Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise
Abstract We seem less likely to endorse moral expertise than reasoning expertise or aesthetic expertise. This seems puzzling given that moral norms are intuitively taken to be at least more objective than aesthetic norms. One possible diagnosis of the asymmetry is that moral judgments require autono...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Driver, Julia [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2006 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer 2006 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Philosophical studies - Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1950, 128(2006), 3 vom: Apr., Seite 619-644 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:128 ; year:2006 ; number:3 ; month:04 ; pages:619-644 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11098-004-7825-y |
|---|
| Katalog-ID: |
OLC2040357173 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract We seem less likely to endorse moral expertise than reasoning expertise or aesthetic expertise. This seems puzzling given that moral norms are intuitively taken to be at least more objective than aesthetic norms. One possible diagnosis of the asymmetry is that moral judgments require autonomy of judgement in away that other judgments do not. However, the author points out that aesthetic judgments that have been ‘borrowed’ by aesthetic experts generate the same autonomy worry as moral judgments which are borrowed by moral experts. The author then explores various approaches to accepting the testimony of moral experts and concludes that the asymmetry may best be explained by (1) the conditions for moral expertise being more difficult to satisfy than those of aesthetic expertise and (2) the intuitive greater seriousness of accepting the moral judgments of others, since moral norms are generally viewed as more binding than aesthetic norms. | ||
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10.1007/s11098-004-7825-y doi (DE-627)OLC2040357173 (DE-He213)s11098-004-7825-y-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 VZ 5,1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid LING DE-30 fid Driver, Julia verfasserin aut Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise 2006 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer 2006 Abstract We seem less likely to endorse moral expertise than reasoning expertise or aesthetic expertise. This seems puzzling given that moral norms are intuitively taken to be at least more objective than aesthetic norms. One possible diagnosis of the asymmetry is that moral judgments require autonomy of judgement in away that other judgments do not. However, the author points out that aesthetic judgments that have been ‘borrowed’ by aesthetic experts generate the same autonomy worry as moral judgments which are borrowed by moral experts. The author then explores various approaches to accepting the testimony of moral experts and concludes that the asymmetry may best be explained by (1) the conditions for moral expertise being more difficult to satisfy than those of aesthetic expertise and (2) the intuitive greater seriousness of accepting the moral judgments of others, since moral norms are generally viewed as more binding than aesthetic norms. Moral Judgment Moral Norm Aesthetic Judgment Moral Expertise Reasoning Expertise Enthalten in Philosophical studies Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1950 128(2006), 3 vom: Apr., Seite 619-644 (DE-627)129094803 (DE-600)7320-9 (DE-576)014430851 0031-8116 nnns volume:128 year:2006 number:3 month:04 pages:619-644 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7825-y lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS FID-LING SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_72 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4027 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4103 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 AR 128 2006 3 04 619-644 |
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10.1007/s11098-004-7825-y doi (DE-627)OLC2040357173 (DE-He213)s11098-004-7825-y-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 VZ 5,1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid LING DE-30 fid Driver, Julia verfasserin aut Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise 2006 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer 2006 Abstract We seem less likely to endorse moral expertise than reasoning expertise or aesthetic expertise. This seems puzzling given that moral norms are intuitively taken to be at least more objective than aesthetic norms. One possible diagnosis of the asymmetry is that moral judgments require autonomy of judgement in away that other judgments do not. However, the author points out that aesthetic judgments that have been ‘borrowed’ by aesthetic experts generate the same autonomy worry as moral judgments which are borrowed by moral experts. The author then explores various approaches to accepting the testimony of moral experts and concludes that the asymmetry may best be explained by (1) the conditions for moral expertise being more difficult to satisfy than those of aesthetic expertise and (2) the intuitive greater seriousness of accepting the moral judgments of others, since moral norms are generally viewed as more binding than aesthetic norms. Moral Judgment Moral Norm Aesthetic Judgment Moral Expertise Reasoning Expertise Enthalten in Philosophical studies Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1950 128(2006), 3 vom: Apr., Seite 619-644 (DE-627)129094803 (DE-600)7320-9 (DE-576)014430851 0031-8116 nnns volume:128 year:2006 number:3 month:04 pages:619-644 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7825-y lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS FID-LING SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_72 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4027 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4103 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 AR 128 2006 3 04 619-644 |
