The limits of non-standard contingency
Abstract Gideon Rosen has recently sketched an argument which aims to establish that the notion of metaphysical modality is systematically ambiguous. His argument contains a crucial sub-argument which has been used to argue for Metaphysical Contingentism, the view that some claims of fundamental met...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Michels, Robert [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2017 |
|---|
| Schlagwörter: |
|---|
| Anmerkung: |
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017 |
|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Philosophical studies - Springer Netherlands, 1950, 176(2017), 2 vom: 30. Dez., Seite 533-558 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:176 ; year:2017 ; number:2 ; day:30 ; month:12 ; pages:533-558 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11098-017-1027-x |
|---|
| Katalog-ID: |
OLC2040378677 |
|---|
| LEADER | 01000caa a22002652 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | OLC2040378677 | ||
| 003 | DE-627 | ||
| 005 | 20230504003408.0 | ||
| 007 | tu | ||
| 008 | 200819s2017 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1007/s11098-017-1027-x |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (DE-627)OLC2040378677 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-He213)s11098-017-1027-x-p | ||
| 040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | |a eng | ||
| 082 | 0 | 4 | |a 100 |q VZ |
| 084 | |a 5,1 |2 ssgn | ||
| 084 | |a PHILOS |q DE-12 |2 fid | ||
| 084 | |a LING |q DE-30 |2 fid | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Michels, Robert |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The limits of non-standard contingency |
| 264 | 1 | |c 2017 | |
| 336 | |a Text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a Band |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a © Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017 | ||
| 520 | |a Abstract Gideon Rosen has recently sketched an argument which aims to establish that the notion of metaphysical modality is systematically ambiguous. His argument contains a crucial sub-argument which has been used to argue for Metaphysical Contingentism, the view that some claims of fundamental metaphysics are metaphysically contingent rather than necessary. In this paper, Rosen’s argument is explicated in detail and it is argued that the most straight-forward reconstruction fails to support its intended conclusion. Two possible ways to save the argument are rebutted and it is furthermore argued that the crucial sub-argument only supports a rather particular variant of Metaphysical Contingentism. | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Metaphysical modality | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Metaphysical necessity | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Metaphysical contingency | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Ambiguity | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Correct conceivability | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Contingentism | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Metaphysical contingentism | |
| 773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t Philosophical studies |d Springer Netherlands, 1950 |g 176(2017), 2 vom: 30. Dez., Seite 533-558 |w (DE-627)129094803 |w (DE-600)7320-9 |w (DE-576)014430851 |x 0031-8116 |7 nnns |
| 773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:176 |g year:2017 |g number:2 |g day:30 |g month:12 |g pages:533-558 |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-1027-x |z lizenzpflichtig |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a GBV_USEFLAG_A | ||
| 912 | |a SYSFLAG_A | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_OLC | ||
| 912 | |a FID-PHILOS | ||
| 912 | |a FID-LING | ||
| 912 | |a SSG-OLC-PHI | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_11 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_22 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2007 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4012 | ||
| 951 | |a AR | ||
| 952 | |d 176 |j 2017 |e 2 |b 30 |c 12 |h 533-558 | ||
| author_variant |
r m rm |
|---|---|
| matchkey_str |
article:00318116:2017----::hlmtonntnado |
| hierarchy_sort_str |
2017 |
| publishDate |
2017 |
| allfields |
10.1007/s11098-017-1027-x doi (DE-627)OLC2040378677 (DE-He213)s11098-017-1027-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 VZ 5,1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid LING DE-30 fid Michels, Robert verfasserin aut The limits of non-standard contingency 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017 Abstract Gideon Rosen has recently sketched an argument which aims to establish that the notion of metaphysical modality is systematically ambiguous. His argument contains a crucial sub-argument which has been used to argue for Metaphysical Contingentism, the view that some claims of fundamental metaphysics are metaphysically contingent rather than necessary. In this paper, Rosen’s argument is explicated in detail and it is argued that the most straight-forward reconstruction fails to support its intended conclusion. Two possible ways to save the argument are rebutted and it is furthermore argued that the crucial sub-argument only supports a rather particular variant of Metaphysical Contingentism. Metaphysical modality Metaphysical necessity Metaphysical contingency Ambiguity Correct conceivability Contingentism Metaphysical contingentism Enthalten in Philosophical studies Springer Netherlands, 1950 176(2017), 2 vom: 30. Dez., Seite 533-558 (DE-627)129094803 (DE-600)7320-9 (DE-576)014430851 0031-8116 nnns volume:176 year:2017 number:2 day:30 month:12 pages:533-558 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-1027-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS FID-LING SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_4012 AR 176 2017 2 30 12 533-558 |
