A $ Neo^{2} $ bayesian foundation of the maxmin value for two-person zero-sum games

Abstract A joint derivation of utility and value for two-person zero-sum games is obtained using a decision theoretic approach. Acts map states to consequences. The latter are lotteries over prizes, and the set of states is a product of two finite sets (m rows andn columns). Preferences over acts ar...
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Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Hart, Sergiu [verfasserIn] Modica, Salvatore Schmeidler, David

Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	1994

Schlagwörter:	Utility Function Economic Theory Game Theory Theoretic Approach Alternative Statement

Systematik:	SA 5860 SA 5860

Anmerkung:	© Physica-Verlag 1994

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: International journal of game theory - Physica-Verlag, 1971, 23(1994), 4 vom: Dez., Seite 347-358
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:23 ; year:1994 ; number:4 ; month:12 ; pages:347-358

Links:	Volltext

DOI / URN:	10.1007/BF01242948

Katalog-ID:	OLC2041757302

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allfields	10.1007/BF01242948 doi (DE-627)OLC2041757302 (DE-He213)BF01242948-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 510 VZ 510 VZ SA 5860 VZ rvk SA 5860 VZ rvk Hart, Sergiu verfasserin aut A $ Neo^{2} $ bayesian foundation of the maxmin value for two-person zero-sum games 1994 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Physica-Verlag 1994 Abstract A joint derivation of utility and value for two-person zero-sum games is obtained using a decision theoretic approach. Acts map states to consequences. The latter are lotteries over prizes, and the set of states is a product of two finite sets (m rows andn columns). Preferences over acts are complete, transitive, continuous, monotonie and certainty-independent (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), and satisfy a new axiom which we introduce. These axioms are shown to characterize preferences such that (i) the induced preferences on consequences are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, and (ii) each act is ranked according to the maxmin value of the correspondingm × n utility matrix (viewed as a two-person zero-sum game). An alternative statement of the result deals simultaneously with all finite two-person zero-sum games in the framework of conditional acts and preferences. Utility Function Economic Theory Game Theory Theoretic Approach Alternative Statement Modica, Salvatore aut Schmeidler, David aut Enthalten in International journal of game theory Physica-Verlag, 1971 23(1994), 4 vom: Dez., Seite 347-358 (DE-627)129290653 (DE-600)120387-3 (DE-576)01447199X 0020-7276 nnns volume:23 year:1994 number:4 month:12 pages:347-358 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01242948 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2244 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4036 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4700 SA 5860 SA 5860 AR 23 1994 4 12 347-358
spelling	10.1007/BF01242948 doi (DE-627)OLC2041757302 (DE-He213)BF01242948-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 510 VZ 510 VZ SA 5860 VZ rvk SA 5860 VZ rvk Hart, Sergiu verfasserin aut A $ Neo^{2} $ bayesian foundation of the maxmin value for two-person zero-sum games 1994 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Physica-Verlag 1994 Abstract A joint derivation of utility and value for two-person zero-sum games is obtained using a decision theoretic approach. Acts map states to consequences. The latter are lotteries over prizes, and the set of states is a product of two finite sets (m rows andn columns). Preferences over acts are complete, transitive, continuous, monotonie and certainty-independent (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), and satisfy a new axiom which we introduce. These axioms are shown to characterize preferences such that (i) the induced preferences on consequences are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, and (ii) each act is ranked according to the maxmin value of the correspondingm × n utility matrix (viewed as a two-person zero-sum game). An alternative statement of the result deals simultaneously with all finite two-person zero-sum games in the framework of conditional acts and preferences. Utility Function Economic Theory Game Theory Theoretic Approach Alternative Statement Modica, Salvatore aut Schmeidler, David aut Enthalten in International journal of game theory Physica-Verlag, 1971 23(1994), 4 vom: Dez., Seite 347-358 (DE-627)129290653 (DE-600)120387-3 (DE-576)01447199X 0020-7276 nnns volume:23 year:1994 number:4 month:12 pages:347-358 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01242948 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2244 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4036 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4700 SA 5860 SA 5860 AR 23 1994 4 12 347-358
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author	Hart, Sergiu
spellingShingle	Hart, Sergiu ddc 510 rvk SA 5860 misc Utility Function misc Economic Theory misc Game Theory misc Theoretic Approach misc Alternative Statement A $ Neo^{2} $ bayesian foundation of the maxmin value for two-person zero-sum games
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topic_title	510 VZ SA 5860 VZ rvk A $ Neo^{2} $ bayesian foundation of the maxmin value for two-person zero-sum games Utility Function Economic Theory Game Theory Theoretic Approach Alternative Statement
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title	A $ Neo^{2} $ bayesian foundation of the maxmin value for two-person zero-sum games
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title_sort	a $ neo^{2} $ bayesian foundation of the maxmin value for two-person zero-sum games
title_auth	A $ Neo^{2} $ bayesian foundation of the maxmin value for two-person zero-sum games
abstract	Abstract A joint derivation of utility and value for two-person zero-sum games is obtained using a decision theoretic approach. Acts map states to consequences. The latter are lotteries over prizes, and the set of states is a product of two finite sets (m rows andn columns). Preferences over acts are complete, transitive, continuous, monotonie and certainty-independent (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), and satisfy a new axiom which we introduce. These axioms are shown to characterize preferences such that (i) the induced preferences on consequences are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, and (ii) each act is ranked according to the maxmin value of the correspondingm × n utility matrix (viewed as a two-person zero-sum game). An alternative statement of the result deals simultaneously with all finite two-person zero-sum games in the framework of conditional acts and preferences. © Physica-Verlag 1994
abstractGer	Abstract A joint derivation of utility and value for two-person zero-sum games is obtained using a decision theoretic approach. Acts map states to consequences. The latter are lotteries over prizes, and the set of states is a product of two finite sets (m rows andn columns). Preferences over acts are complete, transitive, continuous, monotonie and certainty-independent (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), and satisfy a new axiom which we introduce. These axioms are shown to characterize preferences such that (i) the induced preferences on consequences are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, and (ii) each act is ranked according to the maxmin value of the correspondingm × n utility matrix (viewed as a two-person zero-sum game). An alternative statement of the result deals simultaneously with all finite two-person zero-sum games in the framework of conditional acts and preferences. © Physica-Verlag 1994
abstract_unstemmed	Abstract A joint derivation of utility and value for two-person zero-sum games is obtained using a decision theoretic approach. Acts map states to consequences. The latter are lotteries over prizes, and the set of states is a product of two finite sets (m rows andn columns). Preferences over acts are complete, transitive, continuous, monotonie and certainty-independent (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), and satisfy a new axiom which we introduce. These axioms are shown to characterize preferences such that (i) the induced preferences on consequences are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, and (ii) each act is ranked according to the maxmin value of the correspondingm × n utility matrix (viewed as a two-person zero-sum game). An alternative statement of the result deals simultaneously with all finite two-person zero-sum games in the framework of conditional acts and preferences. © Physica-Verlag 1994
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title_short	A $ Neo^{2} $ bayesian foundation of the maxmin value for two-person zero-sum games
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