Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
Abstract Let σ be a social preference function, and let v(σ) be the Nakamura number of σ. If W is a finite set of cardinality at least v(σ) then it is shown that there exists an acyclic profile P on W such that σ(P) is cyclic. Any choice function which is compatible with σ can then be manipulated. A...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Schofield, N. [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
1986 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer-Verlag 1986 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Social choice and welfare - Springer-Verlag, 1984, 3(1986), 2 vom: Juli, Seite 107-117 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:3 ; year:1986 ; number:2 ; month:07 ; pages:107-117 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/BF00435661 |
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| Katalog-ID: |
OLC204498329X |
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| 520 | |a Abstract Let σ be a social preference function, and let v(σ) be the Nakamura number of σ. If W is a finite set of cardinality at least v(σ) then it is shown that there exists an acyclic profile P on W such that σ(P) is cyclic. Any choice function which is compatible with σ can then be manipulated. A similar result holds if W is a manifold (or a subset of Euclidean space) with dimension at least v(σ)-1. | ||
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10.1007/BF00435661 doi (DE-627)OLC204498329X (DE-He213)BF00435661-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 360 300 VZ Schofield, N. verfasserin aut Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions 1986 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag 1986 Abstract Let σ be a social preference function, and let v(σ) be the Nakamura number of σ. If W is a finite set of cardinality at least v(σ) then it is shown that there exists an acyclic profile P on W such that σ(P) is cyclic. Any choice function which is compatible with σ can then be manipulated. A similar result holds if W is a manifold (or a subset of Euclidean space) with dimension at least v(σ)-1. Economic Theory Euclidean Space Social Preference Choice Function Preference Function Enthalten in Social choice and welfare Springer-Verlag, 1984 3(1986), 2 vom: Juli, Seite 107-117 (DE-627)130661341 (DE-600)855101-7 (DE-576)016204883 0176-1714 nnns volume:3 year:1986 number:2 month:07 pages:107-117 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00435661 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4103 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 AR 3 1986 2 07 107-117 |
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10.1007/BF00435661 doi (DE-627)OLC204498329X (DE-He213)BF00435661-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 360 300 VZ Schofield, N. verfasserin aut Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions 1986 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag 1986 Abstract Let σ be a social preference function, and let v(σ) be the Nakamura number of σ. If W is a finite set of cardinality at least v(σ) then it is shown that there exists an acyclic profile P on W such that σ(P) is cyclic. Any choice function which is compatible with σ can then be manipulated. A similar result holds if W is a manifold (or a subset of Euclidean space) with dimension at least v(σ)-1. Economic Theory Euclidean Space Social Preference Choice Function Preference Function Enthalten in Social choice and welfare Springer-Verlag, 1984 3(1986), 2 vom: Juli, Seite 107-117 (DE-627)130661341 (DE-600)855101-7 (DE-576)016204883 0176-1714 nnns volume:3 year:1986 number:2 month:07 pages:107-117 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00435661 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4103 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 AR 3 1986 2 07 107-117 |
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10.1007/BF00435661 doi (DE-627)OLC204498329X (DE-He213)BF00435661-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 360 300 VZ Schofield, N. verfasserin aut Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions 1986 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag 1986 Abstract Let σ be a social preference function, and let v(σ) be the Nakamura number of σ. If W is a finite set of cardinality at least v(σ) then it is shown that there exists an acyclic profile P on W such that σ(P) is cyclic. Any choice function which is compatible with σ can then be manipulated. A similar result holds if W is a manifold (or a subset of Euclidean space) with dimension at least v(σ)-1. Economic Theory Euclidean Space Social Preference Choice Function Preference Function Enthalten in Social choice and welfare Springer-Verlag, 1984 3(1986), 2 vom: Juli, Seite 107-117 (DE-627)130661341 (DE-600)855101-7 (DE-576)016204883 0176-1714 nnns volume:3 year:1986 number:2 month:07 pages:107-117 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00435661 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4103 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 AR 3 1986 2 07 107-117 |
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10.1007/BF00435661 doi (DE-627)OLC204498329X (DE-He213)BF00435661-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 360 300 VZ Schofield, N. verfasserin aut Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions 1986 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag 1986 Abstract Let σ be a social preference function, and let v(σ) be the Nakamura number of σ. If W is a finite set of cardinality at least v(σ) then it is shown that there exists an acyclic profile P on W such that σ(P) is cyclic. Any choice function which is compatible with σ can then be manipulated. A similar result holds if W is a manifold (or a subset of Euclidean space) with dimension at least v(σ)-1. Economic Theory Euclidean Space Social Preference Choice Function Preference Function Enthalten in Social choice and welfare Springer-Verlag, 1984 3(1986), 2 vom: Juli, Seite 107-117 (DE-627)130661341 (DE-600)855101-7 (DE-576)016204883 0176-1714 nnns volume:3 year:1986 number:2 month:07 pages:107-117 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00435661 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4103 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 AR 3 1986 2 07 107-117 |
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Abstract Let σ be a social preference function, and let v(σ) be the Nakamura number of σ. If W is a finite set of cardinality at least v(σ) then it is shown that there exists an acyclic profile P on W such that σ(P) is cyclic. Any choice function which is compatible with σ can then be manipulated. A similar result holds if W is a manifold (or a subset of Euclidean space) with dimension at least v(σ)-1. © Springer-Verlag 1986 |
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Abstract Let σ be a social preference function, and let v(σ) be the Nakamura number of σ. If W is a finite set of cardinality at least v(σ) then it is shown that there exists an acyclic profile P on W such that σ(P) is cyclic. Any choice function which is compatible with σ can then be manipulated. A similar result holds if W is a manifold (or a subset of Euclidean space) with dimension at least v(σ)-1. © Springer-Verlag 1986 |
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Abstract Let σ be a social preference function, and let v(σ) be the Nakamura number of σ. If W is a finite set of cardinality at least v(σ) then it is shown that there exists an acyclic profile P on W such that σ(P) is cyclic. Any choice function which is compatible with σ can then be manipulated. A similar result holds if W is a manifold (or a subset of Euclidean space) with dimension at least v(σ)-1. © Springer-Verlag 1986 |
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