Representation of finite games as network congestion games
Abstract Weighted network congestion games are a natural model for interactions involving finitely many non-identical users of network resources, such as road segments or communication links. However, in spite of their special form, these games are not fundamentally special: every finite game can be...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Milchtaich, Igal [verfasserIn] |
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Englisch |
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2012 |
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Anmerkung: |
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: International journal of game theory - Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1971, 42(2012), 4 vom: 19. Dez., Seite 1085-1096 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:42 ; year:2012 ; number:4 ; day:19 ; month:12 ; pages:1085-1096 |
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DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s00182-012-0363-5 |
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OLC204176466X |
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520 | |a Abstract Weighted network congestion games are a natural model for interactions involving finitely many non-identical users of network resources, such as road segments or communication links. However, in spite of their special form, these games are not fundamentally special: every finite game can be represented as a weighted network congestion game. The same is true for the class of (unweighted) network congestion games with player-specific costs, in which the players differ in their cost functions rather than their weights. The intersection of the two classes consists of the unweighted network congestion games. These games are special: a finite game can be represented in this form if and only if it is an exact potential game. | ||
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650 | 4 | |a Game isomorphism | |
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10.1007/s00182-012-0363-5 doi (DE-627)OLC204176466X (DE-He213)s00182-012-0363-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 510 VZ 510 VZ SA 5860 VZ rvk SA 5860 VZ rvk Milchtaich, Igal verfasserin aut Representation of finite games as network congestion games 2012 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 Abstract Weighted network congestion games are a natural model for interactions involving finitely many non-identical users of network resources, such as road segments or communication links. However, in spite of their special form, these games are not fundamentally special: every finite game can be represented as a weighted network congestion game. The same is true for the class of (unweighted) network congestion games with player-specific costs, in which the players differ in their cost functions rather than their weights. The intersection of the two classes consists of the unweighted network congestion games. These games are special: a finite game can be represented in this form if and only if it is an exact potential game. Network games Congestion games Potential games Game isomorphism Enthalten in International journal of game theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1971 42(2012), 4 vom: 19. Dez., Seite 1085-1096 (DE-627)129290653 (DE-600)120387-3 (DE-576)01447199X 0020-7276 nnns volume:42 year:2012 number:4 day:19 month:12 pages:1085-1096 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0363-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2244 GBV_ILN_4036 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4700 SA 5860 SA 5860 AR 42 2012 4 19 12 1085-1096 |
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10.1007/s00182-012-0363-5 doi (DE-627)OLC204176466X (DE-He213)s00182-012-0363-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 510 VZ 510 VZ SA 5860 VZ rvk SA 5860 VZ rvk Milchtaich, Igal verfasserin aut Representation of finite games as network congestion games 2012 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 Abstract Weighted network congestion games are a natural model for interactions involving finitely many non-identical users of network resources, such as road segments or communication links. However, in spite of their special form, these games are not fundamentally special: every finite game can be represented as a weighted network congestion game. The same is true for the class of (unweighted) network congestion games with player-specific costs, in which the players differ in their cost functions rather than their weights. The intersection of the two classes consists of the unweighted network congestion games. These games are special: a finite game can be represented in this form if and only if it is an exact potential game. Network games Congestion games Potential games Game isomorphism Enthalten in International journal of game theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1971 42(2012), 4 vom: 19. Dez., Seite 1085-1096 (DE-627)129290653 (DE-600)120387-3 (DE-576)01447199X 0020-7276 nnns volume:42 year:2012 number:4 day:19 month:12 pages:1085-1096 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0363-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2244 GBV_ILN_4036 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4700 SA 5860 SA 5860 AR 42 2012 4 19 12 1085-1096 |
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10.1007/s00182-012-0363-5 doi (DE-627)OLC204176466X (DE-He213)s00182-012-0363-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 510 VZ 510 VZ SA 5860 VZ rvk SA 5860 VZ rvk Milchtaich, Igal verfasserin aut Representation of finite games as network congestion games 2012 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 Abstract Weighted network congestion games are a natural model for interactions involving finitely many non-identical users of network resources, such as road segments or communication links. However, in spite of their special form, these games are not fundamentally special: every finite game can be represented as a weighted network congestion game. The same is true for the class of (unweighted) network congestion games with player-specific costs, in which the players differ in their cost functions rather than their weights. The intersection of the two classes consists of the unweighted network congestion games. These games are special: a finite game can be represented in this form if and only if it is an exact potential game. Network games Congestion games Potential games Game isomorphism Enthalten in International journal of game theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1971 42(2012), 4 vom: 19. Dez., Seite 1085-1096 (DE-627)129290653 (DE-600)120387-3 (DE-576)01447199X 0020-7276 nnns volume:42 year:2012 number:4 day:19 month:12 pages:1085-1096 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0363-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2244 GBV_ILN_4036 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4700 SA 5860 SA 5860 AR 42 2012 4 19 12 1085-1096 |
