Corruption and bicameral reforms
Abstract During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobb...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Facchini, Giovanni [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2016 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Social choice and welfare - Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1984, 47(2016), 2 vom: 27. Mai, Seite 387-411 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:47 ; year:2016 ; number:2 ; day:27 ; month:05 ; pages:387-411 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9 |
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OLC2044999579 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers’ bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives. | ||
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10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9 doi (DE-627)OLC2044999579 (DE-He213)s00355-016-0969-9-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 360 300 VZ Facchini, Giovanni verfasserin aut Corruption and bicameral reforms 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 Abstract During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers’ bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives. Bargaining Power Vote Strategy Legislative Body Closed Rule Electoral Accountability Testa, Cecilia aut Enthalten in Social choice and welfare Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1984 47(2016), 2 vom: 27. Mai, Seite 387-411 (DE-627)130661341 (DE-600)855101-7 (DE-576)016204883 0176-1714 nnns volume:47 year:2016 number:2 day:27 month:05 pages:387-411 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 AR 47 2016 2 27 05 387-411 |
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10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9 doi (DE-627)OLC2044999579 (DE-He213)s00355-016-0969-9-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 360 300 VZ Facchini, Giovanni verfasserin aut Corruption and bicameral reforms 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 Abstract During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers’ bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives. Bargaining Power Vote Strategy Legislative Body Closed Rule Electoral Accountability Testa, Cecilia aut Enthalten in Social choice and welfare Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1984 47(2016), 2 vom: 27. Mai, Seite 387-411 (DE-627)130661341 (DE-600)855101-7 (DE-576)016204883 0176-1714 nnns volume:47 year:2016 number:2 day:27 month:05 pages:387-411 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 AR 47 2016 2 27 05 387-411 |
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10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9 doi (DE-627)OLC2044999579 (DE-He213)s00355-016-0969-9-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 360 300 VZ Facchini, Giovanni verfasserin aut Corruption and bicameral reforms 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 Abstract During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers’ bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives. Bargaining Power Vote Strategy Legislative Body Closed Rule Electoral Accountability Testa, Cecilia aut Enthalten in Social choice and welfare Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1984 47(2016), 2 vom: 27. Mai, Seite 387-411 (DE-627)130661341 (DE-600)855101-7 (DE-576)016204883 0176-1714 nnns volume:47 year:2016 number:2 day:27 month:05 pages:387-411 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 AR 47 2016 2 27 05 387-411 |
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10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9 doi (DE-627)OLC2044999579 (DE-He213)s00355-016-0969-9-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 360 300 VZ Facchini, Giovanni verfasserin aut Corruption and bicameral reforms 2016 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 Abstract During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers’ bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives. Bargaining Power Vote Strategy Legislative Body Closed Rule Electoral Accountability Testa, Cecilia aut Enthalten in Social choice and welfare Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1984 47(2016), 2 vom: 27. Mai, Seite 387-411 (DE-627)130661341 (DE-600)855101-7 (DE-576)016204883 0176-1714 nnns volume:47 year:2016 number:2 day:27 month:05 pages:387-411 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 AR 47 2016 2 27 05 387-411 |
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Abstract During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers’ bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 |
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Abstract During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers’ bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 |
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Abstract During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers’ bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 |
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC2044999579</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230331141050.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">200819s2016 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC2044999579</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-He213)s00355-016-0969-9-p</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">330</subfield><subfield code="a">360</subfield><subfield code="a">300</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Facchini, Giovanni</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Corruption and bicameral reforms</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2016</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers’ bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Bargaining Power</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Vote Strategy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Legislative Body</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Closed Rule</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Electoral Accountability</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Testa, Cecilia</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Social choice and welfare</subfield><subfield code="d">Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1984</subfield><subfield code="g">47(2016), 2 vom: 27. 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