A cooperative game of information trading: The core, the nucleolus and the kernel
Abstract A certain trade of the information about a technological innovation between the initial owner of the information andn identical producers is studied by means of a cooperative game theoretic approach. The information trading situation is modelled as a cooperative (n+1)-person game with side...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Driessen, T. [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
1992 |
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Schlagwörter: |
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Anmerkung: |
© Physica-Verlag 1992 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Zeitschrift für Operations-Research - Physica-Verlag, 1972, 36(1992), 1 vom: Jan., Seite 55-72 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:36 ; year:1992 ; number:1 ; month:01 ; pages:55-72 |
Links: |
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DOI / URN: |
10.1007/BF01541032 |
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Katalog-ID: |
OLC2057873277 |
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520 | |a Abstract A certain trade of the information about a technological innovation between the initial owner of the information andn identical producers is studied by means of a cooperative game theoretic approach. The information trading situation is modelled as a cooperative (n+1)-person game with side payments. The symmetrical strong ɛ-cores (including the core), the nucleolus and the kernel of the cooperative game model are determined. Interpretations of these game theoretic solutions and their implications for the information trading problem are given. | ||
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10.1007/BF01541032 doi (DE-627)OLC2057873277 (DE-He213)BF01541032-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 330 VZ Driessen, T. verfasserin aut A cooperative game of information trading: The core, the nucleolus and the kernel 1992 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Physica-Verlag 1992 Abstract A certain trade of the information about a technological innovation between the initial owner of the information andn identical producers is studied by means of a cooperative game theoretic approach. The information trading situation is modelled as a cooperative (n+1)-person game with side payments. The symmetrical strong ɛ-cores (including the core), the nucleolus and the kernel of the cooperative game model are determined. Interpretations of these game theoretic solutions and their implications for the information trading problem are given. Theoretic Approach Technological Innovation Cooperative Game Theoretic Solution Game Model Muto, S. aut Nakayama, M. aut Enthalten in Zeitschrift für Operations-Research Physica-Verlag, 1972 36(1992), 1 vom: Jan., Seite 55-72 (DE-627)129622249 (DE-600)246737-9 (DE-576)015132390 0340-9422 nnns volume:36 year:1992 number:1 month:01 pages:55-72 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01541032 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_30 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_132 GBV_ILN_136 GBV_ILN_140 GBV_ILN_252 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4319 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4327 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 36 1992 1 01 55-72 |
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10.1007/BF01541032 doi (DE-627)OLC2057873277 (DE-He213)BF01541032-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 330 VZ Driessen, T. verfasserin aut A cooperative game of information trading: The core, the nucleolus and the kernel 1992 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Physica-Verlag 1992 Abstract A certain trade of the information about a technological innovation between the initial owner of the information andn identical producers is studied by means of a cooperative game theoretic approach. The information trading situation is modelled as a cooperative (n+1)-person game with side payments. The symmetrical strong ɛ-cores (including the core), the nucleolus and the kernel of the cooperative game model are determined. Interpretations of these game theoretic solutions and their implications for the information trading problem are given. Theoretic Approach Technological Innovation Cooperative Game Theoretic Solution Game Model Muto, S. aut Nakayama, M. aut Enthalten in Zeitschrift für Operations-Research Physica-Verlag, 1972 36(1992), 1 vom: Jan., Seite 55-72 (DE-627)129622249 (DE-600)246737-9 (DE-576)015132390 0340-9422 nnns volume:36 year:1992 number:1 month:01 pages:55-72 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01541032 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_30 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_132 GBV_ILN_136 GBV_ILN_140 GBV_ILN_252 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4319 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4327 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 36 1992 1 01 55-72 |
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10.1007/BF01541032 doi (DE-627)OLC2057873277 (DE-He213)BF01541032-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 330 VZ Driessen, T. verfasserin aut A cooperative game of information trading: The core, the nucleolus and the kernel 1992 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Physica-Verlag 1992 Abstract A certain trade of the information about a technological innovation between the initial owner of the information andn identical producers is studied by means of a cooperative game theoretic approach. The information trading situation is modelled as a cooperative (n+1)-person game with side payments. The symmetrical strong ɛ-cores (including the core), the nucleolus and the kernel of the cooperative game model are determined. Interpretations of these game theoretic solutions and their implications for the information trading problem are given. Theoretic Approach Technological Innovation Cooperative Game Theoretic Solution Game Model Muto, S. aut Nakayama, M. aut Enthalten in Zeitschrift für Operations-Research Physica-Verlag, 1972 36(1992), 1 vom: Jan., Seite 55-72 (DE-627)129622249 (DE-600)246737-9 (DE-576)015132390 0340-9422 nnns volume:36 year:1992 number:1 month:01 pages:55-72 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01541032 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_30 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_132 GBV_ILN_136 GBV_ILN_140 GBV_ILN_252 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4319 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4327 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 36 1992 1 01 55-72 |
