Reference functions and possibility theorems for cardinal social choice problems
Abstract. In this paper, we provide axiomatic foundations for social choice rules on a domain of convex and comprehensive social choice problems when agents have cardinal utility functions. We translate the axioms of three well known approaches in bargaining theory (Nash 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Conley, John P. [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
1996 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1996 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Social choice and welfare - Springer-Verlag, 1984, 14(1996), 1 vom: Dez., Seite 65-78 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:14 ; year:1996 ; number:1 ; month:12 ; pages:65-78 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s003550050052 |
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| Katalog-ID: |
OLC2044986558 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract. In this paper, we provide axiomatic foundations for social choice rules on a domain of convex and comprehensive social choice problems when agents have cardinal utility functions. We translate the axioms of three well known approaches in bargaining theory (Nash 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975; Kalai 1977) to the domain of social choice problems and provide an impossibility result for each. We then introduce the concept of a reference function which, for each social choice set, selects a point from which relative gains are measured. By restricting the invariance and comparison axioms so that they only apply to sets with the same reference point, we obtain characterizations of social choice rules that are natural analogues of the bargaining theory solutions. | ||
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| 700 | 1 | |a McLean, Richard P. |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Wilkie, Simon |4 aut | |
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10.1007/s003550050052 doi (DE-627)OLC2044986558 (DE-He213)s003550050052-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 360 300 VZ Conley, John P. verfasserin aut Reference functions and possibility theorems for cardinal social choice problems 1996 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1996 Abstract. In this paper, we provide axiomatic foundations for social choice rules on a domain of convex and comprehensive social choice problems when agents have cardinal utility functions. We translate the axioms of three well known approaches in bargaining theory (Nash 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975; Kalai 1977) to the domain of social choice problems and provide an impossibility result for each. We then introduce the concept of a reference function which, for each social choice set, selects a point from which relative gains are measured. By restricting the invariance and comparison axioms so that they only apply to sets with the same reference point, we obtain characterizations of social choice rules that are natural analogues of the bargaining theory solutions. Utility Function Reference Point Social Choice Reference Function Theory Solution McLean, Richard P. aut Wilkie, Simon aut Enthalten in Social choice and welfare Springer-Verlag, 1984 14(1996), 1 vom: Dez., Seite 65-78 (DE-627)130661341 (DE-600)855101-7 (DE-576)016204883 0176-1714 nnns volume:14 year:1996 number:1 month:12 pages:65-78 https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050052 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4103 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 AR 14 1996 1 12 65-78 |
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10.1007/s003550050052 doi (DE-627)OLC2044986558 (DE-He213)s003550050052-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 360 300 VZ Conley, John P. verfasserin aut Reference functions and possibility theorems for cardinal social choice problems 1996 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1996 Abstract. In this paper, we provide axiomatic foundations for social choice rules on a domain of convex and comprehensive social choice problems when agents have cardinal utility functions. We translate the axioms of three well known approaches in bargaining theory (Nash 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975; Kalai 1977) to the domain of social choice problems and provide an impossibility result for each. We then introduce the concept of a reference function which, for each social choice set, selects a point from which relative gains are measured. By restricting the invariance and comparison axioms so that they only apply to sets with the same reference point, we obtain characterizations of social choice rules that are natural analogues of the bargaining theory solutions. Utility Function Reference Point Social Choice Reference Function Theory Solution McLean, Richard P. aut Wilkie, Simon aut Enthalten in Social choice and welfare Springer-Verlag, 1984 14(1996), 1 vom: Dez., Seite 65-78 (DE-627)130661341 (DE-600)855101-7 (DE-576)016204883 0176-1714 nnns volume:14 year:1996 number:1 month:12 pages:65-78 https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050052 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4103 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 AR 14 1996 1 12 65-78 |
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10.1007/s003550050052 doi (DE-627)OLC2044986558 (DE-He213)s003550050052-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 360 300 VZ Conley, John P. verfasserin aut Reference functions and possibility theorems for cardinal social choice problems 1996 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1996 Abstract. In this paper, we provide axiomatic foundations for social choice rules on a domain of convex and comprehensive social choice problems when agents have cardinal utility functions. We translate the axioms of three well known approaches in bargaining theory (Nash 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975; Kalai 1977) to the domain of social choice problems and provide an impossibility result for each. We then introduce the concept of a reference function which, for each social choice set, selects a point from which relative gains are measured. By restricting the invariance and comparison axioms so that they only apply to sets with the same reference point, we obtain characterizations of social choice rules that are natural analogues of the bargaining theory solutions. Utility Function Reference Point Social Choice Reference Function Theory Solution McLean, Richard P. aut Wilkie, Simon aut Enthalten in Social choice and welfare Springer-Verlag, 1984 14(1996), 1 vom: Dez., Seite 65-78 (DE-627)130661341 (DE-600)855101-7 (DE-576)016204883 0176-1714 nnns volume:14 year:1996 number:1 month:12 pages:65-78 https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050052 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4103 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 AR 14 1996 1 12 65-78 |
