Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
Abstract In 1961, Vickrey posed the problem of finding an analytic solution to a first-price auction with two buyers having valuations uniformly distributed on $${[\underline{v}_{1}, \overline{v}_{1}]}$$ and $${[\underline{v}_{2}, \overline{v}_{2}]}$$ . To date, only special cases of the problem hav...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Kaplan, Todd R. [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2010 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer-Verlag 2010 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Economic theory - Springer-Verlag, 1991, 50(2010), 2 vom: 19. Sept., Seite 269-302 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:50 ; year:2010 ; number:2 ; day:19 ; month:09 ; pages:269-302 |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s00199-010-0563-9 |
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OLC2060500532 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract In 1961, Vickrey posed the problem of finding an analytic solution to a first-price auction with two buyers having valuations uniformly distributed on $${[\underline{v}_{1}, \overline{v}_{1}]}$$ and $${[\underline{v}_{2}, \overline{v}_{2}]}$$ . To date, only special cases of the problem have been solved. In this paper, we solve this general problem and in addition allow for the possibility of a binding minimum bid. Several interesting examples are presented, including a class where the two bid functions are linear. | ||
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Kaplan, Todd R. |
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10.1007/s00199-010-0563-9 |
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330 510 |
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asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case |
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Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case |
| abstract |
Abstract In 1961, Vickrey posed the problem of finding an analytic solution to a first-price auction with two buyers having valuations uniformly distributed on $${[\underline{v}_{1}, \overline{v}_{1}]}$$ and $${[\underline{v}_{2}, \overline{v}_{2}]}$$ . To date, only special cases of the problem have been solved. In this paper, we solve this general problem and in addition allow for the possibility of a binding minimum bid. Several interesting examples are presented, including a class where the two bid functions are linear. © Springer-Verlag 2010 |
| abstractGer |
Abstract In 1961, Vickrey posed the problem of finding an analytic solution to a first-price auction with two buyers having valuations uniformly distributed on $${[\underline{v}_{1}, \overline{v}_{1}]}$$ and $${[\underline{v}_{2}, \overline{v}_{2}]}$$ . To date, only special cases of the problem have been solved. In this paper, we solve this general problem and in addition allow for the possibility of a binding minimum bid. Several interesting examples are presented, including a class where the two bid functions are linear. © Springer-Verlag 2010 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract In 1961, Vickrey posed the problem of finding an analytic solution to a first-price auction with two buyers having valuations uniformly distributed on $${[\underline{v}_{1}, \overline{v}_{1}]}$$ and $${[\underline{v}_{2}, \overline{v}_{2}]}$$ . To date, only special cases of the problem have been solved. In this paper, we solve this general problem and in addition allow for the possibility of a binding minimum bid. Several interesting examples are presented, including a class where the two bid functions are linear. © Springer-Verlag 2010 |
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Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case |
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Zamir, Shmuel |
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