Setting trigger price in emissions permit markets equipped with a safety valve mechanism
Abstract This study develops an analytical model of emissions markets equipped with a safety valve mechanism. It examines how a regulator can control emission reductions by emitters by setting two policy parameters: emission targets and trigger prices. I demonstrate that the capabilities of these tw...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Maeda, Akira [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2011 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Journal of regulatory economics - Springer US, 1989, 41(2011), 3 vom: 04. Nov., Seite 358-379 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:41 ; year:2011 ; number:3 ; day:04 ; month:11 ; pages:358-379 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11149-011-9168-x |
|---|
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OLC2048941788 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract This study develops an analytical model of emissions markets equipped with a safety valve mechanism. It examines how a regulator can control emission reductions by emitters by setting two policy parameters: emission targets and trigger prices. I demonstrate that the capabilities of these two policy parameters are greatly affected by uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions. I also show that there exists a specific combination of target and trigger-price settings that eliminates the need to consider uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions when regulators set emission reduction goals. The model and its findings identify a rule for setting trigger prices with respect to the total design of tradable permit systems and thus offer practical guidance in designing a permit market. | ||
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10.1007/s11149-011-9168-x doi (DE-627)OLC2048941788 (DE-He213)s11149-011-9168-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Maeda, Akira verfasserin aut Setting trigger price in emissions permit markets equipped with a safety valve mechanism 2011 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 Abstract This study develops an analytical model of emissions markets equipped with a safety valve mechanism. It examines how a regulator can control emission reductions by emitters by setting two policy parameters: emission targets and trigger prices. I demonstrate that the capabilities of these two policy parameters are greatly affected by uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions. I also show that there exists a specific combination of target and trigger-price settings that eliminates the need to consider uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions when regulators set emission reduction goals. The model and its findings identify a rule for setting trigger prices with respect to the total design of tradable permit systems and thus offer practical guidance in designing a permit market. Tradable permits Marketable permits Cap-and-trade systems Uncertainty Price cap Enthalten in Journal of regulatory economics Springer US, 1989 41(2011), 3 vom: 04. Nov., Seite 358-379 (DE-627)170221695 (DE-600)1027173-9 (DE-576)023101695 0922-680X nnns volume:41 year:2011 number:3 day:04 month:11 pages:358-379 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-011-9168-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 41 2011 3 04 11 358-379 |
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10.1007/s11149-011-9168-x doi (DE-627)OLC2048941788 (DE-He213)s11149-011-9168-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Maeda, Akira verfasserin aut Setting trigger price in emissions permit markets equipped with a safety valve mechanism 2011 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 Abstract This study develops an analytical model of emissions markets equipped with a safety valve mechanism. It examines how a regulator can control emission reductions by emitters by setting two policy parameters: emission targets and trigger prices. I demonstrate that the capabilities of these two policy parameters are greatly affected by uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions. I also show that there exists a specific combination of target and trigger-price settings that eliminates the need to consider uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions when regulators set emission reduction goals. The model and its findings identify a rule for setting trigger prices with respect to the total design of tradable permit systems and thus offer practical guidance in designing a permit market. Tradable permits Marketable permits Cap-and-trade systems Uncertainty Price cap Enthalten in Journal of regulatory economics Springer US, 1989 41(2011), 3 vom: 04. Nov., Seite 358-379 (DE-627)170221695 (DE-600)1027173-9 (DE-576)023101695 0922-680X nnns volume:41 year:2011 number:3 day:04 month:11 pages:358-379 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-011-9168-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 41 2011 3 04 11 358-379 |
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10.1007/s11149-011-9168-x doi (DE-627)OLC2048941788 (DE-He213)s11149-011-9168-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Maeda, Akira verfasserin aut Setting trigger price in emissions permit markets equipped with a safety valve mechanism 2011 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 Abstract This study develops an analytical model of emissions markets equipped with a safety valve mechanism. It examines how a regulator can control emission reductions by emitters by setting two policy parameters: emission targets and trigger prices. I demonstrate that the capabilities of these two policy parameters are greatly affected by uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions. I also show that there exists a specific combination of target and trigger-price settings that eliminates the need to consider uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions when regulators set emission reduction goals. The model and its findings identify a rule for setting trigger prices with respect to the total design of tradable permit systems and thus offer practical guidance in designing a permit market. Tradable permits Marketable permits Cap-and-trade systems Uncertainty Price cap Enthalten in Journal of regulatory economics Springer US, 1989 41(2011), 3 vom: 04. Nov., Seite 358-379 (DE-627)170221695 (DE-600)1027173-9 (DE-576)023101695 0922-680X nnns volume:41 year:2011 number:3 day:04 month:11 pages:358-379 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-011-9168-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 41 2011 3 04 11 358-379 |