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10.1007/s00182-012-0363-5 doi (DE-627)OLC204176466X (DE-He213)s00182-012-0363-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 510 VZ 510 VZ SA 5860 VZ rvk SA 5860 VZ rvk Milchtaich, Igal verfasserin aut Representation of finite games as network congestion games 2012 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 Abstract Weighted network congestion games are a natural model for interactions involving finitely many non-identical users of network resources, such as road segments or communication links. However, in spite of their special form, these games are not fundamentally special: every finite game can be represented as a weighted network congestion game. The same is true for the class of (unweighted) network congestion games with player-specific costs, in which the players differ in their cost functions rather than their weights. The intersection of the two classes consists of the unweighted network congestion games. These games are special: a finite game can be represented in this form if and only if it is an exact potential game. Network games Congestion games Potential games Game isomorphism Enthalten in International journal of game theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1971 42(2012), 4 vom: 19. Dez., Seite 1085-1096 (DE-627)129290653 (DE-600)120387-3 (DE-576)01447199X 0020-7276 nnns volume:42 year:2012 number:4 day:19 month:12 pages:1085-1096 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0363-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2244 GBV_ILN_4036 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4700 SA 5860 SA 5860 AR 42 2012 4 19 12 1085-1096 |
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10.1007/s00182-012-0363-5 doi (DE-627)OLC204176466X (DE-He213)s00182-012-0363-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 510 VZ 510 VZ SA 5860 VZ rvk SA 5860 VZ rvk Milchtaich, Igal verfasserin aut Representation of finite games as network congestion games 2012 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 Abstract Weighted network congestion games are a natural model for interactions involving finitely many non-identical users of network resources, such as road segments or communication links. However, in spite of their special form, these games are not fundamentally special: every finite game can be represented as a weighted network congestion game. The same is true for the class of (unweighted) network congestion games with player-specific costs, in which the players differ in their cost functions rather than their weights. The intersection of the two classes consists of the unweighted network congestion games. These games are special: a finite game can be represented in this form if and only if it is an exact potential game. Network games Congestion games Potential games Game isomorphism Enthalten in International journal of game theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1971 42(2012), 4 vom: 19. Dez., Seite 1085-1096 (DE-627)129290653 (DE-600)120387-3 (DE-576)01447199X 0020-7276 nnns volume:42 year:2012 number:4 day:19 month:12 pages:1085-1096 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0363-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2244 GBV_ILN_4036 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4700 SA 5860 SA 5860 AR 42 2012 4 19 12 1085-1096 |
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Representation of finite games as network congestion games |
abstract |
Abstract Weighted network congestion games are a natural model for interactions involving finitely many non-identical users of network resources, such as road segments or communication links. However, in spite of their special form, these games are not fundamentally special: every finite game can be represented as a weighted network congestion game. The same is true for the class of (unweighted) network congestion games with player-specific costs, in which the players differ in their cost functions rather than their weights. The intersection of the two classes consists of the unweighted network congestion games. These games are special: a finite game can be represented in this form if and only if it is an exact potential game. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 |
abstractGer |
Abstract Weighted network congestion games are a natural model for interactions involving finitely many non-identical users of network resources, such as road segments or communication links. However, in spite of their special form, these games are not fundamentally special: every finite game can be represented as a weighted network congestion game. The same is true for the class of (unweighted) network congestion games with player-specific costs, in which the players differ in their cost functions rather than their weights. The intersection of the two classes consists of the unweighted network congestion games. These games are special: a finite game can be represented in this form if and only if it is an exact potential game. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 |
abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract Weighted network congestion games are a natural model for interactions involving finitely many non-identical users of network resources, such as road segments or communication links. However, in spite of their special form, these games are not fundamentally special: every finite game can be represented as a weighted network congestion game. The same is true for the class of (unweighted) network congestion games with player-specific costs, in which the players differ in their cost functions rather than their weights. The intersection of the two classes consists of the unweighted network congestion games. These games are special: a finite game can be represented in this form if and only if it is an exact potential game. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 |
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container_issue |
4 |
title_short |
Representation of finite games as network congestion games |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0363-5 |
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doi_str |
10.1007/s00182-012-0363-5 |
up_date |
2024-07-04T05:24:28.822Z |
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