Efficient outcomes in repeated games with limited monitoring
Abstract The folk theorem for infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring implies that for a general class of games, nearly efficient payoffs can be supported in perfect public equilibrium (PPE), provided the monitoring structure is sufficiently rich and players are arbitrarily patien...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
van der Schaar, Mihaela [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2015 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Economic theory - Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991, 60(2015), 1 vom: 24. Juni, Seite 1-34 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:60 ; year:2015 ; number:1 ; day:24 ; month:06 ; pages:1-34 |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s00199-015-0893-8 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract The folk theorem for infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring implies that for a general class of games, nearly efficient payoffs can be supported in perfect public equilibrium (PPE), provided the monitoring structure is sufficiently rich and players are arbitrarily patient. This paper shows that for stage games in which actions of players interfere strongly with each other, exactly efficient payoffs can be supported in PPE even when the monitoring structure is not rich and players are not arbitrarily patient. The class of stage games we study abstracts many environments including resource sharing. | ||
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| 650 | 4 | |a Imperfect public monitoring | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Perfect public equilibrium | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Efficient outcomes | |
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| 650 | 4 | |a Repeated partnership | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Repeated contest | |
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| 700 | 1 | |a Zame, William |4 aut | |
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10.1007/s00199-015-0893-8 doi (DE-627)OLC2060503094 (DE-He213)s00199-015-0893-8-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 330 510 VZ 83.00 bkl van der Schaar, Mihaela verfasserin aut Efficient outcomes in repeated games with limited monitoring 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015 Abstract The folk theorem for infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring implies that for a general class of games, nearly efficient payoffs can be supported in perfect public equilibrium (PPE), provided the monitoring structure is sufficiently rich and players are arbitrarily patient. This paper shows that for stage games in which actions of players interfere strongly with each other, exactly efficient payoffs can be supported in PPE even when the monitoring structure is not rich and players are not arbitrarily patient. The class of stage games we study abstracts many environments including resource sharing. Repeated games Imperfect public monitoring Perfect public equilibrium Efficient outcomes Repeated resource allocation Repeated partnership Repeated contest Xiao, Yuanzhang aut Zame, William aut Enthalten in Economic theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991 60(2015), 1 vom: 24. Juni, Seite 1-34 (DE-627)13093870X (DE-600)1059110-2 (DE-576)025091611 0938-2259 nnns volume:60 year:2015 number:1 day:24 month:06 pages:1-34 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0893-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4036 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4318 83.00 VZ AR 60 2015 1 24 06 1-34 |
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10.1007/s00199-015-0893-8 doi (DE-627)OLC2060503094 (DE-He213)s00199-015-0893-8-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 330 510 VZ 83.00 bkl van der Schaar, Mihaela verfasserin aut Efficient outcomes in repeated games with limited monitoring 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015 Abstract The folk theorem for infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring implies that for a general class of games, nearly efficient payoffs can be supported in perfect public equilibrium (PPE), provided the monitoring structure is sufficiently rich and players are arbitrarily patient. This paper shows that for stage games in which actions of players interfere strongly with each other, exactly efficient payoffs can be supported in PPE even when the monitoring structure is not rich and players are not arbitrarily patient. The class of stage games we study abstracts many environments including resource sharing. Repeated games Imperfect public monitoring Perfect public equilibrium Efficient outcomes Repeated resource allocation Repeated partnership Repeated contest Xiao, Yuanzhang aut Zame, William aut Enthalten in Economic theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991 60(2015), 1 vom: 24. Juni, Seite 1-34 (DE-627)13093870X (DE-600)1059110-2 (DE-576)025091611 0938-2259 nnns volume:60 year:2015 number:1 day:24 month:06 pages:1-34 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0893-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4036 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4318 83.00 VZ AR 60 2015 1 24 06 1-34 |
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Abstract The folk theorem for infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring implies that for a general class of games, nearly efficient payoffs can be supported in perfect public equilibrium (PPE), provided the monitoring structure is sufficiently rich and players are arbitrarily patient. This paper shows that for stage games in which actions of players interfere strongly with each other, exactly efficient payoffs can be supported in PPE even when the monitoring structure is not rich and players are not arbitrarily patient. The class of stage games we study abstracts many environments including resource sharing. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015 |
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Abstract The folk theorem for infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring implies that for a general class of games, nearly efficient payoffs can be supported in perfect public equilibrium (PPE), provided the monitoring structure is sufficiently rich and players are arbitrarily patient. This paper shows that for stage games in which actions of players interfere strongly with each other, exactly efficient payoffs can be supported in PPE even when the monitoring structure is not rich and players are not arbitrarily patient. The class of stage games we study abstracts many environments including resource sharing. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract The folk theorem for infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring implies that for a general class of games, nearly efficient payoffs can be supported in perfect public equilibrium (PPE), provided the monitoring structure is sufficiently rich and players are arbitrarily patient. This paper shows that for stage games in which actions of players interfere strongly with each other, exactly efficient payoffs can be supported in PPE even when the monitoring structure is not rich and players are not arbitrarily patient. The class of stage games we study abstracts many environments including resource sharing. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015 |
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Efficient outcomes in repeated games with limited monitoring |
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Xiao, Yuanzhang Zame, William |
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