| spelling |
10.1007/s11098-017-1027-x doi (DE-627)OLC2040378677 (DE-He213)s11098-017-1027-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 VZ 5,1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid LING DE-30 fid Michels, Robert verfasserin aut The limits of non-standard contingency 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017 Abstract Gideon Rosen has recently sketched an argument which aims to establish that the notion of metaphysical modality is systematically ambiguous. His argument contains a crucial sub-argument which has been used to argue for Metaphysical Contingentism, the view that some claims of fundamental metaphysics are metaphysically contingent rather than necessary. In this paper, Rosen’s argument is explicated in detail and it is argued that the most straight-forward reconstruction fails to support its intended conclusion. Two possible ways to save the argument are rebutted and it is furthermore argued that the crucial sub-argument only supports a rather particular variant of Metaphysical Contingentism. Metaphysical modality Metaphysical necessity Metaphysical contingency Ambiguity Correct conceivability Contingentism Metaphysical contingentism Enthalten in Philosophical studies Springer Netherlands, 1950 176(2017), 2 vom: 30. Dez., Seite 533-558 (DE-627)129094803 (DE-600)7320-9 (DE-576)014430851 0031-8116 nnns volume:176 year:2017 number:2 day:30 month:12 pages:533-558 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-1027-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS FID-LING SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_4012 AR 176 2017 2 30 12 533-558 |
| allfields_unstemmed |
10.1007/s11098-017-1027-x doi (DE-627)OLC2040378677 (DE-He213)s11098-017-1027-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 VZ 5,1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid LING DE-30 fid Michels, Robert verfasserin aut The limits of non-standard contingency 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017 Abstract Gideon Rosen has recently sketched an argument which aims to establish that the notion of metaphysical modality is systematically ambiguous. His argument contains a crucial sub-argument which has been used to argue for Metaphysical Contingentism, the view that some claims of fundamental metaphysics are metaphysically contingent rather than necessary. In this paper, Rosen’s argument is explicated in detail and it is argued that the most straight-forward reconstruction fails to support its intended conclusion. Two possible ways to save the argument are rebutted and it is furthermore argued that the crucial sub-argument only supports a rather particular variant of Metaphysical Contingentism. Metaphysical modality Metaphysical necessity Metaphysical contingency Ambiguity Correct conceivability Contingentism Metaphysical contingentism Enthalten in Philosophical studies Springer Netherlands, 1950 176(2017), 2 vom: 30. Dez., Seite 533-558 (DE-627)129094803 (DE-600)7320-9 (DE-576)014430851 0031-8116 nnns volume:176 year:2017 number:2 day:30 month:12 pages:533-558 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-1027-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS FID-LING SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_4012 AR 176 2017 2 30 12 533-558 |
| allfieldsGer |
10.1007/s11098-017-1027-x doi (DE-627)OLC2040378677 (DE-He213)s11098-017-1027-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 VZ 5,1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid LING DE-30 fid Michels, Robert verfasserin aut The limits of non-standard contingency 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017 Abstract Gideon Rosen has recently sketched an argument which aims to establish that the notion of metaphysical modality is systematically ambiguous. His argument contains a crucial sub-argument which has been used to argue for Metaphysical Contingentism, the view that some claims of fundamental metaphysics are metaphysically contingent rather than necessary. In this paper, Rosen’s argument is explicated in detail and it is argued that the most straight-forward reconstruction fails to support its intended conclusion. Two possible ways to save the argument are rebutted and it is furthermore argued that the crucial sub-argument only supports a rather particular variant of Metaphysical Contingentism. Metaphysical modality Metaphysical necessity Metaphysical contingency Ambiguity Correct conceivability Contingentism Metaphysical contingentism Enthalten in Philosophical studies Springer Netherlands, 1950 176(2017), 2 vom: 30. Dez., Seite 533-558 (DE-627)129094803 (DE-600)7320-9 (DE-576)014430851 0031-8116 nnns volume:176 year:2017 number:2 day:30 month:12 pages:533-558 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-1027-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS FID-LING SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_4012 AR 176 2017 2 30 12 533-558 |
