Simplicity as a criterion of theory choice in metaphysics
Abstract Metaphysicians frequently appeal to the idea that theoretical simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, in the sense that, all other things being equal, simpler metaphysical theories are more likely to be true. In this paper I defend the notion that theoretical simplicity is truth condu...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Brenner, Andrew [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2016 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Philosophical studies - Springer Netherlands, 1950, 174(2016), 11 vom: 19. Okt., Seite 2687-2707 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:174 ; year:2016 ; number:11 ; day:19 ; month:10 ; pages:2687-2707 |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11098-016-0805-1 |
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OLC2040376631 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract Metaphysicians frequently appeal to the idea that theoretical simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, in the sense that, all other things being equal, simpler metaphysical theories are more likely to be true. In this paper I defend the notion that theoretical simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, against several recent objections. I do not give any direct arguments for the thesis that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, since I am aware of no such arguments. I do argue, however, that there is no special problem with the notion that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics. More specifically, I argue that if you accept the idea that simplicity is truth conducive in science, then it would be objectionably arbitrary to reject the idea that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics. | ||
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Abstract Metaphysicians frequently appeal to the idea that theoretical simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, in the sense that, all other things being equal, simpler metaphysical theories are more likely to be true. In this paper I defend the notion that theoretical simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, against several recent objections. I do not give any direct arguments for the thesis that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, since I am aware of no such arguments. I do argue, however, that there is no special problem with the notion that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics. More specifically, I argue that if you accept the idea that simplicity is truth conducive in science, then it would be objectionably arbitrary to reject the idea that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics. © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016 |
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Abstract Metaphysicians frequently appeal to the idea that theoretical simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, in the sense that, all other things being equal, simpler metaphysical theories are more likely to be true. In this paper I defend the notion that theoretical simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, against several recent objections. I do not give any direct arguments for the thesis that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, since I am aware of no such arguments. I do argue, however, that there is no special problem with the notion that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics. More specifically, I argue that if you accept the idea that simplicity is truth conducive in science, then it would be objectionably arbitrary to reject the idea that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics. © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016 |
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Abstract Metaphysicians frequently appeal to the idea that theoretical simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, in the sense that, all other things being equal, simpler metaphysical theories are more likely to be true. In this paper I defend the notion that theoretical simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, against several recent objections. I do not give any direct arguments for the thesis that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, since I am aware of no such arguments. I do argue, however, that there is no special problem with the notion that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics. More specifically, I argue that if you accept the idea that simplicity is truth conducive in science, then it would be objectionably arbitrary to reject the idea that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics. © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016 |
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Simplicity as a criterion of theory choice in metaphysics |
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https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0805-1 |
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| doi_str |
10.1007/s11098-016-0805-1 |
| up_date |
2024-07-04T02:01:47.953Z |
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1803612070035324928 |
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In this paper I defend the notion that theoretical simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, against several recent objections. I do not give any direct arguments for the thesis that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, since I am aware of no such arguments. I do argue, however, that there is no special problem with the notion that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics. 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