Energy allocation and payment: a game-theoretic approach
Abstract Nowadays, energy represents the most important resource; however, we need to face several energy-related rising issues, one main concern is how energy is consumed. In particular, how we can stimulate consumers on a specific behaviour. In this work, we present a model facing energy allocatio...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Giuliodori, Paolo [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2020 |
|---|
| Schlagwörter: |
|---|
| Anmerkung: |
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 |
|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Annals of mathematics and artificial intelligence - Springer International Publishing, 1990, 88(2020), 7 vom: 18. Feb., Seite 793-816 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:88 ; year:2020 ; number:7 ; day:18 ; month:02 ; pages:793-816 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s10472-019-09685-z |
|---|
| Katalog-ID: |
OLC2041508752 |
|---|
| LEADER | 01000caa a22002652 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | OLC2041508752 | ||
| 003 | DE-627 | ||
| 005 | 20230504154939.0 | ||
| 007 | tu | ||
| 008 | 200819s2020 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1007/s10472-019-09685-z |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (DE-627)OLC2041508752 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-He213)s10472-019-09685-z-p | ||
| 040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | |a eng | ||
| 082 | 0 | 4 | |a 510 |a 004 |q VZ |
| 084 | |a 17,1 |2 ssgn | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Giuliodori, Paolo |e verfasserin |0 (orcid)0000-0003-0513-5273 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Energy allocation and payment: a game-theoretic approach |
| 264 | 1 | |c 2020 | |
| 336 | |a Text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a Band |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 | ||
| 520 | |a Abstract Nowadays, energy represents the most important resource; however, we need to face several energy-related rising issues, one main concern is how energy is consumed. In particular, how we can stimulate consumers on a specific behaviour. In this work, we present a model facing energy allocation and payment. Thus, we start with the explanation of the first step of our work concerning a mechanism design approach for energy allocation among consumers. More in details, we go deep into the formal description of the energy model and users’ consumption profiles. We aim to select the optimal consumption profile for every user avoiding consumption peaks when the total required energy could exceed the energy production. The mechanism will be able to drive users in shifting energy consumptions in different hours of the day. The next step concerns a payment estimation problem which involves a community of users and an energy distributor (or producer). Our aim is to compute payments for every user in the community according to the single user’s consumption, the community’s consumption and the available energy. By computing community-dependent energy bills, our model stimulates a users’ virtuous behaviour, so that everyone approaches the production threshold as close as possible. Our payment function distributes incentives if the consumption is lower than the produced energy and penalties when the consumption exceeds the resources threshold, satisfying efficiency and fairness properties both from the community (efficiency as an economic equilibrium among sellers and buyers) and the single user (fairness as an economic measure of energy good-behaving) points of view. | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Mechanism design | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Cooperation game theory | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Bistarelli, Stefano |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Mugnai, Dimitri |4 aut | |
| 773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t Annals of mathematics and artificial intelligence |d Springer International Publishing, 1990 |g 88(2020), 7 vom: 18. Feb., Seite 793-816 |w (DE-627)130904104 |w (DE-600)1045926-1 |w (DE-576)02499622X |x 1012-2443 |7 nnns |
| 773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:88 |g year:2020 |g number:7 |g day:18 |g month:02 |g pages:793-816 |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-019-09685-z |z lizenzpflichtig |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a GBV_USEFLAG_A | ||
| 912 | |a SYSFLAG_A | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_OLC | ||
| 912 | |a SSG-OLC-MAT | ||
| 912 | |a SSG-OPC-MAT | ||
| 951 | |a AR | ||
| 952 | |d 88 |j 2020 |e 7 |b 18 |c 02 |h 793-816 | ||
| author_variant |
p g pg s b sb d m dm |
|---|---|
| matchkey_str |
article:10122443:2020----::nryloainnpyetgmter |
| hierarchy_sort_str |
2020 |
| publishDate |
2020 |
| allfields |
