The Broadband Access Market: Competition, Uniform Pricing and Geographical Coverage
Abstract In this paper we analyze the market for broadband access. A key feature of this market is that it is considerably more expensive to connect consumers in rural locations than in urban locations. We show that while competition increases welfare compared to monopoly when prices are free to dif...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Foros, Øystein [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
2003 |
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Schlagwörter: |
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Anmerkung: |
© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Journal of regulatory economics - Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989, 23(2003), 3 vom: Mai, Seite 215-235 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:23 ; year:2003 ; number:3 ; month:05 ; pages:215-235 |
Links: |
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DOI / URN: |
10.1023/A:1023408025917 |
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Katalog-ID: |
OLC2048939139 |
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10.1023/A:1023408025917 doi (DE-627)OLC2048939139 (DE-He213)A:1023408025917-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Foros, Øystein verfasserin aut The Broadband Access Market: Competition, Uniform Pricing and Geographical Coverage 2003 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003 Abstract In this paper we analyze the market for broadband access. A key feature of this market is that it is considerably more expensive to connect consumers in rural locations than in urban locations. We show that while competition increases welfare compared to monopoly when prices are free to differ across locations, the opposite may be true if there is a requirement of uniform pricing across locations. Furthermore, we show that given uniform pricing, the regulator may increase consumer surplus as well as profit by requiring a higher regional coverage than the market outcome. Public Finance Industrial Organization Consumer Surplus Rural Location Urban Location Kind, Hans Jarle aut Enthalten in Journal of regulatory economics Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989 23(2003), 3 vom: Mai, Seite 215-235 (DE-627)170221695 (DE-600)1027173-9 (DE-576)023101695 0922-680X nnns volume:23 year:2003 number:3 month:05 pages:215-235 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023408025917 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 23 2003 3 05 215-235 |
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10.1023/A:1023408025917 doi (DE-627)OLC2048939139 (DE-He213)A:1023408025917-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Foros, Øystein verfasserin aut The Broadband Access Market: Competition, Uniform Pricing and Geographical Coverage 2003 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003 Abstract In this paper we analyze the market for broadband access. A key feature of this market is that it is considerably more expensive to connect consumers in rural locations than in urban locations. We show that while competition increases welfare compared to monopoly when prices are free to differ across locations, the opposite may be true if there is a requirement of uniform pricing across locations. Furthermore, we show that given uniform pricing, the regulator may increase consumer surplus as well as profit by requiring a higher regional coverage than the market outcome. Public Finance Industrial Organization Consumer Surplus Rural Location Urban Location Kind, Hans Jarle aut Enthalten in Journal of regulatory economics Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989 23(2003), 3 vom: Mai, Seite 215-235 (DE-627)170221695 (DE-600)1027173-9 (DE-576)023101695 0922-680X nnns volume:23 year:2003 number:3 month:05 pages:215-235 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023408025917 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 23 2003 3 05 215-235 |
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10.1023/A:1023408025917 doi (DE-627)OLC2048939139 (DE-He213)A:1023408025917-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Foros, Øystein verfasserin aut The Broadband Access Market: Competition, Uniform Pricing and Geographical Coverage 2003 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003 Abstract In this paper we analyze the market for broadband access. A key feature of this market is that it is considerably more expensive to connect consumers in rural locations than in urban locations. We show that while competition increases welfare compared to monopoly when prices are free to differ across locations, the opposite may be true if there is a requirement of uniform pricing across locations. Furthermore, we show that given uniform pricing, the regulator may increase consumer surplus as well as profit by requiring a higher regional coverage than the market outcome. Public Finance Industrial Organization Consumer Surplus Rural Location Urban Location Kind, Hans Jarle aut Enthalten in Journal of regulatory economics Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989 23(2003), 3 vom: Mai, Seite 215-235 (DE-627)170221695 (DE-600)1027173-9 (DE-576)023101695 0922-680X nnns volume:23 year:2003 number:3 month:05 pages:215-235 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023408025917 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 23 2003 3 05 215-235 |
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10.1023/A:1023408025917 doi (DE-627)OLC2048939139 (DE-He213)A:1023408025917-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Foros, Øystein verfasserin aut The Broadband Access Market: Competition, Uniform Pricing and Geographical Coverage 2003 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003 Abstract In this paper we analyze the market for broadband access. A key feature of this market is that it is considerably more expensive to connect consumers in rural locations than in urban locations. We show that while competition increases welfare compared to monopoly when prices are free to differ across locations, the opposite may be true if there is a requirement of uniform pricing across locations. Furthermore, we show that given uniform pricing, the regulator may increase consumer surplus as well as profit by requiring a higher regional coverage than the market outcome. Public Finance Industrial Organization Consumer Surplus Rural Location Urban Location Kind, Hans Jarle aut Enthalten in Journal of regulatory economics Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989 23(2003), 3 vom: Mai, Seite 215-235 (DE-627)170221695 (DE-600)1027173-9 (DE-576)023101695 0922-680X nnns volume:23 year:2003 number:3 month:05 pages:215-235 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023408025917 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 23 2003 3 05 215-235 |
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Abstract In this paper we analyze the market for broadband access. A key feature of this market is that it is considerably more expensive to connect consumers in rural locations than in urban locations. We show that while competition increases welfare compared to monopoly when prices are free to differ across locations, the opposite may be true if there is a requirement of uniform pricing across locations. Furthermore, we show that given uniform pricing, the regulator may increase consumer surplus as well as profit by requiring a higher regional coverage than the market outcome. © Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003 |
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Abstract In this paper we analyze the market for broadband access. A key feature of this market is that it is considerably more expensive to connect consumers in rural locations than in urban locations. We show that while competition increases welfare compared to monopoly when prices are free to differ across locations, the opposite may be true if there is a requirement of uniform pricing across locations. Furthermore, we show that given uniform pricing, the regulator may increase consumer surplus as well as profit by requiring a higher regional coverage than the market outcome. © Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003 |
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Abstract In this paper we analyze the market for broadband access. A key feature of this market is that it is considerably more expensive to connect consumers in rural locations than in urban locations. We show that while competition increases welfare compared to monopoly when prices are free to differ across locations, the opposite may be true if there is a requirement of uniform pricing across locations. Furthermore, we show that given uniform pricing, the regulator may increase consumer surplus as well as profit by requiring a higher regional coverage than the market outcome. © Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003 |
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A key feature of this market is that it is considerably more expensive to connect consumers in rural locations than in urban locations. We show that while competition increases welfare compared to monopoly when prices are free to differ across locations, the opposite may be true if there is a requirement of uniform pricing across locations. 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