Moderating Government
Abstract We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultaneous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by majority rule in a local district. The policy to be implement...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
De Sinopoli, Francesco [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2015 |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Social choice and welfare - Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1984, 45(2015), 2 vom: 25. Juni, Seite 415-440 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:45 ; year:2015 ; number:2 ; day:25 ; month:06 ; pages:415-440 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s00355-015-0901-8 |
|---|
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OLC2044998734 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultaneous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by majority rule in a local district. The policy to be implemented depends not only on who is elected President but also on the composition of the Congress. We characterize the equilibria of the model using a conditional sincerity concept that takes into account the possibility that some voters may be simultaneously decisive in both elections. Such a concept emerges naturally in a model with trembles. A crucial feature of the solution is the moderation of Government. Our results are robust to several modifications of the model. | ||
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10.1007/s00355-015-0901-8 doi (DE-627)OLC2044998734 (DE-He213)s00355-015-0901-8-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 360 300 VZ De Sinopoli, Francesco verfasserin aut Moderating Government 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015 Abstract We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultaneous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by majority rule in a local district. The policy to be implemented depends not only on who is elected President but also on the composition of the Congress. We characterize the equilibria of the model using a conditional sincerity concept that takes into account the possibility that some voters may be simultaneously decisive in both elections. Such a concept emerges naturally in a model with trembles. A crucial feature of the solution is the moderation of Government. Our results are robust to several modifications of the model. Ferraris, Leo aut Iannantuoni, Giovanna aut Enthalten in Social choice and welfare Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1984 45(2015), 2 vom: 25. Juni, Seite 415-440 (DE-627)130661341 (DE-600)855101-7 (DE-576)016204883 0176-1714 nnns volume:45 year:2015 number:2 day:25 month:06 pages:415-440 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0901-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4318 AR 45 2015 2 25 06 415-440 |
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10.1007/s00355-015-0901-8 doi (DE-627)OLC2044998734 (DE-He213)s00355-015-0901-8-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 360 300 VZ De Sinopoli, Francesco verfasserin aut Moderating Government 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015 Abstract We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultaneous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by majority rule in a local district. The policy to be implemented depends not only on who is elected President but also on the composition of the Congress. We characterize the equilibria of the model using a conditional sincerity concept that takes into account the possibility that some voters may be simultaneously decisive in both elections. Such a concept emerges naturally in a model with trembles. A crucial feature of the solution is the moderation of Government. Our results are robust to several modifications of the model. Ferraris, Leo aut Iannantuoni, Giovanna aut Enthalten in Social choice and welfare Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1984 45(2015), 2 vom: 25. Juni, Seite 415-440 (DE-627)130661341 (DE-600)855101-7 (DE-576)016204883 0176-1714 nnns volume:45 year:2015 number:2 day:25 month:06 pages:415-440 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0901-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4318 AR 45 2015 2 25 06 415-440 |
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10.1007/s00355-015-0901-8 doi (DE-627)OLC2044998734 (DE-He213)s00355-015-0901-8-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 360 300 VZ De Sinopoli, Francesco verfasserin aut Moderating Government 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015 Abstract We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultaneous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by majority rule in a local district. The policy to be implemented depends not only on who is elected President but also on the composition of the Congress. We characterize the equilibria of the model using a conditional sincerity concept that takes into account the possibility that some voters may be simultaneously decisive in both elections. Such a concept emerges naturally in a model with trembles. A crucial feature of the solution is the moderation of Government. Our results are robust to several modifications of the model. Ferraris, Leo aut Iannantuoni, Giovanna aut Enthalten in Social choice and welfare Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1984 45(2015), 2 vom: 25. Juni, Seite 415-440 (DE-627)130661341 (DE-600)855101-7 (DE-576)016204883 0176-1714 nnns volume:45 year:2015 number:2 day:25 month:06 pages:415-440 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0901-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4318 AR 45 2015 2 25 06 415-440 |
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10.1007/s00355-015-0901-8 doi (DE-627)OLC2044998734 (DE-He213)s00355-015-0901-8-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 360 300 VZ De Sinopoli, Francesco verfasserin aut Moderating Government 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015 Abstract We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultaneous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by majority rule in a local district. The policy to be implemented depends not only on who is elected President but also on the composition of the Congress. We characterize the equilibria of the model using a conditional sincerity concept that takes into account the possibility that some voters may be simultaneously decisive in both elections. Such a concept emerges naturally in a model with trembles. A crucial feature of the solution is the moderation of Government. Our results are robust to several modifications of the model. Ferraris, Leo aut Iannantuoni, Giovanna aut Enthalten in Social choice and welfare Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1984 45(2015), 2 vom: 25. Juni, Seite 415-440 (DE-627)130661341 (DE-600)855101-7 (DE-576)016204883 0176-1714 nnns volume:45 year:2015 number:2 day:25 month:06 pages:415-440 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0901-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4318 AR 45 2015 2 25 06 415-440 |
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Abstract We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultaneous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by majority rule in a local district. The policy to be implemented depends not only on who is elected President but also on the composition of the Congress. We characterize the equilibria of the model using a conditional sincerity concept that takes into account the possibility that some voters may be simultaneously decisive in both elections. Such a concept emerges naturally in a model with trembles. A crucial feature of the solution is the moderation of Government. Our results are robust to several modifications of the model. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015 |
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Abstract We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultaneous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by majority rule in a local district. The policy to be implemented depends not only on who is elected President but also on the composition of the Congress. We characterize the equilibria of the model using a conditional sincerity concept that takes into account the possibility that some voters may be simultaneously decisive in both elections. Such a concept emerges naturally in a model with trembles. A crucial feature of the solution is the moderation of Government. Our results are robust to several modifications of the model. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015 |
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Abstract We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultaneous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by majority rule in a local district. The policy to be implemented depends not only on who is elected President but also on the composition of the Congress. We characterize the equilibria of the model using a conditional sincerity concept that takes into account the possibility that some voters may be simultaneously decisive in both elections. Such a concept emerges naturally in a model with trembles. A crucial feature of the solution is the moderation of Government. Our results are robust to several modifications of the model. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015 |
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