10.1007/s10472-019-09685-z doi (DE-627)OLC2041508752 (DE-He213)s10472-019-09685-z-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 510 004 VZ 17,1 ssgn Giuliodori, Paolo verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-0513-5273 aut Energy allocation and payment: a game-theoretic approach 2020 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 Abstract Nowadays, energy represents the most important resource; however, we need to face several energy-related rising issues, one main concern is how energy is consumed. In particular, how we can stimulate consumers on a specific behaviour. In this work, we present a model facing energy allocation and payment. Thus, we start with the explanation of the first step of our work concerning a mechanism design approach for energy allocation among consumers. More in details, we go deep into the formal description of the energy model and users’ consumption profiles. We aim to select the optimal consumption profile for every user avoiding consumption peaks when the total required energy could exceed the energy production. The mechanism will be able to drive users in shifting energy consumptions in different hours of the day. The next step concerns a payment estimation problem which involves a community of users and an energy distributor (or producer). Our aim is to compute payments for every user in the community according to the single user’s consumption, the community’s consumption and the available energy. By computing community-dependent energy bills, our model stimulates a users’ virtuous behaviour, so that everyone approaches the production threshold as close as possible. Our payment function distributes incentives if the consumption is lower than the produced energy and penalties when the consumption exceeds the resources threshold, satisfying efficiency and fairness properties both from the community (efficiency as an economic equilibrium among sellers and buyers) and the single user (fairness as an economic measure of energy good-behaving) points of view. Mechanism design Cooperation game theory Bistarelli, Stefano aut Mugnai, Dimitri aut Enthalten in Annals of mathematics and artificial intelligence Springer International Publishing, 1990 88(2020), 7 vom: 18. Feb., Seite 793-816 (DE-627)130904104 (DE-600)1045926-1 (DE-576)02499622X 1012-2443 nnns volume:88 year:2020 number:7 day:18 month:02 pages:793-816 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-019-09685-z lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OPC-MAT AR 88 2020 7 18 02 793-816 |
| spelling |
10.1007/s10472-019-09685-z doi (DE-627)OLC2041508752 (DE-He213)s10472-019-09685-z-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 510 004 VZ 17,1 ssgn Giuliodori, Paolo verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-0513-5273 aut Energy allocation and payment: a game-theoretic approach 2020 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 Abstract Nowadays, energy represents the most important resource; however, we need to face several energy-related rising issues, one main concern is how energy is consumed. In particular, how we can stimulate consumers on a specific behaviour. In this work, we present a model facing energy allocation and payment. Thus, we start with the explanation of the first step of our work concerning a mechanism design approach for energy allocation among consumers. More in details, we go deep into the formal description of the energy model and users’ consumption profiles. We aim to select the optimal consumption profile for every user avoiding consumption peaks when the total required energy could exceed the energy production. The mechanism will be able to drive users in shifting energy consumptions in different hours of the day. The next step concerns a payment estimation problem which involves a community of users and an energy distributor (or producer). Our aim is to compute payments for every user in the community according to the single user’s consumption, the community’s consumption and the available energy. By computing community-dependent energy bills, our model stimulates a users’ virtuous behaviour, so that everyone approaches the production threshold as close as possible. Our payment function distributes incentives if the consumption is lower than the produced energy and penalties when the consumption exceeds the resources threshold, satisfying efficiency and fairness properties both from the community (efficiency as an economic equilibrium among sellers and buyers) and the single user (fairness as an economic measure of energy good-behaving) points of view. Mechanism design Cooperation game theory Bistarelli, Stefano aut Mugnai, Dimitri aut Enthalten in Annals of mathematics and artificial intelligence Springer International Publishing, 1990 88(2020), 7 vom: 18. Feb., Seite 793-816 (DE-627)130904104 (DE-600)1045926-1 (DE-576)02499622X 1012-2443 nnns volume:88 year:2020 number:7 day:18 month:02 pages:793-816 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-019-09685-z lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OPC-MAT AR 88 2020 7 18 02 793-816 |
| allfields_unstemmed |
