The Strength of Desires: A Logical Approach
Abstract The aim of this paper is to propose a formal approach to reasoning about desires, understood as logical propositions which we would be pleased to make true, also acknowledging the fact that desire is a matter of degree. It is first shown that, at the static level, desires should satisfy cer...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Dubois, Didier [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
2017 |
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Anmerkung: |
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Minds and machines - Springer Netherlands, 1991, 27(2017), 1 vom: März, Seite 199-231 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:27 ; year:2017 ; number:1 ; month:03 ; pages:199-231 |
Links: |
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DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11023-017-9426-5 |
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Katalog-ID: |
OLC2047789796 |
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10.1007/s11023-017-9426-5 doi (DE-627)OLC2047789796 (DE-He213)s11023-017-9426-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 050 VZ Dubois, Didier verfasserin aut The Strength of Desires: A Logical Approach 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017 Abstract The aim of this paper is to propose a formal approach to reasoning about desires, understood as logical propositions which we would be pleased to make true, also acknowledging the fact that desire is a matter of degree. It is first shown that, at the static level, desires should satisfy certain principles that differ from those to which beliefs obey. In this sense, from a static perspective, the logic of desires is different from the logic of beliefs. While the accumulation of beliefs tend to reduce the remaining possible worlds they point at, the accumulation of desires tends to increase the set of states of affairs tentatively considered as satisfactory. Indeed beliefs are expected to be closed under conjunctions, while, in the positive view of desires developed here, one can argue that endorsing $$\varphi \vee \psi$$ as a desire means to desire $$\varphi$$ and to desire $$\psi$$. However, desiring $$\varphi$$ and $$\lnot \varphi$$ at the same time is not usually regarded as rational, since it does not make much sense to desire one thing and its contrary at the same time. Thus when a new desire is added to the set of desires of an agent, a revision process may be necessary. Just as belief revision relies on an epistemic entrenchment relation, desire revision is based on a hedonic entrenchment relation satisfying other properties, due to the different natures of belief and desire. While epistemic entrenchment relations are known to be qualitative necessity relations (in the sense of possibility theory), hedonic relations obeying a set of reasonable postulates correspond to another set-function in possibility theory, called guaranteed possibility, that drive well-behaved desire revision operations. Then the general framework of possibilistic logic provides a syntactic setting for encoding desire change. The paper also insists that desires should be carefully distinguished from goals. Desire Revision Possibility theory Lorini, Emiliano aut Prade, Henri (orcid)0000-0003-4586-8527 aut Enthalten in Minds and machines Springer Netherlands, 1991 27(2017), 1 vom: März, Seite 199-231 (DE-627)130969850 (DE-600)1070272-6 (DE-576)032730268 0924-6495 nnns volume:27 year:2017 number:1 month:03 pages:199-231 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-017-9426-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-PHI SSG-OLC-MAT GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_70 AR 27 2017 1 03 199-231 |
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10.1007/s11023-017-9426-5 doi (DE-627)OLC2047789796 (DE-He213)s11023-017-9426-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 050 VZ Dubois, Didier verfasserin aut The Strength of Desires: A Logical Approach 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017 Abstract The aim of this paper is to propose a formal approach to reasoning about desires, understood as logical propositions which we would be pleased to make true, also acknowledging the fact that desire is a matter of degree. It is first shown that, at the static level, desires should satisfy certain principles that differ from those to which beliefs obey. In this sense, from a static perspective, the logic of desires is different from the logic of beliefs. While the accumulation of beliefs tend to reduce the remaining possible worlds they point at, the accumulation of desires tends to increase the set of states of affairs tentatively considered as satisfactory. Indeed beliefs are expected to be closed under conjunctions, while, in the positive view of desires developed here, one can argue that endorsing $$\varphi \vee \psi$$ as a desire means to desire $$\varphi$$ and to desire $$\psi$$. However, desiring $$\varphi$$ and $$\lnot \varphi$$ at the same time is not usually regarded as rational, since it does not make much sense to desire one thing and its contrary at the same time. Thus when a new desire is added to the set of desires of an agent, a revision process may be necessary. Just as belief revision relies on an epistemic entrenchment relation, desire revision is