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10.1007/s11149-011-9168-x doi (DE-627)OLC2048941788 (DE-He213)s11149-011-9168-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Maeda, Akira verfasserin aut Setting trigger price in emissions permit markets equipped with a safety valve mechanism 2011 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 Abstract This study develops an analytical model of emissions markets equipped with a safety valve mechanism. It examines how a regulator can control emission reductions by emitters by setting two policy parameters: emission targets and trigger prices. I demonstrate that the capabilities of these two policy parameters are greatly affected by uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions. I also show that there exists a specific combination of target and trigger-price settings that eliminates the need to consider uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions when regulators set emission reduction goals. The model and its findings identify a rule for setting trigger prices with respect to the total design of tradable permit systems and thus offer practical guidance in designing a permit market. Tradable permits Marketable permits Cap-and-trade systems Uncertainty Price cap Enthalten in Journal of regulatory economics Springer US, 1989 41(2011), 3 vom: 04. Nov., Seite 358-379 (DE-627)170221695 (DE-600)1027173-9 (DE-576)023101695 0922-680X nnns volume:41 year:2011 number:3 day:04 month:11 pages:358-379 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-011-9168-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 41 2011 3 04 11 358-379 |
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Abstract This study develops an analytical model of emissions markets equipped with a safety valve mechanism. It examines how a regulator can control emission reductions by emitters by setting two policy parameters: emission targets and trigger prices. I demonstrate that the capabilities of these two policy parameters are greatly affected by uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions. I also show that there exists a specific combination of target and trigger-price settings that eliminates the need to consider uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions when regulators set emission reduction goals. The model and its findings identify a rule for setting trigger prices with respect to the total design of tradable permit systems and thus offer practical guidance in designing a permit market. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 |
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Abstract This study develops an analytical model of emissions markets equipped with a safety valve mechanism. It examines how a regulator can control emission reductions by emitters by setting two policy parameters: emission targets and trigger prices. I demonstrate that the capabilities of these two policy parameters are greatly affected by uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions. I also show that there exists a specific combination of target and trigger-price settings that eliminates the need to consider uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions when regulators set emission reduction goals. The model and its findings identify a rule for setting trigger prices with respect to the total design of tradable permit systems and thus offer practical guidance in designing a permit market. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 |
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Abstract This study develops an analytical model of emissions markets equipped with a safety valve mechanism. It examines how a regulator can control emission reductions by emitters by setting two policy parameters: emission targets and trigger prices. I demonstrate that the capabilities of these two policy parameters are greatly affected by uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions. I also show that there exists a specific combination of target and trigger-price settings that eliminates the need to consider uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions when regulators set emission reduction goals. The model and its findings identify a rule for setting trigger prices with respect to the total design of tradable permit systems and thus offer practical guidance in designing a permit market. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 |
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It examines how a regulator can control emission reductions by emitters by setting two policy parameters: emission targets and trigger prices. I demonstrate that the capabilities of these two policy parameters are greatly affected by uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions. I also show that there exists a specific combination of target and trigger-price settings that eliminates the need to consider uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions when regulators set emission reduction goals. The model and its findings identify a rule for setting trigger prices with respect to the total design of tradable permit systems and thus offer practical guidance in designing a permit market.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Tradable permits</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Marketable permits</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Cap-and-trade systems</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Uncertainty</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Price cap</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Journal of regulatory economics</subfield><subfield code="d">Springer US, 1989</subfield><subfield code="g">41(2011), 3 vom: 04. 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