The economic analysis of antitrust consents
Abstract Henry G. Manne, our friend, Mentor, and colleague, was a pioneer in the economic analysis of law. By consistently challenging the notion that existing institutions were well understood, he expanded the domain of economics to new and fertile ground. In that spirit, our goal in this article i...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Wright, Joshua D. [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2018 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© This is a U.S. Government work and not under copyright protection in the US; foreign copyright protection may apply 2018 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: European journal of law and economics - Springer US, 1994, 46(2018), 2 vom: 22. März, Seite 245-259 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:46 ; year:2018 ; number:2 ; day:22 ; month:03 ; pages:245-259 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s10657-018-9579-6 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract Henry G. Manne, our friend, Mentor, and colleague, was a pioneer in the economic analysis of law. By consistently challenging the notion that existing institutions were well understood, he expanded the domain of economics to new and fertile ground. In that spirit, our goal in this article is to bring out of the shadows an institution that has thus far evaded the light of economic analysis: antitrust consents. In our view, competition authorities around the world should be asking themselves what ratio of litigation to settlement is optimal for their agency. Over the last 35 years, the United States Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have shifted dramatically toward greater reliance upon consent decrees than upon litigation to resolve antitrust disputes. As an aid to national competition agencies considering the desirability of adopting a similar approach, we focus upon the importance of economic analysis in evaluating movement along the continuum from a law enforcement model to a regulatory model of agency behavior. We draw upon the U.S. experience to substantiate our claim that the costs associated with a shift toward the regulatory model, including the potential distortion in the development of substantive antitrust doctrine, may be under-appreciated and discernable only in the long run. We acknowledge that consent decrees can and should be an important tool in an antitrust agency’s toolkit for resolving antitrust disputes. We contend, however, that a full economic analysis of reliance primarily upon consent decrees is necessary to inform each competition agency’s strategic decision about the optimal mix of law enforcement and regulatory techniques. | ||
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10.1007/s10657-018-9579-6 doi (DE-627)OLC2038361592 (DE-He213)s10657-018-9579-6-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 340 330 360 VZ Wright, Joshua D. verfasserin aut The economic analysis of antitrust consents 2018 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © This is a U.S. Government work and not under copyright protection in the US; foreign copyright protection may apply 2018 Abstract Henry G. Manne, our friend, Mentor, and colleague, was a pioneer in the economic analysis of law. By consistently challenging the notion that existing institutions were well understood, he expanded the domain of economics to new and fertile ground. In that spirit, our goal in this article is to bring out of the shadows an institution that has thus far evaded the light of economic analysis: antitrust consents. In our view, competition authorities around the world should be asking themselves what ratio of litigation to settlement is optimal for their agency. Over the last 35 years, the United States Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have shifted dramatically toward greater reliance upon consent decrees than upon litigation to resolve antitrust disputes. As an aid to national competition agencies considering the desirability of adopting a similar approach, we focus upon the importance of economic analysis in evaluating movement along the continuum from a law enforcement model to a regulatory model of agency behavior. We draw upon the U.S. experience to substantiate our claim that the costs associated with a shift toward the regulatory model, including the potential distortion in the development of substantive antitrust doctrine, may be under-appreciated and discernable only in the long run. We acknowledge that consent decrees can and should be an important tool in an antitrust agency’s toolkit for resolving antitrust disputes. We contend, however, that a full economic analysis of reliance primarily upon consent decrees is necessary to inform each competition agency’s strategic decision about the optimal mix of law enforcement and regulatory techniques. Antitrust Competition law Consent decrees Ginsburg, Douglas H. aut Enthalten in European journal of law and economics Springer US, 1994 46(2018), 2 vom: 22. März, Seite 245-259 (DE-627)184980658 (DE-600)1231592-8 (DE-576)046704884 0929-1261 nnns volume:46 year:2018 number:2 day:22 month:03 pages:245-259 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-018-9579-6 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_2062 GBV_ILN_4012 AR 46 2018 2 22 03 245-259 |
