The optimality of nominal contracts
Summary. This paper presents a model in which agents choose to use money as a medium of exchange, a means of payment, and a unit of account. The paper defines conditions under which nominal contracts, promising future payment of a fixed number of units of fiat money, prove to be the optimal contract...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Freeman, Scott [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
1998 |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Economic theory - Springer-Verlag, 1991, 11(1998), 3 vom: Apr., Seite 545-562 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:11 ; year:1998 ; number:3 ; month:04 ; pages:545-562 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s001990050201 |
|---|
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OLC2060487048 |
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| 520 | |a Summary. This paper presents a model in which agents choose to use money as a medium of exchange, a means of payment, and a unit of account. The paper defines conditions under which nominal contracts, promising future payment of a fixed number of units of fiat money, prove to be the optimal contract form in the presence of either relative or aggregate price risk. When relative prices are random, nominal contracts are optimal if individuals have ex ante similar preferences over future consumption. When the aggregate price level is random, whether from shocks to the money supply or aggregate output, nominal contracts (perhaps coupled with equity contracts) lead to optimal risk-sharing if individuals have the same degree of relative risk aversion. Finally, nominal contracts may be optimal if the repayment of contracts is subject to a binding cash-in-advance constraint. In this case, a contingent contract increases the risk of holding excessive cash balances. | ||
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10.1007/s001990050201 doi (DE-627)OLC2060487048 (DE-He213)s001990050201-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 330 510 VZ 83.00 bkl Freeman, Scott verfasserin aut The optimality of nominal contracts 1998 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998 Summary. This paper presents a model in which agents choose to use money as a medium of exchange, a means of payment, and a unit of account. The paper defines conditions under which nominal contracts, promising future payment of a fixed number of units of fiat money, prove to be the optimal contract form in the presence of either relative or aggregate price risk. When relative prices are random, nominal contracts are optimal if individuals have ex ante similar preferences over future consumption. When the aggregate price level is random, whether from shocks to the money supply or aggregate output, nominal contracts (perhaps coupled with equity contracts) lead to optimal risk-sharing if individuals have the same degree of relative risk aversion. Finally, nominal contracts may be optimal if the repayment of contracts is subject to a binding cash-in-advance constraint. In this case, a contingent contract increases the risk of holding excessive cash balances. Tabellini, Guido aut Enthalten in Economic theory Springer-Verlag, 1991 11(1998), 3 vom: Apr., Seite 545-562 (DE-627)13093870X (DE-600)1059110-2 (DE-576)025091611 0938-2259 nnns volume:11 year:1998 number:3 month:04 pages:545-562 https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050201 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4036 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4324 83.00 VZ AR 11 1998 3 04 545-562 |
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10.1007/s001990050201 doi (DE-627)OLC2060487048 (DE-He213)s001990050201-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 330 510 VZ 83.00 bkl Freeman, Scott verfasserin aut The optimality of nominal contracts 1998 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998 Summary. This paper presents a model in which agents choose to use money as a medium of exchange, a means of payment, and a unit of account. The paper defines conditions under which nominal contracts, promising future payment of a fixed number of units of fiat money, prove to be the optimal contract form in the presence of either relative or aggregate price risk. When relative prices are random, nominal contracts are optimal if individuals have ex ante similar preferences over future consumption. When the aggregate price level is random, whether from shocks to the money supply or aggregate output, nominal contracts (perhaps coupled with equity contracts) lead to optimal risk-sharing if individuals have the same degree of relative risk aversion. Finally, nominal contracts may be optimal if the repayment of contracts is subject to a binding cash-in-advance constraint. In this case, a contingent contract increases the risk of holding excessive cash balances. Tabellini, Guido aut Enthalten in Economic theory Springer-Verlag, 1991 11(1998), 3 vom: Apr., Seite 545-562 (DE-627)13093870X (DE-600)1059110-2 (DE-576)025091611 0938-2259 nnns volume:11 year:1998 number:3 month:04 pages:545-562 https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050201 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4036 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4324 83.00 VZ AR 11 1998 3 04 545-562 |
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10.1007/s001990050201 doi (DE-627)OLC2060487048 (DE-He213)s001990050201-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 330 510 VZ 83.00 bkl Freeman, Scott verfasserin aut The optimality of nominal contracts 1998 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998 Summary. This paper presents a model in which agents choose to use money as a medium of exchange, a means of payment, and a unit of account. The paper defines conditions under which nominal contracts, promising future payment of a fixed number of units of fiat money, prove to be the optimal contract form in the presence of either relative or aggregate price risk. When relative prices are random, nominal contracts are optimal if individuals have ex ante similar preferences over future consumption. When the aggregate price level is random, whether from shocks to the money supply or aggregate output, nominal contracts (perhaps coupled with equity contracts) lead to optimal risk-sharing if individuals have the same degree of relative risk aversion. Finally, nominal contracts may be optimal if the repayment of contracts is subject to a binding cash-in-advance constraint. In this case, a contingent contract increases the risk of holding excessive cash balances. Tabellini, Guido aut Enthalten in Economic theory Springer-Verlag, 1991 11(1998), 3 vom: Apr., Seite 545-562 (DE-627)13093870X (DE-600)1059110-2 (DE-576)025091611 0938-2259 nnns volume:11 year:1998 number:3 month:04 pages:545-562 https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050201 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4036 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4324 83.00 VZ AR 11 1998 3 04 545-562 |