| allfieldsSound |
10.1007/s11098-017-1027-x doi (DE-627)OLC2040378677 (DE-He213)s11098-017-1027-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 VZ 5,1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid LING DE-30 fid Michels, Robert verfasserin aut The limits of non-standard contingency 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017 Abstract Gideon Rosen has recently sketched an argument which aims to establish that the notion of metaphysical modality is systematically ambiguous. His argument contains a crucial sub-argument which has been used to argue for Metaphysical Contingentism, the view that some claims of fundamental metaphysics are metaphysically contingent rather than necessary. In this paper, Rosen’s argument is explicated in detail and it is argued that the most straight-forward reconstruction fails to support its intended conclusion. Two possible ways to save the argument are rebutted and it is furthermore argued that the crucial sub-argument only supports a rather particular variant of Metaphysical Contingentism. Metaphysical modality Metaphysical necessity Metaphysical contingency Ambiguity Correct conceivability Contingentism Metaphysical contingentism Enthalten in Philosophical studies Springer Netherlands, 1950 176(2017), 2 vom: 30. Dez., Seite 533-558 (DE-627)129094803 (DE-600)7320-9 (DE-576)014430851 0031-8116 nnns volume:176 year:2017 number:2 day:30 month:12 pages:533-558 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-1027-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS FID-LING SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_4012 AR 176 2017 2 30 12 533-558 |
| language |
English |
| source |
Enthalten in Philosophical studies 176(2017), 2 vom: 30. Dez., Seite 533-558 volume:176 year:2017 number:2 day:30 month:12 pages:533-558 |
| sourceStr |
Enthalten in Philosophical studies 176(2017), 2 vom: 30. Dez., Seite 533-558 volume:176 year:2017 number:2 day:30 month:12 pages:533-558 |
| format_phy_str_mv |
Article |
| institution |
findex.gbv.de |
| topic_facet |
Metaphysical modality Metaphysical necessity Metaphysical contingency Ambiguity Correct conceivability Contingentism Metaphysical contingentism |
| dewey-raw |
100 |
| isfreeaccess_bool |
false |
| container_title |
Philosophical studies |
| authorswithroles_txt_mv |
Michels, Robert @@aut@@ |
| publishDateDaySort_date |
2017-12-30T00:00:00Z |
| hierarchy_top_id |
129094803 |
| dewey-sort |
3100 |
| id |
OLC2040378677 |
| language_de |
englisch |
| fullrecord |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC2040378677</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230504003408.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">200819s2017 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s11098-017-1027-x</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC2040378677</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-He213)s11098-017-1027-x-p</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">100</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">5,1</subfield><subfield code="2">ssgn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">PHILOS</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="2">fid</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">LING</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-30</subfield><subfield code="2">fid</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Michels, Robert</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">The limits of non-standard contingency</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2017</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract Gideon Rosen has recently sketched an argument which aims to establish that the notion of metaphysical modality is systematically ambiguous. His argument contains a crucial sub-argument which has been used to argue for Metaphysical Contingentism, the view that some claims of fundamental metaphysics are metaphysically contingent rather than necessary. In this paper, Rosen’s argument is explicated in detail and it is argued that the most straight-forward reconstruction fails to support its intended conclusion. Two possible ways to save the argument are rebutted and it is furthermore argued that the crucial sub-argument only supports a rather particular variant of Metaphysical Contingentism.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Metaphysical modality</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Metaphysical necessity</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Metaphysical contingency</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Ambiguity</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Correct conceivability</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Contingentism</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Metaphysical contingentism</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Philosophical studies</subfield><subfield code="d">Springer Netherlands, 1950</subfield><subfield code="g">176(2017), 2 vom: 30. Dez., Seite 