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10.1007/s003550050052 doi (DE-627)OLC2044986558 (DE-He213)s003550050052-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 360 300 VZ Conley, John P. verfasserin aut Reference functions and possibility theorems for cardinal social choice problems 1996 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1996 Abstract. In this paper, we provide axiomatic foundations for social choice rules on a domain of convex and comprehensive social choice problems when agents have cardinal utility functions. We translate the axioms of three well known approaches in bargaining theory (Nash 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975; Kalai 1977) to the domain of social choice problems and provide an impossibility result for each. We then introduce the concept of a reference function which, for each social choice set, selects a point from which relative gains are measured. By restricting the invariance and comparison axioms so that they only apply to sets with the same reference point, we obtain characterizations of social choice rules that are natural analogues of the bargaining theory solutions. Utility Function Reference Point Social Choice Reference Function Theory Solution McLean, Richard P. aut Wilkie, Simon aut Enthalten in Social choice and welfare Springer-Verlag, 1984 14(1996), 1 vom: Dez., Seite 65-78 (DE-627)130661341 (DE-600)855101-7 (DE-576)016204883 0176-1714 nnns volume:14 year:1996 number:1 month:12 pages:65-78 https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050052 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4103 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 AR 14 1996 1 12 65-78 |
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10.1007/s003550050052 doi (DE-627)OLC2044986558 (DE-He213)s003550050052-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 360 300 VZ Conley, John P. verfasserin aut Reference functions and possibility theorems for cardinal social choice problems 1996 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1996 Abstract. In this paper, we provide axiomatic foundations for social choice rules on a domain of convex and comprehensive social choice problems when agents have cardinal utility functions. We translate the axioms of three well known approaches in bargaining theory (Nash 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975; Kalai 1977) to the domain of social choice problems and provide an impossibility result for each. We then introduce the concept of a reference function which, for each social choice set, selects a point from which relative gains are measured. By restricting the invariance and comparison axioms so that they only apply to sets with the same reference point, we obtain characterizations of social choice rules that are natural analogues of the bargaining theory solutions. Utility Function Reference Point Social Choice Reference Function Theory Solution McLean, Richard P. aut Wilkie, Simon aut Enthalten in Social choice and welfare Springer-Verlag, 1984 14(1996), 1 vom: Dez., Seite 65-78 (DE-627)130661341 (DE-600)855101-7 (DE-576)016204883 0176-1714 nnns volume:14 year:1996 number:1 month:12 pages:65-78 https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050052 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4103 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 AR 14 1996 1 12 65-78 |
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330 360 300 |
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reference functions and possibility theorems for cardinal social choice problems |
| title_auth |
Reference functions and possibility theorems for cardinal social choice problems |
| abstract |
Abstract. In this paper, we provide axiomatic foundations for social choice rules on a domain of convex and comprehensive social choice problems when agents have cardinal utility functions. We translate the axioms of three well known approaches in bargaining theory (Nash 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975; Kalai 1977) to the domain of social choice problems and provide an impossibility result for each. We then introduce the concept of a reference function which, for each social choice set, selects a point from which relative gains are measured. By restricting the invariance and comparison axioms so that they only apply to sets with the same reference point, we obtain characterizations of social choice rules that are natural analogues of the bargaining theory solutions. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1996 |
| abstractGer |
Abstract. In this paper, we provide axiomatic foundations for social choice rules on a domain of convex and comprehensive social choice problems when agents have cardinal utility functions. We translate the axioms of three well known approaches in bargaining theory (Nash 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975; Kalai 1977) to the domain of social choice problems and provide an impossibility result for each. We then introduce the concept of a reference function which, for each social choice set, selects a point from which relative gains are measured. By restricting the invariance and comparison axioms so that they only apply to sets with the same reference point, we obtain characterizations of social choice rules that are natural analogues of the bargaining theory solutions. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1996 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract. In this paper, we provide axiomatic foundations for social choice rules on a domain of convex and comprehensive social choice problems when agents have cardinal utility functions. We translate the axioms of three well known approaches in bargaining theory (Nash 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975; Kalai 1977) to the domain of social choice problems and provide an impossibility result for each. We then introduce the concept of a reference function which, for each social choice set, selects a point from which relative gains are measured. By restricting the invariance and comparison axioms so that they only apply to sets with the same reference point, we obtain characterizations of social choice rules that are natural analogues of the bargaining theory solutions. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1996 |
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