Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard
Summary. In this paper I ask whether a central bank policy of providing liquidity to banks during panics can prevent bank runs without causing moral hazard. This kind of policy has been widely advocated, most notably by Bagehot (1873). I show a particular central bank liquidity provision policy can...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Martin, Antoine [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
2006 |
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Anmerkung: |
© Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Economic theory - Springer-Verlag, 1991, 28(2006), 1 vom: Mai, Seite 197-211 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:28 ; year:2006 ; number:1 ; month:05 ; pages:197-211 |
Links: |
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DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s00199-005-0613-x |
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Katalog-ID: |
OLC2060494427 |
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10.1007/s00199-005-0613-x doi (DE-627)OLC2060494427 (DE-He213)s00199-005-0613-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 330 510 VZ 83.00 bkl Martin, Antoine verfasserin aut Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard 2006 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006 Summary. In this paper I ask whether a central bank policy of providing liquidity to banks during panics can prevent bank runs without causing moral hazard. This kind of policy has been widely advocated, most notably by Bagehot (1873). I show a particular central bank liquidity provision policy can prevent bank panics without moral hazard problems. I also show that a deposit insurance policy, while preventing runs, can create moral hazard problems. Enthalten in Economic theory Springer-Verlag, 1991 28(2006), 1 vom: Mai, Seite 197-211 (DE-627)13093870X (DE-600)1059110-2 (DE-576)025091611 0938-2259 nnns volume:28 year:2006 number:1 month:05 pages:197-211 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0613-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4036 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4324 83.00 VZ AR 28 2006 1 05 197-211 |
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10.1007/s00199-005-0613-x doi (DE-627)OLC2060494427 (DE-He213)s00199-005-0613-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 330 510 VZ 83.00 bkl Martin, Antoine verfasserin aut Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard 2006 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006 Summary. In this paper I ask whether a central bank policy of providing liquidity to banks during panics can prevent bank runs without causing moral hazard. This kind of policy has been widely advocated, most notably by Bagehot (1873). I show a particular central bank liquidity provision policy can prevent bank panics without moral hazard problems. I also show that a deposit insurance policy, while preventing runs, can create moral hazard problems. Enthalten in Economic theory Springer-Verlag, 1991 28(2006), 1 vom: Mai, Seite 197-211 (DE-627)13093870X (DE-600)1059110-2 (DE-576)025091611 0938-2259 nnns volume:28 year:2006 number:1 month:05 pages:197-211 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0613-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4036 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4324 83.00 VZ AR 28 2006 1 05 197-211 |
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10.1007/s00199-005-0613-x doi (DE-627)OLC2060494427 (DE-He213)s00199-005-0613-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 330 510 VZ 83.00 bkl Martin, Antoine verfasserin aut Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard 2006 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006 Summary. In this paper I ask whether a central bank policy of providing liquidity to banks during panics can prevent bank runs without causing moral hazard. This kind of policy has been widely advocated, most notably by Bagehot (1873). I show a particular central bank liquidity provision policy can prevent bank panics without moral hazard problems. I also show that a deposit insurance policy, while preventing runs, can create moral hazard problems. Enthalten in Economic theory Springer-Verlag, 1991 28(2006), 1 vom: Mai, Seite 197-211 (DE-627)13093870X (DE-600)1059110-2 (DE-576)025091611 0938-2259 nnns volume:28 year:2006 number:1 month:05 pages:197-211 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0613-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4036 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4324 83.00 VZ AR 28 2006 1 05 197-211 |
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10.1007/s00199-005-0613-x doi (DE-627)OLC2060494427 (DE-He213)s00199-005-0613-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 330 510 VZ 83.00 bkl Martin, Antoine verfasserin aut Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard 2006 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006 Summary. In this paper I ask whether a central bank policy of providing liquidity to banks during panics can prevent bank runs without causing moral hazard. This kind of policy has been widely advocated, most notably by Bagehot (1873). I show a particular central bank liquidity provision policy can prevent bank panics without moral hazard problems. I also show that a deposit insurance policy, while preventing runs, can create moral hazard problems. Enthalten in Economic theory Springer-Verlag, 1991 28(2006), 1 vom: Mai, Seite 197-211 (DE-627)13093870X (DE-600)1059110-2 (DE-576)025091611 0938-2259 nnns volume:28 year:2006 number:1 month:05 pages:197-211 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0613-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4036 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4324 83.00 VZ AR 28 2006 1 05 197-211 |
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Summary. In this paper I ask whether a central bank policy of providing liquidity to banks during panics can prevent bank runs without causing moral hazard. This kind of policy has been widely advocated, most notably by Bagehot (1873). I show a particular central bank liquidity provision policy can prevent bank panics without moral hazard problems. I also show that a deposit insurance policy, while preventing runs, can create moral hazard problems. © Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006 |
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Summary. In this paper I ask whether a central bank policy of providing liquidity to banks during panics can prevent bank runs without causing moral hazard. This kind of policy has been widely advocated, most notably by Bagehot (1873). I show a particular central bank liquidity provision policy can prevent bank panics without moral hazard problems. I also show that a deposit insurance policy, while preventing runs, can create moral hazard problems. © Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006 |
abstract_unstemmed |
Summary. In this paper I ask whether a central bank policy of providing liquidity to banks during panics can prevent bank runs without causing moral hazard. This kind of policy has been widely advocated, most notably by Bagehot (1873). I show a particular central bank liquidity provision policy can prevent bank panics without moral hazard problems. I also show that a deposit insurance policy, while preventing runs, can create moral hazard problems. © Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006 |
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