533-558</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)129094803</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)7320-9</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)014430851</subfield><subfield code="x">0031-8116</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:176</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2017</subfield><subfield code="g">number:2</subfield><subfield code="g">day:30</subfield><subfield code="g">month:12</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:533-558</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-1027-x</subfield><subfield code="z">lizenzpflichtig</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_OLC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">FID-PHILOS</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">FID-LING</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-PHI</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_11</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">176</subfield><subfield code="j">2017</subfield><subfield code="e">2</subfield><subfield code="b">30</subfield><subfield code="c">12</subfield><subfield code="h">533-558</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| author |
Michels, Robert |
| spellingShingle |
Michels, Robert ddc 100 ssgn 5,1 fid PHILOS fid LING misc Metaphysical modality misc Metaphysical necessity misc Metaphysical contingency misc Ambiguity misc Correct conceivability misc Contingentism misc Metaphysical contingentism The limits of non-standard contingency |
| authorStr |
Michels, Robert |
| ppnlink_with_tag_str_mv |
@@773@@(DE-627)129094803 |
| format |
Article |
| dewey-ones |
100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| delete_txt_mv |
keep |
| author_role |
aut |
| collection |
OLC |
| remote_str |
false |
| illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
| issn |
0031-8116 |
| topic_title |
100 VZ 5,1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid LING DE-30 fid The limits of non-standard contingency Metaphysical modality Metaphysical necessity Metaphysical contingency Ambiguity Correct conceivability Contingentism Metaphysical contingentism |
| topic |
ddc 100 ssgn 5,1 fid PHILOS fid LING misc Metaphysical modality misc Metaphysical necessity misc Metaphysical contingency misc Ambiguity misc Correct conceivability misc Contingentism misc Metaphysical contingentism |
| topic_unstemmed |
ddc 100 ssgn 5,1 fid PHILOS fid LING misc Metaphysical modality misc Metaphysical necessity misc Metaphysical contingency misc Ambiguity misc Correct conceivability misc Contingentism misc Metaphysical contingentism |
| topic_browse |
ddc 100 ssgn 5,1 fid PHILOS fid LING misc Metaphysical modality misc Metaphysical necessity misc Metaphysical contingency misc Ambiguity misc Correct conceivability misc Contingentism misc Metaphysical contingentism |
| format_facet |
Aufsätze Gedruckte Aufsätze |
| format_main_str_mv |
Text Zeitschrift/Artikel |
| carriertype_str_mv |
nc |
| hierarchy_parent_title |
Philosophical studies |
| hierarchy_parent_id |
129094803 |
| dewey-tens |
100 - Philosophy |
| hierarchy_top_title |
Philosophical studies |
| isfreeaccess_txt |
false |
| familylinks_str_mv |
(DE-627)129094803 (DE-600)7320-9 (DE-576)014430851 |
| title |
The limits of non-standard contingency |
| ctrlnum |
(DE-627)OLC2040378677 (DE-He213)s11098-017-1027-x-p |
| title_full |
The limits of non-standard contingency |
| author_sort |
Michels, Robert |
| journal |
Philosophical studies |
| journalStr |
Philosophical studies |
| lang_code |
eng |
| isOA_bool |
false |
| dewey-hundreds |
100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| recordtype |
marc |
| publishDateSort |
2017 |
| contenttype_str_mv |
txt |
| container_start_page |
533 |
| author_browse |
Michels, Robert |
| container_volume |
176 |
| class |
100 VZ 5,1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid LING DE-30 fid |
| format_se |
Aufsätze |
| author-letter |
Michels, Robert |
| doi_str_mv |
10.1007/s11098-017-1027-x |
| dewey-full |
100 |
| title_sort |
the limits of non-standard contingency |
| title_auth |
The limits of non-standard contingency |
| abstract |
Abstract Gideon Rosen has recently sketched an argument which aims to establish that the notion of metaphysical modality is systematically ambiguous. His argument contains a crucial sub-argument which has been used to argue for Metaphysical Contingentism, the view that some claims of fundamental metaphysics are metaphysically contingent rather than necessary. In this paper, Rosen’s argument is explicated in detail and it is argued that the most straight-forward reconstruction fails to support its intended conclusion. Two possible ways to save the argument are rebutted and it is furthermore argued that the crucial sub-argument only supports a rather particular variant of Metaphysical Contingentism. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017 |
| abstractGer |
