Weight for Stephen Finlay
Abstract According to Stephen Finlay, ‘A ought to X’ means that X-ing is more conducive to contextually salient ends than relevant alternatives. This in turn is analysed in terms of probability. I show why this theory of ‘ought’ is hard to square with a theory of a reason’s weight which could explai...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Evers, Daan [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2011 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© The Author(s) 2011 |
|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Philosophical studies - Springer Netherlands, 1950, 163(2011), 3 vom: 18. Dez., Seite 737-749 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:163 ; year:2011 ; number:3 ; day:18 ; month:12 ; pages:737-749 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11098-011-9842-y |
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| 520 | |a Abstract According to Stephen Finlay, ‘A ought to X’ means that X-ing is more conducive to contextually salient ends than relevant alternatives. This in turn is analysed in terms of probability. I show why this theory of ‘ought’ is hard to square with a theory of a reason’s weight which could explain why ‘A ought to X’ logically entails that the balance of reasons favours that AX-es. I develop two theories of weight to illustrate my point. I first look at the prospects of a theory of weight based on expected utility theory. I then suggest a simpler theory. Although neither allows that ‘A ought to X’ logically entails that the balance of reasons favours that AX-es, this price may be accepted. For there remains a strong pragmatic relation between these claims. | ||
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Abstract According to Stephen Finlay, ‘A ought to X’ means that X-ing is more conducive to contextually salient ends than relevant alternatives. This in turn is analysed in terms of probability. I show why this theory of ‘ought’ is hard to square with a theory of a reason’s weight which could explain why ‘A ought to X’ logically entails that the balance of reasons favours that AX-es. I develop two theories of weight to illustrate my point. I first look at the prospects of a theory of weight based on expected utility theory. I then suggest a simpler theory. Although neither allows that ‘A ought to X’ logically entails that the balance of reasons favours that AX-es, this price may be accepted. For there remains a strong pragmatic relation between these claims. © The Author(s) 2011 |
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Abstract According to Stephen Finlay, ‘A ought to X’ means that X-ing is more conducive to contextually salient ends than relevant alternatives. This in turn is analysed in terms of probability. I show why this theory of ‘ought’ is hard to square with a theory of a reason’s weight which could explain why ‘A ought to X’ logically entails that the balance of reasons favours that AX-es. I develop two theories of weight to illustrate my point. I first look at the prospects of a theory of weight based on expected utility theory. I then suggest a simpler theory. Although neither allows that ‘A ought to X’ logically entails that the balance of reasons favours that AX-es, this price may be accepted. For there remains a strong pragmatic relation between these claims. © The Author(s) 2011 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract According to Stephen Finlay, ‘A ought to X’ means that X-ing is more conducive to contextually salient ends than relevant alternatives. This in turn is analysed in terms of probability. I show why this theory of ‘ought’ is hard to square with a theory of a reason’s weight which could explain why ‘A ought to X’ logically entails that the balance of reasons favours that AX-es. I develop two theories of weight to illustrate my point. I first look at the prospects of a theory of weight based on expected utility theory. I then suggest a simpler theory. Although neither allows that ‘A ought to X’ logically entails that the balance of reasons favours that AX-es, this price may be accepted. For there remains a strong pragmatic relation between these claims. © The Author(s) 2011 |
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