10.1007/s10472-019-09685-z doi (DE-627)OLC2041508752 (DE-He213)s10472-019-09685-z-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 510 004 VZ 17,1 ssgn Giuliodori, Paolo verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-0513-5273 aut Energy allocation and payment: a game-theoretic approach 2020 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 Abstract Nowadays, energy represents the most important resource; however, we need to face several energy-related rising issues, one main concern is how energy is consumed. In particular, how we can stimulate consumers on a specific behaviour. In this work, we present a model facing energy allocation and payment. Thus, we start with the explanation of the first step of our work concerning a mechanism design approach for energy allocation among consumers. More in details, we go deep into the formal description of the energy model and users’ consumption profiles. We aim to select the optimal consumption profile for every user avoiding consumption peaks when the total required energy could exceed the energy production. The mechanism will be able to drive users in shifting energy consumptions in different hours of the day. The next step concerns a payment estimation problem which involves a community of users and an energy distributor (or producer). Our aim is to compute payments for every user in the community according to the single user’s consumption, the community’s consumption and the available energy. By computing community-dependent energy bills, our model stimulates a users’ virtuous behaviour, so that everyone approaches the production threshold as close as possible. Our payment function distributes incentives if the consumption is lower than the produced energy and penalties when the consumption exceeds the resources threshold, satisfying efficiency and fairness properties both from the community (efficiency as an economic equilibrium among sellers and buyers) and the single user (fairness as an economic measure of energy good-behaving) points of view. Mechanism design Cooperation game theory Bistarelli, Stefano aut Mugnai, Dimitri aut Enthalten in Annals of mathematics and artificial intelligence Springer International Publishing, 1990 88(2020), 7 vom: 18. Feb., Seite 793-816 (DE-627)130904104 (DE-600)1045926-1 (DE-576)02499622X 1012-2443 nnns volume:88 year:2020 number:7 day:18 month:02 pages:793-816 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-019-09685-z lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OPC-MAT AR 88 2020 7 18 02 793-816 |
| allfieldsGer |
10.1007/s10472-019-09685-z doi (DE-627)OLC2041508752 (DE-He213)s10472-019-09685-z-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 510 004 VZ 17,1 ssgn Giuliodori, Paolo verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-0513-5273 aut Energy allocation and payment: a game-theoretic approach 2020 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 Abstract Nowadays, energy represents the most important resource; however, we need to face several energy-related rising issues, one main concern is how energy is consumed. In particular, how we can stimulate consumers on a specific behaviour. In this work, we present a model facing energy allocation and payment. Thus, we start with the explanation of the first step of our work concerning a mechanism design approach for energy allocation among consumers. More in details, we go deep into the formal description of the energy model and users’ consumption profiles. We aim to select the optimal consumption profile for every user avoiding consumption peaks when the total required energy could exceed the energy production. The mechanism will be able to drive users in shifting energy consumptions in different hours of the day. The next step concerns a payment estimation problem which involves a community of users and an energy distributor (or producer). Our aim is to compute payments for every user in the community according to the single user’s consumption, the community’s consumption and the available energy. By computing community-dependent energy bills, our model stimulates a users’ virtuous behaviour, so that everyone approaches the production threshold as close as possible. Our payment function distributes incentives if the consumption is lower than the produced energy and penalties when the consumption exceeds the resources threshold, satisfying efficiency and fairness properties both from the community (efficiency as an economic equilibrium among sellers and buyers) and the single user (fairness as an economic measure of energy good-behaving) points of view. Mechanism design Cooperation game theory Bistarelli, Stefano aut Mugnai, Dimitri aut Enthalten in Annals of mathematics and artificial intelligence Springer International Publishing, 1990 88(2020), 7 vom: 18. Feb., Seite 793-816 (DE-627)130904104 (DE-600)1045926-1 (DE-576)02499622X 1012-2443 nnns volume:88 year:2020 number:7 day:18 month:02 pages:793-816 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-019-09685-z lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OPC-MAT AR 88 2020 7 18 02 793-816 |
| allfieldsSound |