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10.1007/s10657-018-9579-6 doi (DE-627)OLC2038361592 (DE-He213)s10657-018-9579-6-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 340 330 360 VZ Wright, Joshua D. verfasserin aut The economic analysis of antitrust consents 2018 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © This is a U.S. Government work and not under copyright protection in the US; foreign copyright protection may apply 2018 Abstract Henry G. Manne, our friend, Mentor, and colleague, was a pioneer in the economic analysis of law. By consistently challenging the notion that existing institutions were well understood, he expanded the domain of economics to new and fertile ground. In that spirit, our goal in this article is to bring out of the shadows an institution that has thus far evaded the light of economic analysis: antitrust consents. In our view, competition authorities around the world should be asking themselves what ratio of litigation to settlement is optimal for their agency. Over the last 35 years, the United States Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have shifted dramatically toward greater reliance upon consent decrees than upon litigation to resolve antitrust disputes. As an aid to national competition agencies considering the desirability of adopting a similar approach, we focus upon the importance of economic analysis in evaluating movement along the continuum from a law enforcement model to a regulatory model of agency behavior. We draw upon the U.S. experience to substantiate our claim that the costs associated with a shift toward the regulatory model, including the potential distortion in the development of substantive antitrust doctrine, may be under-appreciated and discernable only in the long run. We acknowledge that consent decrees can and should be an important tool in an antitrust agency’s toolkit for resolving antitrust disputes. We contend, however, that a full economic analysis of reliance primarily upon consent decrees is necessary to inform each competition agency’s strategic decision about the optimal mix of law enforcement and regulatory techniques. Antitrust Competition law Consent decrees Ginsburg, Douglas H. aut Enthalten in European journal of law and economics Springer US, 1994 46(2018), 2 vom: 22. März, Seite 245-259 (DE-627)184980658 (DE-600)1231592-8 (DE-576)046704884 0929-1261 nnns volume:46 year:2018 number:2 day:22 month:03 pages:245-259 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-018-9579-6 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_2062 GBV_ILN_4012 AR 46 2018 2 22 03 245-259 |
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10.1007/s10657-018-9579-6 doi (DE-627)OLC2038361592 (DE-He213)s10657-018-9579-6-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 340 330 360 VZ Wright, Joshua D. verfasserin aut The economic analysis of antitrust consents 2018 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © This is a U.S. Government work and not under copyright protection in the US; foreign copyright protection may apply 2018 Abstract Henry G. Manne, our friend, Mentor, and colleague, was a pioneer in the economic analysis of law. By consistently challenging the notion that existing institutions were well understood, he expanded the domain of economics to new and fertile ground. In that spirit, our goal in this article is to bring out of the shadows an institution that has thus far evaded the light of economic analysis: antitrust consents. In our view, competition authorities around the world should be asking themselves what ratio of litigation to settlement is optimal for their agency. Over the last 35 years, the United States Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have shifted dramatically toward greater reliance upon consent decrees than upon litigation to resolve antitrust disputes. As an aid to national competition agencies considering the desirability of adopting a similar approach, we focus upon the importance of economic analysis in evaluating movement along the continuum from a law enforcement model to a regulatory model of agency behavior. We draw upon the U.S. experience to substantiate our claim that the costs associated with a shift toward the regulatory model, including the potential distortion in the development of substantive antitrust doctrine, may be under-appreciated and discernable only in the long run. We acknowledge that consent decrees can and should be an important tool in an antitrust agency’s toolkit for resolving antitrust disputes. We contend, however, that a full economic analysis of reliance primarily upon consent decrees is necessary to inform each competition agency’s strategic decision about the optimal mix of law enforcement and regulatory techniques. Antitrust Competition law Consent decrees Ginsburg, Douglas H. aut Enthalten in European journal of law and economics Springer US, 1994 46(2018), 2 vom: 22. März, Seite 245-259 (DE-627)184980658 (DE-600)1231592-8 (DE-576)046704884 0929-1261 nnns volume:46 year:2018 number:2 day:22 month:03 pages:245-259 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-018-9579-6 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_2062 GBV_ILN_4012 AR 46 2018 2 22 03 245-259 |
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The economic analysis of antitrust consents |