based on a hedonic entrenchment relation satisfying other properties, due to the different natures of belief and desire. While epistemic entrenchment relations are known to be qualitative necessity relations (in the sense of possibility theory), hedonic relations obeying a set of reasonable postulates correspond to another set-function in possibility theory, called guaranteed possibility, that drive well-behaved desire revision operations. Then the general framework of possibilistic logic provides a syntactic setting for encoding desire change. The paper also insists that desires should be carefully distinguished from goals. Desire Revision Possibility theory Lorini, Emiliano aut Prade, Henri (orcid)0000-0003-4586-8527 aut Enthalten in Minds and machines Springer Netherlands, 1991 27(2017), 1 vom: März, Seite 199-231 (DE-627)130969850 (DE-600)1070272-6 (DE-576)032730268 0924-6495 nnns volume:27 year:2017 number:1 month:03 pages:199-231 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-017-9426-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-PHI SSG-OLC-MAT GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_70 AR 27 2017 1 03 199-231 |
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10.1007/s11023-017-9426-5 doi (DE-627)OLC2047789796 (DE-He213)s11023-017-9426-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 050 VZ Dubois, Didier verfasserin aut The Strength of Desires: A Logical Approach 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017 Abstract The aim of this paper is to propose a formal approach to reasoning about desires, understood as logical propositions which we would be pleased to make true, also acknowledging the fact that desire is a matter of degree. It is first shown that, at the static level, desires should satisfy certain principles that differ from those to which beliefs obey. In this sense, from a static perspective, the logic of desires is different from the logic of beliefs. While the accumulation of beliefs tend to reduce the remaining possible worlds they point at, the accumulation of desires tends to increase the set of states of affairs tentatively considered as satisfactory. Indeed beliefs are expected to be closed under conjunctions, while, in the positive view of desires developed here, one can argue that endorsing $$\varphi \vee \psi$$ as a desire means to desire $$\varphi$$ and to desire $$\psi$$. However, desiring $$\varphi$$ and $$\lnot \varphi$$ at the same time is not usually regarded as rational, since it does not make much sense to desire one thing and its contrary at the same time. Thus when a new desire is added to the set of desires of an agent, a revision process may be necessary. Just as belief revision relies on an epistemic entrenchment relation, desire revision is based on a hedonic entrenchment relation satisfying other properties, due to the different natures of belief and desire. While epistemic entrenchment relations are known to be qualitative necessity relations (in the sense of possibility theory), hedonic relations obeying a set of reasonable postulates correspond to another set-function in possibility theory, called guaranteed possibility, that drive well-behaved desire revision operations. Then the general framework of possibilistic logic provides a syntactic setting for encoding desire change. The paper also insists that desires should be carefully distinguished from goals. Desire Revision Possibility theory Lorini, Emiliano aut Prade, Henri (orcid)0000-0003-4586-8527 aut Enthalten in Minds and machines Springer Netherlands, 1991 27(2017), 1 vom: März, Seite 199-231 (DE-627)130969850 (DE-600)1070272-6 (DE-576)032730268 0924-6495 nnns volume:27 year:2017 number:1 month:03 pages:199-231 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-017-9426-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-PHI SSG-OLC-MAT GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_70 AR 27 2017 1 03 199-231 |
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10.1007/s11023-017-9426-5 doi (DE-627)OLC2047789796 (DE-He213)s11023-017-9426-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 050 VZ Dubois, Didier verfasserin aut The Strength of Desires: A Logical Approach 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017 Abstract The aim of this paper is to propose a formal approach to reasoning about desires, understood as logical propositions which we would be pleased to make true, also acknowledging the fact that desire is a matter of degree. It is first shown that, at the static level, desires should satisfy certain principles that differ from those to which beliefs obey. In this sense, from a static perspective, the logic of desires is different from the logic of beliefs. While the accumulation of beliefs tend to reduce the remaining possible worlds they point at, the accumulation of desires tends to increase the set of states of affairs tentatively considered as satisfactory. Indeed beliefs are expected to be closed under conjunctions, while, in the positive view of desires developed here, one can argue that endorsing $$\varphi \vee \psi$$ as a desire means to desire $$\varphi$$ and to desire $$\psi$$. However, desiring $$\varphi$$ and $$\lnot \varphi$$ at the same time is not usually regarded as rational, since it does not make much sense to desire one thing and its contrary at the same time. Thus when a new desire is added to