Abstract Gideon Rosen has recently sketched an argument which aims to establish that the notion of metaphysical modality is systematically ambiguous. His argument contains a crucial sub-argument which has been used to argue for Metaphysical Contingentism, the view that some claims of fundamental metaphysics are metaphysically contingent rather than necessary. In this paper, Rosen’s argument is explicated in detail and it is argued that the most straight-forward reconstruction fails to support its intended conclusion. Two possible ways to save the argument are rebutted and it is furthermore argued that the crucial sub-argument only supports a rather particular variant of Metaphysical Contingentism. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract Gideon Rosen has recently sketched an argument which aims to establish that the notion of metaphysical modality is systematically ambiguous. His argument contains a crucial sub-argument which has been used to argue for Metaphysical Contingentism, the view that some claims of fundamental metaphysics are metaphysically contingent rather than necessary. In this paper, Rosen’s argument is explicated in detail and it is argued that the most straight-forward reconstruction fails to support its intended conclusion. Two possible ways to save the argument are rebutted and it is furthermore argued that the crucial sub-argument only supports a rather particular variant of Metaphysical Contingentism. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017 |
| collection_details |
GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS FID-LING SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_4012 |
| container_issue |
2 |
| title_short |
The limits of non-standard contingency |
| url |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-1027-x |
| remote_bool |
false |
| ppnlink |
129094803 |
| mediatype_str_mv |
n |
| isOA_txt |
false |
| hochschulschrift_bool |
false |
| doi_str |
10.1007/s11098-017-1027-x |
| up_date |
2024-07-04T02:02:05.576Z |
| _version_ |
1803612088514379776 |
| fullrecord_marcxml |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC2040378677</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230504003408.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">200819s2017 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s11098-017-1027-x</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC2040378677</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-He213)s11098-017-1027-x-p</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">100</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">5,1</subfield><subfield code="2">ssgn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">PHILOS</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="2">fid</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">LING</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-30</subfield><subfield code="2">fid</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Michels, Robert</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">The limits of non-standard contingency</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2017</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract Gideon Rosen has recently sketched an argument which aims to establish that the notion of metaphysical modality is systematically ambiguous. His argument contains a crucial sub-argument which has been used to argue for Metaphysical Contingentism, the view that some claims of fundamental metaphysics are metaphysically contingent rather than necessary. In this paper, Rosen’s argument is explicated in detail and it is argued that the most straight-forward reconstruction fails to support its intended conclusion. Two possible ways to save the argument are rebutted and it is furthermore argued that the crucial sub-argument only supports a rather particular variant of Metaphysical Contingentism.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Metaphysical modality</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Metaphysical necessity</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Metaphysical contingency</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Ambiguity</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Correct conceivability</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Contingentism</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Metaphysical contingentism</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Philosophical studies</subfield><subfield code="d">Springer Netherlands, 1950</subfield><subfield code="g">176(2017), 2 vom: 30. Dez., Seite 533-558</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)129094803</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)7320-9</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)014430851</subfield><subfield code="x">0031-8116</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:176</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2017</subfield><subfield code="g">number:2</subfield><subfield code="g">day:30</subfield><subfield code="g">month:12</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:533-558</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-1027-x</subfield><subfield code="z">lizenzpflichtig</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_OLC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">FID-PHILOS</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">FID-LING</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-PHI</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_11</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">176</subfield><subfield code="j">2017</subfield><subfield code="e">2</subfield><subfield code="b">30</subfield><subfield code="c">12</subfield><subfield code="h">533-558</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| score |
7.40018 |