Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard

Summary. In this paper I ask whether a central bank policy of providing liquidity to banks during panics can prevent bank runs without causing moral hazard. This kind of policy has been widely advocated, most notably by Bagehot (1873). I show a particular central bank liquidity provision policy can...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Martin, Antoine [verfasserIn]

Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2006

Anmerkung:	© Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Economic theory - Springer-Verlag, 1991, 28(2006), 1 vom: Mai, Seite 197-211
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:28 ; year:2006 ; number:1 ; month:05 ; pages:197-211

Links:	Volltext

DOI / URN:	10.1007/s00199-005-0613-x

Katalog-ID:	OLC2060494427

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abstract	Summary. In this paper I ask whether a central bank policy of providing liquidity to banks during panics can prevent bank runs without causing moral hazard. This kind of policy has been widely advocated, most notably by Bagehot (1873). I show a particular central bank liquidity provision policy can prevent bank panics without moral hazard problems. I also show that a deposit insurance policy, while preventing runs, can create moral hazard problems. © Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006
abstractGer	Summary. In this paper I ask whether a central bank policy of providing liquidity to banks during panics can prevent bank runs without causing moral hazard. This kind of policy has been widely advocated, most notably by Bagehot (1873). I show a particular central bank liquidity provision policy can prevent bank panics without moral hazard problems. I also show that a deposit insurance policy, while preventing runs, can create moral hazard problems. © Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006
abstract_unstemmed	Summary. In this paper I ask whether a central bank policy of providing liquidity to banks during panics can prevent bank runs without causing moral hazard. This kind of policy has been widely advocated, most notably by Bagehot (1873). I show a particular central bank liquidity provision policy can prevent bank panics without moral hazard problems. I also show that a deposit insurance policy, while preventing runs, can create moral hazard problems. © Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006
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up_date	2024-07-04T01:29:04.786Z
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