10.1007/s10472-019-09685-z doi (DE-627)OLC2041508752 (DE-He213)s10472-019-09685-z-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 510 004 VZ 17,1 ssgn Giuliodori, Paolo verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-0513-5273 aut Energy allocation and payment: a game-theoretic approach 2020 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 Abstract Nowadays, energy represents the most important resource; however, we need to face several energy-related rising issues, one main concern is how energy is consumed. In particular, how we can stimulate consumers on a specific behaviour. In this work, we present a model facing energy allocation and payment. Thus, we start with the explanation of the first step of our work concerning a mechanism design approach for energy allocation among consumers. More in details, we go deep into the formal description of the energy model and users’ consumption profiles. We aim to select the optimal consumption profile for every user avoiding consumption peaks when the total required energy could exceed the energy production. The mechanism will be able to drive users in shifting energy consumptions in different hours of the day. The next step concerns a payment estimation problem which involves a community of users and an energy distributor (or producer). Our aim is to compute payments for every user in the community according to the single user’s consumption, the community’s consumption and the available energy. By computing community-dependent energy bills, our model stimulates a users’ virtuous behaviour, so that everyone approaches the production threshold as close as possible. Our payment function distributes incentives if the consumption is lower than the produced energy and penalties when the consumption exceeds the resources threshold, satisfying efficiency and fairness properties both from the community (efficiency as an economic equilibrium among sellers and buyers) and the single user (fairness as an economic measure of energy good-behaving) points of view. Mechanism design Cooperation game theory Bistarelli, Stefano aut Mugnai, Dimitri aut Enthalten in Annals of mathematics and artificial intelligence Springer International Publishing, 1990 88(2020), 7 vom: 18. Feb., Seite 793-816 (DE-627)130904104 (DE-600)1045926-1 (DE-576)02499622X 1012-2443 nnns volume:88 year:2020 number:7 day:18 month:02 pages:793-816 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-019-09685-z lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OPC-MAT AR 88 2020 7 18 02 793-816 |
| language |
English |
| source |
Enthalten in Annals of mathematics and artificial intelligence 88(2020), 7 vom: 18. Feb., Seite 793-816 volume:88 year:2020 number:7 day:18 month:02 pages:793-816 |
| sourceStr |
Enthalten in Annals of mathematics and artificial intelligence 88(2020), 7 vom: 18. Feb., Seite 793-816 volume:88 year:2020 number:7 day:18 month:02 pages:793-816 |
| format_phy_str_mv |
Article |
| institution |
findex.gbv.de |
| topic_facet |
Mechanism design Cooperation game theory |
| dewey-raw |
510 |
| isfreeaccess_bool |
false |
| container_title |
Annals of mathematics and artificial intelligence |
| authorswithroles_txt_mv |
Giuliodori, Paolo @@aut@@ Bistarelli, Stefano @@aut@@ Mugnai, Dimitri @@aut@@ |
| publishDateDaySort_date |
2020-02-18T00:00:00Z |
| hierarchy_top_id |
130904104 |
| dewey-sort |
3510 |
| id |
OLC2041508752 |
| language_de |
englisch |
| fullrecord |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC2041508752</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230504154939.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">200819s2020 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s10472-019-09685-z</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC2041508752</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-He213)s10472-019-09685-z-p</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">510</subfield><subfield code="a">004</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">17,1</subfield><subfield code="2">ssgn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Giuliodori, Paolo</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="0">(orcid)0000-0003-0513-5273</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Energy allocation and payment: a game-theoretic approach</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2020</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract Nowadays, energy represents the most important resource; however, we need to face several energy-related rising issues, one main concern is how energy is consumed. In particular, how we can stimulate consumers on a specific behaviour. In this work, we present a model facing energy allocation and payment. Thus, we start with the explanation of the first step of our work concerning a mechanism design approach for energy allocation among consumers. More in details, we go deep into the formal description of the energy model and users’ consumption profiles. We aim to select the optimal consumption profile for every user avoiding consumption peaks when the total required energy could exceed the energy production. The mechanism will be able