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10.1007/BF01541032 doi (DE-627)OLC2057873277 (DE-He213)BF01541032-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 330 VZ Driessen, T. verfasserin aut A cooperative game of information trading: The core, the nucleolus and the kernel 1992 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Physica-Verlag 1992 Abstract A certain trade of the information about a technological innovation between the initial owner of the information andn identical producers is studied by means of a cooperative game theoretic approach. The information trading situation is modelled as a cooperative (n+1)-person game with side payments. The symmetrical strong ɛ-cores (including the core), the nucleolus and the kernel of the cooperative game model are determined. Interpretations of these game theoretic solutions and their implications for the information trading problem are given. Theoretic Approach Technological Innovation Cooperative Game Theoretic Solution Game Model Muto, S. aut Nakayama, M. aut Enthalten in Zeitschrift für Operations-Research Physica-Verlag, 1972 36(1992), 1 vom: Jan., Seite 55-72 (DE-627)129622249 (DE-600)246737-9 (DE-576)015132390 0340-9422 nnns volume:36 year:1992 number:1 month:01 pages:55-72 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01541032 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_30 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_132 GBV_ILN_136 GBV_ILN_140 GBV_ILN_252 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4319 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4327 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 36 1992 1 01 55-72 |
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10.1007/BF01541032 doi (DE-627)OLC2057873277 (DE-He213)BF01541032-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 330 VZ Driessen, T. verfasserin aut A cooperative game of information trading: The core, the nucleolus and the kernel 1992 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Physica-Verlag 1992 Abstract A certain trade of the information about a technological innovation between the initial owner of the information andn identical producers is studied by means of a cooperative game theoretic approach. The information trading situation is modelled as a cooperative (n+1)-person game with side payments. The symmetrical strong ɛ-cores (including the core), the nucleolus and the kernel of the cooperative game model are determined. Interpretations of these game theoretic solutions and their implications for the information trading problem are given. Theoretic Approach Technological Innovation Cooperative Game Theoretic Solution Game Model Muto, S. aut Nakayama, M. aut Enthalten in Zeitschrift für Operations-Research Physica-Verlag, 1972 36(1992), 1 vom: Jan., Seite 55-72 (DE-627)129622249 (DE-600)246737-9 (DE-576)015132390 0340-9422 nnns volume:36 year:1992 number:1 month:01 pages:55-72 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01541032 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_30 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_132 GBV_ILN_136 GBV_ILN_140 GBV_ILN_252 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4319 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4327 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 36 1992 1 01 55-72 |
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a cooperative game of information trading: the core, the nucleolus and the kernel |
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A cooperative game of information trading: The core, the nucleolus and the kernel |
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Abstract A certain trade of the information about a technological innovation between the initial owner of the information andn identical producers is studied by means of a cooperative game theoretic approach. The information trading situation is modelled as a cooperative (n+1)-person game with side payments. The symmetrical strong ɛ-cores (including the core), the nucleolus and the kernel of the cooperative game model are determined. Interpretations of these game theoretic solutions and their implications for the information trading problem are given. © Physica-Verlag 1992 |
abstractGer |
Abstract A certain trade of the information about a technological innovation between the initial owner of the information andn identical producers is studied by means of a cooperative game theoretic approach. The information trading situation is modelled as a cooperative (n+1)-person game with side payments. The symmetrical strong ɛ-cores (including the core), the nucleolus and the kernel of the cooperative game model are determined. Interpretations of these game theoretic solutions and their implications for the information trading problem are given. © Physica-Verlag 1992 |
abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract A certain trade of the information about a technological innovation between the initial owner of the information andn identical producers is studied by means of a cooperative game theoretic approach. The information trading situation is modelled as a cooperative (n+1)-person game with side payments. The symmetrical strong ɛ-cores (including the core), the nucleolus and the kernel of the cooperative game model are determined. Interpretations of these game theoretic solutions and their implications for the information trading problem are given. © Physica-Verlag 1992 |
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