the set of desires of an agent, a revision process may be necessary. Just as belief revision relies on an epistemic entrenchment relation, desire revision is based on a hedonic entrenchment relation satisfying other properties, due to the different natures of belief and desire. While epistemic entrenchment relations are known to be qualitative necessity relations (in the sense of possibility theory), hedonic relations obeying a set of reasonable postulates correspond to another set-function in possibility theory, called guaranteed possibility, that drive well-behaved desire revision operations. Then the general framework of possibilistic logic provides a syntactic setting for encoding desire change. The paper also insists that desires should be carefully distinguished from goals. Desire Revision Possibility theory Lorini, Emiliano aut Prade, Henri (orcid)0000-0003-4586-8527 aut Enthalten in Minds and machines Springer Netherlands, 1991 27(2017), 1 vom: März, Seite 199-231 (DE-627)130969850 (DE-600)1070272-6 (DE-576)032730268 0924-6495 nnns volume:27 year:2017 number:1 month:03 pages:199-231 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-017-9426-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-PHI SSG-OLC-MAT GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_70 AR 27 2017 1 03 199-231 |
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10.1007/s11023-017-9426-5 doi (DE-627)OLC2047789796 (DE-He213)s11023-017-9426-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 050 VZ Dubois, Didier verfasserin aut The Strength of Desires: A Logical Approach 2017 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017 Abstract The aim of this paper is to propose a formal approach to reasoning about desires, understood as logical propositions which we would be pleased to make true, also acknowledging the fact that desire is a matter of degree. It is first shown that, at the static level, desires should satisfy certain principles that differ from those to which beliefs obey. In this sense, from a static perspective, the logic of desires is different from the logic of beliefs. While the accumulation of beliefs tend to reduce the remaining possible worlds they point at, the accumulation of desires tends to increase the set of states of affairs tentatively considered as satisfactory. Indeed beliefs are expected to be closed under conjunctions, while, in the positive view of desires developed here, one can argue that endorsing $$\varphi \vee \psi$$ as a desire means to desire $$\varphi$$ and to desire $$\psi$$. However, desiring $$\varphi$$ and $$\lnot \varphi$$ at the same time is not usually regarded as rational, since it does not make much sense to desire one thing and its contrary at the same time. Thus when a new desire is added to the set of desires of an agent, a revision process may be necessary. Just as belief revision relies on an epistemic entrenchment relation, desire revision is based on a hedonic entrenchment relation satisfying other properties, due to the different natures of belief and desire. While epistemic entrenchment relations are known to be qualitative necessity relations (in the sense of possibility theory), hedonic relations obeying a set of reasonable postulates correspond to another set-function in possibility theory, called guaranteed possibility, that drive well-behaved desire revision operations. Then the general framework of possibilistic logic provides a syntactic setting for encoding desire change. The paper also insists that desires should be carefully distinguished from goals. Desire Revision Possibility theory Lorini, Emiliano aut Prade, Henri (orcid)0000-0003-4586-8527 aut Enthalten in Minds and machines Springer Netherlands, 1991 27(2017), 1 vom: März, Seite 199-231 (DE-627)130969850 (DE-600)1070272-6 (DE-576)032730268 0924-6495 nnns volume:27 year:2017 number:1 month:03 pages:199-231 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-017-9426-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-PHI SSG-OLC-MAT GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_70 AR 27 2017 1 03 199-231 |
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the strength of desires: a logical approach |
title_auth |
The Strength of Desires: A Logical Approach |
abstract |
Abstract The aim of this paper is to propose a formal approach to reasoning about desires, understood as logical propositions which we would be pleased to make true, also acknowledging the fact that desire is a matter of degree. It is first shown that, at the static level, desires should satisfy certain principles that differ from those to which beliefs obey. In this sense, from a static perspective, the logic of desires is different from the logic of beliefs. While the accumulation of beliefs tend to reduce the remaining possible worlds they point at, the accumulation of desires tends to increase the set of states of affairs tentatively considered as satisfactory. Indeed beliefs are expected to be closed under conjunctions, while, in the positive view of desires developed here, one can argue that endorsing $$\varphi \vee \psi$$ as a desire means to desire $$\varphi$$ and to desire $$\psi$$. However, desiring $$\varphi$$ and $$\lnot \varphi$$ at the same time is not usually regarded as rational, since it does not make much sense to desire one thing and its contrary at the same time. Thus when a new desire is