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10.1007/s11098-004-7825-y doi (DE-627)OLC2040357173 (DE-He213)s11098-004-7825-y-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 VZ 5,1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid LING DE-30 fid Driver, Julia verfasserin aut Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise 2006 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer 2006 Abstract We seem less likely to endorse moral expertise than reasoning expertise or aesthetic expertise. This seems puzzling given that moral norms are intuitively taken to be at least more objective than aesthetic norms. One possible diagnosis of the asymmetry is that moral judgments require autonomy of judgement in away that other judgments do not. However, the author points out that aesthetic judgments that have been ‘borrowed’ by aesthetic experts generate the same autonomy worry as moral judgments which are borrowed by moral experts. The author then explores various approaches to accepting the testimony of moral experts and concludes that the asymmetry may best be explained by (1) the conditions for moral expertise being more difficult to satisfy than those of aesthetic expertise and (2) the intuitive greater seriousness of accepting the moral judgments of others, since moral norms are generally viewed as more binding than aesthetic norms. Moral Judgment Moral Norm Aesthetic Judgment Moral Expertise Reasoning Expertise Enthalten in Philosophical studies Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1950 128(2006), 3 vom: Apr., Seite 619-644 (DE-627)129094803 (DE-600)7320-9 (DE-576)014430851 0031-8116 nnns volume:128 year:2006 number:3 month:04 pages:619-644 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7825-y lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS FID-LING SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_72 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4027 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4103 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 AR 128 2006 3 04 619-644 |
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Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise |
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Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise |
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autonomy and the asymmetry problem for moral expertise |
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Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise |
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Abstract We seem less likely to endorse moral expertise than reasoning expertise or aesthetic expertise. This seems puzzling given that moral norms are intuitively taken to be at least more objective than aesthetic norms. One possible diagnosis of the asymmetry is that moral judgments require autonomy of judgement in away that other judgments do not. However, the author points out that aesthetic judgments that have been ‘borrowed’ by aesthetic experts generate the same autonomy worry as moral judgments which are borrowed by moral experts. The author then explores various approaches to accepting the testimony of moral experts and concludes that the asymmetry may best be explained by (1) the conditions for moral expertise being more difficult to satisfy than those of aesthetic expertise and (2) the intuitive greater seriousness of accepting the moral judgments of others, since moral norms are generally viewed as more binding than aesthetic norms. © Springer 2006 |
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Abstract We seem less likely to endorse moral expertise than reasoning expertise or aesthetic expertise. This seems puzzling given that moral norms are intuitively taken to be at least more objective than aesthetic norms. One possible diagnosis of the asymmetry is that moral judgments require autonomy of judgement in away that other judgments do not. However, the author points out that aesthetic judgments that have been ‘borrowed’ by aesthetic experts generate the same autonomy worry as moral judgments which are borrowed by moral experts. The author then explores various approaches to accepting the testimony of moral experts and concludes that the asymmetry may best be explained by (1) the conditions for moral expertise being more difficult to satisfy than those of aesthetic expertise and (2) the intuitive greater seriousness of accepting the moral judgments of others, since moral norms are generally viewed as more binding than aesthetic norms. © Springer 2006 |
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Abstract We seem less likely to endorse moral expertise than reasoning expertise or aesthetic expertise. This seems puzzling given that moral norms are intuitively taken to be at least more objective than aesthetic norms. One possible diagnosis of the asymmetry is that moral judgments require autonomy of judgement in away that other judgments do not. However, the author points out that aesthetic judgments that have been ‘borrowed’ by aesthetic experts generate the same autonomy worry as moral judgments which are borrowed by moral experts. The author then explores various approaches to accepting the testimony of moral experts and concludes that the asymmetry may best be explained by (1) the conditions for moral expertise being more difficult to satisfy than those of aesthetic expertise and (2) the intuitive greater seriousness of accepting the moral judgments of others, since moral norms are generally viewed as more binding than aesthetic norms. © Springer 2006 |
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