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10.1007/s001990050201 doi (DE-627)OLC2060487048 (DE-He213)s001990050201-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 330 510 VZ 83.00 bkl Freeman, Scott verfasserin aut The optimality of nominal contracts 1998 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998 Summary. This paper presents a model in which agents choose to use money as a medium of exchange, a means of payment, and a unit of account. The paper defines conditions under which nominal contracts, promising future payment of a fixed number of units of fiat money, prove to be the optimal contract form in the presence of either relative or aggregate price risk. When relative prices are random, nominal contracts are optimal if individuals have ex ante similar preferences over future consumption. When the aggregate price level is random, whether from shocks to the money supply or aggregate output, nominal contracts (perhaps coupled with equity contracts) lead to optimal risk-sharing if individuals have the same degree of relative risk aversion. Finally, nominal contracts may be optimal if the repayment of contracts is subject to a binding cash-in-advance constraint. In this case, a contingent contract increases the risk of holding excessive cash balances. Tabellini, Guido aut Enthalten in Economic theory Springer-Verlag, 1991 11(1998), 3 vom: Apr., Seite 545-562 (DE-627)13093870X (DE-600)1059110-2 (DE-576)025091611 0938-2259 nnns volume:11 year:1998 number:3 month:04 pages:545-562 https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050201 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4036 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4324 83.00 VZ AR 11 1998 3 04 545-562 |
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10.1007/s001990050201 doi (DE-627)OLC2060487048 (DE-He213)s001990050201-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 330 510 VZ 83.00 bkl Freeman, Scott verfasserin aut The optimality of nominal contracts 1998 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998 Summary. This paper presents a model in which agents choose to use money as a medium of exchange, a means of payment, and a unit of account. The paper defines conditions under which nominal contracts, promising future payment of a fixed number of units of fiat money, prove to be the optimal contract form in the presence of either relative or aggregate price risk. When relative prices are random, nominal contracts are optimal if individuals have ex ante similar preferences over future consumption. When the aggregate price level is random, whether from shocks to the money supply or aggregate output, nominal contracts (perhaps coupled with equity contracts) lead to optimal risk-sharing if individuals have the same degree of relative risk aversion. Finally, nominal contracts may be optimal if the repayment of contracts is subject to a binding cash-in-advance constraint. In this case, a contingent contract increases the risk of holding excessive cash balances. Tabellini, Guido aut Enthalten in Economic theory Springer-Verlag, 1991 11(1998), 3 vom: Apr., Seite 545-562 (DE-627)13093870X (DE-600)1059110-2 (DE-576)025091611 0938-2259 nnns volume:11 year:1998 number:3 month:04 pages:545-562 https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050201 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4036 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4324 83.00 VZ AR 11 1998 3 04 545-562 |
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the optimality of nominal contracts |
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The optimality of nominal contracts |
| abstract |
Summary. This paper presents a model in which agents choose to use money as a medium of exchange, a means of payment, and a unit of account. The paper defines conditions under which nominal contracts, promising future payment of a fixed number of units of fiat money, prove to be the optimal contract form in the presence of either relative or aggregate price risk. When relative prices are random, nominal contracts are optimal if individuals have ex ante similar preferences over future consumption. When the aggregate price level is random, whether from shocks to the money supply or aggregate output, nominal contracts (perhaps coupled with equity contracts) lead to optimal risk-sharing if individuals have the same degree of relative risk aversion. Finally, nominal contracts may be optimal if the repayment of contracts is subject to a binding cash-in-advance constraint. In this case, a contingent contract increases the risk of holding excessive cash balances. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998 |
| abstractGer |
Summary. This paper presents a model in which agents choose to use money as a medium of exchange, a means of payment, and a unit of account. The paper defines conditions under which nominal contracts, promising future payment of a fixed number of units of fiat money, prove to be the optimal contract form in the presence of either relative or aggregate price risk. When relative prices are random, nominal contracts are optimal if individuals have ex ante similar preferences over future consumption. When the aggregate price level is random, whether from shocks to the money supply or aggregate output, nominal contracts (perhaps coupled with equity contracts) lead to optimal risk-sharing if individuals have the same degree of relative risk aversion. Finally, nominal contracts may be optimal if the repayment of contracts is subject to a binding cash-in-advance constraint. In this case, a contingent contract increases the risk of holding excessive cash balances. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Summary. This paper presents a model in which agents choose to use money as a medium of exchange, a means of payment, and a unit of account. The paper defines conditions under which nominal contracts, promising future payment of a fixed number of units of fiat money, prove to be the optimal contract form in the presence of either relative or aggregate price risk. When relative prices are random, nominal contracts are optimal if individuals have ex ante similar preferences over future consumption. When the aggregate price level is random, whether from shocks to the money supply or aggregate output, nominal contracts (perhaps coupled with equity contracts) lead to optimal risk-sharing if individuals have the same degree of relative risk aversion. Finally, nominal contracts may be optimal if the repayment of contracts is subject to a binding cash-in-advance constraint. In this case, a contingent contract increases the risk of holding excessive cash balances. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998 |
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The optimality of nominal contracts |
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