to drive users in shifting energy consumptions in different hours of the day. The next step concerns a payment estimation problem which involves a community of users and an energy distributor (or producer). Our aim is to compute payments for every user in the community according to the single user’s consumption, the community’s consumption and the available energy. By computing community-dependent energy bills, our model stimulates a users’ virtuous behaviour, so that everyone approaches the production threshold as close as possible. Our payment function distributes incentives if the consumption is lower than the produced energy and penalties when the consumption exceeds the resources threshold, satisfying efficiency and fairness properties both from the community (efficiency as an economic equilibrium among sellers and buyers) and the single user (fairness as an economic measure of energy good-behaving) points of view.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Mechanism design</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Cooperation game theory</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Bistarelli, Stefano</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Mugnai, Dimitri</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Annals of mathematics and artificial intelligence</subfield><subfield code="d">Springer International Publishing, 1990</subfield><subfield code="g">88(2020), 7 vom: 18. Feb., Seite 793-816</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)130904104</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)1045926-1</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)02499622X</subfield><subfield code="x">1012-2443</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:88</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2020</subfield><subfield code="g">number:7</subfield><subfield code="g">day:18</subfield><subfield code="g">month:02</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:793-816</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-019-09685-z</subfield><subfield code="z">lizenzpflichtig</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_OLC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-MAT</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OPC-MAT</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">88</subfield><subfield code="j">2020</subfield><subfield code="e">7</subfield><subfield code="b">18</subfield><subfield code="c">02</subfield><subfield code="h">793-816</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| author |
Giuliodori, Paolo |
| spellingShingle |
Giuliodori, Paolo ddc 510 ssgn 17,1 misc Mechanism design misc Cooperation game theory Energy allocation and payment: a game-theoretic approach |
| authorStr |
Giuliodori, Paolo |
| ppnlink_with_tag_str_mv |
@@773@@(DE-627)130904104 |
| format |
Article |
| dewey-ones |
510 - Mathematics 004 - Data processing & computer science |
| delete_txt_mv |
keep |
| author_role |
aut aut aut |
| collection |
OLC |
| remote_str |
false |
| illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
| issn |
1012-2443 |
| topic_title |
510 004 VZ 17,1 ssgn Energy allocation and payment: a game-theoretic approach Mechanism design Cooperation game theory |
| topic |
ddc 510 ssgn 17,1 misc Mechanism design misc Cooperation game theory |
| topic_unstemmed |
ddc 510 ssgn 17,1 misc Mechanism design misc Cooperation game theory |
| topic_browse |
ddc 510 ssgn 17,1 misc Mechanism design misc Cooperation game theory |
| format_facet |
Aufsätze Gedruckte Aufsätze |
| format_main_str_mv |
Text Zeitschrift/Artikel |
| carriertype_str_mv |
nc |
| hierarchy_parent_title |
Annals of mathematics and artificial intelligence |
| hierarchy_parent_id |
130904104 |
| dewey-tens |
510 - Mathematics 000 - Computer science, knowledge & systems |
| hierarchy_top_title |
Annals of mathematics and artificial intelligence |
| isfreeaccess_txt |
false |
| familylinks_str_mv |
(DE-627)130904104 (DE-600)1045926-1 (DE-576)02499622X |
| title |
Energy allocation and payment: a game-theoretic approach |
| ctrlnum |
(DE-627)OLC2041508752 (DE-He213)s10472-019-09685-z-p |
| title_full |
Energy allocation and payment: a game-theoretic approach |
| author_sort |
Giuliodori, Paolo |
| journal |
Annals of mathematics and artificial intelligence |
| journalStr |
Annals of mathematics and artificial intelligence |
| lang_code |
eng |
| isOA_bool |
false |
| dewey-hundreds |
500 - Science 000 - Computer science, information & general works |
| recordtype |
marc |
| publishDateSort |
2020 |
| contenttype_str_mv |
txt |
| container_start_page |
793 |
| author_browse |
Giuliodori, Paolo Bistarelli, Stefano Mugnai, Dimitri |
| container_volume |
88 |
| class |
510 004 VZ 17,1 ssgn |
| format_se |
Aufsätze |
| author-letter |
Giuliodori, Paolo |
| doi_str_mv |
10.1007/s10472-019-09685-z |
| normlink |
(ORCID)0000-0003-0513-5273 |
| normlink_prefix_str_mv |
(orcid)0000-0003-0513-5273 |
| dewey-full |
510 004 |
| title_sort |
energy allocation and payment: a game-theoretic approach |
| title_auth |
