border transactions in the European Internal Market. I then describe how these transaction costs shape the competitive environment, i.e. what I refer to as the “European market for contract laws” in which the contracting parties choose a law to govern their cross-border contracts. Having identified this environment and the competitive forces operating within it, I propose a model, the “Cycle of European Contract Law”. I use this model to analyze the competitive processes that take place in the European market for contract laws. Based on my results I make recommendations for the optimal implementation of an optional European contract code and the CESL in European contract law. © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014 |
| abstractGer |
Abstract The Common European Sales Law (CESL) is the European Commission’s most recent policy initiative for European contract law. It aims to address the problem that differences between the national contract laws of the Member States may constitute an obstacle for the European Internal Market. This paper develops a model of the institutional competition in European contract law and uses it to addresses the question as to whether an optional European contract code and the CESL are economically desirable for European contract law. To do so I examine the transaction costs involved in the process of choosing an applicable law that European businesses face when they conduct cross-border transactions in the European Internal Market. I then describe how these transaction costs shape the competitive environment, i.e. what I refer to as the “European market for contract laws” in which the contracting parties choose a law to govern their cross-border contracts. Having identified this environment and the competitive forces operating within it, I propose a model, the “Cycle of European Contract Law”. I use this model to analyze the competitive processes that take place in the European market for contract laws. Based on my results I make recommendations for the optimal implementation of an optional European contract code and the CESL in European contract law. © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract The Common European Sales Law (CESL) is the European Commission’s most recent policy initiative for European contract law. It aims to address the problem that differences between the national contract laws of the Member States may constitute an obstacle for the European Internal Market. This paper develops a model of the institutional competition in European contract law and uses it to addresses the question as to whether an optional European contract code and the CESL are economically desirable for European contract law. To do so I examine the transaction costs involved in the process of choosing an applicable law that European businesses face when they conduct cross-border transactions in the European Internal Market. I then describe how these transaction costs shape the competitive environment, i.e. what I refer to as the “European market for contract laws” in which the contracting parties choose a law to govern their cross-border contracts. Having identified this environment and the competitive forces operating within it, I propose a model, the “Cycle of European Contract Law”. I use this model to analyze the competitive processes that take place in the European market for contract laws. Based on my results I make recommendations for the optimal implementation of an optional European contract code and the CESL in European contract law. © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014 |
| collection_details |
GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_2062 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4318 |
| container_issue |
1 |
| title_short |
Institutional competition of optional codes in European contract law |
| url |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-014-9439-y |
| remote_bool |
false |
| ppnlink |
184980658 |
| mediatype_str_mv |
n |
| isOA_txt |
false |
| hochschulschrift_bool |
false |
| doi_str |
10.1007/s10657-014-9439-y |
| up_date |
2024-07-03T18:38:57.944Z |
| _version_ |
1803584209361567744 |
| fullrecord_marcxml |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC2038359393</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230503050456.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">200819s2014 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s10657-014-9439-y</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC2038359393</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-He213)s10657-014-9439-y-p</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">340</subfield><subfield code="a">330</subfield><subfield code="a">360</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Wulf, Alexander J.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Institutional competition of optional codes in European contract law</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2014</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract The Common European Sales Law (CESL) is the European Commission’s most recent policy initiative for European contract law. It aims to address the problem that differences between the national contract laws of the Member States may constitute an obstacle for the European Internal Market. This paper develops a model of the institutional competition in European contract law and uses it to addresses the question as to whether an optional European contract code and the CESL are economically desirable for European contract law. To do so I examine the transaction costs involved in the process of choosing an applicable law that European businesses face when they conduct cross-border transactions in the European Internal Market. I then describe how these transaction costs shape the competitive environment, i.e. what I refer to as the “European market for contract laws” in which the contracting parties choose a law to govern their cross-border contracts. Having identified this environment and the competitive forces operating within it, I propose a model, the “Cycle of European Contract Law”. I use this model to analyze the competitive processes that take place in the European market for contract laws. Based on my results I make recommendations for the optimal implementation of an optional European contract code and the CESL in European contract law.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Law and Economics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Institutional competition</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">European Union</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">European contract law</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Common European Sales Law</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Choice of law</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">European journal of law and economics</subfield><subfield code="d">Springer US, 1994</subfield><subfield code="g">38(2014), 1 vom: 28. März, Seite 139-162</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)184980658</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)1231592-8</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)046704884</subfield><subfield code="x">0929-1261</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:38</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2014</subfield><subfield code="g">number:1</subfield><subfield code="g">day:28</subfield><subfield code="g">month:03</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:139-162</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-014-9439-y</subfield><subfield code="z">lizenzpflichtig</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_OLC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-WIW</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-IBL</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_26</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2062</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4318</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">38</subfield><subfield code="j">2014</subfield><subfield code="e">1</subfield><subfield code="b">28</subfield><subfield code="c">03</subfield><subfield code="h">139-162</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| score |
7.398222 |