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Abstract Henry G. Manne, our friend, Mentor, and colleague, was a pioneer in the economic analysis of law. By consistently challenging the notion that existing institutions were well understood, he expanded the domain of economics to new and fertile ground. In that spirit, our goal in this article is to bring out of the shadows an institution that has thus far evaded the light of economic analysis: antitrust consents. In our view, competition authorities around the world should be asking themselves what ratio of litigation to settlement is optimal for their agency. Over the last 35 years, the United States Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have shifted dramatically toward greater reliance upon consent decrees than upon litigation to resolve antitrust disputes. As an aid to national competition agencies considering the desirability of adopting a similar approach, we focus upon the importance of economic analysis in evaluating movement along the continuum from a law enforcement model to a regulatory model of agency behavior. We draw upon the U.S. experience to substantiate our claim that the costs associated with a shift toward the regulatory model, including the potential distortion in the development of substantive antitrust doctrine, may be under-appreciated and discernable only in the long run. We acknowledge that consent decrees can and should be an important tool in an antitrust agency’s toolkit for resolving antitrust disputes. We contend, however, that a full economic analysis of reliance primarily upon consent decrees is necessary to inform each competition agency’s strategic decision about the optimal mix of law enforcement and regulatory techniques. © This is a U.S. Government work and not under copyright protection in the US; foreign copyright protection may apply 2018 |
| abstractGer |
Abstract Henry G. Manne, our friend, Mentor, and colleague, was a pioneer in the economic analysis of law. By consistently challenging the notion that existing institutions were well understood, he expanded the domain of economics to new and fertile ground. In that spirit, our goal in this article is to bring out of the shadows an institution that has thus far evaded the light of economic analysis: antitrust consents. In our view, competition authorities around the world should be asking themselves what ratio of litigation to settlement is optimal for their agency. Over the last 35 years, the United States Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have shifted dramatically toward greater reliance upon consent decrees than upon litigation to resolve antitrust disputes. As an aid to national competition agencies considering the desirability of adopting a similar approach, we focus upon the importance of economic analysis in evaluating movement along the continuum from a law enforcement model to a regulatory model of agency behavior. We draw upon the U.S. experience to substantiate our claim that the costs associated with a shift toward the regulatory model, including the potential distortion in the development of substantive antitrust doctrine, may be under-appreciated and discernable only in the long run. We acknowledge that consent decrees can and should be an important tool in an antitrust agency’s toolkit for resolving antitrust disputes. We contend, however, that a full economic analysis of reliance primarily upon consent decrees is necessary to inform each competition agency’s strategic decision about the optimal mix of law enforcement and regulatory techniques. © This is a U.S. Government work and not under copyright protection in the US; foreign copyright protection may apply 2018 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract Henry G. Manne, our friend, Mentor, and colleague, was a pioneer in the economic analysis of law. By consistently challenging the notion that existing institutions were well understood, he expanded the domain of economics to new and fertile ground. In that spirit, our goal in this article is to bring out of the shadows an institution that has thus far evaded the light of economic analysis: antitrust consents. In our view, competition authorities around the world should be asking themselves what ratio of litigation to settlement is optimal for their agency. Over the last 35 years, the United States Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have shifted dramatically toward greater reliance upon consent decrees than upon litigation to resolve antitrust disputes. As an aid to national competition agencies considering the desirability of adopting a similar approach, we focus upon the importance of economic analysis in evaluating movement along the continuum from a law enforcement model to a regulatory model of agency behavior. We draw upon the U.S. experience to substantiate our claim that the costs associated with a shift toward the regulatory model, including the potential distortion in the development of substantive antitrust doctrine, may be under-appreciated and discernable only in the long run. We acknowledge that consent decrees can and should be an important tool in an antitrust agency’s toolkit for resolving antitrust disputes. We contend, however, that a full economic analysis of reliance primarily upon consent decrees is necessary to inform each competition agency’s strategic decision about the optimal mix of law enforcement and regulatory techniques. © This is a U.S. Government work and not under copyright protection in the US; foreign copyright protection may apply 2018 |
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| title_short |
The economic analysis of antitrust consents |
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https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-018-9579-6 |
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Ginsburg, Douglas H. |
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Ginsburg, Douglas H. |
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| doi_str |
10.1007/s10657-018-9579-6 |
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2024-07-03T18:39:29.043Z |
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