added to the set of desires of an agent, a revision process may be necessary. Just as belief revision relies on an epistemic entrenchment relation, desire revision is based on a hedonic entrenchment relation satisfying other properties, due to the different natures of belief and desire. While epistemic entrenchment relations are known to be qualitative necessity relations (in the sense of possibility theory), hedonic relations obeying a set of reasonable postulates correspond to another set-function in possibility theory, called guaranteed possibility, that drive well-behaved desire revision operations. Then the general framework of possibilistic logic provides a syntactic setting for encoding desire change. The paper also insists that desires should be carefully distinguished from goals. © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017 |
abstractGer |
Abstract The aim of this paper is to propose a formal approach to reasoning about desires, understood as logical propositions which we would be pleased to make true, also acknowledging the fact that desire is a matter of degree. It is first shown that, at the static level, desires should satisfy certain principles that differ from those to which beliefs obey. In this sense, from a static perspective, the logic of desires is different from the logic of beliefs. While the accumulation of beliefs tend to reduce the remaining possible worlds they point at, the accumulation of desires tends to increase the set of states of affairs tentatively considered as satisfactory. Indeed beliefs are expected to be closed under conjunctions, while, in the positive view of desires developed here, one can argue that endorsing $$\varphi \vee \psi$$ as a desire means to desire $$\varphi$$ and to desire $$\psi$$. However, desiring $$\varphi$$ and $$\lnot \varphi$$ at the same time is not usually regarded as rational, since it does not make much sense to desire one thing and its contrary at the same time. Thus when a new desire is added to the set of desires of an agent, a revision process may be necessary. Just as belief revision relies on an epistemic entrenchment relation, desire revision is based on a hedonic entrenchment relation satisfying other properties, due to the different natures of belief and desire. While epistemic entrenchment relations are known to be qualitative necessity relations (in the sense of possibility theory), hedonic relations obeying a set of reasonable postulates correspond to another set-function in possibility theory, called guaranteed possibility, that drive well-behaved desire revision operations. Then the general framework of possibilistic logic provides a syntactic setting for encoding desire change. The paper also insists that desires should be carefully distinguished from goals. © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017 |
abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract The aim of this paper is to propose a formal approach to reasoning about desires, understood as logical propositions which we would be pleased to make true, also acknowledging the fact that desire is a matter of degree. It is first shown that, at the static level, desires should satisfy certain principles that differ from those to which beliefs obey. In this sense, from a static perspective, the logic of desires is different from the logic of beliefs. While the accumulation of beliefs tend to reduce the remaining possible worlds they point at, the accumulation of desires tends to increase the set of states of affairs tentatively considered as satisfactory. Indeed beliefs are expected to be closed under conjunctions, while, in the positive view of desires developed here, one can argue that endorsing $$\varphi \vee \psi$$ as a desire means to desire $$\varphi$$ and to desire $$\psi$$. However, desiring $$\varphi$$ and $$\lnot \varphi$$ at the same time is not usually regarded as rational, since it does not make much sense to desire one thing and its contrary at the same time. Thus when a new desire is added to the set of desires of an agent, a revision process may be necessary. Just as belief revision relies on an epistemic entrenchment relation, desire revision is based on a hedonic entrenchment relation satisfying other properties, due to the different natures of belief and desire. While epistemic entrenchment relations are known to be qualitative necessity relations (in the sense of possibility theory), hedonic relations obeying a set of reasonable postulates correspond to another set-function in possibility theory, called guaranteed possibility, that drive well-behaved desire revision operations. Then the general framework of possibilistic logic provides a syntactic setting for encoding desire change. The paper also insists that desires should be carefully distinguished from goals. © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017 |
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title_short |
The Strength of Desires: A Logical Approach |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-017-9426-5 |
remote_bool |
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author2 |
Lorini, Emiliano Prade, Henri |
author2Str |
Lorini, Emiliano Prade, Henri |
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doi_str |
10.1007/s11023-017-9426-5 |
up_date |
2024-07-03T16:19:13.322Z |
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