Energy allocation and payment: a game-theoretic approach |
| abstract |
Abstract Nowadays, energy represents the most important resource; however, we need to face several energy-related rising issues, one main concern is how energy is consumed. In particular, how we can stimulate consumers on a specific behaviour. In this work, we present a model facing energy allocation and payment. Thus, we start with the explanation of the first step of our work concerning a mechanism design approach for energy allocation among consumers. More in details, we go deep into the formal description of the energy model and users’ consumption profiles. We aim to select the optimal consumption profile for every user avoiding consumption peaks when the total required energy could exceed the energy production. The mechanism will be able to drive users in shifting energy consumptions in different hours of the day. The next step concerns a payment estimation problem which involves a community of users and an energy distributor (or producer). Our aim is to compute payments for every user in the community according to the single user’s consumption, the community’s consumption and the available energy. By computing community-dependent energy bills, our model stimulates a users’ virtuous behaviour, so that everyone approaches the production threshold as close as possible. Our payment function distributes incentives if the consumption is lower than the produced energy and penalties when the consumption exceeds the resources threshold, satisfying efficiency and fairness properties both from the community (efficiency as an economic equilibrium among sellers and buyers) and the single user (fairness as an economic measure of energy good-behaving) points of view. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 |
| abstractGer |
Abstract Nowadays, energy represents the most important resource; however, we need to face several energy-related rising issues, one main concern is how energy is consumed. In particular, how we can stimulate consumers on a specific behaviour. In this work, we present a model facing energy allocation and payment. Thus, we start with the explanation of the first step of our work concerning a mechanism design approach for energy allocation among consumers. More in details, we go deep into the formal description of the energy model and users’ consumption profiles. We aim to select the optimal consumption profile for every user avoiding consumption peaks when the total required energy could exceed the energy production. The mechanism will be able to drive users in shifting energy consumptions in different hours of the day. The next step concerns a payment estimation problem which involves a community of users and an energy distributor (or producer). Our aim is to compute payments for every user in the community according to the single user’s consumption, the community’s consumption and the available energy. By computing community-dependent energy bills, our model stimulates a users’ virtuous behaviour, so that everyone approaches the production threshold as close as possible. Our payment function distributes incentives if the consumption is lower than the produced energy and penalties when the consumption exceeds the resources threshold, satisfying efficiency and fairness properties both from the community (efficiency as an economic equilibrium among sellers and buyers) and the single user (fairness as an economic measure of energy good-behaving) points of view. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract Nowadays, energy represents the most important resource; however, we need to face several energy-related rising issues, one main concern is how energy is consumed. In particular, how we can stimulate consumers on a specific behaviour. In this work, we present a model facing energy allocation and payment. Thus, we start with the explanation of the first step of our work concerning a mechanism design approach for energy allocation among consumers. More in details, we go deep into the formal description of the energy model and users’ consumption profiles. We aim to select the optimal consumption profile for every user avoiding consumption peaks when the total required energy could exceed the energy production. The mechanism will be able to drive users in shifting energy consumptions in different hours of the day. The next step concerns a payment estimation problem which involves a community of users and an energy distributor (or producer). Our aim is to compute payments for every user in the community according to the single user’s consumption, the community’s consumption and the available energy. By computing community-dependent energy bills, our model stimulates a users’ virtuous behaviour, so that everyone approaches the production threshold as close as possible. Our payment function distributes incentives if the consumption is lower than the produced energy and penalties when the consumption exceeds the resources threshold, satisfying efficiency and fairness properties both from the community (efficiency as an economic equilibrium among sellers and buyers) and the single user (fairness as an economic measure of energy good-behaving) points of view. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 |
| collection_details |
GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OPC-MAT |
| container_issue |
7 |
| title_short |
Energy allocation and payment: a game-theoretic approach |
| url |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-019-09685-z |
| remote_bool |
false |
| author2 |
Bistarelli, Stefano Mugnai, Dimitri |
| author2Str |
Bistarelli, Stefano Mugnai, Dimitri |
| ppnlink |
130904104 |
| mediatype_str_mv |
n |
| isOA_txt |
false |
| hochschulschrift_bool |
false |
| doi_str |
10.1007/s10472-019-09685-z |
| up_date |
2024-07-04T04:54:36.691Z |
| _version_ |
1803622942446190592 |
| fullrecord_marcxml |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC2041508752</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230504154939.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">200819s2020 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s10472-019-09685-z</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC2041508752</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-He213)s10472-019-09685-z-p</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">510</subfield><subfield code="a">004</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">17,1</subfield><subfield code="2">ssgn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Giuliodori, Paolo</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="0">(orcid)0000-0003-0513-5273</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Energy allocation and payment: a game-theoretic approach</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2020</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract Nowadays, energy represents the most important resource; however, we need to face several energy-related rising issues, one main concern is how energy is consumed. In particular, how we can stimulate consumers on a specific behaviour. In this work, we present a model facing energy allocation and payment. Thus, we start with the explanation of the first step of our work concerning a mechanism design approach for energy allocation among consumers. More in details, we go deep into the formal description of the energy model and users’ consumption profiles. We aim to select the optimal consumption profile for every user avoiding consumption peaks when the total required energy could exceed the energy production. The mechanism will be able to drive users in shifting energy consumptions in different hours of the day. The next step concerns a payment estimation problem which involves a community of users and an energy distributor (or producer). Our aim is to compute payments for every user in the community according to the single user’s consumption, the community’s consumption and the available energy. By computing community-dependent energy bills, our model stimulates a users’ virtuous behaviour, so that everyone approaches the production threshold as close as possible. Our payment function distributes incentives if the consumption is lower than the produced energy and penalties when the consumption exceeds the resources threshold, satisfying efficiency and fairness properties both from the community (efficiency as an economic equilibrium among sellers and buyers) and the single user (fairness as an economic measure of energy good-behaving) points of view.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Mechanism design</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Cooperation game theory</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Bistarelli, Stefano</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Mugnai, Dimitri</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Annals of mathematics and artificial intelligence</subfield><subfield code="d">Springer International Publishing, 1990</subfield><subfield code="g">88(2020), 7 vom: 18. Feb., Seite 793-816</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)130904104</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)1045926-1</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)02499622X</subfield><subfield code="x">1012-2443</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:88</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2020</subfield><subfield code="g">number:7</subfield><subfield code="g">day:18</subfield><subfield code="g">month:02</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:793-816</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-019-09685-z</subfield><subfield code="z">lizenzpflichtig</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_OLC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-MAT</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OPC-MAT</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">88</subfield><subfield code="j">2020</subfield><subfield code="e">7</subfield><subfield code="b">18</subfield><subfield code="c">02</subfield><subfield code="h">793-816</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| score |
7.40158 |